The Grammar of Names
A grammar for
Φραντζέσκα
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This work focuses on the relatively neglected grammar of names, thus crucially on their morphology and syntax. These areas have not aroused the kind of interest and controversy associated with (the status of) the semantics of names. The study of names made here, however, assumes that grammar is notional, or ontologically based. Thus we shall explore the association between the structure and distribution of names and their semantics and pragmatics. I shall indeed be suggesting that the conjunction of names and notional grammar is particularly appropriate and illuminating.

The starting-point for the preparation of the present work was the earlier reports of my research on names offered in Anderson (2003a; 2004c), which in turn grew out of the analysis of names in Anderson (1997). It has benefited from discussion, comments and other help from Inès Brulard, Santiago Gonzalez y Fernandez-Corugedo, Susanne Hackmack, Graeme Trousdale, and particularly Roger Böhm and Fran Colman. The former of these encouraged a number of substantial re-thinkings. The work of the latter on moneyers’ names on Anglo-Saxon coins has been a constant inspiration and challenge; §2.1 in particular of the present work is heavily dependent on the preliminary version of Chapter 2 of Colman (in preparation) and on discussions with her of that material and names in general, as well as of several versions of the present book. The content of (especially) Chapters 6–9 also benefited from the very helpful comments of the anonymous reviewers of the articles mentioned above. The structure and content of the whole volume has been much influenced by the suggestions and criticisms of two readers for OUP. And, once again, the work has enjoyed the careful attention of John Davey of OUP and his colleagues.

J.M.A.

Methoni Messinias, Greece
April, 2006
Conventions and abbreviations

Examples and footnotes are numbered consecutively throughout each chapter (1) to (n). References to and re-presentation of examples in other Chapters are preceded by the Chapter number, so that (6.8) is example (8) in Chapter 6; but the Chapter number is omitted with (reference to) examples in the current Chapter. The first significant mention or re-mention of important technical terms is emboldened.

On grounds of practical economy, the previous work of the present author is invoked as simply ‘Anderson (date etc.’; and that of Stephen Anderson as ‘S.R. Anderson (date etc.’).

The following abbreviations are used in glosses of examples, where the practice recommended by the Leipzig glossing rules is followed where appropriate and necessary. The rules are available at: http://www.eva.mpg.de/lingua/files/morpheme.html

Abbreviations in glosses

<table>
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<td>AD</td>
<td>Attributive Determiner</td>
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<td>ART</td>
<td>Article</td>
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<td>ASP</td>
<td>Aspect</td>
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<td>DEC</td>
<td>Declarative (verb)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEF</td>
<td>Definite</td>
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<tr>
<td>EQT</td>
<td>Equative (verb)</td>
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<td>FOC</td>
<td>Focus</td>
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<td>PART</td>
<td>Partitive</td>
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<tr>
<td>REL</td>
<td>Relativizer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Singular</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Third person</td>
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The following are abbreviations used in tree diagrams and the like:

Abbreviations in linguistic representations

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>abs</td>
<td>absolutive</td>
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<tr>
<td>corp</td>
<td>corporate</td>
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ego  first person
erg  ergative
fem  feminine
lang language
loc  locative
masc masculine
N referentiable
P predicative
prt partitive
sap speech-act participant
tu  second person
/ takes as a complement
\  modifies
\\  gives as a derived category
{X{y}} category and subcategory

Subscripted abbreviations:
D  deictic
i,j,k variables over referential indices
R  fixed reference
S  speaker
V  addressee
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.

(Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, V.i)
Part I
Why Names?
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As the title of this work announces, what follows is concerned with the grammar of ‘names’, sometimes distinguished as ‘proper names’ or ‘proper nouns’. Its concern is in particular with their categorial status, one interpretation of which is assumed by the latter appellations: ‘proper names/nouns’ are a kind of ‘name’ or ‘noun’. I shall adopt here the simple terms name and noun, rather than ‘proper’ vs. ‘common’, to avoid this assumption. Let us approach the distinction by way of how it has traditionally been described.

The identification of what I am calling ‘name’ with what I am calling ‘noun’ is an ancient one, and it is enshrined in the common nomenclature of many languages. But, traditionally, philosophers and grammarians have drawn a subcategorial distinction between two kinds of ‘name’, or ‘noun’, typically along the lines of the following, from the eighteenth-century translation of the Port Royal Grammar, which talks in terms, and with examples, that one can trace back to the grammarians of Ancient Greece (A General and Rational Grammar (1753: 29); cf. e.g. Wilkins (1668: 299)):

There are two sorts of ideas, one which represents to us only one thing; as the idea, which each person has of his father and mother, of his friend, of his horse, his dog, of himself, &c.
The other which represents to us several similar things, to which this idea equally agrees, as the idea I have of a man in general, of a horse in general, &c.
Men have occasion for different names to express these two different sorts of ideas. They have given the appellation of proper names, to those, which agree to a single idea, as the name of Socrates, which agrees to a certain philosopher; the name of Paris, which agrees to a particular city.
They have called general or appellative names, those, which signify common ideas; as the word man, which agrees to all men in general; and in like manner the words, lion, dog, horse, &c.

Such a characterization of the proper name/noun vs. general/appellative/common name/noun distinction persists throughout the grammatical tradition, in grammars with diverse aims and audiences.
Consider, from somewhat later (Murray 1829: 17–18):

Proper names or substantives, are the names appropriated to individuals; as, George, London, Thames.
Common names or substantives, stand for kinds containing many sorts, or for sorts containing many individuals under them; as, animal, man, tree, &c.

Or (Latham 1862: §633):

Names are either Proper or Common. Proper names are appropriated to certain individual objects. Common names are applied to a whole class of objects. George, Mary, London, &c., designate one particular person or place. Man, father, town, horse, &c., represent objects of which there is a class or collection.

The familiar distinction scarcely warrants further exemplification, except to indicate the ambiguity that is thereby embodied in popular usage.

The general confusion, or at least equivalence, in usage is well illustrated by the first two definitions of ‘name’ provided by the OED:

1. The particular combination of sounds employed as the individual designation of a single person, animal, place, or thing. . . .
2. The particular word or words used to denote any object of thought not considered in, or not possessed of, a purely individual character.

In relation to the latter, there is cited, among other things: The offence, by whatever name called, which if committed in England would be perjury. Consider too the COD, which weakens the distinction between 1 and 2:

1. Word by which individual person, animal, place, or thing, is spoken of or to . . .
2. Word denoting any object of thought, esp. one applicable to many individuals . . .

Many other dictionaries make a similar distinction under the heading ‘name’.

And this is reflected too in the difference between the common understandings of ‘dog name’ vs. ‘bird name’: a ‘dog name’ for many English speakers would be Bonzo or Rover, for example, if they’re not a dog breeder; but a ‘bird name’, on the most obvious interpretation, is not Polly or Chirpie but willow warbler or snipe. However, Bonzo and Chirpie are ‘proper nouns’, ‘names’ for individuals; snipe is a ‘common noun’ which is a low-level hyponym, a term for a ‘natural kind’. Compare here the ‘equivalents’ for French nom given in a well-known bilingual dictionary (Harrap French Shorter Dictionary, 6th edn., 2000):
(a) \(\ldots \) (de personne) name \(\ldots\)
(b) (de plantes, d’animaux, d’objets etc) name \(\ldots\)
(c) (Gram) noun

(a) and (b) show the same conflation by the dictionary of name and noun (and (a) vs. (c) shows the absence in French of the signalling of a lexical distinction between name and noun).

There is an ontogenetic connexion between the two kinds of naming involved (cf. e.g. Pulgram (1954): §II; Lyons (1977): §7.6; Anderson (2000)). Recognition that there are ‘names for classes’, i.e. nouns, involves a process of abstraction from particular reference, and from names. But with prototypical adult-language instances the distinction formulated by the Port-Royal grammarians is very salient, and, in terms of their concern with ‘individuals’, it distinguishes names not just from nouns, since individual nouns in themselves represent semantic classes, but also from other word classes such as adjectives, which also do not designate individuals. It is therefore with some surprise that I encountered the following in a review of a recent onomastics conference (Coates 2002: 156):

Reminding us that onomastics may concern itself not only with proper names, P.R. Kitson’s abstract \(\ldots\) deals with the problems of the subtlety of Old English bird-names, \(\ldots\)

If onomastics is concerned with the ‘names’ for classes of individuals, why not with the ‘names’ for properties of individuals or with the ‘names’ for the events that individuals participate in, etc. Why not with all word classes?

Certainly, the transition from individual entity (name) to class of entity (noun) is in one respect more direct (as reflected in their ontogeny), particularly the transition to low-level hyponyms (as I shall discuss further in §3.2). Indeed, as we shall see, Kripke, saying that ‘terms for natural kinds are much closer to proper names than is ordinarily supposed’ (1981 [1972]: 127), groups the two classes together as ‘rigid designators’. But, on the other hand, the distinction between ‘proper names’ and all (other) word classes is of the same order in each case, individual vs. general. Onomastics is an interdisciplinary pursuit, but, in addition to this, if we follow Coates’ prompting, we seem to be (untypically) embracing the first of two different senses of the basic domain of ‘onomastics’: either it is concerned with naming in general, or with the status and behaviour of names for individuals, ‘proper names’, or what I am calling simply names.

I am concerned here, then, with the status in (adult) grammar of items like Bonzo and Polly but not with those like snipe, except insofar as this last indeed instantiates in contrast a grammatical non-name, viz. a (common) noun. We can note as a correlate of the distinction that in English, in acts of
nomination (or name-giving), the verb *name* (*I name this child Hieronymus*) is generally used with names proper, whereas *call* is used more generally. (*She calls him Ethelwold/We call earwigs clipshears where I come from/I call that handsome.*)

The ultimate aim of this book, the elaboration of the basis for a grammar of names, is offered in Part III. In the first two chapters of Part III, Chapter 7 and 8, we consider the relationship between names and (other) putative classes of word. We shall also be concerned, especially in Chapter 9, with the subcategories into which names, basic or derived, fall, and with their ‘derivational’ relations with other categories. But much remains to be clarified and illustrated and debated before we shall be in a position to offer an explicit account of the grammar of names. And much of this is of interest in its own right.

For the purposes of the present chapter, it is sufficient for us to envisage the semantic distinction between noun and name in the traditional fashion (though the reader may prefer that relayed by Cottle (1983: 65), where a name is ‘... anything that you can’t use in Scrabble’—which presumably includes ‘Scrabble’—though see §4.2). It is the purpose of the rest of the present book to clarify and evaluate this notion and the nature of its correlation, if any, with syntactic categorization. Does use as a name correlate in any way with membership of a grammatical category, and, if so, what is the place of that category in the language system? Is it, for instance, appropriate to regard names as a subcategory of noun?

The investigation of the grammatical status of names will involve us in looking at research on names carried out in diverse disciplines, from philosophy through various sub-disciplines of theoretical linguistics to onomastics itself—whose relation to the rest of linguistic theory has been ambivalent, as we shall see. All of these enterprises have something to contribute to our understanding of names; and I shall be endeavouring to show that many of these diverse contributions are relevant to the determination of the grammatical status of names.

The immediacy of this relevance depends in part on the approach to syntactic categorization adopted here—that of notional grammar. In this opening chapter I provide some initial reasons for the appropriateness of this choice of framework, and an outline of what kind of categorization it assigns. The results offered by the book as a whole are the main justification for this choice of framework, as they are for the appeal made here to the diverse traditions briefly surveyed in Part II, that is Chapters 3–6. An understanding of the grammar of names cannot be achieved by attempting to study that grammar as an autonomous device, divorced from meaning and use. I think the results of the study that follows also throw some light on questions
in these different traditions themselves, as well as contributing to our general understanding of names and naming.

The survey of work on names in different traditions involves reference to relevant phenomena in a wide range of language systems. Thus, though for practical reasons the detailed exemplification of different categorial structures in Part III involves analyses of only a few Indo-European languages (French, Greek, and particularly English), reference to particular properties associated with a wider range of language types supplements our understanding of the already striking variations in structure associated with the languages focused on. The conclusions offered here thus do not seek to be exhaustive in the account given of variations in name syntax and morphology. But significant variation is nevertheless encountered, and analysed, and the suggested universal aspects have, it seems to me, some plausibility. And the results obtained may encourage similar work by others in other languages in which I can be said to be even less of a specialist, as well as, of course, stimulating reactions, positive and negative, to the analyses offered.

It is my view that the focus of concern in what follows—names—and the approach adopted in relation to pursuit of this concern—**notional grammar**—choose each other, in a sense. Part I of this book, i.e. Chapters 1 and 2, is an attempt at explanation and justification of this assertion. Let us first give ourselves some idea of what is involved in a notional grammar.

### 1.1 What is notional grammar?

The tradition of notional grammar, which was dominant in linguistics until the twentieth century, insists on the notional basis for syntax, and, what is most relevant here, for syntactic categories. A basic assumption, framed in terminology associated with more recent manifestations of notional grammar, is that the defining distributional properties of a syntactic category are those of the semantically prototypical members of the category. Let me spell out something of what this involves.

The distribution of (common) nouns like *murder* illustrated in (1a) apparently shows parallel possibilities, specifically in the arguments it apparently takes, to the corresponding verb of (b):

(1) a. Macbeth’s premeditated murder of Duncan with a dagger
    b. Macbeth murdered Duncan with a dagger premeditatively/with premeditation

Despite differences to do with presence vs. absence of overt tensing and absence vs. presence of inflectional and prepositional marking of some of
the arguments, the noun is associated with analogues of the subject, the complement (‘object’), and the adjuncts of the verb. This kind of apparent parallelism is modelled within the familiar X-bar syntax framework by the categorial labelling and hierarchical structures projected by syntactic categories such as nouns and verbs.

However, notionally prototypical nouns, designating elements of the world that can most obviously be perceived as concrete, stable, and discrete, as ‘entities’, are not associated with such arguments, but instead take the modifiers lacking verbal analogues that we might label as attributives, as shown in (2), with fox:

(2) (the) young fox that Bill found

*Murder* can also take some attributive ‘modification’. But in addition it takes the argument types it does in (1a), not by virtue of its being a noun, but because it is based on a verb, denoting something perceived as an ‘event’. It is not a simple entity-denoting noun; the entity incorporates an event, denoted by the verb in (1b). Prototypical events are relational and dynamic. It is ultimately the relationality and dynamism of what is represented by the verb that licenses the argument types in (1a), and the tensing. On the other hand, verbs, as denoters of events, not entities, do not take attributives.

*Murder* is an abstract noun. Some verb-based nouns are concrete, and so are more likely to show attributives like those in (2), as well as a more restricted set of the analogues of verbal arguments such as those of (1a):

(3) a. (the) young part-time diamond-cutter/cutter of diamonds that Bill found
   b. (He) *youngly cuts diamonds part-time

Here the noun is based on the verb but the suffix ‘corresponds to’ its agentive subject. The *diamond-cutter* of (3a) is closer to noun prototypicality, but part of its distribution is still not associated with its nominal status, and so is misleading as an indication of a characteristic distribution for nouns. Its syntax depends on the relationality and dynamism of the verbal base, so that, for instance, the noun denotes an entity characterized not merely by perceived inherent properties but also crucially by its role in certain habitual activities. The ‘mixed’ distribution of the noun reflects its internal categorial complexity. A corollary of this is that syntax is sensitive to the internal categorial structure of words.

Not all such complex (verb-based) nouns are marked as such by *affixation*, as (3a) or indicated by *conversion*, as (1a). Thus, the verbal basis made overt in (4a)—cf. (b)—is covert in (4c), which is overtly based on another noun:
But both nouns show adjuncts that are licensed by the verbal element, and again the suffix (-er or -ist) ‘corresponds to’ its agentive subject, though novelist is based overtly on the complement of the verb (novel). The verbal component of the complex categorial representation is ‘virtual’ only, in the sense that it is directly reflected in the form of neither the overt base nor an affix.

This assumes that the internal structure of lexical items is not always ‘partially motivated’ in the Saussurean sense. Compare here Saussure on terms that are not as ‘unmotivated’ as others (1916: 181):

... vingt est immotivé, mais dix-neuf ne l’est pas au même degré, parce qu’il évoque les termes dont il se compose et d’autres qui lui sont associés, ... Il en est de même pour poirier, qui rappelle le mot simple poire et dont le suffixe -ier fait penser à cerisier, pommier, etc.

The internal verbal component in novelist is ‘unmotivated’; the internal nominal component is less ‘unmotivated’.

Much of what follows will supplement these brief illustrations that notional distinctions between at least the core members of syntactic categories are not merely what characterizes them cross-linguistically (Lyons 1966), but also that they are basic to an understanding of the syntax of these categories. The syntax of categories cannot be understood simply by looking at the distribution of all or just any items of that category: what is crucial is the distribution of the core of semantically prototypical members. Random, or ad hoc, appeal to distribution will lead to arbitrary analyses, analyses of related phenomena that may be incompatible, contradictory, and incapable of being evaluated. That is, I espouse here a traditional notionalist view of the basis of syntax. I do not defend this further at this point; rather, the interest or otherwise of what follows constitutes support or the reverse. But see for a more extensive discussion Anderson (1997; 2005b; 2006a).

I should point out, though, that an adequate case against notional grammar has never been made out. Rather, critics focus on the alleged inconsistencies and contradictions in particular implementations of such an approach, particularly in traditional pedagogical grammars (whose evolution is discussed in such as Michael (1987) and Leitner (1991)), or on ‘straw men’ that suppose an implausibly crude relationship between semantics and syntax (cf. e.g. Gleason (1965: Chapter 6)), as well as between semantics and ‘the world’. This is not the place to explore the history of notional grammar,
which, until the twentieth century, is almost co-terminous with the history of grammar in Europe. But a further few remarks are perhaps in order.

The grammatical tradition appealed, but in practice often inconsistently, to a mixture of ‘criteria’ in establishing word classes, including morphology and function/distribution as well as notional definitions (cf. e.g. Lyons (1977: §11.1)). Some of the inconsistency and vagueness, as well as devotion to the eight parts of speech of the vernacular tradition, is illustrated by Meiklejohn (1892: 8):

There are eight kinds of words in our language. These are (i) Names or Nouns. (ii) the words that stand for nouns are called Pronouns. (iii) Next come the words-that-go-with-Nouns or Adjectives. (iv) Fourthly, come the words-that-are-said-of-Nouns or Verbs. (v) Fifthly, the words that go with Verbs or Adjectives or Adverbs are called Adverbs. (vi) The words that-join-Nouns are called Prepositions. (vii) Those that-join-Verbs are called Conjunctions. Lastly (viii) come Interjections, which are indeed mere sounds without any organic or vital connection with other words; and they are hence sometimes called extra-grammatical utterances. Nouns and Adjectives, Verbs and Adverbs, have distinct individual, and substantive meanings. Pronouns have no meaning in themselves, but merely refer to nouns, just like a + in a book. Prepositions and Conjunctions once had independent meanings, but have not much now; their chief use is to join words to each other. They act the part of nails or glue in language. Interjections have a kind of meaning, but they never represent a thought—only a feeling, a feeling of pain or of pleasure, of sorrow or of surprise.

This is a mixture of vague distributional notions, diachrony, and semantic interpretation. But what is perhaps most striking is the reliance on the reader’s experience of the language and knowledge of syntax and meaning.

Sometimes we find nine parts of speech, as in The Infant’s Grammar, or a Pic-nic Party of the Parts of Speech, published by John Harris in 1824, whose introduction runs thus:

One day, I am told, and, as it was cold,  
I suppose it occurred in bad weather,  
The Nine Parts of Speech, having no one to teach,  
Resolved on a Pic-Nic together.

The Article mov’d, and the Pronoun apprrov’d  
That the Noun should preside at the feast;  
But the Adjective said, though the Noun might be the head,  
The Verb should be none of the least.

The Adverb cried out, ‘Preposition, no doubt,  
Will sit at one end of the table:’  
Conjunction replied, ‘Let us sit side by side,  
And let him act as Vice who is able.’
INTERJECTION said ‘Pish! Let me have but a dish,
   And a look at your good-humour’d faces;—
Then they who think fit may exert all their wit,
   To make a selection of places.’

Now loud was the call, ETYMOLOGY-HALL!
   Run, ARTICLE;—Substantive, run:
My Reader, run too; and perhaps you may view
   Some scenes full of innocent fun.

Here is included the contentious part of speech ‘article’ (cf. Jespersen (1924: 85): ‘To establish a separate “part of speech” for the two “articles”, as done in some grammars, is irrational’). Again, understanding this account is highly dependent on our knowledge of the semanticity and function of word classes.

For a more recent example, consider Hardie (1990: 8) on verbs (‘a verb informs us about an action or state of being’) and conjunctions (‘a conjunction joins two or more words or clauses to each other’). One ‘definition’ is overtly semantically based, the other is vaguely distributional. But the important thing about this grammatical tradition is that meaning was not excluded, and was often presented as basic. This is implemented more consistently, however, in ‘philosophical grammars’. Consider in this respect James Harris’ Hermes (1751), where he attributes semantic properties to the word classes: ‘substance’ for nouns, ‘energy’ for verbs, combined with ‘assertion’ in the case of finite verbs, etc.

As the preceding examples imply, what is fundamental to a notional grammar is that syntax must appeal to a combination of meaning (which I interpret as appeal to semantically prototypical instances) and distribution (of such instances). Such a perception persisted in grammatical studies prior to the last century despite the admittedly variable practice of grammarians. In the course of the twentieth century, however, the widespread adoption of various frameworks advocating the treatment of grammar (syntax and morphology) as autonomous from semantics served to obscure the previous dominance of the traditional view (however imperfectly implemented), and to lead to distorted conceptions and representations of such earlier research.¹

It is typical of contemporary commentary that Baker simply dismisses recent exemplars of such approaches without offering any critique (2003: 290),

¹ Anderson (2005b: §1), for instance, exposes the confusion underlying Chomsky’s (1966: 31–51) attribution of recognition of ‘deep structure’, a formerly proposed syntactically internal linguistic level, to the Port-Royal grammarians of the seventeenth century. This is further commented on in Chapter 2, note 2. See too, on the historical record, Salmon (1969). More generally, see Anderson (2005c; 2006b: §10.4).
even though the discussion of functional categories in his Appendix, for instance, is largely anticipated by such work. He simply assumes that it is obviously preferable to offer a ‘purely syntactic’ account. But, though recognizing (but underestimating) fundamental correlations between semantics and syntactic categorization (Baker (2003: §5.2.2)), he fails to acknowledge that a well-based notional account (which acknowledges the role of ‘grammaticalization’), utilizing semantic distinctions that are motivated independently of the syntax, renders a ‘purely syntactic’ treatment superfluous, as well as exposing the ad hoc character of any such treatment. Moreover, Baker’s own proposal concerning ‘lexical categories’, even if adequate, invokes constructs with an (at most) thinly disguised notional basis, involving (neutralized) semantic valency (the taking of a ‘subject’) in the case of verbs, and reference in the case of nouns. From a notionalist point of view, this is inevitable if the proposal is to be well founded. Syntactic categories cannot be established ‘purely syntactically’, or autonomously.\(^2\)

\(^2\) There are, of course, differing conceptions of syntactic autonomy; but they all seem to be united by the assumed isolation of the workings of the syntax from considerations of meaning. This is shared, despite profound differences in principle and method, by the pre-transformational American structuralists and the transformational generativists (see Anderson (2005c)). The generativists, however, assume also an isolation from phonology. A familiar formulation of the assumption that syntax is autonomous in this sense is offered in Radford (1988: 31):

\textit{Autonomous syntax principle}

No syntactic rule can make reference to pragmatic, phonological, or semantic information.

(and see Chomsky (1977: 42)).

Much of the history of the main strand of generative grammar, from ‘Syntactic Structures’ (Chomsky 1957) to ‘minimalism’ (Chomsky 1995) and beyond, can be seen as a reluctant, largely unacknowledged, retreat from insistence on the autonomy of syntax. Thus, the belatedly introduced notion ‘thematic role’ and the individual ‘thematic roles’ themselves are semantically characterized, and reference has been invoked by accounts of ‘syntactic’ phenomena. This history is conveniently recorded in the series of textbooks by Radford (1981; 1988; 1997a, b, . . . ), which faithfully reflect the fashions of the day (or the day before). By the time of Radford (1997a, b), ‘autonomy of syntax’ has dropped even from the index (let alone the Glossary). And we find (1997a: 2; 1997b: 1) that ‘syntax is concerned with the form and interpretation of phrases and sentences’, though ‘syntax’ reverts in the Glossary (1997a: 531; 1997b: 272) to ‘the study of how words are combined together to form phrases and sentences’.

I note as an aside that this equivocation is reminiscent of Bloomfield. Compare, for instance (1933: 138):

When the phonology of a language has been established, there remains the task of telling what meanings are attached to the several phonetic forms. This phase of the description is \textit{semantics}. It is ordinarily divided into two parts, \textit{grammar} and \textit{lexicon}.

with (1933: 161):

A morpheme can be described phonetically, since it consists of one or more phonemes, but its meaning cannot be analyzed within the scope of our science.
In support of his autonomist position Baker (2003: §5.2.2) offers merely familiar arguments (cf. Katz (1972: Chapter 8, §1)) which ultimately only involve the obvious fact that, even in the case of a single language, the perceived world can be conceptualized in different ways, so that the ‘same’ phenomenon may be assigned to different categories. Katz’s arguments against semantically based syntax (1972: §8.1) amount to no more than the observation that certain semantic oppositions underlying syntactic distinctions (e.g. ‘count’ vs. ‘mass’) can be ‘neutralized’ with respect to certain entities: certain entities can be conceptualized in different ways (e.g. fog, mass noun, vs. ground-level clouds, count noun phrase), or their representation can be lexicalized (e.g. trousers as plural—cf. e.g. Poutsma (1914: ch. XXV, §§18–21), on pluralia tantum). These are not arguments against the positing of a semantic basis for syntax, an assumption without which the massive correlations between semantic and syntactic distinctions are difficult to understand.

I note too that, curiously, Katz argues (1972: 381–2), as part of an attempt to discredit semantically based accounts of syntax, that the meaninglessness of names means that one cannot establish a semantic distinction between names and (common) nouns, though these belong to different syntactic classes. But lack (apart perhaps from primitive categoriality, as discussed in Part II) vs. presence of meaning, or rather sense, is precisely the appropriate semantic distinction.

In apparently subjecting semantics to determination by the ‘physical world’, the attitude evinced by Katz and Baker (and many others) represents a type of realism of a rather crude sort, that fails to recognize the mediation of perception in our relation to the ‘physical world’. Compare DeLancey (1991) on ‘the objectivist’s misconception’. The mind seems to drop out of such generativist accounts of semantics. Bloomfield would have been sympathetic: cf. e.g. (1933: 144) ‘…all linguists, both mentalists and mechanists, define meanings in terms of the speaker’s situation and, whenever this seems to add anything, of the hearer’s response’.

See further Anderson (2004d).

One reaction to the infiltration into generative syntax of semantic elements has been the adoption of a more ascetic view, whereby the scope of the syntax is radically reduced, which also has the effect of reining in the galloping abstractness associated with recent developments. In Culicover and Jackendoff (2005), for instance, the semantics and various intermediate ‘tiers’ have taken over much of the work elsewhere assigned to the syntax, leaving an arbitrary residue of ‘autonomous’ (?) syntax. McCawley (1985: 669) had already commented that, even if there are ‘autonomous’ syntactic regularities, ‘it is far from obvious…that those grammatical rules that can be stated in purely syntactic terms add up to anything, let alone the whole of “syntax”’. And the viability of an ‘autonomous syntax’ is even less apparent from a present-day perspective. For further discussion see Anderson (2005b; 2006b).
Consider here too the attempts described in Anderson (2006b) to reduce semantic relations (or ‘thematic roles’) to aspects of ‘concrete situations’. For instance, Ackerman and Moore (2001: 24), following Dowty (1989), affirm that ‘on an intuitive level one would assume that, e.g., Max is an AGENT and Mary is a RECIPIENT in both the (a) and (b) sentences’ of (5):

(5)  
   a. Max sold the piano to Mary for $1,000  
   b. Mary bought the piano from Max for $1,000

As Anderson (2006b: §5.3) observes, appeals to ‘an intuitive level’ are always suspect; linguists’ intuitions about structure (which are of diverse origins, including prejudices inculcated by the accidents of their own training) are not evidence. And in the present case, it doesn’t follow from the assumption that the ‘vendor’ in (5a) is an ‘agentive’, as source of the immediate action described by the verb, that the ‘vendor’ in (5b) is also presented as an ‘agentive’. In the latter instance it is rather the ‘customer’ that is presented as the source of the immediate action, even though the same ‘real-world’ event may be being referred to by (5a) and (b). The important point is that each of these (alternative) categorizations involves a different conceptualization which determines that syntactic categorization. Conceptualizations are relative not absolute/universal, though semantically prototypical members of categories persist cross-linguistically, where compatible with the existence of the category in a particular language (see §2.2).

The notionalist, moreover, does not deny that routinizations of syntactic structure occur (as one aspect of ‘grammaticalization’): just as there can accrue to word classes non-prototypical members, so syntactic constructions can weaken their semantic and/or pragmatic basis. Thus subject formation is a routinization that depends on a weakening of a basis in the topicality of agents, a common semantico-pragmatic conjunction, to embrace elements that may be neither topical nor agentive. And in both cases the semantics of the class or construction ‘clings’. Nouns such as war or chaos are still conceived of as entities, despite their semantic non-prototypicality; subjects are both the unmarked slot for topics (though not necessarily topical) and the place for an agentive participant in the predication, if there is one (though there needn’t be). Thus, routinizations are best understood as just that: a weakening of the semantic/pragmatic motivations for constructions, against a background of the semanticity of syntax, as will be apparent at various points in what follows (further illustration and comment is provided in Chapter 2, note 9, for instance).

I should finally emphasize here, in case it is necessary, that the notionalist approach is not to be understood as claiming that grammatical categories,
including word classes, are semantic categories. Grammatical categories are identified by a conjunction of notional and morphosyntactic (distributional and morphological) properties; and the classes established may thus contain members whose marginal perceived possession of the notional character of the class (say war as a noun in English) is mainly to be attributed to its sharing the same distribution as semantically prototypical members like bird. This is a characteristic of grammars of ordinary language that, together with the (unavoidably) figurative basis of much of linguistic structure, serves to complicate the application to the semantics of natural language of the logical systems developed in relation to formal languages.

The next chapter outlines more explicitly a system of syntactic categorization that implements the notionalist assumption in such a way as to allow for such regularities as are exemplified in the preceding discussion of the syntax of nouns, derived and simple. I proceed here, however, to return to a justification of the basic claim of the chapter: why are such a notional grammar and names made for each other? This is because, as we shall look at in some detail, the perspective introduced by notionalism gives us a novel insight into a discrepancy that has arisen in almost all branches of the study of names. Let us look at this discrepancy.

1.2 The semantics vs. the morphosyntax of names

On the one hand, many studies concerned with the semantics and/or pragmatics of (particularly personal) names (as opposed to nouns, in the terminology adopted here) emphasize their distinctiveness. Mill distinguishes names (in the present terminology) from nouns (1919 [1843]: Chapter 1, §5), but also from adjectives (1919: Chapter 5), as uniquely ‘non-connotative’, as not connoting ‘a certain attribute or attributes’ (1919: 59). For Quine (1960), the differentiation of names from (other) words is a crucial stage in the ontogenesis of reference and denotation. For Gardiner (1954: 53) names, unlike (other) words, are ‘identificatory marks recognizable, not by the intellect, but by the senses’. There have been suggestions that names should be assigned to an onomasticon, distinct from the lexicon which contains (ordinary) words of all types, and even that names do not belong to language at all (Harris 1751; Strawson 1950). They certainly do not seem to be recognized as (composed of) instances of ‘the atoms of language’ (Baker 2001). For Recanati (1993) the category of names belongs to language, but, in some sense, as we shall see, individual names do not.

On the other hand, syntactically, names have almost universally been assumed to be a subcategory of noun, even by those who point out the
semantic uniqueness of the former. Names, for Mill ([1843]: 19), are ‘non-connotative individual names’. Names are a subclass of noun. Mill’s characterization of ‘proper names’ as a subclass of ‘name’ seems to embody to some extent the discrepancy between the minor syntactic distinctiveness of the name and its major semantic distinctiveness: ‘The only names of objects which connote nothing are proper names; and these have, strictly speaking, no signification’ ([1843]: 21). However, we should recall that, as in the tradition he inherits, Mill’s category of ‘names’ is a large one, which includes adjectives, for instance. So, ‘proper names’ are opposed as a subclass of ‘name’ to much of the common-word vocabulary. But the semantic distinctiveness of names vis-à-vis nouns and adjectives is difficult to reconcile with mere subclass status.

Others imply, if anything, a more radical discrepancy. For instance, as we shall see, though Coates (2005) attributes to ‘proper names’ a distinct, ‘non-semantic’ mode of reference, the prototypical members of the set of items so used (John, London, etc.), i.e. those which can only make ‘non-semantic reference’, are a subclass of nouns, even though, unlike such ‘proper names’, all lexical words, not just nouns, can refer ‘semantically’.

Traditionally in the whole history of European grammatical studies (though with the notable exception of the later Stoics—see Householder 1995), names have been considered to be a subclass of noun. Gary-Prieur provides a recent forceful statement of this position: ‘... je rejoins le point de vue de la grammaire traditionnelle, qui presente N[om]p[propre] et N[om]c[ommun] comme deux categories lexicales subdivisant celle du nom’ (1994: 243). Similar declarations also characterize the onomastic tradition, as in: ‘it is a common knowledge that the class of nouns falls into two opposite subclasses: common nouns—a city and proper nouns—London’ (Sklyarenko and Sklyarenko 2005: 277). As observed above, this attitude is reinforced by the absence in the common usage of many languages, or language varieties, of a single-word name/noun distinction, as well as by the ontological source of nouns and names in a single category, though one more name-like than noun-like (cf. again Lyons (1977: §7.6)).

An extreme variant of this position is reached in Giering et al. (1980: 59):

There is no strict line of division between proper and common nouns. As a matter of fact, nouns are frequently used as both in keeping with communicative requirements.

While the first statement presents an arguable proposition, the second introduces some highly questionable analyses on their part. Giering et al.’s illustration of the second statement seems to involve a suggestion that smith and Smith are different uses of the same noun, and likewise the lion and The Lion
(as a pub name); and these are, further, not differentiated from the usage of, for example, He is a new Hemingway vs. Hemingway (family name).

Jespersen (1924: 69) also declares that ‘linguistically it is impossible to draw a sharp line of demarcation between proper names and common names’. Pulgram goes so far as to reject the possibility of syntactic criteria for names as distinct from nouns. He suggests that the difference is ‘not one of kind, but of degree, of usage’ (Pulgram (1954: 42); see also Lass (1995: 95)). Compare Jespersen’s (1924: 67) conclusion: ‘the difference between the two classes is thus seen to be one of degree only’. There has indeed been almost a consensus not merely that, to summarize it terminologically, we should talk of ‘proper and common names’ or ‘proper and common nouns’ rather than names and nouns, as I have been doing, but also that the ‘proper’/‘common’ boundary is hazy, at best.

A distinctive variant of this view that we have already registered is the proposal that names are not a category, but rather a ‘mode of reference’ (‘onymic reference’), for which (other) nouns and even other categories and constructions may be ‘utilized’ (see e.g. Zabeeh (1968), Coates (2005)). But there is at least a prototypical set of items used as ‘names’, including simple personal names such as George, which, as well as being limited to ‘onymic’, or ‘non-semantic’ reference (in Coates’ terms), have a distinctive syntax (pace Gary-Prieur etc.), and which thus deserve to be recognized as a (sub)category of some sort.

The use of George as a non-name is marked syntactically as a conversion or by affixation, as with the George I used to know and a Georgian house. Similarly, other categories, or sequences of categories, can be converted into names, and this can lead to ambiguity of use. In this case in English there is often recourse to capitalization, so that The New Town is the name for an area in Edinburgh (whose buildings are no longer very new—which raises another issue), whereas the new town is simply a noun phrase. Confronted with the typical cases, in particular, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there is some kind of difference in syntactic category between name and noun, marginal though it may seem to many investigators.

In terms of their semantics, both names and nouns certainly seem to be associated with what we might call ‘the potential for reference’. But at least textual co-reference is not restricted to them, as is illustrated by (6):

\[
\text{a. Fay may live there but I don’t think so} \\
\text{b. Fay is fair but Bill isn’t} \\
\text{c. Fay is a blonde but Bill isn’t}
\]

The verb and adjective, as well as the noun, participate in a relation involving co-reference, marked by a ‘pro-form’ (in the first instance) or omission (in the
latter two), where the lexical categories are simply the ‘targets’ of co-reference. But all of these common-word categories can be such targets. Further, there are reasons, as I shall indicate in Chapter 2, for attributing reference proper, not to nouns but to elements, such as determiners, that are associated with them in various ways.

Moreover, nouns but not names share with verbs, and adjectives, the capacity for being predicative, as shown in (7) compared with (8):

(7)  a. Fay reddened
    b. Fay is fair
    c. Fay is a blonde
(8)  a. The blonde is Fay
    b. Fay is the blonde

The sentences in (8) are equative not predicative; the post-verbal elements are (referential) arguments not predicators, whereas those in (7b–c) are predicators that take Fay as an argument.

In some languages, the equative predication involves a distinct predicator from that which takes a predicative, conflated as ‘be’ in English. Consider, for instance, these sentences from Seri (an isolate spoken in northwestern Mexico) in (9), from Marlett (forthcoming):

(9)  a. Hipíx hast iha
    this.one stone dec
     (‘This is a stone’)
    b. Hipíx hiif quij haa ha
    this.one my.nose the eqt
     (‘This is my nose’)

(dec = ‘declarative (verb)’; eqt = ‘equative (verb)’; the latter is my terminology.) Names do not occur in the former construction, but require the equative copula, as in (10):

(10) Hipíx Juan quih haa ha
     this.one Juan the eqt dec
     (‘This is Juan’)

In (10) the name, unlike in English, is accompanied by a definite article, which introduces another consideration to which we shall return in §6.2.4 and Chapter 8.

This last discussion, then, anticipates issues considered later, but these phenomena are invoked here to indicate further the semantic isolation of names, from nouns in particular. The discrepancy between the
semantics and the perceived syntax of names that I am pointing to is a real
one.

The interest of this discrepancy is that the situation would seem to provide
some support for an autonomist (non-notionalist) position in syntax (see
again note 2): the semantic uniqueness of names, and the character of this
distinctiveness, find at best, on the traditional view, only a minor correlate in
the syntax, apparently in conformity with the idea that syntax is constructed
independently of semantics. It thus constitutes a direct challenge to the
notionalist programme I have outlined. The question of the status of names
offers notional grammarians an apparently difficult testing ground, pursuit of
which is the aim of this book.

Conversely, the application of a notional approach to the area of names
promises to lead to a possible regrouping of classes that resolves some of the
anomalies in an analysis of names as nouns. For instance, names share
semantic similarities with pronouns, particularly deictic pronouns, in that,
like names, such pronouns have at most minimal non-referential content
(if we acknowledge as such distinctions in gender, in particular). According
to Russell (1946 [1912]: 93), ‘proper names stand for particulars, while other
substantives, adjectives, prepositions, and verbs stand for universals’, and
‘pronouns stand for particulars, but are ambiguous: it is only by the context
or the circumstances that we know what particulars they stand for’. And
Lyons, for example, recognizes ‘three kinds of singular definite referring
expressions in English: (a) definite noun phrases, (b) proper names and
(c) personal pronouns’ (1977: 179; see also here on this widely recognized
grouping e.g. Kripke (1981 [1972]); Seppänen (1974: Chapter 1); Werner (1974);
Conrad 1985: 44–5). Moreover, distributionally, as has often been observed,
names and pronouns have more in common with noun phrases than with
nouns as parts of noun phrases (cf. e.g. Montague (1973)).

Given the syntactic equivalence of names to ‘noun phrases’, it is unsurpris-
ing that Pamp (1998: 252) defines a name as ‘a monoreferential lexicalised noun
phrase’. Typically, names and (deictic personal) pronouns lack restrictive
attributive modification. The modifier in (11), for instance, is not restrictive:

(11) Nobody loves poor me/John

Use of restrictive modification of an apparent name form reflects conversion
to noun (§5.4), just as the presence of the articles in the above examples
of Giering et al. (1980) correlate with conversion to or from nouns. Such
structures can themselves become names, of course—as with Young Fred,
who indeed may no longer be young—and there may at this point be no
reference to Old Fred (dead and/or forgotten). The formation of names
on fully meaningful elements will occupy us in various places in what follows.

Names and pronouns in English and many other languages are not accompanied by articles. Likewise, the distribution of the ‘personal article’ in Maori provides support for the grouping of personal names and personal pronouns (as well as correlating with a range of names of other types). Thus, Biggs (1969) recognizes for Maori, alongside his other word classes of ‘nouns’, ‘universals’ (roughly, non-stative verbs), ‘statives’ and ‘locatives’, a class of ‘personals’ (Biggs 1969: 53):

Personals include all personal names and names of things which have been personified, e.g. a meeting-house which bears the name of an ancestor. The names of the months are personals. The personal pronouns are a special subclass of personals which differ slightly from other personals in the way they are used . . . A PERSONAL IS ANY BASE WHICH TAKES THE PERSONAL ARTICLE A AFTER THE LOCATIVE PARTICLE KI.

The main difference alluded to in this quotation is that, unlike personal pronouns, personal names and ‘locatives’ (including crucially place names) take the personal article a specifically in subject position (as well as elsewhere), as exemplified in (8a). The subject personal pronoun in the example in (12) lacks a preceding a:

(12) E titiro ana ahau ki a ia
    ASPECT look ASPECT I at ART her/him
    (‘I am looking at her/him’)

But the sentence does shows ki + a + personal pronoun, as expected of a ‘personal’.

The syntactic evidence for equating name with noun categorically, on the other hand, does not seem to be very strong. Could it be that the tacit motivation behind the syntactic tradition in this area is semantic: names and nouns both designate entities? But against this must be weighed the semantic discrepancy (individual reference rather than class denotation) between names and nouns (and adjectives and verbs) and the paucity of syntactic evidence. Looking at semantically prototypical uses, as well as the distribution of semantically prototypical members, may lead us to question the traditional perceived discrepancy between the semantics and syntax of names, as an approach based on a notionalist perspective would predict—without denying what they share in terms of designation. Despite the weakness of the traditional position on the categoriality of names, the grammar of names offers an interesting test case for notional grammar: how can it encompass the range of evidence in line with the strong assertion it makes
concerning grammar and meaning? And exploration of the case should throw some light on the nature of names and naming, including on aspects relevant to the other, non-grammatical perspectives on the study of names that we shall also survey in Part II of this book.

1.3 Conclusion and prospect

In the ways just described, the concern with names and the notional approach promise to be mutually rewarding. In the next chapter I outline a system of categories, essentially that proposed in Anderson (1997), including the place allotted there to names. I also give some indication in §2.2 of the kind of motivation offered there for the interpretation of the categorial status of names and other categories. In the section after that (§2.3) I look at the aspects of syntactic structure that are projected by such categorizations, i.e. by the categorial and subcategorizational information provided in lexical entries. The concern of the chapters of Part III will be to develop and evaluate these earlier suggestions (outlined in Chapter 2) against a range of evidence (as presented in Part II, in particular) from some of the diverse fields that have concerned themselves with names.

However, finally in this chapter, I should point out that there are at least two pathways through what follows in this book. The reader who, for instance, is not primarily interested in the mechanisms of syntactic structuring that are explored in parts of Chapter 8, in particular, may prefer to programme a sequence that passes over §2.3, to begin with at least, and go straight to Part II, via the concluding section of Chapter 2, before returning to §2.3 and Part III, and particularly the final two chapters. Or the pre-programmed sequence offered by the book as it stands may be preferred. In either case, these final two chapters offer an articulation of the informal observations and preliminary arguments presented in the previous Parts, in terms of an elaboration of a notionally based system of syntactic categorization, and its syntactic consequences, as introduced in Chapter 2. Chapter 7 offers something of a bridge by trying to give a preliminary systematization of grammatically relevant observations that have been made about names, and about how they resemble and differ from other categories.

The next chapter thus devotes some detailed attention to the system of syntactic categories, since one of our main aims here is to determine the place of names in such a system: to do this we must obviously have a reasonably explicit picture of the whole system of categories which is the matrix for whatever status names might bear.
2

Implementation of a notional grammar

What follows in this chapter is essentially an articulation of the approach to notional grammar advocated in Anderson (1997), with modifications motivated by more recent work, much of it described in Anderson (2006b). Major innovations will be indicated as we proceed. As indicated, to understand the place of names in such a system, and their syntactic properties, it is necessary to look at the general properties of the system, and their motivation, as a preparation for our gradually focusing on names and nouns and related categories.

2.1 Preamble

Syntactic generalizations make reference to word classes such as noun and verb. These word classes are sets of words, listed in the lexicon, which share a distinctive distribution in sentences; this distribution is one of the syntactic generalizations that are the concern of syntax. There are many distributional patterns, however, not all of which correlate with word class: in the previous section we looked at various nouns part of whose distribution is associated with their internal lexical structure and not their word class; these distributional properties may reflect the category of a word that the (derived) noun is based on, not the word-class category itself. Notional grammarians thus argue that it is necessary to select the defining distribution for a word class on the basis of the behaviour of semantically prototypical members of the class which are not themselves internally complex in this way.

This is an interpretation of the centuries-old traditional assumption that the distributional properties of syntactic classes are not semantically arbitrary. It is not arbitrary that it is a subset of a particular class or classes that figures as typical vocatives like those in (1a), or that a subset of a different class is what figures as imperatives like those in (1b):

(1) a. Porter! Mary! Mummy! Someone! You!
    b. Leave! Repent! Smile!
The typical vocative is drawn from (a subset of) that syntactic class whose prototypical members denote (what are perceived as) entities, what I shall refer to as the class of nominals (without wishing thereby to assign noun a privileged position in this class); in particular (non-figurative) vocatives tend to involve animate, particularly human entities. Imperatives crucially involve members of the syntactic class, the class of verbals, that prototypically denotes (what are perceived as) events, particularly, in the case of imperatives, actions. You address someone with a ‘name’; you order them to do an ‘action’.

Entities are prototypically concrete, stable and discrete. And, as we have seen, this accounts for other aspects of the syntax of nominals: the prototypical nominal, such as dog, hill, tree, girl, Bill, or you, has no argument structure, it doesn’t take complements. A nominal with apparent complements (such as that in the martyrdom of St. Agnes) incorporates an event, i.e. verbal, representation; and this may be signalled overtly (with less or more obscuration) by the morphology (the resignation of Blair, the death/birth of Klinghoffer), or not at all (a concert by the Academy of Ancient Music). The discreteness of (the denotata of) prototypical nouns is also reflected in their capacity for allowing optional attributives (where the relationality of verbals favours complementation), which allow for further classifications of a varyingly stable character (large dog, distant hill, deciduous tree, happy girl). It is verbals which are prototypically distinguished by their argument structures, by the range of participant types in the represented event that they imply. As event-representers, prototypical verbals are associated with relationality (events involve participants, circumstances) and dynamism.

This latter aspect, contrasted with the stability of what is denoted by the prototypical nominal, underlies the typical association of verbals with secondary categories such as tense, aspect, and modality. Nominals, on the other hand, are typically associated with stable classificatory secondary categories (gender etc.). The discreteness of (what is designated by) prototypical nominals underlies their association with number markers, while the relationality of verbals is reflected in their being the prime targets of (e.g. person-number) concord. The notional character of these classes underlies the choice of secondary category (tense, gender) that is typically reflected in their structure—but, of course, not necessarily so reflected and not necessarily by them only.

An understanding of distributional and inflectional differences among these classes thus comes from invocation of their notional content. Chomsky and Halle (1968: 295) make the following claim with respect to the phonology:
...if we represented lexical items by means of an arbitrary feature notation, we would be effectively prevented from expressing in the grammar the crucial fact that items which have similar *phonetic shapes* [my italics—JMA] are subject to many of the same rules.

Notional grammar says that the same is true of the syntax, if we substitute for ‘phonetic shapes’ ‘notional shapes’. Even non-prototypical items are interpreted as far as possible in accordance with the notional characteristics of their class. Thus, for instance, *ceremony* may not be a prototypical nominal, in that its denotatum is not obviously more stable or less relational than that of many verbals, but its usual basic syntax confers on it the status of a perceived entity.

Word classes also display various further distributional properties that suggest they are not atomic, but *componential*. This is recognized in the familiar \([\pm N, \pm V]\) system of Chomsky (1970) and much later work. But such properties too can be interpreted as reflecting the notional characteristics of the classes. Thus, on the one hand, nouns and adjectives, and verbs and adjectives, share distributional properties. In terms of the Chomskyan notation, noun and adjective are both \([+N]\) and verb and adjective \([+V]\), as shown in (2):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{noun} &= [+N, -V] \\
\text{adjective} &= [+N, +V] \\
\text{verb} &= [-N, +V]
\end{align*}
\]

But, for the notionalist, the labels in (2) are also, in principle, not to be conceived of as empty: adjectives share morphosyntactic properties with both nouns and verbs because they are notionally intermediate. The prototypical adjective denotatum (of, say, *young, large, bad*) is classificatory, concrete, but with an evaluative element, and relatively stable, but less so than prototypical noun denotata, and less discrete: they denote ‘properties’. Compared with nouns, there are more adjectives, prototypical and not, that are relational (*It’s not far from here, She’s afraid of him*), than there are nouns, and they may even be agentive (*He is careful with his money*). Comparison of adjectives (*younger than*. . . , etc.) is both relational and classificatory.

The features of (2) should be interpreted notionally, then. But also, one can argue, they should not be attributed a binary value; and this is indeed what is argued in the work described in the next section. There I outline more explicitly a system of syntactic categories based on notional (semantically interpreted) features that are single-valued, or privative, or *simplex*. This, it is
argued, allows rather transparently for the various dimensions associated with the componentiality of the categories.¹

2.2 A notional system of syntactic categories

I begin here, in §2.2.1, by outlining the motivations behind the system of primary categories based on simplex features and illustrating its properties. §2.2.2 concentrates on the properties of functional (as opposed to lexical) categories, while §2.2.3 focuses on the functional category of determinative, to which, according to Anderson (1997), belongs the name, along with pronouns and determiners.

2.2.1 The basic system

Anderson (1997) suggests that we can attribute the notional and distributional patterns we have looked at to a characterization of the classes such as is offered (in a very provisional form, which ignores the functional/lexical distinction I have just drawn), in (3), which distinguishes, for the moment, only among the general categories of nominal, adjectival, and verbal (where the first of these, for instance, contains not just nouns):

(3) **Notionally based classes**

Nominal = \{N\}  
Adjectival = \{P,N\}  
Verbal = \{P\}

However, for comparison with the binary system, I shall refer at this point simply to noun vs. adjective vs. verb. The braces enclose combinations of the two notional features that distinguish primary categories. N is a notional feature that promotes perception of something as concrete, stable, and discrete, as potentially referential, while P promotes perception of it as relational and dynamic, potentially predicative. N can be expanded as ‘naming’ or ‘nominating’, or, less mnemonically (but avoiding the well-known other senses of ‘naming’ and ‘nominating’), but perhaps more accurately, as ‘referentiable’,

¹ There are fuller discussions of notional categories and the motivations and responsibilities of a syntactic notation in Anderson (1997: Chapter 2; 2004a: §§1–2; 2006b: chapter 10) and Böhm (1998; 1999). Anderson (2004a: §2), for instance, suggests that ‘the categorial structure of words needs to allow for at least the following set of syntactic properties’:

**Requirements on syntactic categorisation**

(a) to facilitate an account of the distributional differences among the classes  
(b) to facilitate the expression of recurrent cross-classes  
(c) to facilitate the expression of differences in accessibility (markedness) among the classes  
(d) to facilitate the expression of gradient relationships among the classes  
(e) to facilitate expression of the relationship between primary and secondary categories

I do not expand further on these here. But see further note 4.
able to have a referent (or co-referent, as illustrated in what follows). \( P \) is to be read as ‘predicative’, a possible predicator. Each pair of braces in (3) encloses a categorial representation. Co-presence of \( N \) and \( P \) is mutually diluting: the presence of both in the case of adjectives weakens the power of the individual features, resulting in their notionally and distributionally intermediate status.

The non-binary system of (3) has a property absent from the binary one that seems to have empirical consequences. The representation of adjectives is more complex than that associated with nouns and verbs. We can associate this inherent complexity with greater markedness: adjectives are less accessible. Thus, there are languages that lack a distinct word-class adjective, and others where the class is very small, or derived; and, ontogenetically, adjectives as a distinct class tend to be acquired rather tardily (Anderson 2000). Without additional apparatus (such as ‘relative weighting’ of ‘+’ and ‘−’, or translation of the notation into markedness values), the expression of markedness is absent from the binary system. This is one motivation for rejecting a binary system.

The non-binary system retains the capacity to represent ‘natural classes’, so that both verbs and adjectives show \( P \), as well as the associated notion of ‘intermediateness’. As indicated, the intermediate status of adjectives with respect to verbs and nouns correlates with the presence of both of \( N \) and \( P \) in their representation—so that, for instance, whereas most adjectives in English take, like (derived) nouns, (non-subject) complements that are marked with an overt preposition, as in He is fond of Mary (cf. his fondness for Mary), some adjectives behave like verbs in taking a ‘bare complement’, as in She was like Mary (cf. She resembled Mary and She was similar to Mary).

The Chomskyan system allows for a fourth possibility in addition to those in (2), namely \([-N, -V]\), which is the specification usually attributed to prepositions, or adpositions in general. The equivalent in the non-binary system of (3) would be \{ \}, the null combination of (primary) categorial features; it shares a positive feature with nothing. And, indeed, if we attribute this to adpositions, it seems to be more appropriate than the characterization in terms of binary features.

Notice for instance that, though the cross-class adjective-preposition is excluded by the binary system (without recourse to self-destructive ‘Greek-letter’ variables over ‘+’ and ‘−’), the cross-class noun-preposition is allowed. The basis for this difference is unclear. Moreover, the motivation of a verb-preposition cross-class allegedly provided by such as (4) is rather shaky:

(4) a. John works
    b. John loves Mary
c. John sent a present to Mary
d. John’s admiration *(for) Mary
e. John is fond *(of) Mary

‘Only verbs and prepositions take noun phrase complements’ is the alleged generalization. But here too it is not enough to show gross distributional similarities. These may be contingent upon more fundamental differences. Let me spell this out.

Prototypical prepositions, or adpositions, are universally complemented by a noun phrase. Verbs in English may or may not be complemented by a noun phrase, as with (4b) vs. (a); they may alternatively be complemented by a prepositional phrase (4c). In other languages verbs are more uniformly complemented by either one or the other, a noun phrase or an adpositional phrase. The various complements of a verb, of whatever ‘kind’ (adpositional or ‘bare’), and including ‘subjects’, are distinguished as to their semantic or syntactic role in the predication—their relation to the verb—by choice of adposition or inflection or position, or some combination, depending in part on the ‘kind’ of complement. The relation to the verb may thus be expressed analytically (and simultaneously positionally, possibly), as in the post-verbal phrase in (5a), or morphologically (as well as positionally), as in that in (b), or merely positionally, as in that in (c):

(5)  a. He inclined towards Mary  
b. He liked her  
c. He liked Mary

(5) also illustrates that, likewise, the neutralized relation subject can be expressed positionally.

Anderson (1997) interprets this as showing that prototypical verbs are complemented by a phrase-type that may be manifested as either adposition-containing or not; the phrase-type is characterized by the presence of a preposition or case inflection or occupation of a position. He calls this phrase-type functor phrases: they are headed by a category of functor, and, as illustrated, the particular member of the functor category may be manifested by an independent adposition, or inflectionally, or only indirectly, by position of the phrase. One goal of grammar is to express how a category, associated with a consistent role in the grammar, can be manifested in such a variety of fashions.2

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2 The tradition exemplified by the Port-Royal grammarians recognized the systematicity of a grouping of preposition, case inflection, and position as markers of semantic relations and neutralized versions of these. As Anderson (2006b: §2.1.4) notes, this is commented on, apparently approvingly, by Chomsky (1966: 44–5):
Such a distribution takes functors outside the system of lexical categories represented in (2), into the realm of functional categories. These are characterized, apart from anything else, by just such a range of realizational possibilities. They are of highly limited notional content, and their presence contributes more to signalling the semantic basis for syntactic structure than expressing lexical content. The membership of individual functional categories is not large. This is not to deny that there are complex prepositions, which incorporate, for instance, nominal elements (beside and the like), whose presence indeed swells the set of prepositions in English; such prepositions have a complex internal structure, like the derived nouns we looked at in §1.1. But a prototypical adposition, such as at, is a simple functional category. And it does not enter into any cross-class relationships with the other categories allowed for by \([\pm \text{N}, \pm \text{V}]\). There are indeed many reasons for thinking that adpositions are not a happy lexical category (cf., in recent times, e.g. Vincent (1999), Baker (2003)).

The functor is represented as \{\}, i.e. absence of any primary—word-class-distinguishing—feature. There are clearly, as I have implied, other functional categories: categories with a similar potential range of realization-types and function, and with limited membership. How are they to be represented? And how are functional and lexical categories differentiated? Functors have no corresponding lexical category. The other obvious functional categories we shall look at are associated with nouns and verbs. They can be interpreted as belonging to macro-classes of nominals and verbals respectively. That is, these macro-classes contain a component class of functional items. This adds a third question: how are we to relate the functional members to the lexical, while distinguishing them and characterizing their functional status?

Chapter VI of the Port-Royal Grammar considers the expression of these relations in case systems, as in the classical languages, or by internal modification, as in the construct state in Hebrew, or by particles, as in the vernacular languages, or simply by fixed word order, as in the case of the subject-verb and verb-object relations in French. . . . Notice that what is assumed is the existence of a uniform set of relations into which words can enter, in any language, these corresponding to the exigencies of thought. The philosophical grammarians do not try to show that all languages literally have case systems, that they use inflectional devices to express these relations. On the contrary, they repeatedly stress that a case system is only one device for expressing these relations.

But there is little evidence of an attempt to implement this insight in work in transformational grammar (outside the ‘case grammar’ developments and their offshoots described in Anderson (2006b)). Such phenomena, if addressed at all, are the concern of diverse arbitrarily delimited ‘subtheories’. And, as pointed out in Anderson (2005b: §1; 2006b: §2.2.3), and recalled in Chapter 1, note 1, the insight offered by the Port-Royal grammarians has nothing to do with a syntactic ‘deep structure’, as suggested by the sentence that precedes the above quotation (Chomsky 1966: 44):

The identity of deep structure underlying a variety of surface forms in different languages is frequently stressed, throughout this period, in connection with the problem of how the significant semantic connections among the elements of speech are expressed.
Following Anderson (1997: Chapter 2), we can distinguish at least the following categories in English:

(6) **Notionally based classes**

a. **Functional categories**:
   
   

   

   

   b. **Lexical categories**:

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   The English **operatives** include the modals and finite forms of *be* and *have*, including the *be* found with predicative and equative nouns and with adjectives: *She is a worker, She is the ringleader, She is industrious*. So, the operative may be realized as a finite ‘auxiliary’. However, these are merely the realizations of operative in English that involve an independent word. We return below to realizations of operative by inflection and position. Determinative includes determiners and pronouns. But again it may not be realized as an independent word. This variety in realization-types is characteristic of functional categories.

   In this way, the macro-class of nominals (provisionally represented as \{N\} in (3)) has been split into determinative and noun, and verbal into operative and verb; but the respective functional and lexical categories retain a property in common. This is not just the presence of N in the first case and of P in the second: the representations for noun and verb both contain N and P, as does...
that for adjectives. We need to pay attention to the significance of the semi-colon (and colon, in the case of the adjective) separating the two features. The semi-colon indicates that the feature to its left predominates over that on the right; the colon indicates mutual preponderance, showing the adjective as an amalgam of the other two, viz. \{(N;P)&(P;N)\}.

What nouns and determinatives share, as members of the macro-class nominal, is a preponderance of N; N is either present alone or it predominates over P. With verbals it is P that is preponderant. This is represented in (c) in the continuation of (6) as (6)’:

(6)’ Notionally based classes

Cross-classes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>c. Nominal</th>
<th>Verbal</th>
<th>Adjectival</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>{N&gt;}</td>
<td>{P&gt;}</td>
<td>{P=N}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Lexical = {;}

e. Adjective-noun = \{P;N\}  Adjective-verb = \{N;P\}

f. Representation of noun vs. verb in the grammar: \{N;P\} vs. \{P;N\}

‘>’ in (6c) includes sole or predominant presence. (6d) distinguishes the class of lexical categories. (6)’ also shows, in (e), the adjective-noun and adjective-verb cross-classes. These cross-classes are referred to by syntactic and morphological generalizations; the representations in (6a–b), on the other hand, are part of lexical entries. This distinction means that, if there is a grammatical generalization that invokes, for instance, only noun or verb and not adjective as well, then this is distinguished by emboldening, as in (6f).

We can now say that N on its own, as a determinative, confers full referentiality, whereas combined with P it indicates a potential for co-referentiality, as (recall) in (1.6):

(1.6) a. Fay may live there but I don’t think so
    b. Fay is fair but Bill isn’t
    c. Fay is a blonde but Bill isn’t

P on its own, as an operative, confers full predicativity, i.e. finiteness, as in the main clauses in (1.6). If P is combined with N, it is non-finitely predicative only, as with the third items in each of (1.6). They are governed by a \{P\} that permits the sentence to be finite, to be an independent sentence. We return in a moment to such as (1.7a)—vs. (1.7b–c)—which seems to lack a \{P\}, if \{P\} is a separate word:

(1.7) a. Fay reddened
    b. Fay is fair
    c. Fay is a blonde
However, \{P\}, as a functional category, may be marked inflectionally and positionally as well as by an independent word, as in (1.7a). The characterization of this depends on further development of the notation; and we return to the diverse realizational potential of functional categories in §2.2.2.

The present notional system differs from the \([±N, ±V]\) notation of Chomsky (1970) and its developments, not only in that the features are simplex rather than binary, and they can combine in varying proportions, but also in allowing for a wider range of categories involving just the two features, and providing for further gradience, so that the proportion of P decreases as we move from operative to verb to adjective to noun to the other functional categories. Moreover, functional categories are differentiated from the lexical by absence of (at least binary) combination of P and N rather than by different values of \([±F]\), say—as in e.g. Radford (1997).

Each of the categories in (6a–b) is lexicalized in English: that is, each represents a distinct word class. In some languages there is no adjective word class, and this reflects the complexity (markedness) of the representation of adjectives, which is if anything more evident in (6) than in (3). I associated the absence of adjectives even from some languages which display a robust lexical distinction between noun and verb, together with its marginal status as a lexical class elsewhere, with the markedness and relative inaccessibility of the category (Anderson 1997: §§2.3.1, 2.4). In terms of the notation of (6) this is again expressed by the complexity of the representation of adjectives, which are the only category there to involve two asymmetrical combinations, \{P;N\} and \{N;P\}. If we assume that the presence of more complex representations in a system presupposes the simpler ones, then the inaccessibility of adjectives, including, as noted, their ontogenetic tardiness, is accounted for.

And, as concerns word classes, there may be languages (as is increasingly being suggested, though the issues are delicate) which lexically also lack the noun/verb distinction, whose non-functional word classes are reduced to one—what we might call the contentive (for references see e.g. Jacobsen (1979); Kinkade (1983); van Eijk and Hess (1986); Demirdache and Matthewson (1995); Broschart (1997); Mithun (1999: §2.3); and contributions to Vogel and Comrie (2000). Compare here Boas (1911) on Kwakiutl: ‘all stems are neutral, neither noun nor verb’).

This class would involve the lexical representation \{P,N\}, simple combination of the two features. Anderson (2004a) suggests for ‘contentive languages’ the basic system given in (7):

\[(7)\] Notionally based classes in a contentive system
\a. Functional categories:
   \quad \text{Functor} = \{\} \quad \text{Determinative} = \{N\} \quad \text{Operative} = \{P\}\]
b. *Lexical categories:*

\[
\text{Contentive} = \{P,N\}
\]

The distinction between lexical and functional categories remains clear, however.

Notice that we are not saying that such languages lack the syntactic categories ‘verbal’ and ‘nominal’, but merely that there is an absence (if the issue is decided that way) of a word-class difference between verb and noun (cf. Lyons, (1977: §11.2)). As Mithun (1999) says of Swadesh’s famous examples illustrating the syntactic versatility of Nootka lexical items, two of which are replicated in (8), ‘there is no question that the first words . . . are functioning syntactically as predicates, and the words that follow as arguments’ (1999: 61) (examples ultimately from Swadesh (1936–8)):

(8) a. mamo-\text{\textordmasculine} | kma qo-\text{\textordmasculine} | as\text{\textordmasculine} ?\text{\textordmasculine} \\
he.is.working the.man  \\

b. qo-\text{\textordmasculine} | asma mamo-\text{\textordmasculine} | k\text{\textordmasculine} ?\text{\textordmasculine}  \\
he.is.a.man the.working.one

And this seems to be a generalizable characterization, as far as such languages are concerned. Alternative syntactic categories may be derived from contentives: they are converted into operatives or determinatives. This derived categorization as verbal or nominal is provided for by the functional categories. Thus, whatever word-sized (analytic) realizations of the functional categories \{N\} and \{P\} there may be in any of these languages, they will have a role in allowing contentives to function as either nominals or verbals, as I shall formulate in a moment, once the necessary representational and ‘derivational’ apparatus has been introduced in relation to systems of word classes in general.

In such a system, however, despite the variation in the derived categorization that allows items to function as verbs and nouns, basic lexical categories are apparently reduced to one, the only possibility in the system involving combination of the two features. It remains to be determined empirically whether in any particular system it is correct to predict that contentives that are prototypically verbal prefer the derived verbal categorization over the nominal, and vice versa.

2.2.2 *Functional categories*

The poverty of notional syntactic features (both primary and secondary) associated with the functional categories underlies, of course, the ‘reduced’ semantics often attributed to them, but it also correlates with the variety of
ways in which they can be expressed, in that the small number of distinctions made means that they tend to be closed-class. Thus, as we have seen, the functor can appear as an independent word, or an inflection, or be marked by position. The operative category in English, associated with finiteness, can be expressed, together with various secondary grammatical categories (modality, tense, aspect, voice), by an independent word form, as in (9a), or as part of a lexical category, as in (1.7a) or (9b):

(9)  a. John may leave, was leaving
    b. John left
    c. Fred may have come back

Anderson (1997: 287–91) argues, citing German, that finiteness can also be signalled by position alone; I do not pursue this here. Operative auxiliaries express finiteness, but other uses of the auxiliaries, such as that italicized in (9c), have the syntax of non-finite verbals. Thus, auxiliaries have and be are both finite and non-finite, and the modals are normally only finite (operatives). Non-auxiliary verbs are basically non-finite, and, like contentives, gain finiteness by a lexical redundancy, as is illustrated below; and their acquisition of finiteness is expressed inflectionally and positionally.

Determinatives also constitute a functional category, insofar as such notions as definiteness can be expressed analytically, as a separate word, a referential or determinative element (as typically in English), or along with a noun and/or adjective. And the determinative in Swedish and Basque, for instance, may be expressed as an independent word form or by affixation, as illustrated respectively in (10a–b) and (10c–d):

(10)  a. en häst
      a horse
    b. hästen
        horse.the
    c. liburu bat, liburu eder bat
        book a, book beautiful a
    d. liburua, liburu ederra
        book.the, book beautiful.the

In other languages, such as Polish (Szwedek 1974), the definite/non-definite distinction associated with a determinative may be expressed by position (in accordance with ‘functional sentence perspective’).

Terminologically, again (cf. operative vs. operator—note 3), ‘determinative’ is more inclusive than traditional ‘determiner’ or ‘pronoun’; these latter are kinds of determinative, complement-taking (determiner) or not (pronoun).
And, just as the finiteness element confers sentencehood on the construction it heads, so referentiality licenses argumenthood. These are the basic functions of these ‘functional’ categories.

Functional categories head the constructions they appear in, as shown in the representation in (11):

(11) \[ \{P\{past\}\} \]
    | \[ \{P;N\} \]
    | \[ | left \]

(11) is a dependency representation in which the solid line linking two categories marks the upper category as head and the lower as dependent: it is a dependency arc. ‘{past}’ in (11) indicates a secondary category (enclosed within inner braces) of the operative. Primary categories define the basic distribution of the items so categorized; secondary categories encode divisions within a primary category reflected in more specific restrictions. I ignore at this point other secondary category features of whatever category.

In (11) head and dependent are associated (by the discontinuous lines) with distinct words. Finite main verbs such as that in (9b), however, involve a complex lexically introduced categorization of the character of (12):

(12) \[ \{P\{past\}\} \]
    | \[ \{P;N\} \]
    | \[ | left \]

Here head and dependent are not linearly distinct; they are both associated with the same word. The presence of a non-independent operative, or finiteness, category is signalled in English, indirectly, by the marker of tense in (12) (elsewhere person and number), and by position relative to the subject.

The representations in (11) and (12) are thus dependency graphs, graphs based on the government-dependency relation rather than the constituency relation, which they do not represent directly (constituents are identified by their heads); thus, a ‘noun phrase’ is a phrase with a noun head, a noun, and all its subordinates. A subordinate of a head is any element linked to that head by a chain of dependency relations. The \{P;N\} in (11) is said to be adjoined to
its head. In the case of (12) the dependency relation is word-internal; the {P;N} is said to be **subjoined** to the functor; they do not differ in linear precedence. Anderson (1997) also interprets ‘predominate’ (of feature over feature) as an instantiation of the dependency relation; but this need not concern us here.

The substructure in (11) is built in the syntax, on the basis of the categorial information, including subcategorization by complement type, or **valency**, which I indicate in the expansion of (11) given as (13), which represents the operative as being subcategorized for (’/’) a verb:

\[(13) \quad \{P \{\text{past}}/\{P;N\}\} \]

\[\vdash \]

\[\vdash \{P;N\} \]

\[\vdash \vdash \]

\[
\text{was leaving}
\]

The subcategorization given in (13) need not be included in the lexical entry for the operative, given that there is a general lexical redundancy that requires that every {P} be complemented by a lexical category (typically a verb), externally, as in (11), or not, as in (12), viz. (14):

\[(14) \quad \{P\} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \{P/\{;\}\}\]

The ‘expanded’ categorization is given on the right of the two-shafted arrow. The redundancy adds a predictable (or default) valency.

The substructure in (12), however, is allowed for entirely in the lexicon (rather than the syntax), since every {P;N} (inherently non-finite) can optionally be expanded as in (12) by the lexical redundancy in (15):

\[(15) \quad \{P\} \quad \vert \quad \{P;N\} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \{P;N\}\]

The optional expansion is specified on the right of the two-way two-shafted arrow in (15). This has the effect of category change. Thus, the ‘two-way-edness’ of the arrow is to be interpreted as merely saying that both sides may occur as independent items; it does not necessarily mean that formulations such as (15) are symmetrical, or non-directional. They consist of the categorization for a ‘base’ form, the simpler categorization, and for a ‘derived’, the
more complex categorization, that includes the categorization of the ‘base’. Here, as elsewhere (on syntax, see e.g. Anderson (1997: §1.3)), the building of linguistic structure is incremental; structure is not ‘lost’. I shall refer to such redundancies as (15) as inter-categorial, rather than valency-specifying, as in (14).

We thus have both a syntactic and a lexical mechanism for satisfying (14). Lexical redundancies like (14) and (15) add to the basic categorization of an item properties that they (redundantly) either must or may possess. (15) associates \{P;N\}, optionally, with a ‘derived’ finite form. In like manner, determinatives may be ‘converted’ into functors, and nouns into determinatives by such inter-categorial redundancies, as formulated in (16) and (17), respectively:

\[
(16) \quad \{\} \\
\{N\} \Leftrightarrow \{N\}
\]

\[
(17) \quad \{N\} \\
\{N;P\} \Leftrightarrow \{N;P\}
\]

These redundancies allow for where the presence of the functional category is not expressed by a separate word, but by affix or positionally, as in (5b–c) and (10b/d) respectively.

Similarly, the potential for contentives, in languages lacking a word-class distinction between noun and verb (recall the discussion of (7)), to function as either nominals or verbals is provided by the availability of two alternative inter-categorial redundancies, formulated in (18):

\[
(18) \quad a. \quad \{N\} \\
\{P,N\} \Leftrightarrow \{P,N\}
\]

\[
\quad b. \quad \{P\} \\
\{P,N\} \Leftrightarrow \{P,N\}
\]

\{N\} in such a language may be realized independently as a pronoun, as in Nootka (Swadesh 1936–8), for instance; and the operative may similarly appear as an independent word, like the ‘copula’ in Inland Olympic Salish
(Kinkade 1976: 19), perhaps. But it is also the determinative and the operative that allow contentives to occur as respectively potential arguments and as predicators, via the (lexically) derived categories in (18), which are alternative expansions of \{P,N\}, involving its lexically derived subjunction to \{N\} or (P). One or the other of these must apply if contentives are to have a syntactic function.\(^4\)

The subjunction relation introduced above allows us to represent further categories, and word classes, to those presented in (6); they can be allowed for in terms of lexical combinations of these categorial representations, with one category subjoined to another. Thus, many adverbs can be interpreted lexically as a combination of a functor and a determinative, as represented in (19a) (or complexes initiated by such as that):

\[(19)\]

a. \[
\begin{array}{c}
\{ \{\text{loc}\}\} \\
\{\text{N}\} \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\text{there}
\end{array}
\]

b. \[
\begin{array}{c}
\{ \{\text{loc}\}\} \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\{\text{N}\} \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\text{at} \quad \text{it}
\end{array}
\]

\(^4\) To the extent that such ‘contentive-only’ languages are attested, we have now exemplified an instance of another requirement on syntactic categorizations: that they should facilitate the characterization of systems of varying complexity, after the manner of (3) vs. (5) (and without appeal to ad hoc ‘neutralizations’—e.g. Stowell (1981)—or ‘magnetisms’—van Riemsdijk (1998)). This is related to the need for categorizations to express differences in accessibility (markedness) among the classes (one of the desiderata for representations of syntactic categories listed in note 1). For instance, as we have seen, the absence of adjectives from the languages just discussed, as well as others which do distinguish between noun and verb, taken together with its marginal status as a lexical class elsewhere (for references see again Anderson (1997: §2.3)), suggests that this category is marked, relatively inaccessible. As discussed, in terms of the notation of (3) this is expressed by the complexity of the representation of adjectives, which are the only category there to involve two asymmetrical combinations, \{P;N\} and \{N;P\}.

Anderson (1993) makes explicit the assumption that the presence of more complex representations in a system presuppose the simpler ones, in terms of a principle of ‘category continuity’, but I do not pursue this here. I merely note at this point the appropriateness of systems involving categorial representations of inherently varying complexity to the expression of markedness—without recourse to arbitrary meta-notations such as that proposed in Chomsky & Halle (1968: Chapter 9).

Note now, however, that, when we apply even a measure of markedness to the contentive-only system of (5), it is simpler than a system with nouns and verbs (plus or minus adjectives), but is not as well
In (19a) the locative functor, which both structures in (19) represent as lacking both primary features, is shown as having a determinative complementing it, thus dependent on it, as is normal with functors; but in this case the dependency is word-internal and included in its lexical entry. (19a) represents an inherently complex category. Compare the other functor-headed structure in (19b), which represents a construction in which the word it complements, and is adjoined to, the head of the construction, at.

(20) is the lexical redundancy that requires each functor to be accompanied by an argument (specified to the left of the slash), whether it is incorporated, as in (19a), or not, as in (19b):

\[(20) \{ \} \Rightarrow \{ / \{N\}\}\]

In terms of (20) the categorization of functors is amplified with a valency requirement, as is again specified on the right of the two-shafted arrow. In the case of (20) what is added is the normal redundant valency requirement, as in (14). The default for functors is that they require to be complemented by a determinative, which in turn introduces a nominal construction.

2.2.3 Determinatives

Let us now look in a preliminary way at this aspect of nominal structure, which is particularly relevant to subsequent discussion. The determiner subclass of determinatives governs nouns; and for a noun to function as an argument, i.e. have a role (marked by a functor) in a predication it must be governed by such a determinative.

A rather similar suggestion concerning the role of determiners is made in Longobardi (1994; 2001) and has been adopted by a number of works on transformational syntax. However, for English indefinite plural and mass nouns, for example, Longobardi’s analysis involves syntactic derivations which appeal to ‘empty categories’ and ‘movement’; and it remains controversial even within the transformational tradition (see e.g. Baker (2003:§3.3))—though the counter-arguments too are couched in unacceptably attested. Anderson (2006b: Chapter 10) suggests that such considerations of relative simplicity and accessibility are presumably to be reconciled with the need to provide adequate expressive differentiation for our conceptualizations to be represented satisfactorily. This cannot involve an absolute measure; but it may be that such languages (almost) fall below the general threshold of adequacy of expressive resources; and certainly absence of the categories (as opposed to lexical classes) noun and verb does so. To the extent that such languages, with no word-class difference between noun and verb, do not fall below a viable level of word-class differentiation, then their viability, as well as their scarcity, may depend on the necessary presence in the languages of certain ‘compensatory’ properties, properties less commonly available in other languages (cf. here e.g. Jelinek & Demers (1994: 702)).
powerful syntactic terms. And, most importantly, it is unnecessary to deploy the powerful mechanisms of transformational syntax in formulating these relationships. ‘Change of category’ is a lexical matter; its characterization requires only the limited capabilities of lexical rules. These transformational proposals and counter-proposals are another manifestation of what Anderson (2006b: §9.3) calls ‘abstract syntax syndrome’.

The normal valency requirements of determinatives is expressed, provisionally, by the redundancy in (21):

(21) $\{N\} \Rightarrow \{N/\{N;P\}\}$

The requirement again may be satisfied by a distinct complement, as in (22):

(22) $\{N/\{N;P\}\}$

\[\ldots\]

\[\ldots\]

\[\ldots\]

\[\ldots\]

\[the\]

\[lion\]

But once more the complement may be subjoined, as in (23):

(23) $\{N\}$

\[|\]

$\{N;P\}$

\[\ldots\]

\[\ldots\]

\[lions\]

These (provisional) representations ignore the fact that the relation between $\{N\}$ and $\{N;P\}$ in them may be either ‘partitive’, so that (22) involves one particular lion and (23) a subset of lions, or ‘generic’, so that (22) and (23) invoke the whole class of lions.

Much of the discussion that follows in this book is concerned with these and further properties of nominal structures and with elaborating the appropriate categorizations and redundancies, and more particularly with the place of names, if any, within them. Let us therefore spend a little more time here on determinatives, and especially the ‘partitive’ vs. ‘generic’ distinction and related notions.
Partitives refer to a subset of the set denoted by the noun, generics the whole set. Sometimes partitivity is marked distinctively by an overt type of determinative, a quantifier, as in (24a), which spells out one interpretation of (24b):

(24)  a. some men  
      b. men

Consider (25), showing partitive (a) vs. generic (b):

(25)  a. (Some) men came to see her  
      b. I hate men  
      c. Some of the men came to see her

Sometimes the partitive relation itself is spelled out by an overt functor dependent on the determinative, as in (25c). The partitive relation associated with some is given an overt realization: some is subcategorized for a partitive functor that in (25c) is realized as an independent word.

In other languages such analytic expression is widespread, as illustrated by the French of (26a–b) and the Finnish of (26c):

(26)  a. un de ces hommes  
       one of those men  
      b. (un) des hommes  
         (one) of.the men  
      c. Miehät tulee  
         men:PART come:3SG (‘Some men are coming’)

These adpositions and inflections realize (whatever else) a partitive functor. In (26c) an inflection realizes quantifier plus functor; and in the version of (26b) without the un the quantifier and partitive are also co-expressed.

The quantifiers in (26) are subcategorized for a partitive, as is that in (25). And so too is the quantifier in (24a), but in this case the functor is not realized independently of the noun. And in (24b), on the partitive interpretation, neither the quantifier nor the functor is separately expressed. Moreover, the the of (25c), whatever other subcategories, such as {def(inite)}, it is associated with, also apparently introduces partitivity: it refers to a definite subset of men.

This supposes at least the alternative representations in (27) for these English partitive expressions:
It is unnecessary to specify in the statements of valency in (27) that ‘\{prt\}’ is a functor type; thus we have simply ‘/\{prt\}’. Likewise, I have suppressed in (27b) the partitive relation linking lexically the {N} and the {N;P}, since it follows from the presence of ‘/\{prt\}’. I have interpreted the partivity as belonging with the definite determiner in (27c); it takes a partitive dependent there. Semantically, the partitivity of the definite article amounts to little more than singling out the individual(s) that the speaker assumes the addressee to be familiar with.\(^5\)

\(^5\) The treatment of determiners, and specifically the definite article, that is suggested departs from that proposed in Anderson (1997: §3.7.3), and adopted in Anderson (2004c: §3.4), where the article is subcategorized for another determinative, including partitive-taking ones, as that in (25c) would be interpreted. Such ‘direct chaining’ of determinatives (a possibility not allowed, apparently, to other categories, except (non-finite) verbs) is dispensed with here in favour of taking the definite article as itself being optionally inherently partitive-taking, as represented in (27c). However, the present analysis too is modified in other directions in what follows, and further commented on in note 6.
But what now of generics? Do they simply lack a determinative? Certainly, there is no overt determinative in (25b), under a generic interpretation—though a partitive lacks one too. But generic interpretation of (28a), as well as the partitive, has a definite article, as does the singular (28b), though not (28c):

(28)  a. the Greeks
    b. the Greek
    c. Greeks

Moreover, in some languages generic nominals in general usually have a definite article. Thus, the definite nominals from (respectively) Greek and French in (29) are ambiguous between a partitive and a generic reading:

(29)  a. Fovate ta skila
      "s/he.is.frightened.of the dogs"
    b. Les lions sont dangereux
      "the lions are dangerous"

In English, it is more commonly the bare form such as (24b) that is ambiguous in this way. And, as we have seen, there is also a bare form alongside (28a), as shown in (28c), which again can be partitive or generic.

It is consistent with the hypothesis that nouns are potential arguments by virtue of being governed by a determinative, as well as semantically appropriate, to interpret the generics as being universally governed by a definite article, either overt, as mostly in Greek, or covert, as mostly in English. Semantically, as with other definite expressions, the speaker assumes in the case of definites that the addressee is able to establish a specific referent or referents for that expression, here the whole set of denotata. This suggests that the noun is directly dependent on the definite determiner, as in (22).

In consequence, (24b) would have (30) as its representation on a generic interpretation:

(30)  \{N[def] \}
     |  \{N;P\}
     :  :
     :  \text{men}

Compare that for the non-generic (and so non-definite) in (27b).
Indefinite determiners have valency ‘/[prt]’; overt plural definites in English also take ‘{prt}’. The definite determiner of non-overt generic plural in (30), however, takes a {N;P} directly. And when in a singular construction, the overt definite the is associated with either: the lion can be generic or partitive. And the indefinite article apparently takes either: a lion can be interpreted either way, in the appropriate context. In this case, the representations in (31) are appropriate:

(31) a. \[\{N\{sg\}/\{N;P\}\}\]
\[\_\]
\[\_\]
\[\_\]
\[a\]
\[\text{lion} \ (is \ a \ dangerous \ animal)\]

b. \[\{N\{sg\}/\{prt\}\}\]
\[\_\]
\[\_\]
\[\_\]
\[\_\]
\[\_\]
\[a\]
\[\text{lion} \ (came \ towards \ me)\]

The indefinite article in English is primarily a marker of singularity, not necessarily partitivity. The definite article is also apparently variable in this respect, but, unlike the indefinite article, it can head phrases that are singular or plural, though the (definite) generic plural is non-overt in English. This parallelism in valency among the singulars gives some motivation for their often contested grouping as ‘articles’.\(^6\)

Nouns in English can thus be expanded lexically, by inter-categorial redundancy, in at least the three different ways shown in (32):

\(^6\) These representations proposed for the articles allow for determiners to directly govern nouns in some instances, just as finites can directly govern non-finites among verbals. Elsewhere in representations, we have (non-predicative) nouns governed by functors. If this generalization is to be maintained, what would be the relation between the definite article and the noun, if it is not partitive? Here the ‘neutral’ relation absolutive, used (on both sides) in equatives, seems appropriate. But the chaining of determinative and determinative and of determinative and noun may be a characteristic of nominals. However, I do not pursue here the issues raised by such a proposed restriction on chaining of categories.
I shall return in later chapters to the linguistic variation touched on in the preceding discussion, and how these relate to the formulations in (32). Moreover, as is familiar, we find analogous variation in the expression of (definite) names, i.e. with and without overt expression of definiteness; and this will clearly demand our attention.

I have dwelt here on the properties of the subsystem of functional categories, and especially determinatives, because we shall be looking at evidence for and against the suggestion made in Anderson (1997:§2.1.2) that names are not nouns, but a kind of determinative—indeed, in a sense, the basic determinative. We need therefore to try to clarify what determinatives, and what functional categories in general, are like, as well as what the status of non-controversial nouns is.

It seems that languages may lack adjectives and possibly even a distinction in word class between noun and verb, but I am not aware of languages which lack names. This is consistent with the proposal made in Anderson (1997; 2003a; 2004c) that names belong universally to the category of determinative. It is plausible to assume, in line with the above discussion of ‘contentive-only’ languages, that all the functional categories we have looked at here are universally present, manifested as separate words, affixes, or positionally—though not necessarily more than one of these in any particular language. They are essential to articulating syntactic structures, as we shall see in the next subsection. However, names are, in addition, according to this proposal, a word-sized manifestation of a functional category that is itself universally present in language. This is another manifestation of their distinctiveness that will play a role in our discussion. In accordance with notionalism, this is an aspect of the syntactic distinctiveness of names that correlates with its semantic distinctiveness.

We shall find in the chapters that follow that similar redundancies to those we have looked at allow for the further development of nominal structures, including the derived nouns discussed in §1.1. Indeed, from a rather traditional point of view, inter-categorial redundancies such as (15–17) are ‘rules’ of lexical derivation that ‘change’ the category (or subcategory) of an item, giving it a (not necessarily totally) different syntax, as suggested in the discussion of derived nouns.
All of the redundancies formulated in this section express the function of the various functional categories in the construction of sentence structure, in articulating the relationship among the lexical categories. I shall look at this role of the functional categories in the next section, as a way into a brief consideration of the aspects of syntactic structure that will be most relevant to discussions of the syntax of names in Chapter 8 in particular. It is categorizations, including valencies, such as we have looked at, that project syntactic structure.

We have seen that lexical structures may be categorially complex; in particular, they may consist of chains of primary categories. These chains may be ‘derived’: one of the component categories is the ‘base’ on which the complex is ‘formed’; and indeed there may be successive ‘bases’. These are formed in conformity with inter-categorial redundancies such as those shown in (32). Something of the possible extension of such chains is hinted at by the discussion of derived nouns in §1.1. Some chains are not obviously ‘derived’ in this sense; they have internal structure without base. This is illustrated by (19a):

\[
(19) \quad \text{a. } \{ \{ \text{loc} \} \} \\
| \\
\{ \text{N} \} \\
: \\
: \\
\text{there}
\]

But the derived lexical chains in particular have an important role to play in the erection of syntactic structure. And it is to the nature of this imposition of structure that we now turn, as illustrated by aspects of syntax which will be important to the description of the behaviour of names.

2.3 Categories and syntax

Syntactic structure projects the information provided by the categories of lexical items that are assembled to constitute syntactic units. Functional categories can be said to have a distinctive role in this. This role is indirectly embodied in the three valency-specifying lexical redundancies affecting functional categories that I now repeat from §2.2 for convenience of reference:

\[
(14) \quad \{ \text{P} \} \Rightarrow \{ \text{P/;} \}
\]

\[
(20) \quad \{ \} \Rightarrow \{ / \{ \text{N} \} \}
\]

\[
(21) \quad \{ \text{N} \} \Rightarrow \{ \text{N/;} \}
\]
The finiteness element, the operative, confers (potentially independent) sentencehood on the construction it heads. (14) subcategorizes operatives for a lexical category. It is normally only by satisfying this requirement—i.e. complementing {P}, either externally or internally—that a lexical category can have access to finite status. Similarly, the capacity to constitute an argument type, participant or circumstantial, of a predicator, is conferred by dependency on a functor—i.e. by satisfying the valency in (20). Finally as concerns nominals, referentiality, and potential for argument status, is conferred by a determinative on noun expressions dependent on it. These are the basic functions of these ‘functional’ categories. To put it in another way, operatives create predicational structure, functors argument structure, and determinatives referential structure.

Some members of the functional classes, however, are apparently ‘intransitive’, uncomplemented. I have suggested that absolute ‘intransitivity’, absence of either external or internal complementation, may be limited to (a subset of) determinatives. This would accord with the notional character of nominals, as discrete. It is also typical of nouns, though there are a few relational nouns (such as kinship terms (Anderson 2006b: §10.3)). However that may be, within the determinatives, this ‘intransitive’ class consists of pronouns and (according to Anderson (1997)) names; they are sufficient in themselves to form a referential structure. Thus, in this respect, it is being claimed that names, despite (like nouns and pronouns) involving entities, are closer to pronouns than to nouns: the latter are not inherently referential but have to depend on a determinative (either in adjunction or subjunction) to belong to a well-formed referential structure.

2.3.1 The projection of sentence structure

The categorizations and valencies of §2.2 allow for the erection of paths (directed chains) of dependencies, such as may be represented schematically in (33):

\[
(33) \quad \{P\} \\
| \\
\{;\{x\}\} \\
| \\
\{ \{x\}\} \\
| \\
\{N\} \\
| \\
\{N;P\}
\]
Here, ‘x’ is a secondary functor feature such as, say, ‘agentive’. The members of lexical categories (‘;’ in (33)) are subcategorized for one or more functors, each bearing a distinct secondary specification. Each element in the chain may or may not be subjoined (as opposed to adjoined) to its head; each arc in the chain may be derived either in the lexicon or the syntax.

This means that a variety of combinations of adjunctions and subjunctions constitute possible predicational structures. Structural possibilities with almost minimal subjunction and minimal adjunction are illustrated by (34) and (35), respectively:

(34)

```
{P}

\vdots

{P;N/{abs}}

\vdots

{abs}

\vdots

{N{def}/prt}

\vdots

{prt}

\vdots

{N;P}

\vdots

\vdots

those humans may die
```

(35)

```
{P}

\vdots

{P;N/{abs}}

\vdots

{abs}

\vdots

{N{def}}

\vdots

{N;P}

\vdots

\vdots

humans die
```

Here, as elsewhere, the functor category is indicated by absence of both primary features; hence, \{abs\} contains only a secondary feature.

The subjunctions in (34) and particularly (35) are allowed for by the intercategorial redundancies of §2.2, also repeated here:
(15) \{P\} \\
\{P;N\} ⇔ \{P;N\}

(16) \{\} \\
\{N\} ⇔ \{N\}

(17) \{N\} \\
\{N;P\} ⇔ \{N;P\}

And the resulting dependency chain satisfies the valency requirements imposed by (14), (20), and (31) (repeated just above, in the preliminaries to §2.3). Consider now the adjunction relation in (35), for example.

The functor on the left in (35) satisfies the subcategorization of \{P;N\}. This predicator takes an \textit{abs(olutive)} argument, indicated there by ‘/\{abs\}’; it is lexically specified as requiring such a functor complement that bears the secondary feature absolutive. Absolutive is one of the limited set of secondary functor features proposed by Anderson (1977; 1997; 2006b). It is the ‘neutral’ functor, whose interpretation is largely determined by the predicator that is its head; this status correlates with various aspects of its syntax that we shall encounter below. An absolutive functor roughly corresponds to the Gruberian (1965) ‘theme’ thematic role (and its descendants) or a Fillmorean (1968) ‘objective’. But the absolutive is interpreted here as a secondary feature of the functor category; the equivalents of ‘thematic roles’ belong, in the present framework, to a single syntactic category, the functional category of functor.

The commonly invoked ‘agentive’ role (alluded to above) roughly corresponds to the \textit{erg(ative)} functor proposed by Anderson; and also basic, in Anderson’s (1997) system, are said to be the \textit{loc(ative)} and \textit{abl(ative)}. These functor features define the set of ‘semantic relations’ or ‘thematic roles’ or ‘case relations’ signalled by particular functors; neutralizations among the features define ‘grammatical relations’, such as subject; subject is a neutralized functor. Individual features and their variants will be discussed as they arise in what follows.

The subjunctions in predications such as (35) are built up in the lexicon, by such as (15–17); the adjunctions are established in the syntax. However, the properties of the subjoined category are accessible to the syntax. So the (lexical) subcategorization of \{P;N\} in (35) requires to be satisfied in the
syntax, even though that verb has been ‘converted’ to the finite category. Similarly, we saw in §1.1 that requirements and other properties of the verb on which a noun is based may remain to be accessed or satisfied in the syntax of that noun.

So much for what (34) and (35) do contain. According to Anderson (1997), for instance, they are, however, incomplete in at least one crucial respect. Various phenomena discussed in this work are taken to support the assumption that, syntactically, every predicator must be accompanied by a dependent absolutive. This correlates with the status of absolutive as the ‘neutral’ functor feature: it lacks the positive specification of features like locative or ergative; and the precise role of the absolutive argument in a predication is determined entirely by the predicator and other functors: thus the absolutive in a locational predication (defined by the presence of a locative functor) is interpreted as introducing the located entity; in an actional predication, containing a simple ergative, the absolutive introduces the entity that is the goal of the action. This semantic characteristic underlies other aspects of the syntax of absolutives, some of which we shall encounter in what follows.

This assumption concerning absolutive might be seen as, to some extent, an analogue of the requirement that subjects are universal in predications, which is often formulated in terms of the ‘extended projection principle’ of recent variants of generative grammar; but the universality-of-absolutive assumption renders this latter stipulation (concerning subjects) unnecessary—appropriately, as it is false. The universality of subjects cannot be maintained under any conception of ‘subject’ that respects traditional grammatical usage and eschews arbitrary stipulation of extensions of the concept.

The assumption of the universality of absolutive in predications can be implemented as follows: any predicator that is not subcategorized for absolutive must be supplied with an ‘empty’ absolutive dependent. This absolutive can be provided by a redundancy such as is roughly formulated in (36), which supplies an absolutive dependent unwarranted by the subcategorization:

\[(36) \quad \text{\{P/*\{abs\}\}} \Rightarrow \text{\{P/\}} \]
\[\| \]
\[\quad \text{\{\{abs\}\}}\]

In any redundancy, ‘\{P\}’ is any category containing P; recall that to specify an operative only we would need the representation ‘\{P\}\’, a category that is uniquely P. (36) applies to the \{P\} in (35), but not, in this case, to the \{P;N\}, which is subcategorized for absolutive. (36) is a redundancy that regulates the
lexicon-syntax interface: it remedies what would otherwise be a structural deficiency, resulting from the valency of the predicator—or, rather, the lack of it, as here, or of a crucial component in it, an absolutive, whatever else may be present (see below).

In English, such an ‘empty’ absolutive—what Anderson (2006b), for instance, refers to as a free absolutive—is adjoined to the left of {P}, as in (37), which completes, in this respect, the representations given in (34) and (35):

\[
(37) \quad \begin{align*}
&\quad \text{a.} \\
&\quad \text{b.} \\
&\quad \text{those humans may die}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
(37) \quad \begin{align*}
&\quad \text{a.} \\
&\quad \text{b.} \\
&\quad \text{humans die}
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{This redundancy is thus neither an ‘incorporation’ (in the terminology of Anderson (2006b)) nor like the inter-categorial redundancies considered so far, which are ‘absorptions’, in these terms. Incorporation is illustrated by the passive structure in (54b and 56) below. Incorporations differ from absorptions (inter-categorial redundancies) in, apart from anything else, not involving change in primary category for the base.}
\]

Anderson (2006b: §5.5) discusses the motivations for the assumption of universality of absolutive underlying this redundancy, and refers to similar proposals made elsewhere (such as Gruber (1965/1976); Anderson (1971b: 37); Taylor (1972); Starosta (1978; 1988: §4.2.1.4); Cook (1978; 1979)).
This also shows (as indicated by a discontinuous line) the free absolutive as being associated with the absolutive that satisfies the subcategorization of *die*, interpreted here as a ‘change-of-state’ verb where the absolutive introduces the entity that changes. This association is triggered by the need for the free absolutive to satisfy redundancy (20), which requires a functor to have a determinative dependent, and by the incapacity of a {P;N} not dependent on a {P} to constitute an independent sentence. Here satisfaction of these requirements is achieved by sharing of arguments: the (subcategorized-for) absolutive of the {P;N} shares its determinative with the free absolutive introduced by (36) with respect to {P}. The upper functor determines the linear placement of the whole complex, and thus of *humans*. Such argument-sharing has an important role to play in syntax.

The argument that is shared with the free absolutive is (in English and many other languages) the ‘subject’ of the lower predicator, which is selected in accordance with a hierarchy of functor relations, and not stipulated in the syntax (see e.g., among more recent treatments, Anderson (1997: §§3.1.1, 3.3.1; 2006b: Chapter 7)). Thus, if an ergative is present, then it shares its determinative with the free absolutive, as shown in (38):

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ \text{abs} \} & \quad | \\
\{ \text{erg} \} & \quad : \\
\{ \text{N} \} & \quad : \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[John \quad \text{read} \quad \text{it}\]

Attachment by argument-sharing to the free absolutive dependent on {P} expresses **syntactic subject formation**. The placement of *John*, and of *humans* in (37) is determined by the requirement that the free absolutive precede its (functional) head. Absolutives and other functor phrases generally, on the other hand, follow a lexical head, unless overridden by attachment to the free absolutive of {P}: the normal placement of a functor phrase, in this instance

He specifically compares (2006b: §11.2.1) what is being assumed here with the assumption of Starosta that all predications contain a subcategorized-for ‘patient’—what he calls ‘patient centrality’. Starosta’s ‘patient’ is roughly equivalent to ‘absolutive’, but differs crucially (however else) because of how universality is ensured—by redundancy (absolutive) or subcategorization (patient). Every verb is subcategorized for a patient. Patients are thus even less homogeneous semantically than absolutes: absolutes are not semantically agentive, nor locative, but patients may be.
an absolutive, is shown in (38); the ergative in (38) and the (lower) absolutive in (37) are placed in accordance with the requirements of the free absolutive they are associated with.

The ‘normal’ placement of functors dependent on lexical heads is in accord with a general requirement in English (and other basically head-to-the-left languages); they follow their heads. The absolutive dependent on \{P\}, which is neither a complement nor a modifier, does not conform; and it causes functor phrases with which it is associated (by argument-sharing) to violate the general requirement.

Notice, however, that this ‘violation’ does not involve ‘movement’; word order, once imposed, is invariant—throughout the syntax. So too is dependency attachment: a category may acquire ‘new’ attachments in the syntax, by argument-sharing with a free absolutive; but attachments are not destroyed. These requirements constitute what Böhm (1982: §§1.1, 2.1.2) and Anderson (1997: §§1.3, 3.1) refer to as ‘inalterability’. As far as linearity is concerned, this assumes that at least these aspects of linearity are not independent of other aspects of syntax; in these cases linearity is imposed on representations which are not ordered contrastively.

There may not be an argument of the subordinate predicator to provide a ‘host’ for the free absolutive. In this case an expletive form is introduced, as in (39):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(39)} & \quad \{P\} \\
& \quad \{\text{abs}\} \quad \{P;N/\{\text{abs}\}\} \\
& \quad \{N\} \quad \{\text{abs}\} \\
& \quad : \quad \{N\} \\
& \quad : \quad \{N;P\} \\
& \quad : \quad : \\
& \quad : \quad \text{it} \quad \text{rained}
\end{align*}
\]

Here the lexical verb is based on a noun in a particular (absolutive) functor relation to it. The complementational requirements of the verb are thus satisfied internally, and there is no distinct absolutive phrase for the free absolutive to be associated with. Its requirement for a dependent determinative is satisfied by an ‘empty’ pronoun. The configuration in (39) contains only one adjunction relation, and that involves the free absolutive, which is not even subcategorized for.
(37a) and (40), on the other hand, illustrate functional categories that are given independent expression as words, manifested as the successive adjunctions to the right of {P}:

\[
(40) \quad \{P\} \\
\quad \{\{\text{abs}\}\} : : \{\{\text{loc}\}\} \\
\quad \{\{\text{def}\}\} : : \{\{\text{def}\}\} \\
\quad \{N;P\} : : \{N;P\} \\
\quad \text{camels} \quad \text{may} \quad \text{live} \quad \text{in} \quad \text{the} \quad \text{desert}
\]

May, in, and the realize syntactically independent functional categories; their requirements, under redundancies (14), (20), and (21), are satisfied externally. (40) ignores the secondary modality feature(s) on {P}, just as we have so far ignored most other features of secondary categories except the functoral ones, which are crucially involved in subcategorization of predicators. Again, the hierarchically highest functor of {P;N}—absolutive outranks locative—is associated with the free absolutive of {P}. Again, attachment to a free absolutive of {P} of the functor phrase highest on the subject-selection hierarchy in the subordinate predication constitutes the content of syntactic subject formation, which neutralizes expression of the semantic relation—and in English is associated with the placing of a complement in an uncharacteristic pre-verbal position.

The independence of the {P} and {P;N} of (40), combined with the status of camels as a subcategorized-for argument of live, is reflected in the co-reference relations evident in (41):

\[
(41) \quad \text{Camels may live in the desert but I do not believe so}
\]

The antecedent of so is ‘camels live in the desert’, the lower predication in (40) and (41), which takes camels as an argument.

This concludes the substance of our brief survey of the role of categories in the projection of predicational structures. However, there are some other aspects of syntactic structure that are appealed to in the account of the syntax of names in Chapter 8; these are the topic of the subsections that follow. Contemplation of these should also clarify further aspects of the mechanisms we have just been looking at.
The structures we have considered form the syntactic skeleton for an independent sentence. The variety of possible combinations of functors that can form well-formed subcategorizational frames—so far we have encountered only absolutive alone, (37), and absolutive combined with ergative, (38), and locative, (40)—adds further variety. But these structures can be more drastically extended, and reiterated, in two main ways (apart from by coordination, which we need not be concerned with, given our specific concern here): firstly, by the capacity of verbals in particular to be subcategorized—for verbals, both finite and non-finite (as well as the capacity of verbals to complement some functors, as a specified option instead of the default nominal complement—which again I shall not pursue here);8 secondly, by the modification of verbals (by adjuncts) and nominals (by attributives).

Given their role in the representation of structures of name-assignment, or nomination, discussed in Chapter 8, I shall illustrate both of these ‘extensions’ as the concluding parts of this sketch of the envisaged interaction between categorization and syntax. A look at the first of these also enables us to round out the picture of the behaviour of free absolutes; and invocation of the second shows that we cannot identify dependency with subcategorization, even though all the adjunctive dependencies we have looked at so far are imposed by subcategorization. This should help to clarify the character of the grammatical framework within which is couched the analysis of names that is being suggested.

2.3.2 Extending sentence structure I: verbal complements

(42a) and (b) exemplify complementation of a verb by a finite and a non-finite verbal:

8 Some subordinate predications are introduced by obvious functors, as exemplified by those in (i):

(i) a. After John left, the party collapsed
   b. After leaving the party, John collapsed
   c. After ten o’clock, the party collapsed

Compare the nominal-complemented functor in (ic). The availability of (optional) subject position to a subordinate verbal construction illustrated by examples like (ii) leads Anderson (1997: §3.6) to suggest that these also contain (subordinate) verbs bearing a semantic relation:

(ii) a. That he could behave like that surprised her
   b. It surprised her (that) he could behave like that

Compare (42a), just below in the text, which has no subject-formed equivalent:

(42) a. It seemed (that) Bill liked music

See specifically Anderson (1997: §3.6.2) on the relation between presence of a functor and ‘factivity’. It seems too that a determinative intervenes between the functor and the verbal in (ii), thus satisfying redundancy (17).
a. It seemed (that) Bill liked music
b. Bill seemed to like music

As far as (42) are concerned, *seem* is subcategorized as in (43), as taking a complement where *P* is a predominant—that is, the complement may be finite or non-finite:

(43) \( \text{seem}: \{\text{P};\text{N}/\{\text{P} > \}\} \)

In the first sentence in (42), the subordinate structure, not being introduced by a functor, is not eligible for subject formation, which selects among functor phrases in accordance with the hierarchy of semantic relations carried by the functors, and there is no other complement; so once more an expletive item is introduced, as in (44):

(44) \[
\begin{array}{c}
\{\text{P}\} \\
\{\{\text{abs}\}\} \\
\{\text{P};\text{N}/\{\text{P} > \}\} \\
\{\{\text{abs}\}\} \\
\{\text{P}\} \\
\{\{\text{exp}\}\} \\
\{\text{P};\text{N}/\{\exp\}\{\text{abs}\}\} \\
\{\{\text{abs}\}\} \\
\{\text{P}\} \\
\{\text{N}\} \\
\{\text{N}\{\text{def}\}\} \\
\{\text{N};\text{P}\} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[\text{it seemed Bill liked music}\]

Here, the subordinate clause is finite, so the ‘experiencer’ argument of *like*, which outranks the absolutive, is hosted by the free absolutive of the {P} to which the {P;N} is subjoined.\(^9\) The subordinate clause satisfies the valency of

\(^9\) Thus, unlike the finite subordinates of note 8, *like* here does not bear a semantic relation to the upper verb. Experiencer is a ‘cover-term’ in relation to the localist account of functor (or semantic) relations of Anderson (1971; 1977; 2006b), wherein the semantic relations are limited to absolutive, ergative, locative, and ablative. In Anderson (2006b) these are decomposed as in (i) in relation to the localist dimension of direction (cf. Hjelmslev (1935/1937)):

(i) \[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{absolutive} & \text{ergative} & \text{locative} & \text{ablative} \\
\{\text{neutral}\} & \{\text{source}\} & \{\text{locative}\} & \{\text{locative}\{\text{source}\}\} \\
\end{array}
\]

In the case of ‘ergative’, ‘source’ is a first-order secondary feature; with ‘ablative’ it is second-order, indicated by the inner brackets. An ablative functor is thus represented as in (ii):

(ii) \[\{\{\text{loc}\{\text{source}\}\}\}\]

It is a spatial source; ergative is the source of the action.
the upper predicator. Both the \{P;N\} and the \{P\} components of seem require
the introduction of a free absolutive. The free absolutive of the \{P;N\} cannot
be satisfied by the free absolutive of the lower \{P\}; only the arguments of
lexical categories, which are non-finite, are available for being associated with
a higher free absolutive. Finite clauses are (paradoxically, perhaps) ‘complete’,
in this sense, while non-finite constructions are ‘incomplete’: in order for the
latter to occur in an independent sentence they need to depend, eventually, on
a \{P\}. This is allowed for rather directly, by subject formation, in (37–40). But
consider now sentence (42b).

Here, like is non-finite; it has not undergone (15); the \{P;N\} is not depend-
ent on a \{P\}. So the structure in (45) is projected:

(45) 
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\{P\} \\
\{\{abs\}\} & \{P;N/\{P>\}\} \\
\{\{abs\}\} & : & \{P;N/\{exp\}\{abs\}\} \\
\{\{exp\}\} & : & : & \{\{abs\}\} \\
\{N\} & : & : & \{N\{def\}\} \\
\{N;P\} & : & : & : \\
\{\text{Bill seemed to-like music}\} & : & : & : \\
\end{array}
\]

I ignore the status of to- (as well as the optional that of (42a)—for accounts,
see Anderson (1997: §3.6; 2006b: Chapter 11)). (45) illustrates the hosting of

If the predicator takes both \{locative\} and \{locative\{source\}\}, then the former is a ‘goal’ (of the
movement):

(iii) \{\{loc\{goal\}\}\}

Likewise if a predicator takes simultaneously both an ergative and an absolutive, then the latter is also
a ‘goal’ (of the action).

‘Experiencer’ is interpreted as \{erg,loc\}, i.e. a combination of two first-order features. Compare
\{loc\{source\}\} for ablative with \{source,loc\} (the order is irrelevant) for the ‘experiencer’. It is ergative as
‘source of the experience’ denoted by the predicator as well as its location. Another combination is
\{abs,erg\}, for ‘intransitive agentives’. Among other things, the localist interpretation of ‘experiencers’
simplifies the subject-selection hierarchy: see Anderson (2006b: §5.4.3) for a recent discussion. In the
text here I have used ‘experiencer’ alongside the terms of (i) for the convenience of familiarity.

Similarly, I shall persist here with the term partitive (abbreviated as ‘prt’), even though it may
plausibly be interpreted, along localist lines, as a source. Just as ergative marks the source of the action
with predicators, so partitive introduces the source of the subset/part designated by the determinative
it depends on (see again Anderson (1997: §3.7.1; 2006b: §6.4)).
the (lower-clause) experiencer by the free absolutive of a \{P;N\}, not of a \{P\}. This corresponds to traditional ‘raising’ rather than subject formation, though of course *Bill* ends up as subject of *seem* by virtue of the lower free absolutive then being hosted by the free absolutive of \{P\}. Subject formation and raising both involve the filling of a free absolutive; they differ in whether the absolutive depends on a \{P\} or a \{P;N\}.

This treatment of ‘raising’ is another manifestation of the non-invocation by this syntactic framework of ‘movement’ or ‘re-attachments’, or indeed (partially as a consequence) of ‘empty categories’. What is involved, instead, is addition of a possibly non-projective (‘tangling’) attachment licensed by the free absolutive.\(^{10}\) Non-projectivity, where, crudely, lines in the syntactic structure cross, has generally been eschewed by recent grammarians as insufficiently restrictive; but as deployed here, it is strictly limited to where there is argument-sharing involving a free absolutive. This seems to be preferable to indulgence in the excesses permitted by frameworks that violate inalterability of structure. The present interpretation of ‘raising’ conforms to the assumption that both sequence and structure are inalterable except by building; there is no ‘mutation’. Basic structures are built on the basis of the categorizations of the items involved. The introduction of free absolutive involves addition to a predicator of a dependency arc terminating in \{\{abs\}\}. Both raising and subject formation involve addition of association lines. The sequence of elements is determined (once and for all) by the overall structure, crucially the categorization.

It is worth observing further that in such a framework not all ‘raised’ elements also undergo subject formation, as is evident from the representation of (46a) given in (47):

(46) a. Some expected Bill to like music
    b. Bill was expected (by some) to like music

\(^{10}\) Anderson (1977: §3.4; 1992: §4.4; 1997: §3.3.1; 2006b: Chapter 11) and Böhm (1982: §3.1) argue that such an analysis is also appropriate for ‘control’ structures, as well as (Anderson 1997: §3.6.2) phenomena usually grouped under ‘wh-movement’ or its successors.

It has also been argued (see Anderson (2006b: Chapter 7), for instance), that the role of subjects in such phenomena encourages the routinization of subject formation (talked about here at the end of §2.3.2) whereby it embraces arguments that are not agentives (and not necessarily topical), while retaining a privileged position for agentives on the subject selection hierarchy. Subjects provide a convenient means of identifying the relation that it shares its determinative with the free absolutive: its identity with respect to any particular predicator remains determinate under subject formation, given the hierarchy. Even routinizations appeal to non-syntactic factors, in this case functional utility.
some expected Bill to-like music

In this case, Bill is raised to fill the free absolutive of expect, but this absolutive is outranked as potential subject by the experiencer for which expect is subcategorized. The free absolutive, dependent on a {P;N} and not a {P}, is serialized to the right of its head, as was the subcategorized-for {abs} in (38) in §2.3.1.

The raisee is subject only in the corresponding passive in (46b), where the experiencer has been (lexically) ‘incorporated’ (as anticipated in note 7) into the {P;N}, as shown in (48):

The lexical structure of the passive verb form shows the result of subjoining to it an experiencer with unspecified dependent {N}; the internal experiencer satisfies the verb’s valency in this respect. In the absence of a syntactically overt experiencer with expected, the free absolutive and its associated experiencer (dependent on like) form the subject. The (optional) by-phrase in (46b) is a type of adjunct, a type that is in apposition to an incorporated element:
adjunct and incorporated element are co-referential. Apposition and incorporation are relevant particularly to our concern with nominations in Chapter 8, where we shall look at their status more carefully. The representation of modifiers in general is the concern of what remains of this subsection.¹¹

Let us note finally here, however, that the incorporation in (48) is one type of inter-categorial lexical redundancy. We have already encountered another, in the form of the redundancies of (32), which we might describe rather as absorptions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(32)} & \quad \text{a.} & \quad \text{b.} & \quad \text{c.} \\
& \{ \{\text{prt}\} \} & \{N/\{\text{prt}\}\} & \{N\{\text{def}\}\} \\
& \{N,P\} \Leftrightarrow \{N,P\}, \Leftrightarrow \{N,P\}, \Leftrightarrow \{N,P\}
\end{align*}
\]

These serve to subjoin the basic category to another one, the one whose lexical form is signalled by the root, as with (27b), on a partitive interpretation:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(27) } \quad \text{b.} & \quad \{N/\{\text{prt}\}\} \\
& \{N,P\} \\
& : \\
& : \\
& \text{men}
\end{align*}
\]

With incorporations, the base has another category subjoined to it, as in (48). Absorptions often correspond to traditional relations of morphological derivation, including conversion, while incorporations may be reflected in inflectional forms, as in (48), or in forms like Greek *elpizume* ‘we hope’, where the verb has incorporated a functor-determinative complex realized by the person/number morphology.¹² We shall, however, revert to the absorption/incorporation distinction, as well as apposition, in Chapter 8.

¹¹ (48) and discussion of it here present a very oversimplified view of passives. For a recent discussion in a similar framework, and for references to earlier work, see especially Anderson (2006b: §12.2.2). However, the main point here is to illustrate modification and incorporation, which will figure in our discussion of the morphosyntax of names and related categories.

¹² The redundancy in this latter case is again, at least in origin, an interface redundancy rather than a purely lexical one. It is triggered by the lack of an overt (syntactic) argument to satisfy the valency of the verb, specifically the participant highest on the subject selection hierarchy. However, it often becomes routinized, as in Greek, where we find such incorporation even in the presence of an overt subject, as in (i):

\[
\text{(i) } \quad \text{oli i an\text{	ext{o}tropi elpizoun} all the people they hope}
\]

In this case it is purely lexical, with there being a requirement of agreement in such syntactic structures. But this need not concern us further here.
2.3.3 Extending sentence structure II: modification

Modifiers are not subcategorized for by the elements they modify; subcategorization by valency defines the head-complement relation, which is manifested in dependency. In a head-modifier relation it is the modifier that seeks a head of a particular category to modify. How this can be represented is illustrated by (49):

(49) \[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{John} \quad \text{read} \quad \text{it} \quad \text{in} \quad \text{London}
\end{array} \]

The backslash ‘\’ means ‘seeks to modify’; and the effect of this is for there to be introduced above the sought-for category, in this case ‘{P;N}’, a node of the same category as that category; so that we have two ‘{P;N}’s above read. The ‘duplicate’ node is represented as not introducing a free absolutive (but this need not concern us here). The modifier itself is adjoined to this new node, the upper ‘{P;N}’, as in (49). Thus, modification, like complementation, is manifested ultimately in dependency. In this way, dependency cannot be reduced to the head-complement relation, and thus to valency; there are at least these two motivations for introducing a dependency relation, complementation and modification.

Modification phenomena are another area that reveals the internal structure of words of complex category. Thus, modification of alternative heads seems to be associated with the frequently discussed ambiguity of (50), involving whether the referent is beautiful with respect to dancing, or simply beautiful (independent of how the dancing is rated):

(50) a beautiful dancer

This difference can be represented, as a first approximation, and in much simplified form (omitting functors, for instance), as in (51a) vs. (b):
The sense associated with (51a) can be paraphrased as ‘a beautiful person who dances’ vs. (51b) ‘a person who dances beautifully’. Let us refer to this latter as derived-noun modification, since the modification actually involves an adjunct to the verbal category that is part of the internal structure of the noun.13

Likewise, the same item can modify either \{P;N\} (as an adjunct) or \{P\} (as ‘disjunct’ or ‘conjunct’—on these terms see e.g. Quirk and Greenbaum (1973: Chapter 8)), as with hopefully in (52):

(52) We shall continue to travel hopefully

Often such a sequence would be disambiguated by intonation or punctuation. And many modifiers of verbals are dedicated adjuncts, or disjuncts, or conjuncts, as illustrated in (53):

(53) a. These days Bill’s parents are avoiding him (adjunct)

b. Funnily enough, Bill’s parents are avoiding him (disjunct)

c. Nevertheless, Bill’s parents are avoiding him (conjunct)

13 See here Anderson (1997: §2.3.1), where reference is made to Bolinger (1967), on ‘referent’ vs. ‘reference’ modification, to Siegel (1980), on ‘intersective’ vs. ‘non-intersective’ interpretations, and to Kamp (1975). However, the characterization offered here differs from that suggested in Anderson (1997: 306–7) for what I am calling here derived-noun modification (‘non-intersective’ or ‘reference’ modification). The representation suggested in this earlier work did not take advantage of the distinction between adjunct and attributive available with derived nouns, and proposed instead a curious modification of a functor.
All of these types of modification of verbals are common enough.

However, the non-relationality, or discreteness, of nouns is again reflected in the absence of modification of nouns as such, as modification is formulated here, apart from derived-noun modification—which latter, as we have noted, involves modification of (internal) \{P;N\} rather than \{N;P\}. The interpretation associated with (51b) is only available if the categorial structure for the noun contains a verbal component (whether or not the presence of the latter is overtly expressed morphologically); and it is an adjunct to this component that is the base for the modifier.

In distinguishing the senses of (50), we seem to have another manifestation of the adjunct/attributive distinction discussed in §1.1, where I associated attributives with modification of nouns. What we have here, though, is modification of \{N\}; attributives do not modify \{N;P\}. Moreover, I suggest that (51a) is appropriate only for ‘non-restrictive modifiers’, which add additional, non-identificatory, information concerning the referent. So-called ‘restrictive modification’, or ‘restrictive attributives’, in nominal structure does not involve modification at all. Let us look now at the basis for this claim, which is a lexical interpretation of the analysis suggested in Anderson (1976: Chapter IV). It again departs from the accounts offered in Anderson (1997; 2004c), wherein attributives are interpreted as simple modifiers—as is generally the case in the grammatical literature. This discrepancy also demands an explanation.

The motivations for re-interpreting ‘modification of nouns’ will be clearer if we fill in some of the functors (and secondary categories) missing from such representations as (51a). Such a representation, when fleshed out, offers a transparent structure for the ‘non-restrictive’ generic sense of (54a), as in (55):

(54) a. the volatile Greeks
    b. some barren mountains
    c. some of the barren mountains
    d. barren mountains

(55)  \{N\}
      \{N/{N;P}\} \{P:N\{N/\} \}
      \{N\}
      \{N;P\}
      the volatile Greeks
The modifier demands a head that is \(\{N/\}\). But consider (54b), which is ‘restrictive’ (not ‘non-restrictive’) and partitive (not generic).

(54b) involves, indeed, two partitive relations, on the most salient interpretation, since the ‘some’ that is referred to is a subset of ‘barren mountains’, and the ‘barren mountains’ are a subset of ‘mountains’. One of the partitive-taking \{N\}s is realized as \textit{some}; it governs a partitive phrase \textit{barren mountains}. But \textit{mountains} is in a partitive relation with \textit{barren}. This suggests a representation such as (56):

\[
(56) \quad \{N/\{\text{prt}\} \}
\]

\[
:\quad \{ \{\text{prt}\} \}
\]

\[
:\quad \{N/\{\text{prt}\} \}
\]

\[
:\quad \{P:N\} \quad \{ \{\text{prt}\} \}
\]

\[
:\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{\textit{some}} \quad \text{\textit{barren}} \quad \text{\textit{mountains}}
\]

The medial configuration is formed by the inter-categorial redundancy of (57), which converts an adjective into a partitive-taking determiner:

\[
(57) \quad \{N/\{\text{prt}\} \}
\]

\[
:\quad \{P:N\} \Leftrightarrow \{P:N\}
\]

Compare (17), repeated again, which allows nouns to function as determiners:

\[
(17) \quad \{N\}
\]

\[
:\quad \{N;P\} \Leftrightarrow \{N;P\}
\]

(57) is apparently a specialization of (17). But it is only one of a battery of attributive-creating redundancies that convert nouns, functors, and verbals, as well as adjectives, into attributives.

Before the definite in (54c) the upper partitive functor is overtly expressed:
some of the barren mountains

(Recall (31b) in §2.2.4 above.) And both partitives in the (non-generic) phrase in (54d) are covert:

\[
(59) \{N/{\text{prt}}\} \\
\mid \\
\{N/{\text{prt}}\} \\
\mid \\
\{P:N\} \{\text{prt}\} \\
\mid \\
\{N;P\} \\
\mid \\
\text{barren} \text{ mountains}
\]

An attributive partitive-taking \{N\} can be converted into another partitive-taking \{N\}, as shown to the left of (59).

Sometimes the lower partitive functor is made overt, as in the question form in (60):

\[
(60) \text{What sort of mountains?}
\]

Sort seeks a hyponym or an attributive in answer, including adjectival.

Unlike the modifier of (54a/55), the ‘restrictive’ attributive thus bears the same relation to a governing determiner as a noun does, and the attributive is in turn complemented by the noun. Attributives are categorially complex: forms that are in attributive function to a determiner are subjoined to covert
partitive-taking determiners. Such ‘stacking’ of partitive structures as we find in (59) is a crucial component in the expansion of determinative structures. This does not mean, however, that all sequences of adjectives are necessarily ‘stacked’ (in the sense of e.g. Stockwell, Schachter, and Partee (1973)), nor that there are not other factors involved in the formation of extended structures of this kind (see e.g. Bache (1978) on ‘premodifying adjectives’).  

Attributivization is thus not a kind of modification; the only modifiers of nominals are so-called ‘non-restrictive’ modifiers, which are modifiers of determiners. In some languages, however, there is apparently no such redundancy as (57), and the determinative is given separate syntactic expression, as in Albanian (61) (Morgan 1972: 68):

(61) a. джалі i miré boy.the AD good (‘the good boy’)  
    b. вазja e mirè e bukur  
   girl.the AD good AD beautiful (‘the beautiful good girl’)  

AD = attributive determiner, my label for what Morgan calls (neutrally) ‘connecting particle’ (otherwise the glosses are Morgan’s). Unsurprisingly for a determinative, the ‘particle’ also ‘agrees in case, number and gender, as well as definiteness, with the head noun’ (Morgan 1972: 66); part of this is what underlies the variation in form between (61a) and (b). The same ‘particle’ also occurs before relative clauses:

(62) qyteti nē tē cilin banote tē r jetén  
    city.the in AD REL lived all life  
   (‘the city in which she lived all her life’)  

(REL = relativizer.) It seems to be a general marker of attributivization—though this statement oversimplifies a complex situation (see e.g. Androutsopoulou (2001)).  

14 In Basque, the partitive-taking determinative of the attributive can be also marked as definite, as in (i):

(i) zuhaitz handia  
    tree big.the (‘the big tree’)  

It also carries functors, as in (ii):

(ii) zuhaitz handiaren  
    tree big.the.of (‘of the big tree’)  

In this case the partitive [N] to which the adjective is subjoined is itself (lexically) subjoined to a definite partitive which is itself governed by a functor—all of which is spelled out in the morphology. Much in the analysis of attributives in language is merely or scarcely touched on here.
We might represent (61a) as in (63), where I take the noun to agree with the ‘particle’ in definiteness, not vice versa, so the latter is interpreted as a definite partitive {N}:

\[(63) \quad \{N\{\text{def}}\}/\{\text{prt}\} \}
\{ \{\text{prt}\} \}
\{ \}
\{N\}
\{N\{\text{prt}\} \}
\{\text{P:N}\{N\{\text{prt}\} \}\}
\]

\end{verbatim}

(63) also interprets the adjective as a separate modifier of a partitive-taking \{N\} (compare non-partitive ‘non-restrictive’ modification). But there is still no noun modification as such.\(^\text{15}\)

These very last considerations, to do with nominal modification, may seem to have taken us quite far from our concern with the status of names. However, as intimated at various points, the characterization of such structures as we have looked at in §2.3 will be crucial in formulating the categorization and syntax of names in Chapter 8, as distinct from related categories, as well as being important in articulating the ‘derivational’ relationships between names and other categories in Chapter 9. And the revelation of determiners as, like other functional categories, both complement-taking and modifier-taking, already serves to isolate names and pronouns from both other determinatives (the determiners) and other functional categories in general: they are members of a functional category that do not behave in the ways associated with functional categories. We might associate this with their nominal (‘discrete’) character, which overrides among this subset of determinatives our normal expectations concerning functional categories.

\(^{15}\) The description of English attributives departs from the analysis of attributives offered in Anderson (1997: §3.7; 2004c), where attributives modify independent partitive \{N\}s or such \{N\}s with adjoined \{N;P\}. It offers instead, as indicated, a lexical interpretation of the analysis suggested by Anderson (1976: Chapter 4). The latter kind of analysis seems to be more appropriate to a language like Albanian, and other Balkan languages (see again Androutsopoulou (2001), on Albanian and Greek).
But other factors considered in what follows will combine with these observations to suggest something different.

2.4 Conclusion and prospect

Names present an interesting challenge to theories of grammar, and a crucial one for notional theories. As delineated in Chapter 1, this challenge resides in the discrepancy between their typical syntactic characterization in the literature, as a type of noun, more closely tied (if anything) to nouns than to pronouns, and certainly than to determiners/articles, and, on the other hand, the perceived distinctiveness—indeed, uniqueness—of their semantics compared with that of (other) members of lexical categories, including nouns. This is difficult to reconcile with the notionalist assumption that syntactic categories are identified by a necessary conjunction of semantics and syntax: that what characterizes a syntactic category is the prototypical distribution of its semantically prototypical members. Anderson (1997) suggests that names are no exception in this respect, however, and, accordingly, that names do not belong to the lexical category noun, but are more closely related to pronouns and determiners. The semantic set of ‘referring expressions’ is constituted by determinative-headed phrases, and this grouping is reflected in the distribu-
tional parallels among names, pronouns, and noun phrases. Lyon’s ‘definite referring expressions’ (recall §1.2) belong to a subcategory of these. And Kripke (1981 [1972]), for instance, groups together names and ‘definite descriptions’ as ‘designators’—though, as we have already observed, he also regards ‘terms for natural kinds’ as ‘rigid designators’ (and see further §5.2).

After some preliminary remarks on notional grammar (§2.1), §2.2 presented a system of notionally based syntactic categories which makes a fundamental distinction between lexical and functional categories. The latter, which may be expressed in various ways, and not necessarily as independent words (§2.2.2), include the category determinative. Anderson (1997) assigns names to this category. In §2.2.3, however, we looked especially in a preliminary way at the syntax of determiners (complemented determinatives rather than names), again in preparation for discussion of the place of names in the grammatical system.

With the same motivation, §2.3.1 described the projection of the dependencies of syntactic structure from the categorizations and subcategorizations provided by the lexicon. There too are formulated some of the lexical redundancies that relate different categorizations of varying internal complexity, where the component categories of complexes are related by the dependency relation, but in this instance involving subjunction (absence of a linear
difference between head and dependent) rather than adjunction. The next subsections of §2.3 introduced extensions to basic sentence structure. Relevant to the later discussion of the structure of nomination was the description (in §2.3.2) of the syntax of lexical categories, particularly verbs, that are dependent on other lexical categories. Of particular relevance is also modification, whereby a category seeks to modify a particular category of head. As indicated in §2.3.3, each of these aspects of lexicon and syntax has a role to play in establishing, in an explicit way, the place of the name in the system of syntactic categories and an account of its basic syntax. This last subsection also offered the perhaps surprising suggestion that nouns as such are not modified.

This framework will not be fully exploited until Part III, but even Part II benefits from being read against this background. Chapter 7 looks in some detail at the distribution and meaning of various syntactic classes in relation to the issue defined by the opposing views of the status of names we sampled in Chapter 1. And Chapter 8 proceeds to articulate a detailed account of the categorization and syntax of names and other categories on the basis of the dependency representations outlined in §2.3, and to argue for the general appropriateness of these in the light of the discussion in Chapter 7. Similarly, Chapter 9, using the same categorial framework, formulates some of the lexical regularities involving names and other (lexical) categories of word, which I shall distinguish from names as common words. These relationships include traditional ‘derivational’ relations, some of which have been alluded to in the preceding sections and interpreted as involving inter-categorial redundancies. The notional framework outlined in this and the preceding chapter is largely based on Anderson (1997; 2003a; 2004c), but both in Part II and Part III I shall offer some new suggestions that increasingly modify and extend the views offered in these works.

However, the study of names also presents another sort of challenge. And this concerns the diversity of perspectives from which they have been viewed, combined with the comparative isolation from each other of the different traditions that have developed. Part II, therefore, is devoted to a look at some of the main conclusions to be drawn from these traditions. This ‘look’ is not comprehensive, either in its treatment of each tradition, or in the range of traditions that is considered. I have drawn on work that I am aware of as being most relevant to an understanding of the grammar of names. The diversity of views that emerges from this Part will clearly also form an important input to the discussion of the status of names that follows. Various philosophical, cultural, and linguistic, as well as specifically onomastic, traditions have much to contribute to our understanding of names. And another claimed aspect of
the notionalist view is that such an approach provides a framework that serves to allow some integration of work from these different fields of inquiry, which have too often been pursued in relative isolation. In this way, the proposed analyses and their background should be informative for workers in each of these fields, in particular.

I turn now to a critical, though selective, review of work emanating from these different kinds of research programme, before offering, in Part III, a formulation of the grammar of names that, as I have indicated, and as influenced by the views looked at in Part II as well as fresh work of my own, will differ in some significant respects from that described in Anderson (1997; 2003a; 2004c).
Part II
Approaches to the Study of Names
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Prelude to a survey of name studies

Despite the very general title of this chapter, I shall be surveying in Part II only work that seems to me to contribute to our goal of gaining further understanding of the grammar of names. From this perspective, the study of names over the last few centuries can be very roughly divided into three great traditions. The first part of the following preamble to Part II is concerned with distinguishing these—as far as one can, since they do interact and indeed individual contributions straddle boundaries.

This is partly because focus on considerations of meaning characterizes all of these traditions. And even with a single tradition we encounter a diversity of views and terminologies concerning the study of meaning; and the confusions and attempts at the disentangling of the latter are multiplied when we try to embrace a cross-disciplinary approach, as is necessary here. Some of this will be unavoidable (as illustrated in what follows). However, this chapter also introduces, in §3.2, as a preliminary to looking at the different traditions of name study, what I think is a convenient and not too controversial terminology (largely drawn from Lyons (1977)) for distinguishing different aspects of meaning. I shall use this as my ‘vocabulary of reference’ in the chapters that follow.

3.1 The three traditions

One of the traditions that has been much concerned with names has been driven by traditional philosophical concerns with ‘connotation’ and ‘denotation’ (as Mill (1919 [1843])), sense and reference, particular and general terms, and truth, as well as, particularly more recently (see e.g. Zabeeh (1968), Kripke (1979b)), pragmatics; this last is central to the development and full exploitation of ‘model-theoretic’ semantics and its view of names.

Our concern in the present work is with the grammar of names, and with the extent to which their morphosyntax is semantically informed. Ideas emanating from various philosophical traditions provide relevant, possibly negative, considerations for any such notionalist account. Therefore one thing
we shall be concerned with in this Part is a brief survey of those discussions in these traditions that seem to me to be pertinent in this way to the pursuit of our objective. It will already be clear that my own interest and background in coming at names is as a grammarian. Our specific interest here in the grammar of names means that our look at the rich philosophical tradition concerned with names will be limited both in depth and breadth, with many philosophical considerations being glided over. But this tradition forces us to confront some sharply delineated issues in semantics that impinge immediately on the grammar of names. And, as already expressed, I believe that in the area of names especially, some attempts at understanding across traditional boundaries should be rewarding for all concerned. Such ‘philosophical’ work is the concern of Chapter 5.

Work within a second tradition, one which has often drawn on the philosophical tradition, and in recent years, at least, has to some extent impinged on the latter, has been concerned with the manifestation of names in different languages and is framed within different theoretical linguistic frameworks. However, most linguistic work has largely confined itself to the problematical semantics of names, and it is here in particular that it draws on the philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, for the same reasons as given in the previous paragraph, much of that work is also relevant to our enterprise. And, as I shall acknowledge more explicitly below, there is also a slowly growing body of work on the syntax of names in different languages.

However, because of the concentration of attention on the meaning of names, and because names are often simply assumed to be a subclass of noun, it is typically the case that little attention is paid in grammars of particular languages to the distinctiveness of names (and they may even not figure at all in the index to the grammar), unless some morphosyntactic stigma of namehood is sufficiently gross to demand attention. Thus, for instance, grammars of Hungarian are compelled to attend to the suffix -nak/-nek which attaches to names that, on the usual interpretation, complement verbs of nomination, as in (1a)—though, to be sure, it also attaches to non-name complements of such verbs, as in (1b):

\[(1)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{Én Ferinek fogom hívni} \\
& \text{I Frank I.shall call (him)} \\
& \text{('I shall call him Frank')} \\
\text{b. } & \text{Ezt szépnek mondják} \\
& \text{this beautiful they.call} \\
& \text{('They call this beautiful')} 
\end{align*}\]
Likewise, attention will be drawn, in passing, in grammars of such languages as Fijian to the ‘particle’ that accompanies personal names. But little attention is generally paid, particularly in more recent grammars, to the syntactic correlates of the more delicate notional subcategories of name provided by some grammars, unless one is particularly salient, such as the co-occurrence of some subcategories of name in English (such as river names) with the definite article, despite its frequent incompatibility with English names: cf. the Thames vs. the mountain name Scawfell, for example. All too typical is what is explicitly acknowledged by Fries: ‘In this book I have not dealt with proper names’ (1952: 120, fn. 4).

Likewise, with a few notable exceptions which I shall acknowledge as we proceed, until recently little theoretical attention in general linguistics has been paid to the morphosyntax of names (as bemoaned by e.g. Gary-Prieur (1994: 2–4)), despite the attention devoted to the semantics of names.

Moreover, as again already noted, concern with the syntax of names usually starts from the assumption that names are a (difficult to distinguish) sub-type of noun. Many scholars have offered ‘criteria’ for distinguishing names. But there has too often been too little awareness of the difficulties involved in wielding ‘criteria’, particularly in the absence of an explicit theory that shows why the particular ‘criteria’ should be regarded as ‘criterial’—and of what. And thus it remains unclear from most such accounts precisely what the character of the categorial—or other—distinction between names and nouns is, as opposed to their particular vs. general reference: is this a word class difference (contrary to what seems to be assumed, but almost never explicitly argued, by the tradition)? Are other categories related, notionally and/or distributionally, more to one of these two categories than the other? Are some nouns more name-like than others, and vice versa? And so on. The explicit arguments sometimes offered for the traditional view (that names are some sort of subclass of noun) are, as we shall see, inadequate. And some have even concluded that distributionally names are at best only marginally distinguishable from nouns (e.g. Sloat (1969), Gary-Prieur (1994))—but such conclusions are based on a rather crude concept of ‘distribution’, as we shall see.

It will be clear that it is my view that the syntax of names and its relation to meaning has been neglected compared with other aspects of their behaviour, to the detriment of the study of names in general. The problem posed by Kuryłowicz in summing up his discussion of names has been addressed only fitfully (1966: 370):

Les remarques précédentes ont le but de poser le problème grammatical du nom propre en le dégageant de la richesse déconcertante de points de vue et de considérations
d’ordre non-linguistique, qui tendent à occuper le premier plan dans les recherches onomastiques.

Be that as it may, the study of names in various grammatical frameworks and the observations that accrue from studies of a range of languages are the concern of Chapter 6; and much of value emerges therefrom.

The third tradition in name studies that confronts us is that which specifically focuses on names of different sorts, onomastics. This has often been construed as concerned only with the origins or etymologies of names (cf. e.g. the discussions in Part IV of Robinson (1993)), which certainly present their particular problems, compared with the etymologies of other words (see also e.g. Lass (1973), Morpurgo-Davies (2000)). This etymological focus is less prominent in some name studies, as in much recent work, such as the less onomastically oriented theories of names alluded to at the beginning of §6.1, or in some of the theoretical contributions to, say, Nicolaisen (1998: Vol. 1), discussed in §4.3. But inevitably a concern with meaning and pragmatics, with the functions of names and naming, predominates there too. But again the onomastic tradition, or traditions, as well as contributing to common themes to do with semantics and pragmatics, offers distinctive perspectives on the behaviour of names. In particular, along with other culturally informed studies, it may serve as a corrective to some of the limitations of other traditions, such as the neglect (in some philosophical work, for instance) of social, including ritual and magical (onomantic), conditions on naming and the use of names (see e.g. Lyons (1977: §7.5)), and the failure to recognize the variety of name types and name structures, and their functions in language use.

Each of these ‘great traditions’ leads us through primary occupations with aspects of the meaning and communicative function of names to where we can attempt to assess how these relate, if at all, to the morphosyntax of names, our focus of attention. It seems not inappropriate to start, in our look at all of them, with those studies whose primary concern, on the most salient interpretation, is with just names, onomastics. A consideration of the main points that emerge from this tradition that are pertinent to the grammar of names will therefore occupy us in the chapter that now follows1, which also serves to

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1 The chapter was to have been called ‘Names in onomastics’, until it struck me that this title was somewhat redundant, after the fashion of ‘Stars in astronomy’.

There is, however, even in the case of onomastics, as elsewhere, a familiar uncertainty concerning the scope of the term ‘name’. Thus, as observed in the preliminaries to Chapter 1, Coates (2002: 156) comments on a contribution to The Proceedings of The XIXth International Congress of Onomastic Sciences (Nicolaisen 1998):

Reminding us that onomastics may concern itself not only with proper names, P.R. Kitson’s abstract (167) deals with the problems of the study of Old English bird-names, …
introduce from a particular perspective many of the issues (re-)arising in the chapters that follow it.

As a final preliminary, though, it is also appropriate, as indicated, to outline a framework within which we can talk about questions of meaning, questions which have been fundamental to all three of the traditions I have distinguished. As emphasized above, this is particularly important in view of the terminological confusion in this area, as described, for instance, by Lyons (1977: Chapter 7).

3.2 A working framework for semantics

I adopt here the three-way distinction drawn by Lyons himself among **sense**, **reference**, and **denotation**. He illustrates the distinction between sense and reference as follows (1977: 200):

... on the one hand, what we take, pre-theoretically, to be non-synonymous expressions (like ‘my father’ and ‘that man over there’) can be used to refer to the same individual and, on the other hand, the same pre-theoretically non-ambiguous expression (like ‘my father’ or ‘that man over there’) may be employed to refer to distinct individuals.

Reference is an ‘utterance-bound’ relation: it holds between expressions in context and referents of these. This contrasts with both sense and denotation.

Consider now reference and denotation, as drawn in Lyons (1977: 208), and where ‘lexeme’ is roughly ‘vocabulary word’ (rather than word-form), or, better maybe, ‘lexical item’:

This apparently implies that onomastics embraces the study of (all) low-level noun hyponyms, at least, as well as names as understood here. This is not a usage I shall adopt. On the other hand, Landau (2001: 42) regards onomastics as ‘another fertile branch of lexicography’, without acknowledging that the dictionaries of names that he cites are etymological only.

Such competing claims are but one aspect of the complexities arising from the study of names. This is summed up by Bacchielli as follows (2005: 7):

The study of names... involves a large number of disciplines: linguistics, sociology, history, demography, ethnography, anthropology, literature, etc., but it is also a field fraught with difficulties and snare and far from easy to explore: think of the large and varied terminology, a real maze of terms, created to disentangle the complex situation one is faced with in the study of names: proper / first / personal / given / adopted / Christian name / forename / font-name, pet name / short name / pet name [sic], second name / middle name, last name / family name / surname, by-name / to-name, nickname / sobriquet / substitute name, makeshift or sham name, place-name / toponym, patronymic / metronymic, pseudonym / pen name / stage name / nom de plume / nom de guerre, eponym, epithet, double-barrelled name, oath-name, imperative name, ornamental name / arbitrary name, brand name / trademark / proprietary name, company name, fun name, namesake, metonym, etc. Do we actually know the social, cultural, and juridical implications of all these terms?

Here I have tried to focus on those traditions that seem to have most to offer to the grammarian, as well as to negotiate the ‘maze’ of terminology and the tangle of competing concepts. Bacchielli also provides a brief but extensive catalogue of structural types manifesting names, only a few of which I shall be able to touch on here.
...reference is an utterance-bound relation and does not hold of lexemes as such, but of expressions in context. Denotation, on the other hand, like sense, is a relation that applies to lexemes and applies independently of particular occasions of utterance. Consider, for example, a word like ‘cow’ in English. Phrases like ‘the cow’, ‘John’s cow’, or ‘those three cows over there’ may be used to refer to individuals, but the word ‘cow’ alone cannot. Now the reference of phrases which contain ‘cow’ is determined, in part, by the denotation of ‘cow’. For example, the phrase ‘this cow’ may, in certain circumstances, be understood by the hearer to mean ‘the object near us which belongs to the class of objects that “cow” denotes’.


It is obvious enough that the relationship between two lexemes, like ‘cow’ and ‘animal’, is to be distinguished from the relationship that either of these lexemes bears to the class of objects it denotes: the relationship between a linguistic entity and something outside the linguistic system.

He argues that, though these relations are obviously ‘interdependent’, ‘they are equally basic’ (1977: 211). And this will indeed have some relevance to the ensuing discussion of names.

Lyons (1977: Chapter 7) acknowledges, and indeed addresses, some of the questions this terminology raises, both in itself and in its relationship to the plethora of other terminologies. However, what is important for our present purposes is principally the distinction between the utterance-bound relation of reference and the other, context-independent two. The referential act belongs to the pragmatic domain. Also relevant, however, will be the distinction between the language-system-internal relation of sense and those (denotation and reference) which involve relation across the intra-/extra-linguistic divide. What the latter share I shall refer to as designation. Mill’s ‘connotation’ (recall §1.2), to which we shall return in §5.1, roughly corresponds to sense. And, in terms of designation, we can extend our characterization of names vs. nouns by saying that, from a Millian perspective, provided we restrict reference to determinatives (as argued in Chapter 2), nouns involve denotation only and names, unlike other ‘referring expressions’, involve reference only.

As just acknowledged, these concepts, and particularly ‘sense’, remain a contentious area (cf. e.g. Burge (1973); Kaplan (1989a, b)). However, what seems to me important for an understanding of the use of names in language is that we take ‘sense’ to involve relations between semantically defined classes of words in the mental lexicon of language users (no matter how inadequate, and variable, are the actual definitions that users can offer). In relation to the lexicon, in what follows I shall invoke a difference between lexical and encyclopaedic
knowledge. And this affects my understanding of ‘sense’. ‘Sense’ is defined by the ‘sense relations’ (Lyons 1977: 203–6)—i.e. ‘opposition’ (of different kinds), ‘hyponymy’, etc.—that lexical items enter into (Lyons 1977: Chapter 9; Persson 1990); and this constitutes what I am calling ‘lexical knowledge’. Distinctions in what I’m calling ‘lexical’ knowledge are reflected in linguistic generalizations, besides ‘sense relations’, syntagmatic (Lyons 1977: §8.5) as well as paradigmatic: concord, rection, valency, etc. The ‘encyclopaedic’ knowledge that concerns us, on the other hand, is, in short, beliefs about the ‘real’ and other (fictitious) worlds that attaches to particular denotata or referents.

Making a differentiation between lexical and encyclopaedic knowledge does not necessarily imply that there is a sharp distinction between the two. Indeed, all lexical knowledge that is not totally desemanticized is encyclopaedic; ‘sense relations’ reflect knowledge of the world. However, all of what I shall refer to as ‘encyclopaedic’ knowledge is not embodied in individual lexical items of the language and the ‘sense relations’ they enter into; but a particular item can be a mental ‘address’ for information relating to the denotata or the reference (in the case of names) of the item; and this information may be more or less difficult to describe ‘periphrastically’. As stated, I shall understand ‘sense’ in what follows as pertaining to lexical knowledge. This will, of course, present at least terminological problems.

Let me try out a simple illustration of the intended distinction. One of the (few) Berties I ever refer to has a referent about whom I believe that he would give energetic support to a Society for the Abolition of Aunts (his surname is ‘Wooster’). The potential for such support could be said to be part of my ‘concept’ of that name-referent unit, but it is not part of its sense, whatever sense it might have. For the Millian, the name has no sense. Adherents of what I shall describe as a ‘modified Millian’ position, who allow that names have minimal sense, would attribute to the name ‘Bertie’ the sense ‘human, male’, shared with many other names, but contrasting in this respect with ‘Fido’ and ‘Gertie’; and they would recognize a hypocoristic relation with names such as ‘Bertram’, ‘Bertrand’, and ‘Albert’, and, in this particular case, a ‘co-referential’ relation with uses of ‘Bertie Wooster’, ‘Mr.Wooster’ etc. But the referent’s enthusiasm for a certain potential Society is (under either ‘Millian’ interpretation) not part of the sense of the name.

Likewise, for a time all the referents of the word ‘automobile’ that I was familiar with were powered by petrol (including diesel). When a little older I learned that there were steam-powered automobiles, and later that there were electric-powered. These expansions in my world view did not involve a change in my sense of ‘automobile’, merely a modification in my ‘mental encyclopaedia’. The discovery of alternative sources of power for automobiles
need not disturb the sense of ‘automobile’. This is not to say that delimiting the sense of ‘automobile’ (or anything else) is straightforward: I do not think I would accept the syntagm *wind-powered automobile*, for instance—but others would no doubt differ on this.

With lowest-level hyponyms, such as so-called ‘bird names’, more generally ‘terms for natural kinds’, the sense components differentiating between the nouns involved become more difficult to specify, closer to encyclopaedic knowledge, and more variable in interpretations of their sense. Thus for some speakers, the sense of *whale* involves what they would call ‘fish’, whereas others adopt the more prestigious sense whereby *whale* is not so characterized. This richness of lexical and encyclopaedic detail in part underlies the confusion between ‘bird names’ and names; names are typically also associated with encyclopaedic (but not lexical) detail. But, crucially, as we have seen, names refer to individual entities, nouns of any kind denote classes of entities. Talk of names in terms of ‘one-member classes’ in this connection (as with Brendler (2005), apparently enthused by the wonders of set theory) merely confuses things.

We can also distinguish various kinds of reference, including definite and indefinite reference, and generic reference. These need not concern us at this point. But, from such a perspective, we can at least roughly characterize prototypical names, when they are used as arguments, as necessarily referring to definite individuals; and this is part of their entry in the mental lexicon; it is what distinguishes different entities with the same name. Whether names also have sense is a different question. Nouns, which have sense, never refer to definite individuals; indeed, in terms of the framework introduced in the last chapter, and as implied by Lyons’ discussion of the noun ‘cow’ (1977: 208), they never refer.

In terms of that framework, reference is associated with determinatives, pronouns, determiners and names, including non-overt determinatives, which, as one manifestation of a functional category, can be realized simultaneously with a noun. Recall the discussion in §2.2, where the definite reference in (2.22), with distinct determinative, contrasts with the indefinite reference in (2.23), where the noun is subjoined to the determinative:

(2.22) \[
\{N/\{N;P}\}
\]

\[
::
\]

\[
::\{N;P\}
\]

\[
:::
\]

\[
:::
\]

\[
\text{the lion}
\]
Either of these may be generic or not, but the definiteness of reference or lack of it is associated with the determinative.

As a counterbalance to acknowledgment of the various problematical areas that remain in any semantic terminology, let us illustrate further the kind of non-problem that the use of Lyons’ distinctions avoids. Seppänen contends (1974: 34):

All the evidence cited points to the conclusion that proper names of identical phonological shape are treated as distinct items in the same way as are homonymous common nouns and thus it leads to a recognition of homonymy also between two or more proper names. . . . it is also misleading to speak of proper names as shifting their denotation from context to context. Quite the contrary, it is common names that can shift their denotation because they are names given to objects of a certain kind.

I am not concerned here with the ‘homonymy’ suggestion (which is perhaps simply terminological, though I find it misleading—see Chapter 5, note 3) but with the non-issue concerning ‘shifting denotation’. Neither names nor nouns ‘shift denotation’ in terms of the framework outlined here.

Names, in (largely) lacking sense, do not denote (though they are associated with more or less encyclopaedic information); and nouns (as opposed to noun forms—inflectionally variable) do not change their sense from context to context (except from an evolutionary perspective), and they denote the same class of entities. That is to say, nouns may ‘contract’ or ‘expand’ the detail of their perceived denotation, a difference in focus conditioned by context, so that a particular context may encourage a particular detail of interpretation of, say, the noun hammer (depending on whether one is in a carpenter’s or gunsmith’s, perhaps). But abrupt ‘shifts’ involve different (though perhaps related) nouns with different senses but with the same form (homonymy). However, names, even if they may be associated with sense (as suggested in what follows), do not denote; whatever sense they have does not shift. And it is not ‘exhaustive’, so that any particular name does not denote a corresponding class of individuals. Contrast a name like Joan with a noun like woman: the latter might have its sense roughly characterized as ‘human, female, possibly adult’, and the sense of Joan might be ‘human, female’; but though woman denotes the set of (adult) female humans, Joan does not, in that only
some women are designated Joan. Names do not designate sets, merely individuals that may share certain elements of sense. So they cannot change denotation. Names can in a way ‘shift referents’, however, given that the lexicon provides alternative referents for say Joan (as formulated in §5.2 below and subsequently), but nouns do not shift referents, as well as not ‘shifting denotation’, except as part of a determinative phrase, where the ‘shifting’ of reference is performed by the determinative and its dependent description.

So much for the prelude to our survey of work on names. Such a survey has, if nothing else, the benefit of inducing a humility concerning her/his own enterprise in anyone confronting the task of investigating names, humility both in relation to the range and quality of work that has been done on names and in face of the glimpses this work gives into the subtle complexities of the roles of names and naming.
Onomastics

This chapter, despite (once more) the generality of the title, is concerned specifically with what I see as the contribution of onomastic studies to our understanding of the grammar of names. The preamble, §4.1, dwells on manifestations of the continuing human fascination with the ‘meaning’ of names, where what is meant by ‘meaning’ is usually their etymology, their possible common-word sources, and where this ‘meaning’ can be invested with significance including an onomantic role. The development of systematic onomastics in the nineteenth century can be seen as in part a further manifestation of this preoccupation with etymology, though systematized in accordance with the dominant, ‘neo-grammarian’ ideas of the time concerning the development of language. Such concerns, as well as onomasts’ interest in the uses to which names and naming are put, are one continuing aspect of the controversies over the meaning of names.

§4.2 is devoted to traditional onomastics and its etymological orientation. From these studies there also developed, however, ideas about the distinctive structure of names and the systems of naming that determine the components of names. Also important is the recognition that in many names, particularly place names, common-word components remain transparent, synchronically accessible, and presumably, therefore, potentially part of the lexical representation of the name, not merely an etymology. Naming and the use of names can serve various functions, and this may be reflected in our knowledge concerning a particular name-referent. All of these aspects in particular must be taken into account in a grammar of names.

Subsequent developments, particularly in the latter half of the twentieth century, served to extend the empirical base of name studies, which provided documentation of a wide range of different functions for naming and a variety of systems of naming and of name structures. I point to just some of this in §4.3. But that section recognizes too that there has also been generated among onomasts a continuing debate on the theory of names, which is of particular concern here. Firstly, however, I glance at the context of interest in the ‘meaning’ of names in which traditional onomastics developed.
4.1 Preamble

From ancient times, scholars and authors in particular have been concerned with the etymology of names, or rather their relationship to their non-name sources. I shall use the term name etymologies in this special sense. When these etymologies are viewed by a community as ‘meanings’, they can assume considerable cultural significance. Consider, for example, as a substantial earlier manifestation of ‘communal’ etymologizing, the rich Roman and medieval European tradition of invoking name ‘meanings’ for exegetical, literary, and magical purposes that is described by Robinson (1993: Part IV). The core of this tradition depends in part on the literacy and multilingualism of the (sub-)societies involved.

Robinson concludes a plea for more attention to ‘Anglo-Saxon onomastics’ thus (1993: 217–8):

Far too much attention was accorded to onomastics by the Anglo-Saxons for the poetic results to be limited to an occasional adventitious subtlety or a random epithet. But in approaching all these questions, it seems above all important that we bear in mind the essential difference between the literary onomastics of the Anglo-Saxons and that of our own writers today. Their precedents then were the sacral etymologies of the Bible, the commentaries of the Fathers, the exuberant interpretations of Isidore and the Irish writings, all of which encouraged a learned searching out of etymological significance in names received from tradition. Our own precedents, by contrast, are the explicit, moralizing names of late medieval drama and the comic sobriquets of Congreve or Dickens. On the whole, their tradition was subtle, learned, and artful, while ours tends to be spontaneous and obvious.

It must be observed, however, that the medieval tradition and modern literary practices are both very specialized domains, parasitic upon specialist knowledge, and that the general evolution of names in European societies is towards de-semanticization, of individual names and in the system itself—except in regard to some popular name-selection practices.

Nevertheless, the variety of cultural areas in medieval Europe in which the ‘meaning’ of names is invoked is striking. Often, supposed etymologies were the basis for word-play. Thus the name of Alain de Lille (the author of the Anticlaudianus—see e.g. Curtius (1953 [1948]: Chapter 6, §4)) becomes in Latin, via a punning ‘etymology’, Alanus ab Insulis. But this is just a surface reflection of a scholarly society in which ‘etymology was not a minor philological interest, but rather a dominant mode of thought’ (Robinson 1993: 185). And this did not just concern name etymologies. Curtius (1953: 43) presents a translation of Isidore of Seville’s formulation of etymology as a part of
grammar thus: ‘For if you know the origin of a word, you more quickly understand its force. Everything can be more clearly apprehended when its etymology is known.’ But in practice, as Curtius observes (1953: 43–4): ‘Since, however, all things are not named in accordance with their “nature”, and many, indeed, entirely arbitrarily, not all words can be etymologized’. Names figure prominently in the work inspired by the fundamental status accorded to etymology underlying Isidore’s declaration—for instance, and notably, in biblical exegesis (see e.g. Robinson (1993: 186–92)), where the names of protagonists (in particular) may be accorded various levels of exegetical significance. And this is but one illustration of the recurrence of recourse to the ‘meaning’ of names in various contexts and times.

Thus, in still another sphere (though still medieval), Smart, in looking at the names on (Anglo-Saxon) coins of the moneyer responsible for them, identifies Pitit and Litelman, the latter of whom ‘appears to shadow Pitit in time and place’, as belonging to the same person (2002: 135). She posits the following scenario (2002: 137):

A young continental with some experience in minting comes to England around the 920s like several others, to assist the expansion of the English coinage. At first he uses his French name Pitit, but his colleagues discover the meaning of this and dub him Litelman, or he adopts the name himself. For a few years he uses both names, then after having lived here for some thirty years and being well and truly settled, he drops Pitit and becomes solely Litelman.

This too involves attributing ‘meanings’ to names on the part of the participants in the scenario.

At various periods in the history of English name-giving has had a very special significance by virtue of the ‘meanings’ of names. Name-givers may wish to attribute qualities to the namees by their choice of name (Modesty, Patience, Felicity, etc.). Smith-Bannister comments in his study of names in early modern England: ‘Children were named and supposed to act accordingly’ (1997: 13). Or names have been supposed to provide namees with protection, as well as figuring in other, more abstruse necromantic practices (Smith-Bannister (1997: 13–14), who cites Thorndyke (1941a: 661; 1941b: 147, 169; 1958: 269, 509)). There persist to the present day books, dictionaries, of ‘meanings of names’ for prospective name-givers (Smith-Bannister 1997: 12). And popular concern with this is reflected in the (apparently profoundly anti-Millian) common enquiry: ‘What does your name mean?’.

There is also much (continuing) evidence of pervasive ‘folk-etymologizing’, or, to use a possibly less dismissive term, re-motivation (Gendron (1998), where there is also cited the term ‘étymologie vivante’ of Gilliéron (1922)).
This is particularly prevalent with place names. Indeed, Cottle concludes his chapter on place names with the observation that ‘local folk etymology is often grotesque, as when an old man at Haltwhistle (Northumberland) insisted on telling me that it was so named because the leader of an invading Scots troop said to his men, “Halt! I hear a whistle” ’ (1983: 172). As Nicolaisen observes (2001: 8): ‘Making the meaningless meaningful may be a strong folk-etymological motivation observable in all languages at all times’. It seems to me that the role of such re-motivation deserves still more serious investigation, whatever one thinks of Kallasmaa’s tentative suggestion that ‘it could even be speculated that the development of a name is nothing but a chain of successive folk etymologies’ (1998: 232).

Concerning etymologizing, Nicolaisen immediately goes on to say that ‘however, it does not improve the name’s ability to function, or increase its usefulness’. The relative commonness of these various ‘meaning-based’ motivations for assigning names does not mean that in the normal use of names they can be said to ‘have meaning’. Colman (in preparation: Chapter 2) comments on the *Pitit/Litelman* example discussed by Smart (2002), and mentioned above:

...by citing Smart’s reference to the ‘meaning’ of the name, I am not suggesting that either *Pitit* or *Litelman* are to be taken literally as connoting *small man*. Rather, this seems to me an example of ‘naturalisation’ of a name in a culture where etymology was in the air;...

Motivations for naming are irrelevant to the identificatory function of names as arguments in predications. Typically, knowledge of the etymology fades, as usually does allusion to it, except by nagging relatives, perhaps. In many western societies, despite recurrent outbreaks of interest among sections of society in the ‘meaning’ of names, for the speakers of a particular language there often exists a pool of names that may be accorded to persons, distinct from common words and often not synchronically related, except playfully or mystically, to any common-word cognates there may be. The identificatory function often tends to predominate in language use.

Thus, names may become etymologically opaque in various ways (on such developments in earlier English, see e.g. Coates (1987); Clark (1991); Colman 1992: Chapter 2, §9)), and still function as names. The irrelevance of etymology, and thus, apparently, of any sense, to the normal functioning of a name no doubt encourages developments in the phonology of names that can involve ‘processes’ not found or less common in common words, which contribute to etymological opacity (cf. e.g. Mithun (1984: 51); Clark (1992a: §7.1.1)): ‘natural processes’ are less inhibited by concerns with obscuring
etymological sense. Thus, for instance, Welna (2005: 82) finds that loss in
Middle English of a final [d] following [n] occurs ‘first in compounds, usually
place names and proper names’, as in Stran-ton for Strand- (2005: 77).

On the other hand, the social importance of names can lead to ‘interven-
tions’ in their ‘normal’ development, since ‘people are more aware of what
happens to names than of what happens to other lexical items’—Morpurgo-
Davies (2000: 23), who illustrates this with:

Consider, for instance, the name of King Nikoklewes of Paphos in Cyprus, who died c.
309 BC. He belongs to a period when intervocalic [w] tends to disappear. One of his
syllabic inscriptions...has the form ne-a-se...and not the expected *ne-wa-se; in
another...his father is given the title (in the genitive) of pa-si-le-o-se...and not pa-si-
le-wo-se. Yet all his syllabic inscriptions have the form ni-ko-ke-le-we-se or (in the
genitive) ni-ko-ke-le-we-o-se....To the linguist it looks as if phonological change has
been deliberately suspended, but that is not the case; sound change goes on, but an
older form of the name has been preserved or revived.

Morpurgo-Davies also notes developments due to shifts in the status of
different dialects within the community.

But opacity is particularly obvious when names are ‘imported’ from other
systems, as with many modern personal names in English, or when they
remain as testimony to a system no longer used in the society, as with many
Scottish place names (cf. Nicolaisen (2001: 7–8), on the Cumbric-derived
town name Melrose). Such circumstances can also, of course, given the
persistent interest in ‘making the meaningless meaningful’, encourage the
formulation of ‘folk etymologies’, as in one stage in the (unusually well-
documented) development of the Scottish town name Falkirk, which occupies
provides a rather striking example where migrants into Vermont from
Saint-Athanase in French-speaking Canada are represented in the town
records of Burlington, Vermont, as having come from ‘Saint At-The-North,
Canada’.

For the scholar of no-longer-attested name systems, this mutability of name
forms, as well as the relative inscrutability of naming practices and of the
history of the naming of an individual, renders hazardous such scholars’
speculations about what constitutes a more or less likely name to be assigned
to an individual. What does one make of Puritan names like Damned Bare-
bones, for instance, without the information that this particular instance
results from the abbreviation of a pious quotation which had been given as
the baptismal name, namely ‘if-Christ-had-not-died-for-you-you-had-been-
damned-barebones’? (Bowman 1932: 91).
It is unsurprising, however, given the connections that can be made between names and common words, and the pervasive interest in finding in this link a ‘meaning’ for names, that pre-twentieth-century, and much of twentieth-century, onomastics has been predominantly diachronic, etymological, in orientation. And this was encouraged by the historical, and phylogenetic, cast of the empirical work on comparative linguistics that gradually took more precise forms from the renaissance into the nineteenth century, a tradition in which the early systematic onomasts grew up.

4.2 Traditional onomastics

Nineteenth-century onomastics was largely concerned with the sources of names in the Indo-European languages and the common structural principles that they appeared to share. But these concerns had important results not just for understanding the history of names, and indeed of the languages in general, given the etymological connection between name and common word and the partially distinct (and less inhibited) phonological development of names (Colman 1992), but also for any concern with the grammar of names. For they led to scholarly recognition that names in different languages can have different internal structure and that names and their components may have a system and structure distinct from those associated with other categories, and independent of their sources.

4.2.1 Naming systems and name structure

As concerns structure, by the last quarter of the nineteenth century studies of Indo-European names recognized a division among them into ‘compounded’, or dithematic, names, composed of two elements each of which can in principle be associated with a common word, and ‘uncompounded’, or monothematic, names. Some of these latter are apparently ‘shortened’ forms of dithematic. But some seem to be plausibly interpreted as (what are often called) ‘bynames’, in origin additional, more overtly descriptive, names (such as, at a later period, the sources of Modern English surnames like Baker, Little), or as names based on other names (as Greco-Latin Apollonius), or lall names (names originating in child speech or imitations thereof—cf. Morpurgo-Davies (2000: 22)). However, making these distinctions in individual cases is a treacherous enterprise. A ‘byname’ or lall name may (eventually) supplant a name given in accordance with the institutionalized onomastic system, just as a shortened form may. This is one aspect of the problem of tracing the source of monothematic names, intensified by the fact that the names of the (dithematic) system have common-word cognates, as I shall illustrate below.
There developed among early onomastic studies a recognition that there were more, and a greater variety of, monothematic names than had been allowed for. However, these early studies (discussed by Redin (1919)—see too the critical remarks of Pulgram (1954: 10–11)) are but the beginning of a controversy concerning the origins of monothematic names that to some extent and in various forms still continues (see e.g. Kaleta (1998), on the proposal that early Indo-European names reflect social class—it is aristocrats who bear dithemes). This is a controversy that need not concern us here in any detail (see, however, Colman (in preparation: Chapter 2)), but illustration of some of the problems involved is perhaps in order.

Consider Colman’s comments (in a personal communication) on the traditional ‘neo-grammarians’ assumption of a dithematic source for short forms in general:

It does not allow, for instance, for the possibility of a name such as OE Babba, spelled also <Baba>, to be a name based on a ‘nursery word’; in such ‘lall’ words, alternations between single and geminate medial consonants is a phenomenon attested in many languages. The gemination is associated with some affective signification, such as diminutive, or affectionate, or the opposite. It is not the result of a phonologically conditioned, regular, sound-change. Compare the typical neogrammarian etymological ‘derivation’ of this name from a two-theme Germanic name beginning with an element such as badu ‘war, dispute’, and followed by an element with initial /b/, such as bald ‘bold’. Thus the doubled consonant in <Babba> is explained by the plausible phonological process of assimilation between /d/ and /b/, to give /bb/. But this would not account for the single consonant spelled <b>. Nor does a strictly etymological approach allow for the vagaries of nick-names;…

(Cf. Redin (1919: xxxiv).) What is more directly relevant for us, however, is the recognition in such studies of a distinctive internal structure for (some) names; this is not to be obscured by the fact that it is sometimes difficult to determine in particular instances whether this structure is to be applied to their sources or simply to the names.

As concerns structure, describing the dithematic names as ‘compounded’ is slightly misleading. For, whatever may have originally been the case in the parent Indo-European system these combinations often do not correspond to common-word compounds or conform to the regularities governing the latter. Certainly, Anglo-Saxon names, both simplex and bipartite, usually have rather transparent common-word cognates (nouns and adjectives, in this case) which again, presumably, are their historical sources: e.g. Hild, cf. hild ‘war’, Godwine, cf. god ‘good’, wine ‘friend’. But individual recorded Anglo-Saxon nominations in the historical period do not seem to reflect an intention to represent, by use of particular elements, personal characteristics
or circumstances of the nominee, but rather reflect attempts, if anything, to indicate kinship in terms of variations with a shared element or at least alliteration of initial elements (Clark 1992a: 458): cf. the related West Saxon royal names Cerdic, Cynric, Ceawlin, Cuða, Ceadda, Cenbeorht, Ceadwalla. Such attempts are at best inconsistently pursued by the late Old English period (Colman 1992: 26). But they are themselves difficult to reconcile with any other kind of ‘characterizing’, or descriptive, function for Old English name formations. And names like Dagnieht ‘day-night’ (Colman 1992: 26) are difficult to associate with such a function, even at the point of the first such nomination. All of this underlies Clark’s pronouncement that ‘the combining of themes into compounds was ruled by onomastic, not semantic choice’ (1992a: 458). Whatever rules of combination there are do not reflect the semantics of the common-noun cognates.

Morpurgo-Davies (2000: 18–19), for instance, distinguishes between ‘onomastic compounds’ and ‘lexical compounds’, where the dithematic forms belong to the former. Again we observe (whatever the terminology used) the ‘de-etymologization’ of names and naming practices, which happens even with ‘byname’. These dithematic formations reveal a distinctive structure, distinctive rules for selection, and a distinctive onomastic system, not based on the meanings of the cognate common words.

It is worth observing, however, that even in relation to two-element forms, there can be uncertainty over whether a name belongs to the traditional system or has another source, such as a ‘byname’. Von Feilitzen (1937: 15) says of some of the two-element names in Domesday Book that they ‘…are evidently original bynames, corresponding to recorded O[ld]E[nglish] nouns: æaldormann, flotmann, gliwmann, hofweard (?), sotmann’. He notes too that smeawine and snotorman contain descriptive first elements, OE smēah ‘subtle, wise’, and snotor ‘wise, prudent’, which are not otherwise used in OE dithematic names’, as well as (1937: 16, fn. 1), for example, Gladwine (OE glæd ‘bright, cheerful, glad’: 261), Lustwine (OE lust ‘desire, pleasure’: 322), Swetwinus (OE swēte ‘sweet’: 382). But trying to establish more than just the possibility of such a status in any individual case, given the common-word, but non-descriptive, basis of the historical major system, is a hazardous venture (Colman in preparation: Chapter 2, §5). This is but one aspect of the problems associated with establishing with any exactitude the diversity of Anglo-Saxon practice, though it seems to be the case that minor systems co-existed, in varying proportions at different times (Woolf 1939: 104; Smart 1981: xiii), with the traditional one.

In his discussion of the Anglo-Saxon naming system, Barley (1974: 3–4) alludes, via quotation of Lévy-Strauss (1962 [1966: 182–3]), to another kind of
naming system that is also based on combination of common words and again is in accordance with a distinct onomastic system, but with rather different conditions on selection and combination:

Thus the Seminole Indians form adults’ names by employing several series of a few elements, combined without regard for their meaning. There is a ‘moral’ series: wise, crazy, cautious, malicious, etc.; a ‘morphological’ series: square, round, spherical, elongated, etc.; a ‘zoological’ series: wolf, eagle, beaver, puma, etc. By means of these, by taking a term from each series and juxtaposing them, they form the name ‘crazy-spherical-puma’.

And he comments:

In other words the only constraints on naming are that each should be of the form ‘abc’, each letter representing a semantic class. There is no reference to the qualities of the individual so-named.

The historical Anglo-Saxon and the Seminole are but two manifestations of an onomastic system of (name) formation based on elements that are typically overtly cognate with non-names but where the name structures do not reflect the principles of formation affecting non-names, in particular, semantic relations between the two elements.

We can contrast such formations, not just with the allegedly compound-based Anglo-Saxon ‘byname’ cited by von Feilitzen (1937), but also with, for example, the widespread analysable place names based on noun compounds discussed by Dalberg (1998). She notes that in Danish, alongside names based (with some descriptive intention) on simple nouns, such as Dam (dam ‘pond’), we also find names based on compounds, such as Mølledam (mølle-dam ‘mill pond’). The latter are not names ‘compounded’ according to an onomastic system, but names based on noun compounds (Morpurgo-Davies’ ‘lexical compounds’), and are thus descriptive.¹

¹ Dalberg (1998) provides a careful analysis of such compound-based place names in Danish which are not place-name ‘compounds’ as such. She divides them into four types, the first of which is illustrated by Mølledam. It is based rather transparently on a noun compound. The second type is also so based but involves not a straightforward ‘descriptive’ base, but a metaphorical one, as in the simplex- and compound-based Trøjøen (trøje ‘jacket’) and Gåsehals (Gåsehals ‘goose neck’) used of plots of land, where the metaphor is based on similarity of shape. A third type involves settlement names based on other place names, as with Helsingør, where Helsing is a group name, which compounds with ør ‘gravelly beach’ to give a topographical name, ‘beach of the Helsings’, which is then transferred, by metonymy, to the settlement which was established there. Finally, there are what, following Rentenaar (1984), Dalberg calls ‘eponymized place-names’. These involve the transfer of a place name from one application to another one. She cites the Danish stream called Niagara and the adoption by an ex-soldier farmer of the Danish castle name Kronborg for his farm. These are, however, strange ‘eponymies’, since eponymy, like metonymy, is based on adjacency, or some other connection (Colman and Anderson 2004); here we have transfer based (apart from on emulation?) at most on
However, as we have seen, even in naming systems like the attested Old English, there can appear apparent outbreaks of semanticity, no doubt reflecting the persistence of the universal impulse to find ‘meaning’ in names. Systems may be differently applied at different times and in different circumstances. Or, to put it another way, there may be competing subsystems.

4.2.2 Sources of names

I have already observed that there are problems with associating conventional etymologies with names (cf. again Lass (1973)), and they tend to develop in ways that encourage ‘obscurcation’ and promote ‘folk-etymologizing’ (Clark 1992b: 542). But most—perhaps all—naming traditions clearly originate in processes of naming based on common nouns or other categories, though often any such origin may be obscure (cf. e.g. Jäkel (1999: 212), on German surnames). Even lall names often derive from children’s mispronunciations of existing names or common nouns, or adults’ imitation of such childish (in)capacities. On the other hand, it is not unusual for such a name to constitute a de novo creation; however, my personal experience contains only one (apparent) instance of a lall name that was adopted as a child’s ‘official’ personal name (not as an additional or alternative name). Names tend to institutionalize. And even the literary inventors of ‘pen-names’ are remarkably uncreative in this respect.

The class of names (indeed, of words in general) in recent English that seems to be most productive of genuine neologisms is perhaps that of **product names**. Anderson (2003a) illustrates this with names for cleansing agents (such as *Omo*), but even these are not uncommonly based on other names (*Ajax, Ariel*) or on common words (*Tide, Surf*), including loans (*Vim, Lux*), or they allude to such (*Daz, Dreft*)—cf. Cottle (1983: Chapter 4). And the most typical use of such terms is as converted uncountable nouns (*Throw in some Daz!*) or countables (*He drives a Twingo*) rather than as names (cf. Sloat (1969: 26–7)—who indeed regards them as simply mass nouns). Such names have been overtaken, in my experience (see too Bergien (2005)), by product names from electronics, particularly computer systems. But perhaps most productive are names, or ‘titles’, of works of art, in often being based on description of particulars (such as Sisley’s *The Flood at Pont-Marly*). These are genuine names, and ideally permit individual reference whatever form they

some perceived similarity (i.e. metaphor). With this qualification, though, it is striking that all but the first type of formation are figuratively based. See further the discussion that follows in the main text of metonymy and the sources of surnames, and cf. Jäkel’s work on metonymy and naming (1996; 1998; 1999).
take. But they are not typical, in that part of their point is that their use of the non-onomastic lexical system and syntactic structures should remain transparent; and, not generally being 'passed on', they are not free to develop into an independent onomastic system. Institutionalized naming traditions in general tend to be or become very conservative, whatever the original source of the names.

Many classifications of sources of personal names are apparently excessively language-particular. This is illustrated by those offered by Weekley (1922: Chapters I, IV, V); Smith (1950); Reaney (1967); or Dolan (1972: 10)—though this can perhaps be largely excused in their case by the declared narrow focus of the works. The latter three are concerned specifically with the development of surnames. However, they do provide excellent examples of the development of a naming subsystem from one providing (in this case, ancillary, and differentiating) ‘descriptions’ of particular referents of a personal name (Small, Baker), to a system of family names (which have only that limited genealogical sense). Let us consider their status, before proceeding with more general consideration of the sources of names.

In the Middle English period there began to develop more generally a structuring of names into first or personal name (themselves evolving away from the Anglo-Saxon system) and surname, or family name. As I have indicated, the latter seem to originate in ‘byname’ of various sorts, and thus throw some light on the process of de-etymologization. These eventual onomastic combinations again constitute ‘compounds’ of a distinctive sort, involving (unlike in the Anglo-Saxon system) largely distinct subsystems of personal and surnames; and the two components of such a ‘compound’ name may be used of the same referent in combination, or singly, or together with a title and other elaborations. The development of surnames thus also illustrates that an individual may have more than one name, depending on the context: the same person may be John, or the ‘compounded’ John Smith, or the titled Mr. (John) Smith, or the simple Smith. The title adds another element of structure. Further, surnames and titles illustrate that a name may contain a sense-bearing element.

As noted, de-etymologization doesn’t lead to complete loss of sense, but substitution of the limited sense of a ‘family name’ in place of a (fuller) description. Surnames identify an individual not simply by her/his personal name but by a name, or part-name, that is the name of her/his family, a name with a genealogical source. Of course, this sense may or may not be salient in any one use, but the information concerning family affiliation is recoverable. And it has various ‘official’ functions in our form-filling world. And the title part of a ‘full’ name (Sir, Mr., etc.) indicates gender, as well as pragmatic
aspects to do with assignment of status. ‘Bynames’ themselves also provide, as ‘bynames’, an identifi
catorily more powerful name than the personal name alone; and it may develop into an alternative to the institutionalized personal name, or even replace it.

In terms of naming practice, the two basic systems, of first names and surnames, as now practised in English-speaking countries, illustrate the difference between a system within which selection involves relative free choice and one where there are severe restrictions. Over time, however, the degree of restriction on both subsystems has varied. Cf. Smith-Bannister: ‘…when investigating names we must weigh the freedom of choice against the degree of prescription’ (1997: 3). One kind of prescription is based on the often classificatory function of naming. And the classification may involve either the namee or the namer or, commonly, both. Thus choice of a particular name, depending on the system of naming and associated name structure (Smith-Bannister 1997: 186), may reflect the namer’s social class or geographical provenance or religion or some other classification and/or her/his wish to assign the namee to the same or different class. This is another factor adding difficulty to studies of the etymology of names: we have to reckon with descriptive intrusions not merely as the result of attempts to characterize

2 Something of one kind of evolution for bynames and its social matrix is illustrated by the following passage from Charles Dickens’ The Old Curiosity Shop (Chapter XVII):

The real name of the little man was Harris, but it had gradually merged into the less euphonious one of Trotters, which, with prefatory adjective, Short, had been conferred upon him by reason of the small size of his legs. Short trotters, however, being a compound name, inconvenient of use in friendly dialogue, the gentleman on whom it had been bestowed was known among his intimates either as ‘Short’, or ‘Trotters’, and was seldom accosted at full length as Short Trotters, except in formal conversations and on occasions of ceremony.

Without such insider commentary, the history of many names is obscure.

It is all very well for Kitson (2002: 122) to affirm that ‘the only constraints [on Old English single-element personal names—see §2.1.2—JMA], in my view, were tradition—what sounded right—and meaning, avoidance of lexical items’. What precisely does it mean for something to ‘sound right’? There is little force in what ‘sounds right’ (whatever that might mean) to the investigator, or even in what ‘sounds right’ in relation to his view of earlier naming practices, limited as that must be. There seems to have been little thought given here to the motivations for name-giving other than as projections of Kitson’s own feelings, including prejudices that do not reflect general naming patterns.

Also, ‘avoidance of lexical items’, as a ‘constraint’, is difficult to square with the large number of Old English names (of all sorts) that contain elements clearly related to common words. Kitson himself seems to take ‘meaning’ rather seriously in the footnote (p.72) concerning the name Hengest (corresponding to a common word meaning ‘stallion’, or possibly ‘gelding’) on the same page: ‘no-one is going to persuade me that the treacherously resourceful founder of the kingdom of Kent was known by his men by a name whose gist was “lacking balls”’. And, again, what is the relevance of the investigator’s own feelings about someone being called by such a name? Controversies based on the prejudices of individual investigators over what is a ‘suitable’ name bedevil traditional onomastics, a problem not sufficiently acknowledged by some of the inheritors of the tradition.
the namee but also reflecting facets associated with the namer and the backgrounds of both (Dubois 2000).³

Let us return now to the sources of (in the first place) surnames, in the context of an awareness of the varying functions of naming, whose discussion will continue to inform us about matters to do with the structure of names. Despite its narrow focus (on language-particular surnames), Dolan’s (1972) classification, for instance, which is essentially that of Smith (1950), can nevertheless serve as a familiar starting point for a look at the sources of names. Dolan distinguishes English surnames as in origin ‘bynames’, based on place names (of place of origin or residence—Ford, Gates), on personal names (overtly derived from the name of a related person, usually the father—Williamson), on ‘occupational’ nouns (Butcher, Slaughter), and on terms which originate as what he calls ‘nicknames’ (Small, Swift—cf. e.g. Pulgram (1954: 16)).

This range is typical of the sources of surnames in general (cf. e.g. Pulgram (1954); Allerton (1987: §8)). Jäkel (1999), for instance, traces many German

³ Smith-Bannister (1997: 15) sums up the conclusions on names of the work of Lévi-Strauss (1962 [1966: 181]):

The French social anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss has argued that there are two extreme forms of proper name and a number of intermediate forms. At one extreme the name acts as an identifying mark which establishes the named as a member of a pre-ordained social group. At the other extreme is a free creation in the gift of the namer and thus expresses ‘a transitory and subjective state of his own by means of the person he names’. The choice is thus between classing someone or classing oneself. Most commonly, as Lévi-Strauss argues, one does both at once.

A similar distinction has been observed by Herbert (1998) and many others.


Men are considered to be the only fully social beings. They enter the social world by means of initiation and through the names that are bestowed on them. There are sets of such names that go together, and over a period of time a name giver will bestow the various names of the set on a name receiver. People are said to enter their names when they receive them and to leave them when they pass them on to others. Names are not therefore attributes of the person who bears them. On the contrary, they bring that person into certain relationships with other people. . . . Names then are what distinguish humans from animals. It is the names bestowed on a human that give that person his/her social persona and link him/her to other people. Central Brazilians consider that there are two separate aspects to each individual personality. There is the social self, inculcated through names, and the physical self, which is acquired biologically.

. . . and in relation to the Northern Gé:

In many of these societies men belong to groupings and moiety systems by virtue of their names and it is through this name-based dual organization that community rituals are performed to emphasize complementarity, balance and harmony. Conflict and disharmony, meanwhile, are associated with kin groups and kinship ties.

The latter description may strike a chord with some non-Central Brazilians.

Perhaps one extreme of namer-focused naming is reached (though it also reflects the social status of the namee) by the traditional practice in Oghuz Turkic (Aslanov 1998: §6) whereby a family which has produced uniquely female children can resort to names like Qisbes ‘having enough daughters’ and Qisqayit ‘girl return back’ if another girl is born, but deploy Taipitq ‘we have found’ or Dursun ‘let him live’ if it is a boy.
surnames (apart from an opaque residue) to genealogical and occupational sources; the others involve metonymies, involving location (‘place (of origin or residence) for person’), quality (‘salient quality for person’), and utensil (‘important utensil for person’). Jäkel’s work (1996; 1999) suggests, indeed, that such a classificatory framework may be more generalizable than might have seemed to be the case.

There have been some vagaries in the usage of ‘nickname’ and similar terms such as ‘so(u)briquet’, which have not always been kept entirely distinct from ‘byname’ (see e.g. the OED entries, or Ferreira (1998), who seems to identify all ‘bynames’ as ‘nicknames’) — unsurprisingly, given the etymology. However, Dolan here seems to be using the term ‘nickname’ in one familiar sense of additional names based on ‘characterizing phrases taken from the common vocabulary’ (Clark (1992a: 460); and cf. Weekley (1922: Chapter XXI), who exemplifies these with surnames like Small and Ambler). However, ‘characterizing’ here excludes (for Dolan) the preceding ‘occupational’ names, as well as name-based names. It is not clear that this ‘byname’/‘nickname’ usage is the most effective. It is certainly not universally adopted, or understood; and there is resulting confusion.

The basis for questioning the terminology is illustrated by the fact that the second pair of Dolan’s classes—occupation-based names and ‘nicknames’—both draw in an obvious way on common vocabulary (with adjectives and animal terms being the most plentiful sources of ‘nicknames’ (Weekley 1922: Chapters XXI–XXIII); the others draw on other names). And all of the classes are clearly metonymic: the name is derived from an associated name or characteristic. Only the patronymic type (of Williamson, etc.) make this derivation overt, however. I am talking here of diachronic derivation; the transparency of the metonymic source usually declines over time, and often even patronyms become simply family names.

I thus want to look at the basis for classifying the sources of ‘additional’ names in general, whether or not they develop into family names. In discussing the sources of Anglo-Saxon names, Colman (in preparation: Chapter 2) points to the arbitrariness of excluding ‘occupational’ names from the ‘characterizing’ set, which Dolan labels ‘nicknames’. And she suggests using the term for all names used in addition or as an alternative to the person’s system-conforming, ‘standard’ name. ‘Nickname’ and ‘byname’ have often been used overlappingly. But traditionally ‘nickname’ seems to be more inclusive, in including hypocoristics, i.e. diminutives or ‘pet-names’ (see e.g. sense b of the OED entry for ‘nickname’), lall names, and joke names. So Colman’s suggestions seem just. I now outline the system of nicknames she proposes.
Nicknames would thus include, in the first place, both the likes of *Jumbo* (used of someone who is in some way ponderous, or the reverse—attempts at humour are another factor in naming) and the ancestors of surnames such as *Ford, Butcher, Williamson*. This group are distinguished as *bynames* from other nicknames, such as *hypocoristics* (*Johnny*) and *lall* formations (French *Mimi, Loulou*; perhaps Old English *Bab(b)a*—above). This offers a classification of nicknames of the form of (1):

(1) **Nicknames**

- Supplementary
  - Bynames
    - E.g.: Leofwine Horn, Wulfstan Deoring
  - Hypocorisms
    - E.g.: Horn, Deoring
  - Lall names
    - E.g.: Johnny, Mimi, Loulou

The patronymic marker is *-ing*. On interpretation of *Horn* as a byname, cf. Colman (1984: §5.2.a.iv):

*Horn*: possibly O[ld]E[nglish] *horn*, ‘horn’ or *hornere*, ‘maker of horn spoons, combs etc.’ (Francsson 1935: 167); but surely more winning is Tengvik’s suggestion (1938: 377) of ‘a person with a long nose, or possibly some other part of the body markedly projecting’. In the light of the name *Gadwine Clawecunt*, recorded in the *Winton Domesday* (von Feilitzen 1976: 210, fn.1), an interpretation of *Horn* as a byname reflecting the bearer’s prowess would not be too far-fetched.

The bynames, including patronymics, all contain elements of sense, though, except perhaps in the case of the patronymics, this sense and associated encyclopaedic attachments may be difficult to interpret for those not ‘in the know’, including later interpreters, such as historical onomasts. Hypocoristics and lall names are more affective and indexical in content. Unlike the byname formations in (1), the ‘standard’ OE dithematics lack sense, despite being etymologically linked with common words, but can provide genealogical information (shown by alliteration and variation, as referred to above).
We have seen that traditions of assigning basic personal names, as well as bynames, also overwhelmingly originate in the use of common vocabulary. Something of the range of sources of names is revealed by what Pulgram (1954: 9) describes as Hilka’s ‘fairly comprehensive list’ of sources arising from his work on Sanskrit names, Pulgram’s ‘résumé’ of which is reproduced here in (2):

(2) Hilka’s list of sources for personal names

1. The realm of the gods
   a. Deva-‘God’ (in compounds)
   b. Divine names (in compounds)
2. The realm of nature
   a. Plants
   b. Animals
   c. Minerals
   d. Other elements
3. Time and circumstances of birth
4. Time of life; kinship
5. Geographical situation; ethnic relation
6. Dress; finery
7. Physical appearance
8. Human mind
   a. General attributes
   b. Intelligence or lack of it
   c. Character; temperament
9. Human conditions
   a. Way of life; food
   b. Happiness; luck
   c. Wealth
   d. Joy; love
   e. Activities
      (1) Religion; cult
      (2) Science; philosophy
      (3) Public service
10. Various other concreta
11. Titles (sovereign; honorary)
12. [Women’s names]

The sources in section 1 of (2) and section 10 (not to mention 12) still leave the classification open-ended. However, Pulgram argues that the same range of sources characterize a range of languages of different families examined by him, and affirms: ‘I have found no names which ultimately and basically are not part
of the current or past lexicon of a language’ (1954: 19). Such a claim remains to be tested against our increased knowledge of the range of languages.

However that may be, what is perhaps more difficult is to determine whether, in ultimate origin, names in different traditions, even if based on common-noun vocabulary, are ‘characterizing’ when first used in nomination in all cases—i.e. are to begin with essentially freshly applied ‘nicknames’ that are (paradoxically, perhaps) basic rather than additional. Is even the initial application of a common noun or other lexical element as a name necessarily descriptive? It may be so. This naming would be a property shared by names like Chirpie or Bluey with (particularly) many lowest-level hyponyms, such as willow warbler (cf. e.g. García Mouton (1987)); and this is perhaps associated again with the inclusion of these latter, in many popular (and indeed more scholarly—see Chapter 3, note 1) discussions of ‘names’, in the more inclusive sense of ‘name’ we have already encountered.

I recall in this connection the COD definitions of ‘name’ cited above in Chapter 1:

1. Word by which individual person, animal, place, or thing, is spoken of or to . . .
2. Word denoting any object of thought, esp. one applicable to many individuals . . .

(This ambivalence of the common word name is what is played on with such panache in Cottle (1983: Chapter 1).) Lowest-level hyponyms come closest to names in their specificity, and are thus often grouped with them as names. But, unlike typical institutionalized names, such hyponyms have a sense which is not just a set of higher-level categories, and they are not uniquely identifying. As discussed in Chapter 1, ‘bird names’, as commonly interpreted, are not names in the sense adopted here.

The sources of names reflect different functions of naming. And the aims of naming systems may be embodied in the information associated with names. This includes encyclopaedic information (such as the circumstances of birth) and lexical information (such as gender). Names primarily have a referential, identificatory function; but they nevertheless are also the receptacle for a network of information of various kinds. In the subsection that follows we focus on the functions of naming and the information this may plant in our ‘concept’ of a particular name-referent.

4.2.3 Functions of naming

Whatever their source, typically names, even nicknames, can quickly become opaque to a common-word interpretation. Thus, in Mohawk, names have a
variety of transparent sources, including verbs: ‘most Mohawk proper names referring to persons and places are verbs’ (Mithun 1984: 46), as in *Wathahı́:ne* (= ‘she takes up the path’). And some names have to do with the circumstances of birth. But ‘speakers are not at all disturbed that many of the names they use continually are now uninterpretable except as names’ (Mithun 1984: 49). As I have been suggesting, this seems to be typical of names in language in general, so that in many highly institutionalized naming systems names are perceived as opaque with respect to the common-word bases from which they were converted, except for specific (e.g. literary, comical, magical) purposes. This shows the strength of the identifying function.

In many languages the descriptive content of names is regularly salient at nomination, however, and may remain so. This seems to be the case in Sirionó (Priest 1964), where a child born during a hunting expedition may be named after the animal killed or a child may be named after the particular occasion of birth. And the child may subsequently be given further descriptive names reflecting characteristics of the child’s that become apparent or names reflecting kinship; so that a person may have several names (originating in different classifying), though not all of them used by everybody. But even in such a language there are a couple of birth names that ‘apparently have no meaning’ (Priest 1964: 1150). This is again consonant with the observation that many synchronic personal-naming systems tend to cease to be based synchronically on common words, even if the common words cognate with the names persist in the language.

On the other hand, some Mohawk namings and most Sirionó are descriptive, and this is far from being unparalleled (cf. e.g. Andrews (1975: 372–4); Rowlands (1969: 216–9); Duke (2005)). Maxwell affirms that ‘cultures dependent on oral tradition often exhibit a greater richness in the semantic significance and structure of personal names’ (1984: 25). And Duke (2005: §3.5) alludes to the varied functions of name-giving and name-using in African cultures, particularly the preservation of a historical record, or as a way of mentioning contentious subjects (‘friction names’). For such cultures the descriptive basis of the derived name remains readily accessible. But even in them, as we have seen, there can often be found purely identificatory (simplex) names not perceived as derived from common nouns or other words, as well as those, as with the Seminole three-element system, where ‘meaningful’ elements from particular semantic fields are combined arbitrarily. And the naming system can come to serve a variety of other functions, as we have seen.

There is a number of system-external motivations for naming—involving, in particular, functions that aim at ‘classifying’ the namee and/or namer, as we saw in §4.2.2. But basic of course is the differentiating and identificatory function of
the system. We expect the system of nomination to be designed to offer, apart from anything else, extensive differentiation, though the function is often combined with others. Consider again here the Germanic principles of combining elements in the formation of the preponderant dithematic names in such a way as to allow both such differentiation and (the system-external function of) kinship-continuity (Woolf 1939): Æþelstan, Æþelmær, etc. (recall §4.2.1). Such a system does provide for considerable differentiation—though the ‘uniqueness’ of individual Anglo-Saxon and other Germanic names has been somewhat exaggerated—e.g. by Dolan (1972: 2–3, 11)), according to whom, in the case of Old English the alleged ‘infinite variety’ of naming (1972: 3) involves allegedly ‘thousands of almost unpronounceable names’ (1972: 11); and, as we have noted, it is limited by the desire to show kinship.

Given the prominent identificatory function of names, one might nevertheless expect the capacity for differentiation to be paramount in naming systems. But there are limitations on this. For instance, in extensive communities in particular this obviously poses problems leading to recycling of names. Moreover, many other systems reflect more saliently other functions for name-assignment, usually classificatory—though these too can help in identification. We have already encountered a number of these, but here I draw them together with further observations, in order to demonstrate something of the range of functions, as well as variation in how differentiation is achieved.

Marking of kinship is often important in different ways (one variant of which the Anglo-Saxon system also illustrates, as just noted), and instances of this can reduce variety of naming even more strictly than do the Anglo-Saxon practices. The alliterating names indicating family relationship in Anglo-Saxon custom can still have an identificatory function. But systems like the Greek one (or the ‘public’, post-infancy names of the Sotho-Tswana system (Herbert 1998: 190–1)), wherein the names assigned to the first two male and the first two female children are typically those of their grandparents, respectively paternal and maternal, lead (together with limitations imposed by the traditionally circumscribed pool of names) to there being whole villages where most of the inhabitants have only a few first names among themselves. And the range of surnames is also, for some other and some related reasons, rather restricted too. For various official purposes Greek names thus include a specification of the paternal name as well. Even local uniqueness is difficult to achieve in such a system: Pjos Kostas? (‘Which Kostas?’) is, I suspect, an even more frequent question than Which John? is in the UK.

However, additional names serving an ‘external’ function can also, obviously, in combination with the personal name, offer further differentiation.
As we have seen, the family name allows for differentiation based on classification by family. And also rather widely used for differentiation are other additional genealogical, or kin-based subsystems, such as the additional system of patronymics deployed in, say, Russian (Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky) or the sole-surname patronymics of Icelandic (Pál Jónsson, Paul John’s-son). Scottish Mac- names (and e.g. Greek names in -opoulos) constitute a fossilized patronymic: what follows the Mac- is usually the name of the often mythical ‘founder’ of the (extended) family or clan that bear the name (Dorward 1998).

These are patronymics overtly signalled by an affix. But, as observed, the official Greek bureaucratic system is also patronymic, though not overtly signalled as such, except by position in the overall name. Thus, I am known by various institutions in Greece as John William (my father’s name) Anderson—and my baptismal ‘middle name’, which is the family name of my mother—is often ignored. My wife knows that it is important to remember that her official ‘middle name’ is Ernest (her father’s name). The different functions of these three namings in Greece, ‘baptismal name’, ‘father’s name’, and ‘family name’, result in three different systems, members of which can be combined to form a ‘full name’. There is a large overlap between the memberships of the first two, though individual whole names should not agree in the first two names (given the by-passing of generations in assigning first (personal) names); and the ‘patronymic’ is often signalled as such by being put in the ‘genitive’ and postposed to the other names. And the last two names both have sense, in identifying respectively the name of the father and of the family.

Maxwell (1984) provides a description of the structure of Kadayan personal names which gives a further idea of different kinds of elaboration in nomination that may take place. Kadayan names include as basic a personal name and patronymic and, if appropriate, the element Haji (to mark a past pilgrim to Mecca), but to these may be prefixed honorific terms and other titles; nicknames are also deployed, and names may be changed, as in other cultures, in order to elude some affliction.

A still different, inherently dynamic, socio-chronological kind of differentiation is involved in the Sirionó system alluded to above, and is also rather well illustrated by the Ilongot practices described by Rosaldo (1984). He distinguishes (1984: 11–12) five types of names that may be assigned to an individual, with different chronological and/or social functions, ranging from ‘infant names’ to ‘in-law names’, the latter being names used by persons not permitted to know the individual’s adult ‘true name’, which is unique within the social group and lasts for the individual’s lifetime. He also illustrates
(1984: 15–19) the complex interplay of associations, word play, and social interaction (as well as phonological principles) that can drive the formal evolution of a particular name. These other functions of names and naming emphasize the frequently dynamic and contingent character of naming. Here and in other languages name differentiation is again contingent on subsystems serving various social functions.

And various other, perhaps more familiar, naming mechanisms allow for differentiation while performing other functions. Bynames are one means, as are (usually hypocoristic) diminutivizations, including some lall words. These may be signalled by affixation, sometimes shared with common words (Johnny), by shortening (Jo), by more or less conventionalized phonological modification (Jack), or by some combination of these (Peggy). These latter increase the identificatory power of the system by allowing differentiation associated with, for instance, size or age. But they also have a social function, typically hypocoristic, affection-expressing (ironic or not). And both diminutives and many bynames (occupation-based nicknames), though descriptive in origin, and performing various social functions, nevertheless well illustrate the de-semanticization frequently associated with adoption of a term as a name, as with diminutives that become standard names, and as with the evolution, noted above, of many nicknames into surnames; though again partially descriptive in origin, surnames can again become de-semanticized, as with my own name.

Naming can involve a variety of further social functions. For instance, Basso (1984) argues that ‘the formal organization of Apache place-name systems is directly related to the physical organization of native settlements’ (85). Specifically, he sets out to show (1984: 79) ‘that Western Apache place-name terminologies are organized into hierarchies, that the hierarchies may vary in at least two important respects (scale and amount of place-name partitioning), and that such variation is closely associated with variation in the size and social composition of local populations’. Also concerning place names, Takaki (1984: 73) affirms that in Kalinga (Northern Luzon) ‘regional names used in local discourse…express—among other things—politically colored spatial arrangements. Naming regions thereby projects a political blueprint on physical space’.

These and other studies in the same volume (Tooker 1984) emphasize the importance of understanding the social and instrumental (rather than simply referential) roles of personal and place names, a perspective not prominent in the philosophical and theoretical linguistic literature on names. This is commented on by Lyons (1977: 218, fn. 11): ‘there is a tendency for philosophical treatments of proper names to underestimate the ritual, and even magical, significance of names in many cultures’.
Thus, in this same volume (Tooker 1984), as concerns personal names, Maybury-Lewis (1984: 7) remarks concerning the name-usage of societies in Central Brazil that ‘names do not . . . function primarily to identify individuals. Their purpose is rather to transform individuals into persons’. (This recalls the Latin tag *sine nomine persona non est.*) While Rosaldo (1984: 22) asserts: ‘the semantic content of Ilongot names relates more profoundly to the interpersonal play of assertion and reply than to the structural properties of individuation and differentiation’. Naming and re-namining in different cultures serve a variety of functions, from (in Ilongot) marking stages in an individual’s social development and social relationship to others (involving e.g. ‘name avoidance’ or taboo) to more restricted phenomena in other societies like the taking of a ‘pen name’. Such observations have analogues elsewhere. Compare, for instance, the discussion in Smith-Bannister (1997). And these phenomena all depend on names being conceptualized in such a way as to permit to them various social functions.

However, it is important to differentiate between the function of giving a name and the use of names, though naming may leave available for use some encyclopaedic information, including the sort usually called *indexical information*. This is sometimes quite complex (as in the societies described by the quotations in note 3), but commonly it includes indications of social class or religion or geographical provenance (of the namer(s) at least). Thus the use of names involves various aspects not all relevant to sense. So the indexical material attached to a name is not to be identified with sense. And, of course names are a lexical ‘hook’ for all kinds of (other) encyclopaedic information concerning the referent that is not based on naming.

We have also observed concerning the non-lexical information conveyed by names that use of a name may have a directly pragmatic role, as in the use of a diminutive rather than the corresponding non-diminutive, or the reverse, as an *affective* term, to express (dis-)affection. And a name may serve, commonly serves, simply to identify, to call up a particular referent—a question of reference, not sense. We must be cautious (more cautious than Anderson (2003a)) in our attribution of ‘meaning’ to an individual name, and not only with respect to etymological ‘meaning’. Indexical and other encyclopaedic information and affective and even referential uses do not in themselves involve sense.4

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4 Maybury-Lewis confuses these in the quotation given above when he concludes, with respect to the societies his description of which is quoted in note 3, that: ‘names do not . . . function primarily to identify individuals. Their purpose is rather to transform individuals into persons’ (1984: 7). Consider too Martini (1998: 212), who suggests, in intended contradiction of Migliorini’s (1927: 5) essentially Millian view:
It is also important to observe that, as well as the identificatory function not necessarily being the only function of naming, requirements on the identificatory function itself may be in conflict. Also, properties apparently concerned with other functions may contribute to some aspect of identification. Thus, Nübling (2000) offers a listing of the properties that would characterize the ‘ideal proper name’, which allows the precise identification of referents. And she demonstrates conflicts in satisfying these properties arising in the systems of German and Swedish surnames. Duke adopts Nübling’s work as a basis for her study of African personal-naming systems, where she lists the following properties of the ‘ideal proper name’: ‘precise identification’, ‘brevity’, ‘ease of memorization’, and ‘formal marking of onomastic status’. ‘Brevity’ is included as constituting one of the advantages of names over descriptions that compensates for the memory burden they impose; at least part of the motivation for naming is the frequency with which the entity has to be referred to. Duke mentions as well, as a property, ‘characterization of referent’ (2005: §§3.2.2.1, 3.4). This last and ‘ease of memorization’ are enhanced by descriptive names, with the first of these involving a description of the referent itself: names which are identical with common words aid memorization, while possibly obscuring ‘onomastic status’. Use of descriptive names can be balanced in achieving the ‘ideal name’ by the presence of overt markers of onomastic status. Compare too Nübling (2000) on Polish vs. German surnames.

African personal names differ from most European ones in being in some way descriptive. Duke (2005) argues that typical European and African personal names share low capacity for precise identification (which often depends on context and supplementary names or description), except in the case of African names based on referent characterization or family affiliation (and to a lesser extent those based on place of birth). Both sets of names score on brevity, except for the African ones high in referent characterization. The African names are mostly higher in memorability, and also in marking of

In reality, the historical, family and ethnical culture of which men are bearers and guardians flows into the name. This culture is condensed in those words after a long distillation like a thick vapour in a drop of precious brandy. Each name, therefore, encloses an enormous and extremely complex width of meaning, and is therefore extremely difficult to ‘decode’ for the complexity of its component, influences and mediations.

Similar is e.g. Hedquist (2005).

Such confusions between sense and indexical information (including instrumental role)—the latter often resulting from the circumstances of name-giving—undermine any attempt to talk systematically about ‘meaning’. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of the large and possibly (for any one language-user) idiosyncratic range of information, including indexical, conveyed by a name even when it is being used to serve an identificatory function.
onomastic status. Both sets usually distinguish onomastic status, the European ones by virtue of belonging to an onomastic inventory.

To the extent to which some such cluster characterization of the ‘ideal name’ is well founded, the satisfaction in different ways by different systems of the possibly contrary demands of different properties may also account for some of the difficulties in finding cross-linguistic ‘criteria’ for names. This among names in the same communities and across language systems is intensified, not just by attempts to satisfy the other functions of naming (such as the classificatory), but also by the multiplicity of factors of use, including frequency and thus familiarity.

4.2.4 Classifiers of names

The survey so far made in this section is unrepresentative in one obvious respect of the wide concerns of traditional onomastics. Little attention has been paid to the range of non-personal names, in particular, which tend to be neglected outside onomastics. However, some characteristics of names emerge rather more clearly from a study of non-personal names. Thus, while not attempting here a comprehensive coverage of name types, whose taxonomy is still evolving, I want to point to a particular bundle of phenomena that has assumed some importance in onomastic studies—and, more importantly for our concerns here, has some significance for an account of the grammar of names. It bears particularly on the role in this grammar of descriptive elements that remain salient. Thus, a final thing to be considered here, albeit briefly, is the extent to which the taxonomy of place names (in particular) is made overt in their internal structure, and the role in this of descriptive terms, ‘classifiers’ in onomastic parlance. The extended gender of place names is typically signalled in this way.

Consider, for example, English place-name examples like those in (3), some of which may, the rest of which must, contain a descriptive noun, a ‘classifier’:

\[(3) \text{ a. (Lake) Windermere, the (River) Thames} \]
\[
\text{ b. the Baltic (Sea), the Atlantic (Ocean), the Gobi (Desert), the Scilly Isles/the Scillies, Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, Lundy Island} \]
\[
\text{ c. the Straits of Magellan, the Bay of Biscay, the Isle of Sheppey, the Isles of Scilly, the Gulf of Bothnia} \]

Here the presence of *the* is an idiosyncratic property of subcategories of name or even of individual names (see further §6.3.1). A name may also or alternatively incorporate a descriptive, subclassifying noun; in this case, the
subcategory of name is overtly, and systematically, signalled (cf. Carroll on ‘rule-scheme strategies for name generation’ (1985: 144)). The kind of entity named is indicated in the name structure. Indeed, this is typically the case with many types of place name (cf. e.g. Gómez de Silva (1994: 209)), formed in this way from a name and a descriptive (‘classifier’) noun indicating its subcategory, such as those in (3).

Still other place names consist entirely of descriptive elements, with or without the:

(4) a. the Black Hills, the Dead Sea
    b. Long Island, Thunder Bay, Newtown

The ‘nouniness’ of the components is often not cognitively salient in any particular instance of use. They may be ‘fossilized’, in the terminology of Giering et al. (1980: 66). But even fossilization does not obscure the accessibility of a term relevant to subcategorizing (Sea, Bay, etc.). Thus, a component equivalent to sea is part of the lexical structure of many names, though this may not be relevant to the particular act of reference being made; but this element of sense may be conveyed, whether necessary or not.

Such names as those in (4) are based on phrases. But as names the phrases are ‘frozen’. There may be some variation with some sub-types of phrasal name, as in The University of Glasgow alongside Glasgow University, but the variety of ways in which the components may comport themselves with respect to each other is very limited. They too belong to an onomastic system. We look more carefully at the structure of these phrasal names in §9.1.6.

4.2.5 Some preliminary conclusions

One thing that immediately emerges from consideration of the varied functions of names is the limitations they, together with questions of system economy, impose on the identificatory function. We typically have naming systems that aim at distinguishing referents but in which different referents share the same name. The sources of names correlate with different functions, discriminatory, classificatory in various ways, expressive. These leave traces in our lexical and encyclopaedic knowledge. As well as a range of functions, but related to them, we have encountered a variety of name structures and naming systems, and subsystems vary in the extent to which sense-bearing is retained—retained, since names seem to originate in sense-bearing elements. Thus, another important, if rather obvious, conclusion to be drawn from all the preceding is that, though de-semanticization is a not uncommon tendency, many names contain elements which in origin are descriptive and
have remained transparently and accessibly so, and this does not detract from their status as names. This is true particularly of patronymics and surnames, insofar as they identify family and not individual. And titles are descriptions, though they are usually only part of a name, not a name in themselves: to be addressed as Sir or Mr. involves the use of a surrogate name. Yet there seems to be no point in denying that these elements are used as names or as parts of names, in identifying individuals without recourse to distinct determiner expressions involving anaphora and/or a description.

As we have seen, this conclusion is perhaps even more strikingly apposite in the case of many place names, which are often even more obviously based on common words, though in non-rural areas, perhaps, this tends to attract less popular attention to their ‘meanings’. Thus Clark (1990: 56): ‘names of all kinds are created out of elements taken from ordinary language: a place-name, that is to say, normally begins as a description of the place originally concerned’. And parts of these descriptions may remain transparent, as emerges from many traditional descriptions of place names. The status of sense-bearing particularly in place names has aroused some controversy in more recent onomastics, however, as we shall see in §4.3.

The examples in (3) can be seen as involving a kind of eponymy: in the Straits of Magellan we have a derived name formed from a name and a descriptive element, where the derived name refers to a classified entity in some way connected with the component name. Other types of name are formed by simple eponymy: the name of the founder may be taken as a corporate name, institutionalized as the name of a corporation (otherwise typically formed by abbreviation and where possible acronymy). These designate individuals in the sub-world peopled by corporations; but the collective nature of corporations in the larger world is often revealed by concord, as in (5a):

(5) a. Ford are laying off workers
    b. the Messrs Carson, Messrs Carson, Carsons’ fire, Carson’s factory

All of the phrases in (5b) come from the first two pages of Chapter VI of Gaskell’s Mary Barton, wherein plurality is signalled on the title in the first two instances, and the latter two show that the corporate name may be plural or singular. With the middle two, the plural name, unusually for such, is not accompanied by the definite article.

The traditional name-to-name eponymy involved in (5) is, of course, to be distinguished from eponymy in the extended sense of name-to-noun conversions (Borkin 1972; Clark 1978). As an illustration of this latter sense of the term, Ford is a personal name and the name of a corporation, as well as a
brand or product name; cf., for example, Langendonck (2005: 319)—though I am doubtful of his distinction between ‘brand name’ and ‘product name’. But *Ford* is also a name-based common noun in examples like (6a):

(6)  
  a. Bill drives a Ford  
  b. Bill needs a new hoover

For many speakers the name base is not salient, and in some cases the noun comes to be used for any such product irrespective of provenance, usually with loss of initial capitalization in writing, as, for many speakers, with the item in (6b).

Such examples as (5) and (6) respectively illustrate further the diversity of kinds of name, as well as derivational relations between them (personal to corporate), and exemplify the derivation of other categories from names (corporate name to noun). Recognition of this diversity of names and their role in derivational relationships is another of the insights to emerge from onomastic studies, particularly as practised in more recent years. The notion of subcategories of name, particularly as overtly signalled, remains controversial, however, as anticipated above—and as clearly emerges in the next section. It is only when such controversy has been confronted that we shall be in a position to look in a more systematic way at the subcategories of names and their structures.

We have, indeed, already extended our discussion in this section somewhat beyond the confines of the traditional onomastics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which was our initial concern, not just in anticipating more recent work but also in taking in work emanating from social and social-anthropological fields. But this presages what we shall turn to in the next section (and perhaps avoids any suggestion of discontinuity), where we confront the proliferation of concerns involving cross-disciplinary work and the intensified interest in theories of names characteristic of the last fifty years in onomastics.5

5 Unfortunately, there has also developed and persisted a reactionary strand of onomastic philology that has failed to accommodate to the increasingly interdisciplinary character of philology (cf. e.g. Bibire’s (1998: 157) statement that ‘philology is to some extent a closed discipline’, whatever that might mean, as well as his vague characterization of ‘philological method’) and that resents its continuing intimate dependence on linguistic theory (cf. e.g. Kitson’s (2002: 91) attribution to ‘modish grammarians’ of a ‘contrastive approach’ that he clearly does not understand). Given that, as defined by Bibire (1998: 155), ‘philology’ is ‘the history and development of a particular language, as evidenced in particular texts’, it necessarily deploys theoretical linguistics as central in pursuit of its aims (language and text are linguistic ‘objects’); but, given the close of this quotation, ‘philology’ is clearly also multidisciplinary, involving reference to paleography or epigraphy, knowledge of the where, when, how, by and for whom of texts, the social and political context, and so on. It is a paradigm case of interdisciplinarity; it is not clear in what sense it can be said to be ‘closed’.
4.3 Some recent work in onomastic theory

The continuing vigour of the onomastic tradition is testified to not only by recent works already referred to but also by the appearance of a range of journals with varied interests, and of the series of volumes from a succession of International Congresses of Onomastic Sciences, as well as the reflection in the titles of these latter of the plurality (‘Onomastic sciences’) of the discipline as practised from the 1950s. There continues, as is to be found in these places and elsewhere (including such recent publications on English as Coates and Breeze (2000); Postles (2002); Rumble and Mills (1997)), a strong tradition of work on name etymology and naming systems; but such work is now concerned with a much more extensive range of languages and shows increased awareness of interaction with wider historical concerns and of psychological and social motivations for name-giving. Emblematic of this latter aspect is the innovatory work of Gelling and colleagues (e.g. Gelling (1984); Gelling and Cole (2000)) in de-coding Anglo-Saxon names for settlements on the basis of careful study of these names and the landscapes where they were applied. What is of most interest in the present context, however, is the range of developments which we might group together as (the rapidly expanding concern with) ‘theories of names’. And we can make use of some of this work in particular to add to the picture of names that is emerging.

Even this ‘theoretical’ subset of recent onomastic contributions is too vast and varied for me to attempt to survey here, and not all of the contributions

These attitudes are not characteristic of the earlier philological tradition, which was both broadly based and crucially dependent on the concepts of contemporary comparative grammar; and they can result only in work, however industrious, that is both conceptually and empirically impoverished. In contrast, but in line with the philological tradition, Pamp (1998: 256), for instance, while defensive of onomastics as an independent discipline in relation to interdisciplinary concerns, places it firmly within ‘the study of language’, i.e. linguistics, and envisages the clear dependence of ‘name philology’ on ‘name linguistics’.

6 These congress proceedings provide by their contents useful overviews of the field at the time of their publication. But the field is not always well served by the editing characteristic of the series. Despite the not inconsiderable time that passes between Congress and publication of the Proceedings (and despite sometimes the listing of a not undistinguished board of editors), there is little evidence of the contributions having been reviewed, and there is no attempt to sort out the medley of different presentation types: some of the papers contain only abstracts rather than finished papers, or what appear to be conference handouts, or transcripts of a spoken presentation, or simply presentations of, or advertisements for, projects. In deferring to ‘section chairs’, indeed, Brylla and Wahlberg (2005: x), not untypically, disclaim responsibility for content and literacy. There is also little sign of any attempt to ensure that those papers purporting to be in, for example, English have been adequately Englished.

Perhaps this reflects, or iconicizes, the relative recentness of many of the new developments in the field, which remain rather exploratory, as does the still rather limited and tentative acknowledgment in recent onomastic contributions of work on names in non-onomastic traditions. Thus, Herbert (1998: 187) complains:
are pertinent to the grammar of names as such. What I do in what follows is, rather, to consider examples of three sets of developments concerned in general with names and categorization, and evincing rather different attitudes to it. Let me, as a prelude to looking at these in some detail, consider a recent extreme version of the Millian (1919 [1843]) view that names only refer (or only ‘denote’ not ‘connotate’, in his terms—which we examine in §5.1). This is offered in a book by a general linguist, Thrane (1980). And I want to compare what he says to the view concerning the sense of names that seems to emerge from much of traditional onomastics. This will serve as useful background to our contemplation of the selected recent work in onomastics that occupies the subsections that follow.

In onomastic studies, names, particularly place names, are traditionally divided into semantic subcategories in accordance with what the referents of each subcategory (such as settlements, regions, rivers) have in common. However, according to Thrane (1980: 214), for instance, ‘proper names are non-categorial signs, which means that they do not in any way indicate what kind of thing they are being used to refer to on a given occasion’. In support of this view, Thrane goes on to point out that when presented with a sentence like (7) ‘there is no non-contextual way in which the hearer may learn whether I visited a friend or a town’:

(7) I visited Sydney on my way home

And assigning particular personal names to males or females is simply ‘conventional’ (with some names ‘doing service in both categories’). Indeed, he avers: ‘Everything can be given a name: ships, planes, and cars often are’. But this seems to me to oversimplify the situation, and, in the case of the last statement at least, to drastically misrepresent it. However, as I have anticipated, these views serve at least to bring into focus the disagreements about categorization that will emerge in what follows.

The traditional view in ‘onomastics’ of recognizing subcategories of name is at odds with Thrane’s articulation of Mill (1919 [1843]). However, this
traditional view merely amplifies the Millian by saying that names are at most subcategorizationally impoverished, and thus denotationally deprived: subcategorization of names involves only a few distinctions along the gender dimension (in a wide sense), the basic terms of which (animacy, sex) are frequently grammaticalized in languages, together with further distinctions which elaborate upon this dimension, particularly among the place-name subset of names for non-humans.

As I have noted, such distinctions are apparently universally relevant in languages to defining subclasses of name: ‘languages do not seem to have a category of pure names, in the logician’s sense. Rather there are personal names, place names, color names, and so on’ (Chomsky (1975: 45)—but see §7.3.2 on colour terms). Onomasts and linguists, unconcerned with pursuit of the pure ‘logically proper name’ (as described in Chapter 5), have been more ready than philosophers to acknowledge the (limited, but differential) sense of names (among linguists, cf. e.g. Seppänen (1974: Chapter 3); Jackendoff (2002: 318–19)).

Anderson (2003a; 2004c) argues that, though instances of ‘pure names’ may be absent from language, it is possible to establish a category of names (including, certainly, various subcategories), distinct from other syntactic categories. Particularly relevant at this point is that it has been generally assumed among onomasts that subcategorization of names by (extended) gender is prevalent in language. Recall (§3.2) that this differentiation in sense does not commit us to saying that names have denotation, if denotation involves designation of a class characterized by a particular sense. Names refer to individuals, to which they may attribute minimal sense (on the view that has emerged here), but they do not denote classes.

The positing of differentiation in gender is, of course, not to deny the possibility of, for example, hermaphroditic names (‘doing service in both categories’, as Thrane puts it), or, on the other hand, the creativity of naming, whereby names may be extended to diverse categories on a personal or figurative basis, or as a social development. And much recent work, such as Jørgensen (2005) and Sjöblom (2005), proposes the extension of names into fresh classes of entity. The status of such ‘classification’, however, is basic to the divergences emerging from recent onomastic work on ‘theory of names’. Before we confront these, let us dispose of Thrane’s appeal to the ‘conventionality’ of assigning names to males or females.

The conveying of gender by use of a name is varyingly important in different languages: not all languages differentiate between male and female names as starkly as does Latin (see e.g. Chase (1897); Pulgram (1954: 5)), whereby women were denied the traditional ‘tria nomina’ of a Roman citizen.
And not all communities legally require, as does Switzerland (Allerton 1987: 89), that a given personal name clearly indicate the gender of the bearer. But consider the embarrassment experienced by speakers of many languages when they ‘mis-sex’ some foreign individual being referred to on the basis of ambiguity of the name or of imperfect knowledge of the foreign ‘conventions’. It is instructive to notice here, as a reflection of subcategoriality involving gender, that the gender of many personal names is what underlies their use as gender-distinguishing initial elements in some nominal compounds whose second (common-noun) element is gender-neutral, as with *billy-goat*, *tom-cat* (cf. e.g. Poutsma (1914: Chapter XXVII, §14, Obs. III)). This suggests that what characterizes the meaning of names is that, though they are not individually distinguished in sense from each other, particular sets of them are typically associated with particular categories (particularly of gender).

These categorialities are not to be diminished by labelling them (as does Thrane) ‘conventional’, or by saying dismissively that *Providence* ‘happens to be the name of a city’ (Vendler 1967: 39). Linguistic systems as a whole are largely conventional. The word *table* in French is feminine, by ‘convention’, and ‘happens’ to be a term for an item of furniture; but this is not to deny the appropriateness to the analysis of French of the category of grammatical gender, nor does it mean that *table* lacks sense. The sign association here (between *table* and ‘table’), however, is no less arbitrary, or ‘conventional’, than that between *John* and ‘male’.

The assignment of some names, as well as other words, is indeed less ‘conventional’ in one respect. As we have observed, many place names, for instance, remain transparent as to their descriptive origin, as do nicknames (though, of course, the denotation of the sources themselves is again conventionally established). But, as we have seen, such ‘non-conventionality’ of origin is equally not relevant as such to the categoriality of names, as opposed to that of many instances of their sources. It is the synchronic role of these descriptive elements that is controversial, along with (possibly non-overt) gender distinctions. So, it is controversial whether it is linguistically relevant or even true that *Dartmouth*, for instance, is still overtly based (for many speakers) on a name and a noun, i.e. is ‘relatively motivated’ in the Saussurean sense, compared with, say, *London*.7 This information may not be relevant to an act of reference, but it has been argued that it is part of the structure of the name and remains available in any particular speech act. We return to this.

7 Compare again Saussure on the relative arbitrariness of some signs (1916: 181):

\[
\ldots vingt \text{ est immotivé, mais } dix-neuf \text{ n’}e \text{t pas au même degré, parce qu’il évoque les termes dont il se compose et d’autres qui lui sont associés, } \ldots \text{ Il en est de même pour } \text{poirier, qui rappelle le mot simple poire et dont le suffixe -ier fait penser à cerisier, pommier, etc.}
\]
Notice now too that though, as Thrane claims, ‘everything can be given a name’, this is often so only by breaking the linguistic ‘conventions’. By changing the ‘convention’ we change the linguistic system, or use it figuratively. Normally not all semantic classes are involved in naming: in English we do not usually name individual trees as opposed to people and cities (though I am very fond of our olive tree called *Sybil*); so that in non-figurative usage *Sydney* cannot refer to any ‘kind of thing’. There is cross-linguistic evidence that names are given to people and places (the anthroponyms and toponyms of the onomastic tradition) in the first instance, and that other nominations are further anthropocentric extensions of this ‘convention’ (to continue to use Thrane’s term). Children recognize at an early stage that names are given to people (and anthropomorphomic extensions thereof) and not inanimates, as noted by Karmiloff and Karmiloff-Smith (2001: 73–4).

Further, in English to name a male *Mary* is as system-infringing as referring to a known male as *she* or calling your garden shed a *palace*. The interpretation of (7) nicely illustrates the ambiguity arising from well-defined competing categorizations: person or place? Interpretation of (7) together with possible continuations, such as (8), illustrates indeed the grammatical relevance of the ‘conventions’ involved:

(8) How did he/she/it strike you?

And, as we have seen, in many languages (most) individual personal names are applied either to males or to females and not to both, by ‘convention’. Particular names typically invoke certain gender-based subsets of referents (cf. e.g. Morpurgo-Davies (2000: 20–1)).

We return shortly to some of the arguments provided in more recent manifestations in onomastics in support of something like Thrane’s position. Firstly, though, let us look, in contrast, at another recent(-ish) discussion that is relevant to our concerns here but which assumes that names are associated with subcategories. And it is of interest for another (relevant) reason, to do with the relative status of these subcategories.

### 4.3.1 Hierarchies of names

Van Langendonck (1998: 342) laments that, though ‘in European toponymy, a lot of work has been devoted to the classification of place names in view of diachronic investigations’, on the other hand, ‘synchronic research, i.e. the study of contemporary categories and structures of place names has been largely neglected’. And he offers ‘a typological approach’. Though the data are confined to familiar Indo-European languages, the results are, nevertheless, suggestive, at least.
He provides (1998: 342–3), on the one hand, a classification of place names based on overt structural properties, on what he calls a ‘formal approach’. This results in four main categories, as shown in (9):

(9) Van Langendonck’s formal classification and hierarchy

(i) zero-forms: London, Spain
(ii) suffixed forms: Germany, Bulgaria, Scotland
(iii) with article: the Thames, the Atlantic
(iv) with classifier: Lake Erie, the Atlantic Ocean

For simplicity, I give here only examples from English—though, admittedly, this lessens the apparent weight of Van Langendonck’s case even further. (9) constitutes a hierarchy of relative formal markedness, from ‘unmarked’, the ‘zero-form’, through increasingly ‘marked’. The interest of this is how it matches what is ‘on the other hand’ anticipated at the beginning of the paragraph, namely his ‘semantic classification and hierarchy’.

Van Langendonck suggests (1998: 344–6) that relevant to the establishment of the latter hierarchy are semantic distinctions to do not only with geography but particularly with degree of ‘human interaction’ with the spaces designated by place names. He argues that settlement names come high on the hierarchy, in displaying such features as ‘habitable’, ‘dwelling place’, ‘administratively structured and bounded’, and ‘human integration’. Let us call this ‘semantic class (a): names of settlements’. With the names of states, ‘the properties of settlements are present here secondarily’; states are ‘sets of settlements’; ‘names of states’, semantic class (b), are lower on the hierarchy. Lower still comes a semantic class, (c), associated with ‘the absence of human organisation or administration’, including ‘names of regions, fields, swamps, rivers, orientation points, mountains, forests and so on’. But ‘names of places which score lowest on the parameters, habitability, administrative organisation and human integration’ belong to class (d): Van Langendonck lists here names of seas and oceans, but also of forests, also listed in class (c); however, this may be in accord with his observation that ‘we can expect transitional cases, e.g. among settlements, the hamlets, which are close to minor places like fields’.

As presented, these hierarchies, and particularly the second, would benefit from a tightening of definitions (particularly of the semantic categories), and some fleshing out, especially in invocation of a greater variety of languages; and Van Langendonck concedes that the classification is incomplete. And he also observes that ‘in case of frequent or expressive or even colloquial usage’ we may find ‘the occasional deletion of the formal markings (The Atlantic (Ocean), the Sahara (Desert)). Also, the argument does involve, it seems to me, some ‘special pleading’, e.g. in regarding such ‘town suffixes’
as -ton, -ham, -wick, -bridge, -ford in English as of ‘diachronic’ interest only, even though they are clear markers of settlement names (whether or not one knows the etymology).

Despite these caveats, he suggests that in the languages he looks at there is a correlation between the two hierarchies, such that relative ‘markedness’ in the one hierarchy tends to correlate with a lower position on the other. He suggests an ‘implicational universal’, and an instance of it, as follows (1998: 347):

If a place name subclass $x$ in the semantic cline is characterised by a form $y$, then it is impossible for a more (resp. less) than $x$ to be characterised by a less (resp. more) marked form than $y$. For instance, when we see that names of regions have an article in German, it cannot be the case that country-names have a classifier.

(He treats -land in Finland etc. as a suffix, not a classifier.) And he observes that the importance of human involvement in determining the semantic hierarchy ‘reminds us of the well-known animacy hierarchy in language typology’ (1998: 345).

Now, if such a picture can be substantiated more generally, there are two interesting conclusions to be drawn relevant to our present enterprise. In the first place, this correlation between markedness of form and markedness of semantic category is exactly what we might expect from a notionalist perspective; form is not autonomous. And, secondly, the correlation involves (part of) the animacy dimension, which is thereby shown to be relevant to names as well as to pronouns, and (to a lesser degree) nouns. It confirms the conceptual primacy of people over places, the anthropocentricity of naming and of the classifications that result from naming.

Of course, as is clear from e.g. Duke’s (2005) work briefly described in §4.3.2, there are other factors involved in determining the complexity of names in different systems, depending on which functions of naming are prioritized. But even in personal naming systems based on descriptions of different types, as in the African languages considered by Duke, personal names tend to be brief, simplex. As such, they could be seen as representing the top of both of Van Langendonck’s correlated hierarchies.

4.3.2 Onymic reference and the sense of names

Coates (2005), in contrast with Van Langendonck, adopts a strictly Millian view: ‘proper names have no sense at all’ (2005: 126). Moreover, ‘proper names’ are not a category in their own right, nor are they a subcategory of noun or anything else. Instead, according to Coates, one should be talking about two ‘modes of referring’: ‘one semantic, where the entailments accruing from the words used in particular structures are preserved intact, and one
onymic, where they are not’ (2005: 130). There are expressions which can be used to refer in either manner. Thus:

(10) a. semantic: ‘I live at the old vicarage’ entails ‘I live at the house which was formerly that of some Anglican priest’

b. onymic: ‘I live at the Old Vicarage’ entails only ‘I live at the place called The Old Vicarage’

I cannot subscribe to Coates’ suggestion that ‘we may agree that this account is linguistically satisfying’. In relation to both (a) and (b) in (10), on his own account, there seems to be an entailment that ‘I live at a certain place’; this makes sense, in both senses. Also, while you may decide, as Coates also suggests, to name your house The Old Vicarage without it ever having been occupied by an Anglican priest, this would simply be perverse: names which have a transparent source may over time become opaque, but to build in unsignalled obscurity of structure contravenes naming conventions and the conversational conventions which apply in the use of names.

Likewise, for Richard Coates to name his son Richard (2005: 127) would be representative of a not uncommon practice in Britain, though not usually taken to the extreme of one family of my acquaintance where the sons all bear the same first name as the father. But it is usually compensated for in various ways, such as differentiation between Richard and Dick or Father/Dad and Richard or the use of nicknames. And some naming traditions are designed to avoid just this situation. It may be that ‘names just don’t have the property of necessarily denoting uniquely’ (Coates 2005: 127), but people like to behave as if they do, even if in their own mental lexicon there is a (name) form associated with two or more possible referents; and context, nicknames and descriptions are brought into service when the uniquely-referring use of a name is frustrated. Coates’ (and others’) objection to the traditional view that what characterizes names is referring uniquely is a trivial quibble: if on a particular occasion a name fails to refer uniquely then the act of speech is a failure.

I suggest that (what seems to me to be) Coates’ confusion arises precisely from a failure to recognize the validity of associating with names both a distinctive ‘mode of reference’ and the content and structure of the category whose existence he denies, i.e. the name. By uttering (10b) I can make a successful reference without appeal to the internal structure of the name (thus onymic, in his terms), but this structure is still available to my interlocutor (on the normal understanding that the name is not applied pathologically), and it may indeed, in the case of The Old Vicarage, enable this person to establish the location and imagine the appearance of the place I refer to.
And this is done on the basis of the structure and sense and any attached encyclopaedic information of the phrase on which the name is based. It is the category of names that is used to refer onymically; the expressions involved are all names, simple, John, and derived, The Old Vicarage.

Thus, names have internal structures which may contain components with sense. The name Edinburgh Castle, to take a familiar example, is composed of a name and a noun. In a particular act of reference the sense element may not be relevant as such: the reference is made by a holistic name. But the sense information is nevertheless available, and accessible. The same is true with sense components that are not expressed distinctively, as with most personal names. Indeed, a particular act of speech may be intended to convey this sense, at the same time as making a reference.

Consider the utterance in (11a):

(11) a. That’s my neighbour you can hear. Mary always switches on her TV at this time of day
b. That’s my neighbour you can hear. She always switches on her TV at this time of day
c. That’s my neighbour you can hear. That woman always switches on her TV at this time of day
d. That’s Mary you can hear. She always switches on her TV at this time of day

It is part of the content of Mary that it refers to a female, as it is of Edinburgh Castle that it refers to a place, specifically a castle. Now this is not part of the act of reference, here in (11) co-reference, but it can be part of what the speaker is trying to convey; gender may be introduced as relevant for some reason. (11b) illustrates that this situation is not unique to names: in using a singular third-person definite pronoun in English one willy-nilly conveys the gender of the referent. (11c) can convey the same relevant information. And, indeed, what a speaker intends by the use of any word will not necessarily exhaust its content (in the lexicon of the speaker or of the hearer); the speaker of (11a–b) may or may not intend to convey gender.

Now, one may object that in (11a) one is likely to be carrying out a naming, a nomination, or ‘baptism’ (cf. e.g. Lyons (1977: §7.5); Kripke (1981 [1972]); Carroll (1985: Chapter 8, §3.1)), (of my neighbour), as well as making an act of co-reference (which latter establishes something about the ‘baptizee’). But do we have then to say that, after all, ‘proper names’ can ‘bear sense’, but only in such (‘baptismal’) situations as (11a)? At the very least, it has to be admitted that even simple names are not just used for onymic reference.
Conveying the gender of someone known personally to both speaker and hearer is usually unnecessary; but use of most personal names conveys it anyway. Gender is part of the sense of the name, and it is reflected linguistically in pronominal anaphora, as in (11a) and (d). Some names, as we have seen, are ambiguous in gender, but so are some nouns (such as doctor). If a wife says to her husband, or vice versa, ‘Our doctor is visiting his/her mother’, there does not need to be a disambiguation of gender, but again it is conveyed anyway. Gender-ambiguous names and nouns and pronouns (they) are disambiguated by specific reference, whereas other names and nouns and pronouns have inherent gender. We legitimately infer that, unless there is contra-indication, anything referred to as Mary is human and female, just as we can infer that anything referred to as a/the crone is human and female, as well as old. And we can infer a lot more in personal naming systems that are ‘characterizing’, such as that of Ilongot (§4.2.3).

The legitimacy of such inferences is not put in question by the possible transfer of names, whether figuratively or affectively or merely whimsically, to individuals that lack the sense of the originals, as with some ship and race-horse names, for instance. These are derived names, based on names; and anthroponyms are prototypical; they are the unmarked gender. A particular name-referent combination will be assumed to be that unless overridden by the context. As with other words, sense and reference is, in the ideal case, clear in context.

The rejection of what I am calling names as categorial, rather than simply a ‘mode of reference’ largely comes from failure to recognize that names can bear sense. There is a body of names whose members may be internally complex categorially, and this complexity may arise from the name being derived (possibly only in part) from a non-name, whose contribution to the derived (name) form remains accessible, in communication as well as to syntactic structure. The status of the whole as a (derived) name introduces the possibility of obscuration, such that, for example, ‘New College, Oxford is no longer new’ (Coates (2005: 130), citing Conrad (1985)), as with other derived forms. But talk of ‘obscuration’ implies previous ‘transparency’; and this transparency is not limited to the moment of naming. Recall here the discussion of nouns derived from verbs in §1.1.1, where it was shown that the properties of the verb remain accessible in determining the possible arguments of the derived noun.

That names are typically used for onymic reference does not preclude them having sense, nor this sense from being communicated without their ceasing to be names. Names are categorial, not merely referential. Certainly, nouns
largely contribute to the semantics of ‘semantic reference’ (though the ‘reference’ depends on a determinative), but with names, semantics, or sense, is unnecessary to making a reference (in context). But this does not prevent sense being conveyed by the same act of speech, which may not be purely referential.

On the other hand, nouns do not refer at all, but denote; they provide sense to permit a determinative to make a successful reference by limiting the set of denotata. Coates recognizes among the set of ‘onymically-used’ expressions (what I call names) a subset with a special property. He distinguishes these as ‘proper nouns’, which correspond to my underived names (John etc., as opposed to The Old Vicarage). For Coates, ‘the category of proper nouns is epiphenomenal upon the basic category of proper name-expressions’ (2005: 131). The distinction between ‘proper noun’ and ‘proper name’ is reminiscent of Huddleston’s (1984: 229–30) proposal, which is looked at in §6.2 below. And like that proposal, it raises questions as to the status of the ‘category of proper nouns’ and the ‘category of proper-name expressions’ (my italics—JMA). Appeal to onymic reference doesn’t explain what kind or kinds of category or categories is involved, nor account for the distinctive structural properties of both ‘proper nouns’ and ‘proper-name expressions’ (which are pursued in Chapter 9).

Coates characterizes ‘proper nouns’ thus: ‘items which never bear sense, the proper nouns which are the prototypical proper names, are the special case where the scope for semantic or senseful reference is or has become zero’ (2005: 132). This proposal leaves uncertain what exactly the grammatical status of ‘proper nouns’ is, i.e. items that refer only onymically. For Coates they may be ‘epiphenomenal’ to a mode of reference, but what sort of phenomenon are they, given too that Coates also describes the ‘proper noun’ subset of ‘proper names’, as being ‘numerous, salient and even typical’ (2005: 129), and even ‘prototypical’ (as in the above quotation)? ‘Prototypicality’ and ‘epiphenomenality’ make a strange conjunction of characterizing properties, if they are both to be interpreted as having synchronic reference. The proposed status of ‘proper nouns’, whatever it is, should begin to answer such questions as: why do they have the distribution of ‘noun phrases’, while, as Coates observes, citing Hamp (1956: 347), morphosyntactic resemblance to nouns is far from universal (such a view indeed being ‘Eurocentric’)? According to Anderson (1997), names are not to be regarded as nouns but as determinatives (possibly internally structured categorially), which thus head ‘noun phrases’, i.e. determinative phrases.

In those terms, what Coates calls ‘proper nouns’ are prototypical because, among other things, they are not derived from other categories; but this does not mean that even they lack sense, which is minimally present in the form of
gender distinctions. And in some languages these distinctions may be spelled out in their structure. Personal names are regularly differentiated in gender in many languages, as in Greek, which also has gender-specific ‘diminutive’ forms. My grandparents grew up in Leith (Scotland) in a generation of Thomasinas and Williaminas and the like, for instance. Derived names expand on this dimension of gender in various ways. In the society concerned, these names also told you that the father of the bearer of the name was called by the (simple) masculine form of the name. In possessing this sense, are they then not ‘proper nouns’? Coates suggests that (2005: 129) the overt patronymic of Icelandic, in possessing sense, is, unlike a ‘given name’, not ‘a true proper name (sic)’; indeed, it may be used either onymically or with ‘semantic reference’ (133). This suggestion is mainly based—it must be said, inconclusively—on the fact that Icelandic heitur ‘is called’ is not used with patronyms; this merely tells us that patronyms are not ‘given names’. Patronyms do not involve the giving of a name, only transmission of a name derived from the father’s name. But all names, ‘given’ or ‘transmitted’ (or both as in the case of Thomasina, etc.), are used for onymic reference and typically have sense.

The mention of name-giving also reminds us that, when this is done, the name is not making onymic reference, it is having reference assigned to it (as explored in the following chapters). The notion of onymic reference, which, as we shall see, resembles Kaplan’s (1989a, b) and Recanati’s (1993) ideas on ‘direct reference’, offers an important insight into the use of names as arguments, though not in naming constructions. And Coates rightly points out that the capacity for onymic reference transparently relates to the evidence that reference by ‘proper names’ involves less cost in processing than reference ‘mediated by sense’ (evidence that has been accumulating since at least the appearance of Donders (1868)). Derived names are lexically more complex than simple names, they contain additional sense-bearing elements, but in both cases the sense will not be accessed in onymic reference, reducing processing time compared with non-names of parallel structure (Coates 2005: 132–3). The dominance of onymic reference among the uses of names also underlies the widespread tendency for names to become ‘obscured’. However, the importance of the recognition of onymic reference should not be allowed to blind us to the categoriality of names. Nor does the recognition of onymic reference absolve us from having to investigate the source of the capacity for its exercise.

These issues are pursued in the chapters that follow. But they also lead on to a discussion representative of a rather different view still, as concerns names and categorization. Indeed, the work in question attempts to provide an
account of the meaningfulness of names, based on a phenomenological approach which emphasizes the importance of intuitive knowledge and the centrality of meaning in language, particularly in relation to categories.

4.3.3 The phenomenology of names

I focus here on Willems (1996; 2000), particularly the more recent, compact presentation of the latter, which announces itself as hoping ‘to contribute to a better understanding of the semantic nature of the linguistic phenomenon traditionally called “proper name”’ (2000: 87). The starting point is the claim that, from a phenomenological viewpoint, ‘…any theory of proper names as meaningless signs is a priori untenable’ (2000: 91), so that views stemming from Mill whereby ‘…proper names are conceived of as “mere forms”, not meaningful “linguistic forms”’ (2000: 93), though pervasive, must be rejected. Such a view as the latter ‘amounts to claiming that proper names are no linguistic signs at all but rather general signs with a particular pragmatic and referential, yet without any intra-linguistic meaning function’.

This obviously depends on one’s notion of meaning. Willems suggests: ‘the meaning of a word can be called the condition of its use’ (2000: 94–5). According to Willems, attributing meaninglessness to names results from a too limited view of meaning, reducing it to ‘lexical meaning’, or ‘classematic meaning’ (2000: 96). Proper names do not bear ‘classematic meaning’, ‘a meaning that enables the speaker to subsume the referent under a certain class’ (2000: 94).

Willems follows Coseriu (1987) in distinguishing five types of meaning. Of these, ‘classematic meaning’ is said to be often confused with ‘categorial meaning’. ‘Categorial meaning’ is associated with particular ‘parts of speech’, which are ‘functional-semantic categories’ (Willems 2000: 95). Willems illustrates the distinction between ‘classematic’ and ‘categorial meaning’ thus (2000: 95):

...in phrases like a white wine the word white carries at least two different types of meaning in ordinary language use, viz. a lexical meaning because it is an item of the English lexicon, and the value of being an ‘adjective’.

Unlike ‘classematic meaning’, ‘…the difference between the series of adjectives and the series of nouns does not lie in the lexicon’. And ‘…is not (and cannot be) situated on the level of langue—even though categorial meaning is partly lexicalized in most languages’ (2000: 96, fn. 7).

Now, this seems to me to assume a very limited view of the lexicon—and of ‘langue’. Those ‘categorial’ differences that underlie ‘parts of speech’, at least, are a property of particular lexical items. Consider Willems’ illustration (2000: 96):
One may, for example, attribute a lexical class-meaning to the word *fire*, yet the categorial meaning of this word depends on actual speech, and whether *fire* is used as a verb (for example, in the sentence *They fired rubber bullets*) or as a noun (for example in *There was a fire on the ground floor*) depends on the sentence as a whole.

But these are two different words *fire*, quite different in lexical ‘classematic meaning’ and synchronically unrelated, and the meaning of the verb word is tied to its verbness. The verb seems to be plausibly interpreted, on the other hand, as being related to the noun *fire* in *Hold your fire*, but this relationship too involves a synchronic relation in English that invokes different ‘parts of speech’, of conversion to one from another. A word that appears indifferent to ‘part of speech’ is, instead, different words possibly derivationally related (by conversion). However, let us proceed with looking at the consequences of Willems’ proposals for names, since there can, in any case, be maintained a distinction between ‘classematic’ and ‘categorial meaning’.

In characterizing the categorial meaning of names, Willems (2000: 102) cites Husserl (1970 [1890]; 1984 [1900–1]), in particular his view that, in Willems’ words, ‘… sense (i.e., linguistic meaning) and reference coincide in the proper name, whereas they do not (and cannot) coincide in the appellative with its classematic meaning’. This underlies the first of Coseriu’s (1955) defining properties of names, ‘monovalence’. In the words of Willems (2000: 103), ‘monovalent words designate referents without classifying them as members of a class’. Willems comments on this:

From Husserl’s explanation of the difference between universal and non-universal names, quoted above, it follows that the monovalence of proper names is not a particular subtype of classematic designation. Instead, it is a highly specific negation of classematic designation, such that proper names and appellative nouns share a basic categorial meaning (both being ‘nouns’), while proper names lack the classematic function lexemes typically have as parts of speech.

As observed, Coseriu distinguishes three other types of meaning. Willems (2000: 96) comments on the first of these, ‘instrumental meaning’, as referring ‘to the semantics of word order and intonation, but also to the meaning of typical functional morphemes like articles, prepositions, and conjunctions’—including ‘bound morphemes’ like ‘pluralization’. The latter (and arguably the former) involves the meaning of functional categories. Fourthly, ‘particular “forms” such as the modes and tenses of the verb (e.g. the indicative as opposed to the imperative, or the present indicative as opposed to the future indicative), the active and the passive or antipassive, etc. induce specific differences in syntactic meaning’. And the fifth type, ‘ontological meaning’, ‘refers to differences in the various representational values that derive from differences in syntactic construction, for example the different values in *How tall!* as opposed to *How tall?*’

These distinctions, as formulated, and as partly revealed by their evident failure to yield a transparent demarcation, do not seem to me to reflect well-articulated and explicit theories of the lexicon and syntax, let alone of meaning. But it is not necessary to pursue them here.
This seems to be, to some extent, equivalent to saying that names do not have denotation, only reference.

Willems does not explain what the categorial meaning of ‘noun’ is. Names have a categorial meaning but it is shared, in Anderson’s (1997) terms, not with nouns but with other determinatives, namely the function within the system of permitting reference. Nouns do not have this meaning; rather, they are the lexical class most amenable to being made referential with the help of a determiner. In terms of the notation of Anderson (1997), determinatives are \{N\}, nouns \{N;P\}; they share a preponderance of N, which motivates the preferential status of nouns as (indirect) acquirers of reference.

Moreover, there are the same problems with Willems’ suggestion that names deny ‘classematic meaning’ as with Coates’ claim that onymic reference precludes meaningful reference. Neither suggestion is compatible with clear evidence for the (minimal) semanticity of names (and determinatives in general), and I shall not duplicate what I have already said about this.

The second defining property of ‘proper names’ is ‘individualization’: ‘a proper name individualizes a referent’ (Willems 2000: 105). Individualization ‘has no influence on the linguistic status of the word, whether there is a referential, representational or even natural unity that corresponds to the individuating function of the proper name’. Willems points out that the forms in (12a) are ‘as much proper names as’ those in (b):

\[
\begin{align*}
(12) & \quad \text{a. the Bahamas, the Greater Antilles, the Lesser Antilles, the Pyrenees} \\
& \quad \text{b. Cuba, Hawaii, Mexico, Germany}
\end{align*}
\]

Quite so. But the first set signal in their form that these places are to be understood as consisting of a set, and the second and third in the set are signalled as related but of different dimensions; they have meaningful components. -s is a ‘linguistic form’ that signals that an element that is lexically count is actualized as plural; and, in phenomenological terms, ‘linguistic forms’, such as -s, are ‘always..., in one way or another, meaningful’ (Willems 2000: 91). We are back with familiar problems with any attempt to arbitrarily restrict the meaning of names.\(^9\)

\(^9\) Similarly, the classificatory nature of names is made overt in place names such as Williamstown and Newport: such names contain in their structure a noun that does just this. And this classification is accessible to any interlocutor. Denial of this would again apparently be incompatible with the phenomenological maxim that ‘linguistic forms’ are ‘always..., in one way or another, meaningful’ (Willems 2000: 91). And how otherwise are we to contrast such names with personal names in Seminole (§4.2.1), which also involve combinations of items that have sense-bearing cognates but whose presence in a name serves not to classify but to actively ‘negate lexical meaning’ by the arbitrariness of the combinations?
The ‘non-classematic individualization’ of ‘proper names’ is also used by Willems to resolve instances whose ‘proper name’ status has been seen as problematical (some of them cited by Dummett (1996: 1188)). Thus, for example, the final words in each of (13) are for Willems not ‘proper names’:

(13) a. My uncle always wants to play skat  
    b. They plan to move in February

Such forms as skat ‘derive their meaning from the lexical field or “paradigms” to which they belong: skat, bridge, whist, twenty-one, etc.’ (Willems 2000: 107). (Indeed, in my case, this exhausts my knowledge of this particular card game.) But then John can be said to ‘derive its meaning’ from the paradigm James, Brian, Jeremy, etc. If it can be said of skat that it ‘simply designates a particular game among other games’, then so does John designate a particular man. Of course, as a prototypical name, it is less common to ‘de-individualize’ John, as in This isn’t the John I used to know, whereas we can readily substitute for the non-prototypical, abstract name skat in (13a) a game of skat, which requires a ‘re-individualizing’ a. The non-prototypical name is more easily converted.

There is a crucial difference between the two paradigms of names given above, on the one hand, and similar paradigms of nouns, on the other: names are instances of types, nouns are sub-types of a type (man, woman). Thus, while, among names, both the game of skat and the city of Manchester are viable, as is the woman Mary, something like *the bird (of) sparrow, involving a noun, is never acceptable: a sparrow is a sub-type of a type, whereas skat, Manchester and Mary are instances of a type.

There is nothing in the use of skat (or February) in (13) to suggest that they are not ‘proper names’. Certainly, a verb like play in (13a) normally requires a complement of a particular ‘classematic’ category, and this is satisfied by skat and not by John (except figuratively), but so does the verb murder, and this is satisfied by John, and not skat (except figuratively). Similar remarks apply to February. Willems seeks to show the status of this form as a non-name with the examples in (14):

(14) a. This February is a beautiful month  
    b. The month of February I mean is not the month of February you mean

But Willems himself points out (2000: 110) that the initially-capitalized forms in (15) are not ‘proper names’, although they may be elsewhere:

(15) a. All the Raquels you know  
    b. He loves his Cadillac  
    c. What a Bush does, a Clinton can do better  
    d. Which Cambridge?
In present terms, the forms in (15) are nouns derived from names. Similarly, the examples in (14) show nothing about the status of *February* elsewhere, including (13b).

Such examples as those in (15) are discussed under Willems’ treatment of the third of Coseriu’s defining characteristics of ‘one-dimensionality’, vs. the ‘two-dimensional’ ‘appellative noun’; but I shall not pursue that here, as nothing of consequence for us seems to hang on it, since, insofar as it is valid, it follows from the distinction between determinative and noun, or rather noun phrase.\(^{10}\)

It seems to me that neither Coates nor Willems provides evidence that names necessarily lack lexical meaning. And other aspects of the onomastic tradition rely heavily on the semanticity of names, not just their etymologies. And this is well illustrated by the work of Van Langendonck discussed above. However, we must return to consider further the semantic status of the various sub-types of place name discussed by Van Langendonck and others; I shall take this up in §6.3. We turn in the next chapter, however, to aspects of the philosophical debate on the meaning of names. Firstly let me summarize what I think emerges from this one.

\(^{10}\) According to Willems (2000: 110):

\[\ldots a \text{ two-dimensional appellative noun either refers explicitly to an individual referent and implicitly to the class to which the referent belongs; or it refers explicitly to a group of individuals and implicitly to the individual members of the group.}\]

But ‘a proper name is restricted to a single referential (‘individualizing’) function’. This seems to me to be unclear, and, where apparently not, to oversimplify and so confuse things. Firstly, it is not clear how a noun can refer ‘implicitly to the individual members of a group’. Constructions with plural nouns in English such as that in (i) can refer to either all the members of the group denoted by the noun (generic) or a sub-group of that group (non-generic):

(i)  
- a. Lions are carnivorous
- b. Lions approached the tent

Similarly the singular definite phrase in (ii) can refer generically or to an individual:

(ii)  
- a. The lion is carnivorous
- b. The lion approached the tent

What groupings or individuals are referred to explicitly or implicitly in these examples? Does (iia) refer explicitly to an individual referent? Moreover, we can in the case of the generics and the plural in (ia) distinguish among group-referents between reference to either the group as a whole (‘collective’) or to the group as individuals (‘distributive’). Compare (iii) with the relevant examples:

(iii)  
- a. Lions are extinct
- b. The lion is extinct
- c. Lions gathered around the tent

Some clarification is needed here.
4.4 Conclusion

This chapter started from evidence of the pervasive desire among language-users to find ‘meaning’ in names, which continues to affect our understanding of the nature of naming and indeed the evolution of naming systems. Certainly, it is difficult to find naming systems where the names cannot be seen as ‘originating’ in non-names, and often, but certainly by no means always, nouns. This fact greatly influenced the early developments in onomastics, which largely concerned themselves with etymologies, particularly of names in the early Indo-European languages. But the systematic work done since the nineteenth century revealed other aspects of names and naming which are also very important for our concern here with the grammar of names. These aspects are indeed related to a result that emerges directly out of these investigations into etymology, the revelation of the distinctive phonological histories that names can have compared with the cognate non-name. Names belong to a distinctive subsystem, with a particular function, and they may be structured differently from non-names.

Early onomastic studies have shown that names may have an internal structure that is governed by principles of a system that cannot be identified with the combinatory systems forming compound and complex non-names. It seems, however, that too little attention has been paid to onomastic structure other than early Indo-European. This is partly remedied in work by anthropologists. But what Hudson (2002) calls ‘the syntax of names’, their internal ‘onomastic syntax’, even that of modern European ones, asks for more and more explicit attention.

Some complex names, however, may contain non-name compounds, on the other hand. We need to distinguish onomastic structures from those structures that are taken pre-formed from other linguistic expressions, as in Newbridge, or the Old Vicarage—without denying the restrictions that name formation imposes on these latter derivations. The important point is that they introduce descriptions, with coherent elements of sense.

Moreover, even some of the components of personal names (for instance) may bear a sense which indicates something about the referent’s family affiliations (as in patronyms or modern surnames) or other cultural relationships, as in ‘titles’ such as Lord or Haji. These reveal functions for naming other than the simply identificatory.

Much recent work by onomasts and anthropologists and other social scientists has been devoted to distinguishing the different functions of naming. These studies have elicited the classificatory and other functions that
result in and are served by naming systems; and these may be in conflict with the identificatory/discriminatory role of name use. This, together with the results of conflict among the properties of the ‘ideal’ discriminatory name (Nübling 2000), is typical of actual naming systems, where name forms are usually not assumed to be absolutely uniquely referring, despite the appearance of actual use.

Some such studies on the functions of naming and of name use, however, are not sufficiently careful in distinguishing indexical features of names, providing information about the social position and attitudes of the name-giver and about the origins of the namee, from sense-bearing aspects of names which are part of the linguistic system. These indexical features relate to the functions of naming. But we must also reckon with features of language use itself other than the discriminatory. Among the functions of name use we must distinguish the pragmatic ones from the referential: the deployment of a name may have an affective aim, as well as making a reference. And this may interact with identification in various ways, including enhancing discrimination (Dick vs. Richard).

Much other recent research in onomastics has been concerned with semantic distinctions among names, rather than simply indexical or pragmatic. This is particularly transparent with the differentiation of place names, but also, more recently, with name systems associated with industrialization and commercialization. In §4.3 we looked at one particular study (Van Langendonck 1998) that illustrates this interest, one which attempts a generalization concerning the relationship between semantic classes of place names and their relative structural simplicity. He thus provides the outlines of a notionalist account of place names.

As in other traditions, the association of names with sense has become controversial among some onomasts, as exemplified in §4.3 by recent studies by Coates and Willems. My discussion in §4.3.2 suggests that the function of names in making ‘onymic reference’ (Coates 2005) is not incompatible with their also bearing (and indeed conveying) sense, particularly gender. Willems (2000), discussed in §4.3.3, allows names meaning, but ‘categorial meaning’ not ‘lexical/classematic meaning’. Moreover, according to Willems, the ‘categorial meaning’ is that of a noun (which ‘meaning’ is not clarified), though names are distinguished from nouns, and other lexical categories, in ‘negating’ ‘lexical meaning’. I agree that names do share a ‘classematic meaning’, but Anderson (20003a; 2004c) seems to me to be closer to what is appropriate by considering it to be shared with (other) determinatives. Moreover, this meaning is lexical, part of the language system.
The approaches of both Coates and Willems seem to me to confuse the intended unique identificatory function of names with their categoriality, which displays extended gender distinctions that are not to be dismissed by labelling them ‘conventional’. These onomasts thus represent, as it were, an extreme reaction to the views of Jespersen, discussed briefly below in §6.1: ‘In Mill’s terminology, but in absolute contrast to his view, I should venture to say that proper names (as actually used) “connote” the greatest number of attributes’ (1924: 66).

Whatever one believes about the semanticity of names, it is misleading for Thrane to declare, as cited above: ‘everything can be given a name: ships, planes, and cars often are’ (1980: 214). As is confirmed by a wealth of onomastic studies, naming is strikingly, though unsurprisingly, anthropocentric: we name what is most involved with us. And this is embodied in the categorization of names. This emerges, for instance, from Van Langendonck’s (1998) hierarchy of place names, which is essentially a hierarchy reflecting human involvement. And personal names clearly head the hierarchy: unlike even settlement names, they lack any overt indication of their ‘personalness’ vs. (say) ‘settlementness’ (contrast the large numbers of names like Milltown, Johnstown, Dartington, Edinburgh, Peterborough). Naming spreads out to other semantic sets that come (over time) within an intimate human ambit.

Thus, only ‘pet cars’ (e.g. Genevieve) or other one-offs (Bluebird) have (anthropomorphizing or intimacy-indicating) names; other cars are referred to with name-based nouns, and these nouns behave very differently from names. The same is true of nouns of nationality. In both these cases, the items concerned, unlike names, can be predicative (with an indefinite article):

\begin{enumerate}
  \item Bill’s car is a Ford
  \item Bill is an American
\end{enumerate}

And they show the usual range of modifiers associated with (common) nouns. In this respect, the use of initial capitalization is perhaps misleading, in that it reflects the name status of the base from which the item is derived rather than anything to do with the derived categorization of the item itself.

From consideration of work in onomastics it emerges too that while the institutionalization of a name and the dominant role of onymic reference tend (with greater or less pressure in different societies) to render the name opaque, many complex names (in particular) contain salient common-word elements. And these elements often spell out, as ‘classifiers’, the categorization applicable to the noun, and are often essential to the identification of the referent (as in the University of Queensland). Of course, it is obvious that we cannot, on the other hand, simply identify the sources of names with their...
synchronic categorization. And the etymologies of, for example, English personal names represent specialist knowledge rather than being part of the naming system. But the synchronic semanticity of names is displayed both in the structure of place names and the (otherwise covert) gender distinctions this structure elaborates upon.

I shall be suggesting in what follows that underlying part of the debate among philosophers and linguists concerning the meaning of names is the confusion that I have already described above, particularly in relation to Coates (2005). It is a confusion about whether one is talking about the act of reference when a name is used or about the content of the name, particularly what defines its place in the language system. In the next chapter I offer some observations on relevant aspects of the lengthy philosophical concern with names, before turning more briefly, in Chapter 6, to the grammatical tradition, which, even more than the onomastic, has been much influenced by philosophical debates. That will form the springboard for the chapters that follow in Part III.
Remarks on the philosophy of names

Perhaps even more than in the case of grammar and etymology, the early histories of grammar and philosophy have been intertwined. As far as names are concerned, it is nevertheless not too much of an over-simplification to say that, traditionally, and where it shows most independence of philosophy, grammar has predominantly been occupied with the word class of names. Philosophy, on the other hand, has focused on singular particular reference vs. general and the place in these distinctions of the ‘logical name’, and, particularly since Mill (1919), on the sense, if any, of names. This—slightly artificial—division of interest will nevertheless determine the respective focuses of the next two chapters, though, as I have indicated, much of the discussion in linguistics is dependent on the philosophical tradition.

From the point of view of the grammarian, it might be objected of the latter tradition that it does indeed concentrate in the main on an idealization, the ‘logically proper name’, and on its referentiality, at the expense of other functions of names, and especially of naming (cf. e.g. Zabeeh (1968: Chapter III, pt.1); Lyons (1977: 218, fn. 11)). Little attention is paid to the structural properties of names and the naming systems that underlie them, as uncovered by the onomastic tradition considered in Chapter 4. But philosophers have their own proper concerns, whose consequences are nevertheless more generally relevant. And, in the present case, the intensive study of a few crucial examples has generated revealing debates concerning the semantic status of names in general—and thus, from a notionalist perspective (if such a perspective is to be appropriate), of their grammatical status.

Scholars from the philosophical tradition tend, indeed, to be at their weakest when they venture into wider empirical concerns. Thus, for instance, it has been asserted that names ‘have meaning’ on the basis of their appearance in dictionaries and their translatability (Shawayder 1961; 1964). But, as Zabeeh (1968: 35) points out, dictionary entries for names, in both general and specialist dictionaries, typically provide either their etymological meaning or
descriptions of famous bearers of the name, not a description of sense. And ‘translations’ are intermittent and involve either simply provision of an equivalent anglicized (for instance) form of the name (Leghorn rather than Livorno), or translation of meaningful components in a complex non-name-based name (The Bartered Bride for Prodaná nevěsta, whereas Rusalka remains Rusalka; and see Lyons (1977: 222), on Geach (1962: 27)). However, let us not dwell on what is thought to be absent from the philosophical tradition.

Parmenides’ association of use of a ‘name’ with the existence of a referent, and Plato and Aristotle’s concern with names as referring to particulars rather than universals (denoted by lexical classes), were codified by the Stoics as a distinction that was translated into Latin as a distinction between proprium vs. commune (‘proper’ vs. ‘common’). This is the starting point for the philosophical tradition of concern with names—along with the grammatical identification of names and nouns. However, the debate over the semantic status of names can be said to have been brought into sharp focus by Mill’s (1919 [1843]) analysis, though he is careful, nevertheless, to acknowledge contributions of his predecessors, particularly the ‘schoolmen’, Hobbes, and Locke. I shall spend a little time here discussing what he presents in Book I of the System, particularly Chapter II, before looking at some of the reactions it provoked. Indeed, the reader may have a feeling that it is high time that I looked at his proposals more carefully, given the extent to which the name has already figured in the preceding story. And this attention to Mill is also important because those aspects of the analysis that have attracted the attention of subsequent philosophers don’t necessarily exhaust everything he says that is pertinent to the grammar of names.

5.1 Mill

After a first chapter devoted to expounding why it is necessary to start his investigation with the ordinary-language use of words (despite the acknowledged problems for the philosopher associated with this), Mill lays out his classification of ‘names’, where ‘names... shall always be spoken of in this work as the names of things themselves, and not merely of our ideas of things’ (Bk.I, Chapter II, §1, p.15). ‘Parts of names’ are not names (§2): this excludes from namehood ‘particles’, marked by inflection or preposition/adverb, i.e. functors in the terminology of §2.2.1 above, but also, it appears, to begin with, adjectives.

But eventually, based essentially on the observation that adjectives may be ‘predicates’, it is suggested that adjectives are ‘names, whether in their own right, or as representative of the more circuitous forms of expression above
exemplified’. The distinction made here refers to, for example, ‘a round object’ vs. simply ‘round’, as in *The earth is (a) round (object)*; according to Mill, the distinction is ‘rather grammatical than logical’, and ‘it is only custom which prescribes that on any given occasion one shall be used, and not the other’. The first of these quotations, in particular, must give the grammarian pause; it suggests that we are not arriving at a characterization of different ‘names’ that is directly relevant to the explication of ordinary language—though this may be of less concern to the autonomist. The second involves yet another invocation of the ‘mere convention’ topos. However, let us accept that ‘adjectives’ are ‘predicatives’ in some sense.

Mill (Chapter II) offers a partially cross-cutting classification of ‘names’ that invokes six parameters. Most relevant to a characterization of ‘proper names’ are the first three he introduces: ‘general’ vs. ‘singular’, ‘concrete’ vs. ‘abstract’, and ‘connotative’ vs. ‘non-connotative’. Traditional ‘proper names’ are ‘singular names’. Thus in *John is a man* (§3, p.17):

*John* is only capable of being truly affirmed of one single person, at least in the same sense. For, though there are many persons who bear that name, it is not conferred upon them to indicate any qualities, or anything that belongs to them in common; and cannot be said to be affirmed of them in any *sense* at all, consequently not in the same sense.

But also ‘individual names’ are expressions such as those in (1), where even (1b) may be an ‘individual name’, ‘when the context defines the individual of whom it is to be understood’:

(1)  
- a. the king who succeeded William the Conqueror  
- b. *the* king

Mill comments on (1a): ‘that there cannot be more than one person of whom it can be truly affirmed, is implied in the meaning of the words’. The distinction between these two kinds of ‘individual name’ (different kinds of singular definite reference) relates to another of Mill’s parameters, ‘connotative’ vs. ‘non-connotative’. But, firstly, we must distinguish between ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ names.

Mill says of this last distinction (§4, p.17): ‘a concrete name is a name that stands for a thing; an abstract name is a name which stands for an attribute of a thing’. *John, the sea, white,* and *old* are ‘names of things’; *whiteness, humanity,* and *old age* are ‘names of an attribute of those things’. This brings us to ‘connotative’ vs. ‘non-connotative’ (§5, p.19):

A non-connotative term is one which signifies a subject only, or an attribute only. A connotative term is one that denotes a subject, and implies an attribute. By a subject here is meant anything that possesses attributes.
Mill explains, as regards ‘connotative names’: ‘the name...is said to signify the subject directly, the attributes indirectly; it denotes the subjects, and implies, or involves, or indicates, or as we shall say henceforth connotes, the attributes’ (§5, p.20).

This distinction between ‘connotative’ and ‘non-connotative’ gives us the classification in (2):

(2) a. connotative: i) all concrete general names: man, white
   ii) abstract names with attributes: fault
      (= ‘bad/hurtful quality’)
   iii) non-proper individual names:
      the only son of John Stiles
      the Roman army (‘in context’)

b. non-connotative: i) ‘simple’ abstract names (attributives only):
   whiteness
   ii) proper names (subjects only): John

‘Proper names’ are ‘individual’, ‘concrete’, and ‘non-connotative’. Mill concludes (§5, p.21):

From the preceding observations it will easily be collected, that whenever the names given to objects convey any information, that is, whenever they have properly any meaning, the meaning resides not in what they denote, but in what they connote. The only names of objects which connote nothing are proper names; and these have, strictly speaking no signification.¹

This provides one definition of the logically proper name.² Such a concept, however, does not seem to be embodied in the grammars of natural languages; as noted, Chomsky claims: ‘languages do not seem to have a

¹ Mill appends to this passage the following salutary footnote:

A writer who entitles his book Philosophy; or, The Science of Truth, charges me in his very first page (referring at the foot of it to this passage) with asserting that general names have properly no signification. And he repeats this statement many times in the course of his volume, with comments, not at all flattering, thereon. It is well to be now and then reminded to how great a length perverse misquotation (for strange as it appears, I do not believe that the writer is dishonest) can sometimes go. It is a warning to readers when they see an author accused, with volume and page referred to, and the apparent guarantee of inverted commas, of maintaining something more than commonly absurd, not to give credence to the assertion without verifying the reference.

Caveat lector!

² Consider too: ‘proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals that are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals’ (§5, p.20). I do not pursue the consequences elsewhere, for example, for the ‘essential proposition’, which ‘is purely verbal’; in spelling out an attribute, it ‘gives no information, or gives it respecting the name, not the thing’ (Chapter VI, §4, p.74). According to Mill: ‘... no proposition can be reckoned such that relates to an individual by name, that is, in which the subject is a proper name’ (Chapter VI, §3, p.73).
category of pure names, in the logician’s sense. Rather there are personal names, place names, color names, and so on’ (Chomsky 1975: 45). This discrepancy (whatever the status of Chomsky’s chosen examples) has led to some confusion, particularly in linguists’ interpretations of philosophical writings.

The limitations on the appropriateness of philosophers’ remarks to names in language partly derives from this lack in language of ‘the logically proper name’. Consider Mill’s own illustrations (§5, p.21):

... when we say, pointing to a man, this is Brown or Smith, or pointing to a city, that it is York, we do not, merely by doing so, convey to the reader any information about them, except those are their names.

Observe that we are invited to contemplate pointing to a man when we say Brown, or a city in the case of York; the act of deixis would be puzzling otherwise. Certainly, York is ambiguous, since, as a city name or a surname derived from the former, it could involve pointing either at a city or at a man or woman; otherwise the deixis would still be puzzling, however. Names are not associated with pointing at just anything. This is because, as argued in §4.3, they have (restricted) sense.

Thus (3a) is understood as tautological (an ‘essential proposition’), unless used figuratively (‘John is a real man’), and (3b) is interpreted as contradictory, unless figurative (‘John is a miserable wretch’):

(3)  a. John is a man
    b. John is a dog

Of course, the normal sense of John, as with other words, can be deliberately flouted, for effect, by applying it to a dog, say, or, as in my earlier example (involving common words) calling one’s garden shed ‘a palace’, or my parents’ reference to their junk room/store-room as ‘the glory hole’. The ‘flouting’ may become regular: the last term was not unique to my parents, I discovered, and its ‘etymology’ seemed to be opaque to users. Likewise, dogs named John may become common, and the ‘etymology’ not necessarily apparent to users of (3b). In this case the name becomes ambiguous. These possibilities are ordinary post-figurative developments.

Another problem with Mill’s formulations is the relative vagueness involved in the equation of ‘having meaning’ with ‘whenever the names given to objects convey any information’. In onymic reference, gender (sense) and other ‘information’ may not be relevant to establishing the referent, but the act of reference itself, by using the name, will ‘convey’ gender along with a reminder of, or an appeal to, a range of ‘information’ concerning the referent,
‘information’ both of sense (gender) and encyclopaedic. This formulation of Mill’s tends to encourage reactions such as Jespersen’s, cited in §4.3.3.

Mill declares that ‘... the name, once given, is independent of the reason’ (§5, p.20). But some names leave not just indexical indications of the naming, they embody as part of their structure sense-bearing elements. Mill dismisses names like *Dartmouth* by observing that ‘if sand should choke up the mouth of the river, or an earthquake change its course, and remove it to a distance from the town, the name of the town would not necessarily be changed’ (§5, p.20). But opacity of interpretation brought on by changing circumstances is not limited to names: there are many people who still talk about *dialling a friend* or *giving you a bell*, though the typical telephone has ceased to have a dial or to make the sound of a bell. This does not mean that a transparency did not exist, and a meaning was not conveyed, when the sense was still appropriate to such a form. Moreover, this is perhaps not the main point: however we, as users of English, interpret town names ending in *-mouth* (notice that, anyway, this syllable is typically reduced, introducing phonological opacity), we do indeed interpret them (independently of prior nomination) as town names; *-mouth* is a signal of ‘town name’, at least; such a name refers to a town (cf. Searle (1969: 167)). We know the sort of thing that our interlocutor will be pointing at when s/he says ‘this is X-mouth’.

Names have, admittedly, minimal sense, and it is not distinctive of the name in relation to other names of the same semantic class (gender). That is, what characterizes them is that, unlike other words, they are not distinguished in sense from other members of their semantic class. Compare pronouns. They too have minimal sense, but each member of the class of definite (personal) pronouns ‘connotes’ a unique set of ‘attributes’. In English, there is no member of the class that is feminine singular other than *she/her*. This is how it can function anaphorically with respect to any definite feminine determinative phrase, i.e. any phrase containing a nominal (noun or determinative, including name) that is feminine. Names are different. A name designates either a unique (in context) individual or it designates individuals that may have nothing in common but their gender.

Even the role of *Mary* in the anaphora in (4.11) (repeated here for ease of reference) is only ‘indirect’, unlike with the above pronouns; the sentence is primarily the product of an act of ‘baptism’ with respect to the expected anaphor:

\[(4.11)\]

a. That’s my neighbour you can hear. Mary always switches on her TV at this time of day

b. That’s my neighbour you can hear. She always switches on her TV at this time of day
The use of the name is certainly not purely anaphoric and gender-indicating; cf. (4.11b).

It seems to be relatively uncontroversial to say that pronouns have sense. They differ from names in this respect only in their exhaustiveness vs. the absence of this. On the other hand, they also share with names, according to Anderson (1997), categorization as determinative, with which we can associate, as a functional category, this minimality of sense. But, as the category that is uniquely N, we can also associate with determinatives the locus of referentiality, which is not a property of lexical categories, as such, or of other functional categories. Nouns are also, as are pronouns, exhaustive with respect to sense, and they relate to entities; but, unlike with pronouns, their sense in principle uniquely characterizes a type or sub-type of entity. Application of a name or pronoun to an entity, on the other hand, assigns it as a token to a sub-type.

Mill otherwise shows little concern with non-prototypical names, and his judgments when he does venture to introduce them are questionable. Thus he rejects (Bk.I, Chapter II, §5, p.21) as ‘proper names’ both the sun and God (even for a monotheist), since ‘when we are imagining and not affirming, we speak of many suns; and the majority of mankind have believed, and still believe, that there are many gods’. But this can be argued merely to show that there are nouns sun and god besides the names the Sun and God; and, indeed, the noun sun is historically based on the name. Moreover, for many speakers, sun the noun is much more marginal to the lexicon than the Sun. The sentence There is no other god than God makes sense only if there is both a noun and a name with the same form. Certainly, such as these are not prototypical names, in that the names are not applied to other entities (unlike John etc.) except by becoming nouns, and thereby losing their uniqueness. Nevertheless, they can be used to refer onymically. Indeed, they approximate to the ideal ‘logically proper name’.

Subsequent philosophers have not been particularly concerned with the kind of interpretation of the (minimal) sense of names that I am postulating here. But, as we shall see, recognition of this sense and its minimality is very pertinent to the determination of their grammar, and the status and character of determinatives. Philosophy, however, shows a range of other reactions to Mill’s proposals, as part of an ongoing concern with names, most of which will not be touched on here, as apparently less relevant to our concerns. Some of the questions raised, however, relate to the kind of example (the Sun) we have just been looking at, which thus, as we turn to more recent philosophical work on names, will demand our continued attention. And there has also
been, of course, questioning of the main Millian thesis concerning the ‘non-connotative’ character of names.

As I have just indicated, our look at this considerable body of work will be very partial, in several senses: our concern with the grammar of names, and the limits of space (and proportionality in relation to the other traditions invoked in this Part of the book), will lead to a discussion that ignores issues and proposals that have been central to the philosophical enterprise, as well as one that doesn’t attempt to explore the possible philosophical deficiencies of the linguistic analyses offered here. The following sections concentrate on those developments that seem to me to offer insights and challenges to any account of the grammar of names.

5.2 ‘Descriptivism’

The name *the Sun* (the heavenly body), if it is such, can be ‘replaced’ by a description that can be used to refer uniquely to the entity involved without invoking the name. For the ordinary earthling, even the following might suffice: ‘the only heavenly body we can normally see in the middle of the day’. Does the existence of the name, and perhaps of other names, merely provide a convenient ‘abbreviation’, then? This view has some plausibility in relation to *the Sun*, which apparently labels a unique type of entity, indeed, a sub-type of heavenly body (in the same way as, to the ordinary earthling, a noun such as *planet* designates a sub-type), as well as being at the same time the label for a token, or instance, of that sub-type, as one expects of names. But it is indeed the unique token. It is not just that (as suggested at the end of the previous section) this name is applied to only one entity, but this entity is unique of its sub-type. It is a one-member subset. We interpret *John*, on the other hand, as referring to an instance of the type ‘male human’, and not in itself referring to a sub-type of human male. It is not helpful to think of it as designating a one-member subset.

But Russell (1918) appears to argue in general that ‘ordinary names’ are ‘really abbreviations for descriptions’. The implications of this are perhaps most clearly illustrated, in a more general way than the *Sun* example, with names of entities that are remote from us in time and space, and limited in possible description. Thus, for Linsky (1977: 56), ‘“Homer”, if he existed, is just the author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. But, once more, ‘Homer’ is not typical in this respect: most names will provoke a diversity of attempts at description from different language users. This is not a question of differences in sense (cf. Donnellan (1970)), but the selection of different pieces of encyclopaedic knowledge concerning the referent. Moreover, that different
speakers might come up with different descriptions does not signify that they attribute different ‘senses’ to the name or that they have different referents in mind.

Before proceeding further, however, it is appropriate to acknowledge that some caution is required in assessing Russell’s views in terms of natural language examples. For he is not principally concerned with ‘proper names’ in ordinary language. Many ‘proper names’, on his view, are not ‘logically proper names’ (see e.g. Church (1956: 4); Zabeeh (1968: 17–23)). ‘Logically proper names’ roughly correspond to Mill’s ‘proper names’ in referring without describing (‘connoting’); but these are limited to names of particulars with whom we are ‘acquainted’. It appears to be that it is names applied to a particular with whom we are not ‘acquainted’, remote in space and/or time, such as the ancient ‘Homer’, ‘Socrates,’ and ‘Plato’, that are ‘really abbreviations for descriptions’. However, the pursuit of the ‘logically proper name’ does eventually lead him to conclude that only ‘this’ or ‘that’ are ‘logically proper names’.

This conclusion does reflect an important insight into what names and demonstratives, particularly demonstrative pronouns, have in common. A name and this are both intended to refer, without description or co-reference, to a unique referent in a particular context. They enable what Anderson (2004c) calls primary identification, the identification on which other acts of reference ultimately rely for identification of their referent. With other definites, identification may be incomplete, purely descriptive, and indecisive as to independent identification. Consider Donnellan’s (1966) example Smith’s murderer is insane, where the referent of Smith’s murderer may or may not be known to the speaker. On the second of these interpretations—Donnellan’s ‘attributive’ (vs. ‘referential’)—reference is to whatever otherwise-unidentified person murdered Smith; and this can be spelled out as . . . whoever s/he may be. The ‘referential’ interpretation of Smith’s murderer, where we can identify the referent independently of this description, relies, if identification is to be complete, on knowledge that ultimately derives from a name or names or from deixis (see further below). And of the two names are the more powerful carrier of primary identification.

We also need to recognize, moreover, that Russell is principally concerned with the logical status of even ‘ordinary proper names’, not their ‘meaning’, or the lack of it. Concerning the latter, he holds that words have ‘meaning’ by virtue of ‘denoting’ (Russell 1903: 47) and that ‘when meaning is thus understood, the entity indicated by John does not have meaning’. And he says, in distinction to Frege’s (1892) views, that ‘such words as John merely indicate [have “Bedeutung”—JMA] without meaning [“Sinn”]’ (1903: 502). But
‘meaning, in the sense in which words have meaning, is irrelevant to logic’ (1903: 47). Russell elsewhere (1940: Chapter 6) makes very clear the discrepancy between his definition of ‘name’ and the ordinary understandings of the term.

There are often such conflicts as this between the interests of philosopher and linguist. In what follows, however, as I have warned (with some trepidation), I shall knowingly over-simplify by ignoring philosophical concerns and trying to test, from the grammarian’s perspective, the parts of various proposals against ordinary-language usage where these proposals, to my understanding, are construable as being so applicable.

 Relevant here is a recognition that elsewhere in his early work Russell comes close to the much more recent ‘direct reference’ approaches we shall look at at the end of this chapter. Consider particularly the latter part of Russell (1946 [1912]: 54):

Common words, even proper names, are usually really descriptions. That is to say, the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper name by a description. Moreover, the description required to express the thought will vary for different people, or for the same person at different times. The only thing constant (so long as the name is rightly used) is the object to which the name applies. But so long as this remains constant, the particular description involved usually makes no difference to the truth or falsehood of the proposition in which the name appears.

One way of interpreting this is as an account of the encyclopaedic knowledge we all attach to a name, rather than an account of the use of names, any of whose particular descriptions is irrelevant to truth conditions ‘so long as the name is rightly used’.

Observe too such later statements as: ‘A proper name, in practice, always embraces many occurrences, but not as a class-name does: the separate occurrences are parts of what the name means, not instances of it’ (Russell 1940: 33). This distinction seems to correspond to (what I have described as) the type-token relation that distinguishes the status of names from that the type-subtype relation associated with common words.

Moreover, in the pages which immediately follow the long extract quoted above, Russell (1946 [1912]) provides a description of Kripke’s ‘chain of communication’, whereby ‘knowledge concerning what is known by description is ultimately reducible to knowledge concerning what is known by acquaintance’ (1942 [1912]: 58). Recall our brief discussion of Donnellan’s ‘attributive’ vs. ‘referential’ distinction. However, that is also to anticipate. What I am illustrating here is simply that, depending on your selection of
quotations, you can present Russell as either the ancestor of theories of ‘direct reference’ or of what I am referring to as ‘descriptivism’.

However, the influential status of Russell’s ‘theory of descriptions’ and the ‘replacement’ of names by descriptions that it necessitates did much to inspire the development of the ‘descriptivist’ approach to the meaning of names, which is commonly interpreted as being at variance with the Millian position. In the debates that ensued, it is particularly the case that it is sometimes unclear whether what is discussed is thought of as applying to natural language rather than an idealization. This goes along sometimes with a neglect of the distinction between the pragmatic role of an expression (e.g. to make an act of reference) and its semantic content (including whether it is of fixed reference(s) or not). Irrespective of this, I shall be interested here in eliciting what is of interest in these developments in elaborating our ideas of the grammar of names.

Before proceeding, however, let me attempt to say a little, without getting into technicalities, about Russell’s ‘theory of descriptions’, which lies behind much that followed, and which illustrates the indirect character of his concerns in relation to the grammar of natural language. Crudely, the determination of truth conditions concerning statements is facilitated within the logical system envisaged by Russell and others, if definite descriptions are interpreted as propositions involving quantification. And statements involving names, if the latter are interpreted as definite descriptions, can be accommodated in the same way. A descriptive approach to names contributes to a truth-functional account of the ‘meaning’ of statements. Now, the characterization of truth is in principle important in understanding part of the functioning of language, but the characterization developed by Russell is only indirectly related to the semantic properties that are encoded in ordinary language. ‘Truth’ and ‘existence’ are not primitive, linguistically (rather, they are localist constructs—see note 6). And the ‘real worlds’ of different speakers may be ‘worlds apart’.

Let us turn now, briefly, to the development of the ‘descriptivist’ view. Strawson (1959), Searle (1969), and others talk of the necessity for ‘descriptive backings’ for a name rather than merely a single description; the latter interpretation of ‘descriptivism’, indeed, leads to all sorts of problems, such as the possible incompatibility of two different speakers’ single descriptions. But Strawson still maintains (1959: 20):

...it is no good using a name for a particular unless one knows who or what is referred to by the use of the name. A name is worthless without a backing of descriptions which can be produced on demand to explain the application.
These ‘descriptions’ associated with names remain attempts at descriptions of encyclopaedic knowledge, comparable with the encyclopaedic knowledge concerning the potential denotata of a common word. With names, the ‘descriptions’ are not accounts of the sense of the name. The sense of a common word enables it to have a range of denotata conforming to this sense, but names do not designate classes; they have no denotata. ‘Descriptions’ associated with a name are one language user’s articulation of his knowledge of, or ‘concept’ of, the referent of the name. But this is not invoked in making an onymic reference; it is not usually what is meant when a name is used, though the use of the name is a reminder that there is a referent associated with such a ‘concept’. This ‘concept’ is attached to an item in the mental lexicon, but it is not part of the structure of the linguistic system (apart from the limited elements of sense—essentially gender).

Such a description as Linsky provides for ‘Homer’ does not represent the sense of the name, which is a name that, as is familiar, may be applied to other entities not meeting this description, such as countless male Americans; we can have alternative conceptions of the referent, each of which will in principle be the salient one in any particular context. The description may be used to distinguish the entities bearing a particular name, but it can’t be said to tell us how ‘sensibly’ to apply a name. Thus, such differentiating descriptions are sometimes necessary in practice (if a name is ambiguous in context), except in the case of ‘pure’ or ‘logical’ proper names, which are unique to a particular individual. These are not prototypical in natural language; and they are perhaps manifested only in the case of such names as the Sun.3

However, in pursuing the role of descriptions, let us proceed as if names were ‘pure’, by relativizing their use in terms of purport in a particular context: ‘...both definite descriptions...and P[roper] N[ame]s may be used to refer to various persons or things; however, they always purport, in any particular context, to name only one entity’ (Zabeeh 1968: 57). In expounding his concern with names and ‘descriptive backing’, Searle agrees with Frege ‘in assuming that any singular term must have a mode of presentation and hence, in a way, a sense’ (1969: 170), while (what he describes as) Frege’s ‘mistake was in taking the identifying description as a definition’ (but see note 3). However, say it is true that in ordinary language use we have in principle the ability (though it may not be called upon—Ayer (1963)—and may

3 It is misleading for Searle (1969: 179) to say that ‘both “bank” and “John Smith” suffer from kinds of homonymy’ (cf. too Seppänen (1974: 14); Kaplan (1989a: 562)); and it is not surprising that ‘almost every philosopher to whom I have presented this account makes this objection’ (i.e. that names can refer to different entities, an objection that is not met by misusing ‘homonymy’, a misuse encouraged by the ‘descriptivist’ approach—see Van Langendonck (1982)).
be difficult to apply) to provide ‘descriptive backings’ concerning a word. This is not usefully conflated (even ‘in a way’) with that word’s having sense. As Zabeh (1968: 33) observes, ‘... there is no logical connection, even in a loose sort of way, between a name and the bearer of that name’ (cf. too Kripke (1981 [1972]: 74)). Even Strawson (1952: 189) concedes that ‘to bestow a name is not to give a name meaning’.

Further, Kripke (1981 [1972]: 59) argues that Frege’s ‘Sinn’ confuses ‘meaning’ and referent-fixing, and that this is maintained in (other) ‘descriptivist’ theories. As far as Frege is concerned, this may not be accurate, since on the latter’s view (as articulated by Linsky (1977: 10)), ‘reference is routed through sense so that, though the fixing of reference is different from the determination of sense, they are not logically independent of each other’. But certainly the two actions of ‘referent-fixing’ and ‘reference-making’, must be distinguished in some way. Kripke suggests that descriptions may have a role in the initial ‘baptism’ of a potential referent, an ‘object’: an ‘initial “baptism”’ takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of a name may be fixed by a description’ (1981 [1972]: 96). But ‘descriptions’ are not involved in the use of a name to refer. Our concept of the referent of a name is a Gestalt attached to an address in the lexicon. In referring, names tend to be both ‘brief’, or compact, and (as we have seen) sparing in the time devoted to the mental processing of identification.

It is, moreover, impossible to provide adequate descriptions that do not depend on reference; ‘descriptivist’ theories are circular. This is rather obviously true of Kneale’s (1962: 629–30) ‘“Socrates” means “the individual called Socrates”’. There must be ‘some independent way of determining the reference independently of the particular condition: being the man called “Socrates”’ (Kripke 1981 [1972]: 73). Description may have a role in initially fixing a referent, but ‘it’s by virtue of our connection with other speakers in the community, going back to the referent himself, that we refer to a certain man’ (Kripke 1981 [1972]: 94). Full identification of a referent depends ultimately on appeal to the establishment of primary identification. There is a ‘chain of communication’ linking us to the ‘baptism’. We come back to this in §5.4.

Reference-fixing establishes the usefulness of names as ‘abbreviations’. But observation of an ‘abbreviatory’ role for names, though conveying something of their usefulness, does not pertain just to them; nor is it simply a matter of ‘abbreviation’. Consider, firstly, the awkwardness of avoiding use of the word Bob in making reference to an individual. At a stab, we might try, in a particular instance, (4) as an alternative, though there might be a further problem in distinguishing which cousin is involved, unless there is only one:
the ex-husband of my cousin’s wife

But say we are also denied such ‘relational nouns’ as are deployed in (4). We seem to have to have recourse to something like (5):

(5) the man who formerly was married to the woman whom the man who descends immediately from someone who is immediately descended from the same person as is the person from whom I am immediately descended is now married to

Now remove the deictic ‘I’, or any deictic. We are lost, though the use of a name instead of ‘I’ might save us. But then the circularity is revealed.

The use of a name is unavoidable at some point if a referent not directly connected with the speaker (say ‘Julius Caesar’, rather than ‘Bob’, or ‘you’) is involved. We can substitute some kind of description for this name, but then the description will need to be anchored in some way by a name or names. Thus, relational nouns are dispensable (we can substitute expressions involving verbs or adjectives), but we cannot dispense with deictics or names: they help us to establish the references out of which descriptions can be built. It is not just that deployment of names is ‘convenient’. It is central to the use of language in providing referential ‘anchors’ for chains of references, particularly where ‘anchoring’ is not available via deixis, the other mode of primary identification that derivative modes involving definiteness ultimately depend on.

Words are thus useful as ‘abbreviations’ for descriptions (of their denotata, in the case of common words, or, with names, of their referents) to the extent not only that the descriptions are increasingly awkward the more we deprive ourselves of particular sets of words but also that, without the help of names or deictics we run out of descriptions even before we deprive ourselves of words in general. But this ‘abbreviatory’ function does not distinguish names. Rather, linguistically, they are distinguished by their minimal sense and, particularly, their lexically-assigned token-type relation to this minimal sense.

‘Descriptive backing’ has a role to play both in relation to names and nouns, but the descriptions in the case of names are necessarily of individuals, whereas descriptions of nouns are of classes; it is only as part of ‘definite descriptions’ that descriptions of nouns involve temporarily identified individuals. Moreover, in the prototypical instance (which ‘Aristotle’, as applied to the Ancient Greek philosopher, or ‘Tully’, as applied to the Roman orator is not), our knowledge of the referent of a name is through direct experience of the referent (in its simplest form, ostension), what Russell calls ‘knowledge by acquaintance’. This is knowledge which enables us to recognize a referent, one we may be hard put to it to describe distinctively. The descriptions and, in some cases, likenesses (paintings,
photographs etc.) that supply knowledge of referents we have no direct experience of (they are remote in time and/or space) provide ‘surrogate’ experience. These are instances in which ‘it seems plausible to suppose that, in some cases, the reference of a name is indeed fixed via a description in the same way that the metric system was fixed’ (Kripke (1981 [1972])).

Apart from in this respect, I do not think the ‘descriptivist’ programme offers much direct insight into the grammar of names. Notice too, as Zabeeh remarks of Russell: ‘he argued later, that both in practice and theory P[roper] N[ame]s are indispensable’ (1968: 21); and he quotes Russell (1948: Chapter III.):

Somebody must be the tallest man now living in the U.S. Let us suppose that he is a Mr. A. We may then, in place of ‘Mr. A.’ substitute ‘the tallest man now living in the U.S.,’ and this substitution will not, as a rule, alter the truth or falsehood of any sentence in which it is made. But it will alter the statement. One may know things about Mr. A. that one doesn’t know about the tallest man in the U.S., and vice-versa. One may know that Mr. A. lives in Iowa, but not know that… This illustrates once more, that the same things cannot be expressed by means of descriptions substituted for names.

Names are a necessary property of language. Given this, and given our focus of interest here, I shall not pursue (except incidentally) the solutions offered by the ‘descriptivists’ to the problems they see with Mill’s proposals, such as are embodied in Russell’s (1905; 1911) ‘theory of descriptions’ and developments thereof; nor shall I discuss in general further problems in implementing the ‘descriptivist’ programme itself (see e.g. Donnellan (1972); Linsky (1977: Chapter 7); Jubien (1993: Chapter 4, §1)), which also need not concern us.

It will already be apparent, and will remain so throughout this chapter, that I shall not be able to investigate here the status of proper names in the various logical systems that have been developed, or the uses to which these systems are put (for some discussion of earlier proposals see Linsky (1977); particularly Chapter 3). Much of this remains highly controversial. Though the views of Russell and Frege are commonly yoked together, for instance, Linsky (1977: 6) argues that ‘there is no reason to believe that the sense theory of proper names entails the description theory. Frege accepts the former and not the latter’. However, ‘while Frege does not hold that ordinary proper names are disguised descriptions as Russell does, he would agree with Russell that the logical behaviour of proper names is the same as that of definite descriptions’.

The ‘sense theory’ offers a different account of the alleged problems associated by the ‘descriptivists’ with Mill’s approach, such as that to do with ‘singular negative existentials’, for instance. This involves the logically anomalous character of statements denying the existence of an individual (see further §5.3). According to Linsky: ‘names in oblique contexts have as their
referents what in an ordinary context is their sense’. This depends on Frege’s attributing to proper names both ‘reference’ and ‘sense’: thus Linsky (1977: 5) argues that ‘the relation of denotation in which a singular term stands to its referent is routed through the sense of that term. Singular terms express a sense which is a concept of a unique object.’ It is tempting to equate the Fregean ‘sense’ of names with what is accessed via the indices introduced below. But this would take some space to argue.

It behoves us, however, to give some consideration to the logical problems the ‘descriptivists’ perceived with Mill’s proposals; ‘descriptivism’ indeed is specifically designed to resolve these perceived problems. These centre on names, existence, and truth; and indeed, as we have seen, Russell’s ‘solutions’ depend on representing both names and ‘definite descriptions’ as propositions involving existential quantification. This is not fruitful for the study of the grammar of natural language, as I shall try to illustrate. And it results in wrong predictions concerning natural-language use that ultimately reflect the more general confusion about the relation between being a referent and existing—though this in itself is illuminating in our pursuit of the grammar of names. Before looking at the ‘descriptivist’ critique of Mill, let us expand a little on the consequences of the quotation from Russell (via Zabeeh (1968)) just given, in relation to one of the problems for ‘descriptivism’ relating to reference and existence and their linguistic expression.

Consider the sentence in (6):

(6) This girl wants to marry a British cabinet minister}

(6) illustrates an ‘opaque’ context (Quine 1960), in which at least the scope ambiguity roughly indicated in (7) might be thought to hold:

(7) a. There is an entity $x$ such that $x$ is a British cabinet minister and this girl wants to be married to $x$

b. This girl wants there to be an entity $x$ such that $x$ is a British cabinet minister and this girl is married to $x$

Take now (8):

(8) This girl wants to marry Tony Blair

which ignores the problem that the envisaged bridegroom is already married. (I am not inviting contemplation of bigamy or divorce or murder, or the envisaged bridegroom’s adoption of a religion that would permit more than one wife, but merely envisaging another ‘possible world’ in which T.B. is unmarried.) One of the descriptions the name in (8) ‘abbreviates’ at the time of writing might be incorporated in (9):
(9) This girl wants to marry the British prime minister
(9) has the alternative ‘quantified’, and scope-differentiating, forms in (10):

(10) a. There is an entity $x$ such that $x$ is the present British prime minister
    and this girl wants to be married to $x$

b. This girl wants there to be an entity $x$ such that $x$ is the present
    British prime minister and this girl is married to $x$

But there is no interpretation of (8) that corresponds to (10b). And this discrepancy holds of any description of Tony Blair.

Let us note that, for one thing, ‘this girl’ may not want to marry the British prime minister; Mr. Blair’s resignation may be a condition of marriage. Moreover, ‘this girl’ doesn’t have to wish Tony Blair to exist; he is one of those referents that many people believe exists in the ‘real world’. This suggests that the ordinary use of a name in general does not involve an assertion of existence, but merely presupposes that the referent is located in some relevant domain, such as the ‘real world’, in the present case, or some imagined one. Referents may be presupposed to exist in fictional worlds, where questions of truth and existence again arise, but where again referents are merely presupposed to be located in a relevant world. We must also recognize ‘meta-fictions’, such as the fantasies concerning Shakespearean characters enacted in the second chapter of Meredith’s *The Adventures of Harry Richmond*. A truth-functional account of the semantics of natural language must confront these, in ways that do not introduce the problems associated with the notion of ‘possible worlds’. However, it is not immediately clear that such a confrontation would directly illuminate the grammar of names.

I acknowledge that what I’ve been saying about reference and existence gets us into difficult waters, one stretch of the waters being adjacent to those inhabited by the debate engendered by Russell’s (1905) analysis of *The present King of France is bald* (see e.g. Strawson (1950; 1964)—cf. note 5 below). However, I suggest again that interpretation of the use of names in terms of propositions involving existential quantification, particularly relating to just the ‘real world’, does not provide a perspicuous account of the linguistic phenomena involved. Consider here Lyons’ concluding comment on the Russell/Strawson debate (1977: 184):

In many situations, it may be unclear, and of little consequence, whether a speaker is implicitly committed, by the words he utters, to a belief in the truth of particular existential propositions; and it is rarely the case that a speaker uses a referring expression for the purpose of ontological commitment. Philosophy and linguistics undoubtedly converge in the study of reference, and each can benefit from their joint
discussion of the notions involved. But their primary concerns remain distinct; and it is only to be expected that what the one discipline considers to be crucial the other will regard as being of secondary importance, and conversely.

At any rate, I do not pursue this problematical area here, in order to concentrate on the problems attributed to a ‘non-descriptivist’ approach that have grammatical significance—though questions of ‘existence’ will arise again as we proceed.

5.3 The ‘descriptivist’ critique of Mill

One much discussed problem with the Millian view arises from the use of names in identity statements which, according to Searle (1969: 165), ‘convey factual and not merely linguistic information’, and thus show that names must have ‘descriptive content’, sense. Let us ignore problems to do with the interpretation of ‘sense’. I shall argue that identity statements involve reference—rather than any sense of ‘sense’. A classic example here is (11a):

(11) a. Hesperus is Phosphorus
    b. The guy in the corner is the man who kissed her
    c. Hesperus is Hesperus
    d. The guy in the corner is the guy in the corner

Both (11a) and the ‘definite description’ in (11b) convey ‘information’, unlike (11c) or (11d).

    But all (11a) conveys directly is the identity of reference of the two names. Likewise, the ‘definite descriptions’ of (11b) are asserted to refer identically. (1.8) shows a mixture, where the referent of a name is asserted to be identical to that of a ‘definite description’:

(1.8) a. The blonde is Fay
    b. Fay is the blonde

Of course, equative expressions can be said to be attempts to change the interlocutor’s ‘view of the world’, his ‘mental encyclopaedia’, but only insofar as this is contingent on the ‘merger’ of two referents and the encyclopaedic information associated with them (cf. Larson and Segal (1995)); each of them is familiar as such from different contexts, including descriptions (cf. e.g. Ogden and Richards (1949 [1923]: 212–3)).

A more mundane example of an equative involving names is provided by (12):
(12) John is Mr. Smith

This might be used to convey identity of referent to someone who knows someone as ‘Mr. Smith’ but has also heard in another context of someone called ‘John’: it is saying that the referent in ‘John’ contexts is to be identified as the same as the referent in ‘Mr. Smith’ contexts. Frege’s example of (the equivalent of) ‘Morning Star–Evening Star’, on the other hand, somewhat muddies the waters (Searle 1969: 171), since these are derived names that obviously incorporate descriptive material. And, in implementing the identification asserted in the equivalent of (11a), this descriptive material, along with dependent encyclopaedic knowledge, must be ‘merged’ conjunctively (‘both morning and evening’) rather than in contradiction.

But this does not affect the main point that what is involved here is the establishment of identity of reference, with a resultant ‘merger’ of the two sets of contextual associations and expectations, including ‘descriptive backings’, previously associated with the two names. Such identity statements are essentially meta-linguistic: they are intended to correct perceived errors in usage concerning name-referent relations.

Kripke (1981 [1972]: 108) argues that ‘an identity statement between names, when true at all, is necessarily true, even though one may not know it a priori’. However, the ‘necessary truth’ of such identity statements is contingent upon what is considered to be current knowledge, ‘scientific’ or otherwise. We need to acknowledge not only that language users differ in their encyclopaedic knowledge, but also that encyclopaedic knowledge cannot in any sense be said to be determinate or necessarily true; it is always contingent. Our knowledge of the concepts of any world, including the ‘real’, is provisional. We must even conceive that there can be ‘misbaptisms’, involving errors or deception, or conflicting ‘baptisms’; beliefs about items of encyclopaedic knowledge differ, particularly if it does not involve ‘knowledge by acquaintance’.

However, contemplation of questions of necessity does not further the present enterprise to any great extent. More significant for an understanding of the grammar of names (and other definite expressions) is that the statements in (11a–b) and (12) are intended to be informative (or, at least, in some cases, misinformative), and the information they convey is the identity of reference of two names. This might be represented in various ways. I now look at how it might be integrated, in a provisional way, with the notionally based notation of Chapter 2.

We can, provisionally, represent this expression of identity schematically, by a slight extension of the notation of Chapter 2, as in (13):
The notational ‘extension’ is the inclusion of variables over referential indices (which I shall elaborate on later, in Chapter 8) and of the ‘=’ symbol; the latter is an expository measure whose function is merely a reminder to us that predications consisting of two absolutive arguments are equative, in the sense of stating identity between the referents of the two absolutive {N}s. The co-occurrence in the valency of a single predicator of two absolutives is another indication of the distinctiveness of absolutive compared with other functors; otherwise predicators are subcategorized for only one instance of each functor subclass.

The ‘=’ in (13) merely expresses the content of equative be, the ‘equating’ of referents (or, as we shall see, of denotata, with nouns); in some languages, as we have seen, such an equative copula is distinguished in form (including by lack of distinct encoding) from the predicative copula (see Stassen (1997: §§3.6–7)). The identity assertion obliterates the difference in referential index; and (11c) and (11d) convey no ‘information’ only because their referential indices are already identical. As Stassen puts it: ‘while identity statements are about the form of the mental file organization, predicational statements are about its content’ (1997: 102). Identity statements do not change ‘sense’, only its organization, specifically the mental addresses.
The assertion of identity obliterates the difference in referential index. So (11c) and (11d) convey no 'information' only if, and because, their referential indices are already identical. Equative sentences normally involve arguments whose referents have been conceptualized by someone as distinct (Sampson 1969). In this respect (13) correctly assigns the same kind of representation to identity statements involving names and non-names. But clearly there is a difference in the kind of reference made; and this is missing from these representations.

We can say, for the moment, that what differentiates the arguments in (13a) from those in (13b) is that the indices in (13a) are inherently, or lexically, constant, whereas the indices in (13b) are merely contextually constant (though we shall suggest a refinement of this view in the chapters that follow). But in neither case does the equative assert identity of 'descriptive content'. Note finally that, just as (1.8) illustrates the 'reversibility' of the two absolutive arguments of an equative predication, this is also characteristic of (13).

These representations, as they stand, also ignore the role of definiteness; but this is something we shall return to in the chapters that follow. Further, however, the matrix for the formulations in (13) does not directly address the various philosophical concerns that have been associated with such examples (as acknowledged in general terms above), but, unlike many proposed solutions to these concerns, it provides direct and transparent (though informal) interpretations of the communicative function of the linguistic phenomena involved.4

Let us consider some further alleged problems concerning 'identification'. One such problem has been introduced in relation to such pairs as (14a) and (b) (see e.g. Kripke (1979a)), which can be resolved with the same mechanism as was applied to (11):

4 As we have seen, Russell (1911) re-interprets the definite descriptions that names 'abbreviate', and other definite descriptions, as existentially quantified descriptions. And Jubien (1993: §§3–5) suggests (in Quinean fashion) that 'ordinary proper names' are 'disguised predicates', so that (11a) and (11c) involve respectively (i) and (ii):

(i) 3x 3y (x is-Hesperus & y is-Phosphorus & x ¼ y)
(ii) 3x (x is-Hesperus & x is-Hesperus & x ¼ x)

Unfortunately, from a linguistic point of view, the syntactic function that names most notably never perform is a predicative function. Now this comment might be interpreted as simply an assertion of the notionalist assumption of the basis of syntax in semantic properties. But it is, rather, based on the absence of any linguistic motivation for regarding names as predicates.

The use of existential quantification in the formulations in (i) and (ii) relates to discussion of the next kind of example taken up in the text, as well as picking up from the end of the previous section. The assigning of a referent doesn't commit us to the existence of this referent in the 'real world', merely to having in some domain an identifiable referent, possibly imaginary but in principle accessible to the relevant users of the language. See further note 5.
These are reconcilable if uttered by different persons: there may, in this case, be a quibble about what it means to ‘denounce’ someone. But say they are spoken by the same person? That person’s beliefs are consistent if he does not know that the two names in subject position refer to the same individual, there has been no ‘merger’; he does not believe that (14c) is the case.

Just as (14a) and (b) do not introduce a distinct problem, the discrepancy between examples such as (14d) and (e) (Salmon 1986) is related to referential understanding: to someone who has not ‘merged’ the entries for ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ (14d) leaves opaque the motivation for the condition, while to someone who has, (14d) involves a gratuitous use of alternative names for the same entity and is no more informative than (14e).

The necessary relativization of beliefs also means that the logical problems presented to idealized knowers and believers by such sentences as (14f) are not relevant to an understanding of ordinary-language usage. Linsky (1977: 64) comments:

According to Hintikka [1969—JMA] … this says that in at least one possible world compatible with what George IV believes it is not the case that Hesperus = Phosphorus. But ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are rigid designators, hence there is no possible world in which it is not the case that Hesperus = Phosphorus. The possible worlds involved in a person’s beliefs are doxastically possible alternatives to his possible belief states, that is, they are mutually compatible sets of beliefs which are each compatible with the person’s actual beliefs. Hintikka’s analysis requires that some of these doxastically possible worlds be metaphysically impossible, at least if George IV is not to believe that Hesperus = Phosphorus. But with this, the possible world analysis of propositional attitudes yields a paradox.

But for the non-idealized knower/believer such as ‘George IV’, it is quite possible for (14f) to represent her/his actual belief, whatever the speaker of (14f) (or Hintikka) may believe.

A second major concern in relation to the Millian view is the use of names in existential predications, such as Searle’s examples given in (15):

(15)  
  a. There is such a place as Africa
  b. Cerberus does not exist
Searle comments: ‘here proper names cannot be said to refer, for no such subject of an existential statement can refer’ (1969: 165). This seems to me to involve a misinterpretation of the ordinary-language use of existential sentences. What these sentences in (15) are saying is that the referent of the name does or doesn’t (respectively) occupy a place in (the speaker’s conception of) the ‘real world’. But the mere use of a name here assumes that it has a referent, though that referent may exist only in fiction or in people’s beliefs (which are apparently in the case of (15b) being interpreted as irrational). Referents are mental constructs (‘concepts’ if you like), some of which may be accorded a ‘correspondent’ in the ‘real world’. This again illustrates that it is inappropriate to wield ‘existence’ as a ‘blunt instrument’ in discussing natural language. As I have indicated, this is not of course in any way to deny the relevance—indeed, necessity—of truth conditions to empirical studies of how language is interpreted, but merely to question their centrality, if interpreted in terms of applying only to the ‘real world’, in understanding names and their functions. Referents ‘exist’ only in the sense of their presupposing some domain (not necessarily or definitively the ‘real world’) in which speakers locate the referents in their mental lexicons.5

A related problem is allegedly raised by such sentences as the already alluded to The present King of France is dead. But, whatever the status of the expression The present King of France, its having or not having a referent is not to be equated with its existence, or non-existence, in the ‘real world’. The Russellian solution to the problems that he sees in the Millian view is to introduce existential quantification into the representation of such definite expressions, among which, via their status as ‘abbreviated descriptions’, ‘proper names’ are included. However, in the context of a discussion of a work of fiction, the present king of France, for instance, has a referent, but that

5 The burden of Russell’s rant (1926) (quoted by Zabeeh 1968: 32) about the ‘deliberately confusing’ use of ‘existence’ in relation to imagined or fictional entities accords with one popular usage, in which to talk of, say, ‘Hamlet’ as ‘existing’ is recognized as an ‘extension’ of usage; ‘existence’ simple is commonly understood as existence in the ‘real world’:

To say that unicorns have an existence in heraldry, or in literature, is a most pitiful and paltry evasion . . . Similarly to maintain that Hamlet, for example, exists in his own world, namely in the world of Shakespeare’s imagination, just as truly as (say) Napoleon existed in the ordinary world, is to say something deliberately confusing . . . There is only one world, the ‘real world’.

But this is to miss the main point: being a referent does not entail existence in the ‘real world’ (cf. note 4). What’s more, though most people might want to make a distinction between what they consider ‘real’ and what ‘not real’, the difference is not obviously agreed on, or always clear-cut, even in the mind of a single individual; the ‘real world’ is presented through our own perceptions, and it is these perceptions that language attempts to represent, rather than directly ‘encoding’ the ‘real world’. Indeed, a misunderstanding of this undermines a number of commonly adduced pieces of linguistic argumentation: for a little discussion and illustration, see Anderson (2006b: §5.3). Recall too Lyons (1977: 184), quoted at the end of §5.2 above.
referent doesn’t exist in the ‘real world’. The Russellian solution does not apply to all valid referents, unless, contrary to common usage, we reduce ‘existence’ of referents to ‘presupposed as having a referent’; but then there is apparently no problem, anyway.\(^6\)

Moreover, nothing in these examples, or in the preceding, suggests that in ordinary-language usage names lack referents or have sense (beyond the minimal). The referents may exist in the ‘real world’, but this is a fact about the referent not about the name or about reference. There are also circumstances, such as nominations, or ‘baptisms’, in which names might very well be said not to refer. These are circumstances which we shall come back to (particularly in §8.2), but the sense in which names in nomination structures can be said to lack reference is not relevant to the present issues.

As I have already suggested, part of the problem here is that what are basic concepts for philosophers are often, from the point of view of the structure of language, best characterized as derivative. So ‘existence’, for instance, is linguistically a specialization of ‘location in some domain’ (e.g. Lyons (1977: §15.7)); location in the ‘real world’ may involve the most salient domain, but existence itself is an ‘abstraction’ away from what is linguistically basic. Another discrepancy of this kind, over a different disciplinary boundary, is between the numbers that are basic to arithmetic and their linguistic status, where they seem to be derivative of numerals, or numerical quantifiers, as we shall find in §9.1.5; they are again an ‘abstraction’, linguistically derivative.

\(^6\) A way of looking at this that I have already implied is to acknowledge that linguistically ‘existence in the real world’ is (after all) a predicate; it is a generalized locational; it can be interpreted localistically (Lyons (1977: 723–4); recall too, on localism Chapter 2, note 9). To speak of ‘existence in a book’, for instance, is to speak figuratively; but the figure may become institutionalized. And a speaker’s referents may occupy ‘spaces’, locations, in his cognition which are not attributed to the ‘real world’. Are these spaces an ‘existence’? We can be said to make true and false statements about them and the referents they contain, in a limited way. Whatever, to predicate of the referent of a name that it does not occupy the ‘real world’ does not in principle give rise to problems in achieving a coherent understanding of their use.

The natural language semantics of ‘existence’ is a complex one, involving reference to tense/aspect (entities can ‘go out of existence’, ‘not yet be in existence’, ‘be extinct’, ‘be permanent’), for instance, as well as the possible fictionality or uncertain existential status of referents (Lyons 1977: 183). As a fictional personage says (Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Act I, Scene 5):

There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

I do not think it unfair to say that natural-language usage, rather than being merely something concerning which it ‘is needful to guard against the errors to which it gives rise’ (Mill 1919 [1843]: Bk.1, Chapter 1), is indeed more subtle than often allowed by proponents of systems of logic.
5.4 ‘Rigid designation’, ‘baptisms’, and ‘direct reference’

Kripke (1981 [1972]) rejects the ‘descriptivist’ approach, and adopts an essentially Millian view—at least as far as names are concerned. But he is concerned to provide such a view with an account of how reference is made. Kripke’s proposals, as well as those of Kripkeans, present some interpretative difficulties, in view of the apparent range of possible and actual interpretations of, in particular, the relation between what he calls ‘rigid designators’ and existence in possible worlds (see e.g. Salmon (1982); Kaplan (1989a, b)). Kaplan (1989a) points to two interpretations apparently offered by Kripke (1981 [1972]). In the preface to the (1981) version of his work, Kripke (1981 [1972]: 21, fn. 21) himself points to two interpretations of the thesis of ‘rigid designation’:

Clearly my thesis about names is that they are rigid de jure, but in the monograph I am content with the weaker assertion of rigidity [de facto—JMA]. Since names are rigid de jure… I say that a proper name rigidly designates its referent even when we speak of counterfactual situations where that referent would not have existed.

Under the weaker interpretation, ‘a designator rigidly designates a certain object if it designates that object wherever that object exists’ (Kripke 1981 [1972]: 49). He acknowledges (1981 [1972]: 21, fn. 21) that ‘the issues about non-existence are affected’ by choice of interpretation.

The situation is scarcely clarified by the excerpt from a letter of Kripke’s relayed by Kaplan (1989b: 569):

In a letter… Kripke states that the notion of rigid designation is that ‘a designator d of an object x is rigid if it designates x with respect to all possible worlds where x exists, and never designates an object other than x with respect to any possible world’.

However, I do not pursue this here, or other aspects of the continuing controversy over ‘rigid designation’. See e.g. Dummett (1973; 1981); Peacocke (1975); Donnellan (1977); Jubien (1988; 1993); Kaplan (1989a, b)—though particular citations are invidious in this area. Resolution of these conflicts does not impinge much on our understanding of the grammar of names—though it is obviously desirable that we should be able to appeal to a generally accepted account of the interpretation of names. Unfortunately, Church’s judgment—doubtless implying an unrealistic hope—still seems to apply in the philosophy of names: ‘There is not yet a theory of the meaning of proper names upon which general agreement has been reached as the best’ (1956: 9).

Moreover, Kripke also associates ‘rigid designation’ with ‘terms for natural kinds’, which ‘are much closer to proper names than is ordinarily supposed’
He regards Mill ‘as more or less right about “singular” names, but wrong about “general names”’—at least as concerns ‘terms for natural kinds’, such as cow, tiger, gold, or water. And these latter have their reference fixed in the same way as names and involve the same chain of communication with the fixing—though he notes, in an addendum to the original publication, that ‘it is probably true, however, that in the case of proper names, examples with no identifiable initial baptism are rarer than in the species case’ (Kripke 1981 [1972]: 162).

However, since Kripke’s grouping of ‘rigid designators’ thus cuts across any grammatical classes, as well as across the division into particular reference vs. denotation (associated with a class), it does not seem to be of much relevance to the object of our enquiry. The affinity between terms for natural kinds and names relates, in grammatical terms, to the richness of encyclopaedic knowledge that they both subtend; names also show little sense and low-level hyponyms have an uncertain boundary between sense and encyclopaedia.

It is perhaps also worth indicating, however, that, in the case of natural kinds also, it is inappropriate to talk of equatives involving them as expressing ‘necessary truths’. Just as identity statements with names may be said to involve identity of reference, and, for the interlocutor, resultant ‘merger’ (if accepted) of the individual concepts, so with ‘terms for natural kinds’, such statements reduce to identity of denotation, and ‘merger’ of sense. And such identities are not ‘necessary truths’. So that, as observed above concerning encyclopaedic understanding in general, something like (16a) is contingent on scientific knowledge, which is provisional:

(16) a. Water is H₂O
    b. H₂O is water

Further, many speakers have less of a concept of ‘H₂O’ than they have of ‘water’, so that (16b) would be for them more informative than (16a); for them (16) is no different from (11a/14c) and the like, apart from being associated with a class rather than an individual. Both state identity of the denotation or reference of the words on either side of the copula. For some discussion (respectively less and more unfavourable to Kripke’s view) see Hughes (2004: Chapter 1); Fodor (2005). However, pursuit of this would again divert us from our present aims.

However, an important, and very pertinent, aspect of Kripke’s (1981 [1972]) proposal is the notion of ‘baptism’ and the ‘chain of communication’ that in principle can be traced back to this ‘baptism’—prefigured in the quotation from Russell (1946 [1912]) given initially in this section. Kripke recognizes
‘baptism’ by ostension and ‘baptism’ by description. I note that in his ‘fundamental principle in the analysis of propositions’, Russell, indeed, appears to propose something which is, in a sense, more radically Kripkean: ‘every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted’ (1946 [1912]: 58).

As the reader will be all too aware, what I have surveyed in this section gives a very limited picture of philosophical approaches to the study of names; this is partly for reasons to do with the aim of the present work, partly by reason of limitations of space and of my competence. But I cannot conclude this subsection without even a mention of the views of advocates of ‘direct reference’, such as those associated with Kaplan (1989a, b) and Recanati (1993), which come closest to the suggestions made in Anderson (2003a, 2004c).

According to Kaplan (1989b: 569):

The directly referential term goes directly to its referent, directly in the sense that it does not pass through the proposition. Whatever rules, procedures or mechanisms there are that govern the search for the referent, they are irrelevant to the propositional component.

This could be taken as a characterization of onymic reference, in the sense of Coates (2005)—recall §4.2.

The idea of ‘direct reference’ is embodied in an important aspect of Recanati’s (1993) proposal: names, as directly referential expressions, contain a feature, ‘REF’, which signals that the truth conditions for any proposition containing that expression are singular; they do not invoke whatever information may have led to the establishment of reference. It thus has something of the role of the indices introduced above and elaborated upon in what follows.

According to Recanati, however, the relation between name and referent is established by ‘social convention’. Indeed, Recanati argues that, while the category of name is part of language, individual names are not. Again we have a dubious appeal to ‘convention’ that seems to me highly questionable, in characterizing how names are assigned referents as (presumably) being distinct from how common words are assigned denotata. As already observed, almost all of language is ‘social convention’ in some sense. Naming and calling something by a name or common word are both social activities, and they both involve initiation into use of a linguistic system, via ‘baptisms’, no matter how varying the circumstances of the ‘baptism’ may be. Moreover, Recanati’s arguments in support of the non-linguistic character of individual names are defective. Let us look briefly at the main points.
To begin with, it seems to me that any sense that names are not part of the linguistic system can be attributed to the particular character of their lexical entries. The non-phonological and non-morphological part of the lexical entry for a name contains, apart from (extended) gender specification, only a concept of a referent that gives access to encyclopaedic information, idiosyncratic information particular to that or those individuals that bear(s) the name. Each fixed index attached to a name is the mental address for this information; it gives access to the ‘concept’ that is perhaps the Fregean ‘sense’ of names—note 3—but one that may be difficult to describe, and is not part of the linguistic system itself. But an act of reference may not rely on any of this, it is simply onymic reference. A common noun denotes a class of entities systematically differentiated in sense from other classes, together with encyclopaedic information (possibly idiosyncratic to a particular language user) which is partly particular to that class. It is thus unsurprising, given the minimality of the sense that we can attribute to names, that Recanati (1993) should observe that individual names scarcely belong to language in the same way as other words. The discrepant linguistic behaviour of names observed by Recanati (1993) is associated simply with their lack, or rather minimality, of sense, and the predominance of purely encyclopaedic information that is associated with them.

Thus, we can observe, along with Recanati (1993), that when we, as English-speakers, come to know someone with a non-English name, we don’t automatically try to translate the name when we talk about this person in English—even though speaking English usually involves minimizing appeal to non-native, or un-nativized, words. But this is because the name itself is part of the encyclopaedic information about the person we are referring to; it is strictly untranslatable (as are some cultural and other terms, such as chic, which become ‘loan words’). And in appropriate social circumstances, translation of some sort may become normal. Greeks emigrating to English-speaking countries, for instance, regularly adopt an additional equivalent English first name; and ‘equivalence’ is not usually based on etymology, but rather other factors including perceived social and phonetic similarity; so that Vasili(s) ‘becomes’ Bill(y) (not Basil), Dimitris ‘becomes’ Jim(my), though Yanis ‘becomes’ (etymologically connected) John.

The minimality of the sense of names also accounts for an intuition, invoked by Recanati (1993), that failure to understand a name (who ‘Elise’ refers to, for instance) rather than a common word is a failure of encyclopaedic knowledge (rather than of knowledge of the language). I nevertheless recognize as a language user that in English, for example, Elise is a name for women. And, on the other hand, we can also fail to grasp the denotation of
common words on the basis of gaps in our knowledge of the world: for instance, I know that ‘cantharides’ is ‘dried Spanish fly’, but I would not be able to recognize a sample. Names are simply associated with much less sense, and possibly, in some cases, more encyclopaedic knowledge.

Individual names, as linguistic entities, participate in the morphological and ‘phonological processes’ of the language they belong to (despite e.g. Lass (1973: 395)); and, as Recanati (1993) recognizes, they have the status of a syntactic category of some sort (and I would add subcategories). Their lack of (non-minimal) sense does lead to divergences, so that, as we have observed, they are subject to ‘phonological obscuration’—though this often involves more advanced application of phonological processes that also affect common words, which are less restrained in the case of names by concerns with obscuring sense. But there is no reason to deny English names the status of words of English; indeed, to turn Recanati’s (1993) observation around, so much part of the English language are they that they cannot strictly even be translated into another language, only ‘borrowed’. However, foreign-language names that become familiar, particularly through referring to well-known individuals, are often naturalized in the adoptive language (The Hague, Titian, Avicenna). Recall too the prevalence among medieval scholars, writing in Latin, for naturalizing, Latinizing, their native-language names—sometimes via plays on their etymological meanings. Can there be any surer signs of belonging to a particular language?

5.5 Conclusion

The main thing to emerge from this highly selective look at philosophers on names is confirmation of the non-exhaustive character of the sense of names—indeed, its minimality in the case of the prototypical name, the personal name. This is what I referred to in §3.2 as the ‘modified Millian position’, ‘modified’ in not accepting that names are totally without sense, or ‘connotation’: they do not denote types, but display a limited set of distinctions in sense associated with the types of which they are tokens. What is

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7 Lass (1973: 395) goes so far as to suggest that the syntactic and semantic representations of names ‘are probably null’. Moreover, he continues, ‘names in fact do not even have to be well-formed morphemes of the language: Vlasic, Zwicky, Dvorak can be used by English speakers despite their non-canonical sequences’ (1973: 395–6). This last observation has no force (even if typical pronunciations of all these names do contain ‘non-canonical sequences’ for some speakers—they certainly don’t for all): there are common nouns used by English speakers which are similarly divergent, as in common pronunciations of genre (as Fran Colman reminds me), or of penchant or avant-garde or angst (cf. e.g. Barber (1964: 98–100); Diensberg (1986) and references therein, or, on Yiddish words, Rosten (1968: passim)); unassimilated loans are not limited to the class of names.
distinctive about names is that they involve a ‘token-of-type’ rather than a ‘sub-type-of-type’ relation to their sense. The use of a member of the grammatical category of name typically involves onymic reference, not encyclopaedic knowledge, and only occasionally sense, as possibly in (4.11a), again repeated:

(4.11) a. That’s my neighbour you can hear. Mary always switches on her TV at this time of day

(Recall §4.2.)

What I’m saying about names can be put in the following terms: in the case of names there is a gap between their very general lexical properties (involving gender) and ‘direct reference’. It is not that such ‘intermediate properties’ are necessarily absent from someone’s knowledge of a referent, but they are purely encyclopaedic, not a systematic part of the sense of the name (which may consist only of ‘male human’, for instance). Nouns, on the other hand show a gradient of distinctions, and they are never individual: even the detailed properties (lexical or encyclopaedic) that we can associate with a lowest-level hyponym (say thumb or breakfast or chapel, perhaps) designates a class, not an individual; and they involve denotation not reference. And it is often these intermediate properties that are involved in definite descriptions, such as in that ivy-covered red-brick chapel we used to walk to. These are unnecessary to pure onymic reference.

Another thing that has arisen in this chapter is the role of description in fixing referents, rather than in the use of names. Names are not distinguished from other words by the fact that in certain circumstances use of a name may warrant ‘descriptive backing’ in support, as explication. This can also be observed of the behaviour of common words. Nor is the use of a name, or other word, necessarily dependent on the capacity to provide ‘descriptive backing’. Moreover, descriptions are ultimately dependent on primary identification by deixis or providing a known name. Names are not merely convenient abbreviatory devices, though this is a role they play; they are the referential anchors for discourse.

Adoption of the ‘modified Millian position’ also does not commit us to existential or identity-statement paradoxes in the use of ordinary language, if the expressions involved are interpreted appropriately: naming is a relation between name and referent that does not commit us to the existence of the referent in the ‘real world’, merely to the presupposition of its location in some domain in a mental lexicon; and ‘identity statements’ involving names and other categories concern identity of referent, not of sense. Implementation
of these ideas led to the introduction in §5.3 of referential indices, which will be important in the chapters that follow.

Otherwise here we have skirted round the problems of truth and existence that the work of Russell, Kripke and others has brought into particular focus, allegedly in relation to an understanding of the meaning of names—without, I trust, losing too much of relevance. Kripke (1981 [1972]) also introduces, however, the important notion of ‘baptism’ and its role in establishing the name-referent relationship in an expanding community, parts of which will be remote in time and space, but linked to a ‘baptism’, though not typically by chains that it would be practical to trace. And we shall take this up too in the chapters that follow—and indeed in the next chapter, where we acknowledge and discuss further the notion of ‘baptism’, or nomination, within the linguistic tradition.

As with work in onomastics, concern with names in philosophy continues unabated. There is no doubt that my brief survey of work in philosophy has omitted to consider much that might be seen to be relevant to the pursuit of our aim here. But I have attempted to examine at least some of the relevant proposals that aroused most debate in the field and continue to do so. However, there is at least one development, or set of developments, that I have neglected here, which it would be inexcusable not to acknowledge, viz. the ‘formal semantics’ that evolved initially in relation to ‘formal languages’. However, I have delayed what consideration to these that I can give here until the next chapter, specifically §6.1. This is because of the extent to which these developments, particularly those associated with the work of Montague (1973; 1974), have influenced the ideas of linguists on the semantics and syntax of ordinary language.
Studies on the linguistics of names

As mentioned, the later Stoics took the step of basing a categorial distinction between noun and name on the particular vs. general property (cf. again Householder (1995)), recognizing προσηγορία vs. ὀνόμα; and they strove to establish correlating morphosyntactic properties differentiating the two categories. By now, the reader will not be surprised that it seems to me unfortunate that this initiative was not developed. Later scholars (again, as we have seen) retained the traditional categorization—even though Robins (1951: 28, fn. 1), for example, while sceptical of the Stoics’ efforts to find syntactic correlates of the name-noun distinction in Greek, acknowledges, at least, that ‘a better case can be made in English for the status of proper names as a formal linguistic category’. However, history has been otherwise.

By this point too, the reader might well also have come to doubt the usefulness of my division into the three different ‘traditions’, given the extent of the overlapping of interests involved among these. This chapter will not serve to lessen this impression much, given the dependence of treatments of (especially) the meaning of names by linguists on various proposals emanating from philosophy. The next section openly acknowledges this relationship in focusing on some well-known linguistic treatments of the semantics of names. In the section following that I take up the debate over the categorial status of names, as raised by the Stoics, a focus that characterizes the main concern of most other linguistic treatments of names, such as there have been. Even here, however, we shall have to acknowledge various philosophical contributions to the question—and we shall continue to do so in the chapters that follow.

These first two sections complete our preparation for the discussions in Chapters 7 and 8. The discussion in §6.3, concerned with subcategories of name, leans more on the onomastic tradition, and is mainly taken up in Chapter 9. As implied by the title of the chapter as a whole, these sections merely introduce and illustrate from work in linguistics some of the issues and discussions of them that will be the primary concern of Part III.
The semantics of names

There is an extensive linguistic (as well as philosophical) literature on names and similar expressions concerned with issues in the semantics and pragmatics that they raise. Sørensen (1963); Seppänen (1974); Lyons (1977: §7.5); Conrad (1985); Allerton (1987); and Gary-Prieur (1994: part I) provide, among other things, brief reviews of earlier work. Treatises devoted to ‘the theory of names’ and the like, such as Pulgram (1954) and others noted by Nuessel (1992: 5), are indeed typically concerned almost entirely with the semantic properties of names and with their origins. Some of these discussions, concerned with the subcategories of name (as well as their etymologies), reflect the focus of the onomastic tradition. Others adopt a Millian position (as illustrated above, at the beginning of §4.3, by Thrane (1980)—see too Lyons (1977: §7.5)), which excludes sense from names; others still are ‘descriptivists’. And some linguistic scholars (such as Kleiber (1981), Lass (1973)), as well as philosophers, have seen names as marginal even to the semantic structure of languages. Here I look at only one or two examples of recurrent ideas and viewpoints.

As I have said, linguistic work on the meaning of names, insofar as we can divorce it from the philosophical, has been heavily dependent on the latter. Thus, a number of works of the early- to mid-twentieth century, while in agreement in articulating their ideas in terms of ‘language’ vs. ‘speech’ (which we need not get into), differ mainly in their apparent attitude to Mill: for instance, Gardiner (1932) seems to be setting out to support a Millian position, whereas Sørensen (1963) offers a ‘descriptivist’ account. However, rather than further illuminating the philosophical debate, this divergence presents misunderstandings that sometimes arise, again, from conflicts of interest between philosophy and linguistics.

Gardiner (1954: 42) departs from his earlier book, in which a ‘proper name’ was defined as a ‘a word referring to a single individual’. He recognizes in the later book that not all names are such; on the basis of the behaviour (respectively) of surnames and of items like moon, he concludes that ‘there are exact individually applied names which are not proper names, and commonly applied names that are’. But, since this conclusion does not lead to a viable characterization of names, or of why they might be a non-category, insofar as Gardiner abandons any attempt at a ‘water-tight definition’, one might suspect that answers to the questions involved have not been adequately articulated. But his frustration does at least recognize the existence of ‘proper names’ other than simple personal names (Zabeeh (1968: 41) contrasts this
with what is offered by ‘many logicians’). However, he is also led to the view that the ‘best proper names’ are those that have only one referent (1954: 40), contingent as such singularity must always be, and more contingent as must be our knowledge that some name is so.

Gardiner is misled, too, by assuming that Russell, in regarding ‘this’ as a ‘proper name’, is immediately contradicted by confrontation with any natural language; whereas, as we have seen, Russell is concerned here with ‘logically proper names’. Moreover, Gardiner’s contention (1954: 64), apparently in opposition to Russell, that ‘the word Socrates is a mere sound-label, and as such is an alternative to any description of Socrates complete enough to identify him, but is not a description itself . . .’ implies a (not uncommon) misunderstanding, or at least over-simplification, of Russell’s position, particularly concerning the logical, rather than linguistic, role of the ‘theory of descriptions’.

Sørensen (1963), on the other hand, propounds a very crude version of ‘descriptivism’. Thus, as concerns names, he contends that ‘theoretically we could do without them, but it is very inexpedient to have to say “the person that . . .”, therefore we say “Anderson”, or whatever it may be’. Further, if a name has more than one bearer, it has more than one meaning (‘homonymy’ looms once more); and as applied to only one bearer, it may have different meanings, depending on how it is described. Sørensen (1963: 87) provides the following definition of ‘proper names’:

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According to Zabeeh (1968), Gardiner is not alone as a linguist in misunderstanding Russell, at least in part. For instance, Zabeeh (1968: 22) juxtaposes the following quotations from, respectively, Russell and another linguist. The first is from Russell (1919: 33–34):

From a logical point of view, a proper name may be assigned to any continuous portion of space-time (Macroscopic continuity suffices). Two parts of one man’s life may have different names; for instance, Abram and Abraham, or Octavianus and Augustus. ‘The Universe’ may be regarded as a proper name for the whole of space-time . . . It may therefore be assumed, at least for the present, that every proper name is the name of a structure, not of something destitute of parts. But this is an empirical fact, not a logical necessity.

And the second (Chomsky 1965: 201):

There is no logical necessity for names or other ‘object words’ to meet any condition of spatiotemporal contiguity or to have other Gestalt qualities, and it is a non-trivial fact that they apparently do insofar as the designated objects are of the type that can actually be perceived (for example, it is not true of ‘United States’).

There is no a priori reason why a natural language could not contain a word ‘HERD’, like the collective ‘herd’ except that it denotes a single scattered object with cows as parts, so that ‘a cow lost a leg’ implies ‘the herd lost a leg’, etc.

And Zabeeh comments: ‘Such objections to Russell’s theory are captious’. However, misunderstanding, or at least over-simplification or selectivity of reference, is not limited to linguists, as we have seen.
Let ‘P’ be a variable for a proper name. And let ‘W’ be a variable for an appellative stem + singular flexive. This, then, is the partial definition formula—and what is on the right side of the equation marks the partial definiens formula of proper name:

`P’ = ‘the X that . . .’

Since Sørensen ‘himself emphasized that identity of denotatum is no guar-
antee of identity of meaning’ (Strawson 1966: 298), ‘he seems, . . . to be com-
mitted to a contradiction: that a proper name, insofar as it stands for a single
bearer, has both one meaning only and many more than one’.

The views of Jespersen on the meaning of names have already been referred to
(§4.4), where I cited: ‘in Mill’s terminology, but in absolute contrast to his view,
I should venture to say that proper names (as actually used) “connote” the
greatest number of attributes’ (1924: 66—cf. too Sweet (1891: §163); Bréal
(1897)). As Lyons points out (1977: 221), this trades in part on equivocation in
the (informal vs. logical) use of ‘connotation’. But it may also reflect Jespersen's
acknowledgment of the fact that in the case of many names we have extensive
encyclopaedic knowledge of one or more of the referents of the name. However,
Jespersen’s invocation of ‘use’ is perhaps unfortunate, insofar as names can be
said to be used typically to make onymic, not description-based, reference.

Ullmann (1957 [1951]: 73–4), who espouses a Millian position, also alludes
to a number of linguistic works of the same period that discuss names, which
mainly follow Mill. Interestingly, in the context of the discussion in Chapter 5
above, he himself cites Russell (1940) as seeing the same distinction as Mill
from another ‘angle’. However, a number of general treatments of linguistic
semantics scarcely treat names at all. Thus, in Leech (1974), discussion of the
‘proper name’ is limited, as far as I am aware, to the sentence ‘proper names
also contain the definite feature’ (168). Chafe (1970: §10.8), as far as names are
concerned, simply applies to any ‘human noun’ involving ‘a singular individ-
ual’, such as Michael, the specification ‘unique’. On the other hand, in the still-
expanding tradition of work inspired by Montague (1973), the place occupied
by the name has attracted much discussion and indeed controversy (well
represented in Portner and Partee (2002))’ though, as in the philosophical
tradition that it inherits, attention to other than personal names is scant.

This tradition recognizes the shared syntactic distribution of names and
determined (including quantified) descriptions. The ‘standard’ assumption,
following Montague, was that identity of syntactic distribution is matched
with identity of semantic type. However, quantified expressions are of a
complex semantic type, or ‘formula’, which, without getting into the theory
of semantic types, involves combination with a complex type. Now it might
seem that a name should be of simple type, or ‘constant’, in the formation of
‘formulas’; but that is seen as immediately presenting a syntax-semantics
mismatch, given the parallel in syntactic distribution with quantified expressions. Accordingly, what is adopted is a modified version of Russell’s ‘theory of descriptions’, whereby both names and definite descriptions are interpreted as of the same type as quantified expressions (see Cann (1993: §6.4) for a succinct account). Unfortunately (it seems to me, given our previous discussion), by virtue of recognizing the problems with ‘descriptivist’ accounts of names (Cann 1993: §6.4), we end up with a characterization of names in terms of self-identity. In Cann’s words: ‘every distinct entity has one property not shared by any other individual in the model and this is the property of being identical to itself’ (1993: 173).

I do not pursue the different proposals that have arisen within the tradition in relation to the problem posed by the treatment of names (and other categories), the majority of which envisage some kind of ‘type-shifting’ (Partee 2002; Groenendijk and Stokhof 2002). Those variants which interpret names as simply ‘e’ (‘individual constant’) or its equivalent (for some discussion see Zeevat (1988)) obviously come closest to what is suggested in Anderson (1997).

However, it is also worth observing in the present context that Partee (2002: 360) suggests, on the basis of the work of Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982), that ‘not only proper names and definites license discourse anaphora but indefinites as well’, as illustrated in (1)—her (7):

(1) John/the man/a man walked in. He looked tired.

She claims that this relates to the fact that they are all of semantic type ‘e’ (just as, for Anderson 1997, they are all determinatives), since, on the other hand, she argues, ‘other more clearly “quantificational” NP’s do not’ license such anaphora (not being simply type ‘e’). To illustrate this she cites (2)—her (8):

(2) Every man/no man/more than one man walked in. *He looked tired

However, this seems to be a mis-location of the problem.

Compare (3) with (2):

(3) a. Every man/more than one man walked in. They looked tired
   b. Some man/water came in. He/it dripped all over the carpet
   c. Both men came in. They looked tired

(3a) shows that part of what is involved in the apparent discrepancy between (1) and (2) is simply number. (3b) illustrates that another part of what is involved is the presence/absence of negation. (3c) illustrates that things are improved even more if we replace the heavily ‘distributive’ quantifier in (2/3a) with another. Quantified expressions are thus in principle also accessible to discourse anaphora. According to Anderson (1997), they too are headed by
determinatives (though they do involve additional considerations, manifested
as ‘scope’, among other things—Anderson 1997: §3.7.2).

Lyons (1977: §7.5) provides a brief survey of a range of earlier views on
names, and adopts a basically Millian position. But he goes on to differentiate
what he calls their ‘referential function’, which has dominated the discussions
we have looked at so far, from their ‘vocative function’, of which latter he says
(1977: 217):

By the vocative function of names is meant their being used to attract the attention of
the person being called or summoned. . . . this function appears to be basic in the sense
that it is not reducible to any other semiotic function, though the vocative . . . utter-
ance of a name may be paralinguistically modulated to give additional, mainly
indexical, information.

Such work as that reported in Davies (1986) illustrates the variety of functions
of vocatives.

She confirms that, as well as vocatives in general serving to identify the
addressee and thus to attract their attention, they also can, particularly if the
addressee is obvious, be used ‘to indicate the speaker’s attitude to, or view of,
some aspect of the addressee(s), such as status, role or personality’ (Davies
1986: 144). By extension, the someone of Close the door, someone or The phone’s
ringing, someone is ‘used not to identify a specific individual to whom the
utterance is addressed, as most vocatives are . . . but rather to indicate that the
speaker is indifferent as to which of his hearers assumes the role of addressee’
(Davies 1986: 21). Zwicky (1974) distinguishes the ‘address’ function from a
‘call’ function. Vocatives such as what'syourname are limited to the latter
function, and are discourse-initial only (797).

This is a distinction, simple referential vs. vocative, that will assume some
importance in our discussions in later chapters. It is very relevant to any
analysis of names and related categories—as has been recognized elsewhere,
such as in Longobardi (1994). We touch on its syntactic consequences in a
preliminary way in §6.2.3.

Lyons also distinguishes these uses of names from ‘their assignment to their
bearers’ (1977: 217), what he terms ‘nomination’, i.e. roughly Kripke’s
‘baptism’. And he also distinguishes further among nominations, between what
he calls (1977: 217–8) didactic nomination and performative nomination:

By didactic nomination we mean teaching someone, whether formally or informally,
that a particular name is associated by an already existing convention with a particular
person, object or place.

And he observes that ‘. . . didactic nomination operates, not only in the
acquisition of language, but is a continuing and important semiotic function
of language’ (1977: 217). In explicating performative nomination, Lyons cites one of the examples used by Austin to illustrate the idea of a ‘performative utterance’ (1977: 218):

(4) I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth

(from Austin 1961). Lyons emphasizes the range of forms performative nomination may take (including the giving of nicknames), apart from the formal baptism ceremony or its equivalent, as well as the varying importance of nomination in different societies (as noted here in §4.2).

Carroll (1985: Chapter 8, §3.1), too, for instance, examines the character of nominations, or ‘baptisms’, and emphasizes that such acts may depend on a ‘reference-fixing description’ (recall Kripke (1981 [1972])). Nomination, both didactic and performative, will also have an important role in our further pursuit of the grammar of names.

Also important will be deployment of referential indices, as introduced in §5.2, and particularly the idea that the index associated with a name is lexically given. Such ideas too are not novel—though trans-framework comparisons are always difficult to interpret. But compare, for example, Jackendoß’s remarks: ‘it is standard to say that proper names denote an individual. In the present approach this translates into saying that a proper name has an indexical in its associated concept.’ (2002: 319)—which I would in turn translate as the suggestion that names have a reference given in the lexicon.

In relation to the suggestion made in §5.2 that the fixed index attached to a name is the mental address for encyclopaedic information, that it gives access to the ‘concept’ that is the Fregean ‘sense’ of names, with the name itself being part of the concept, we should notice too Jackendoß’s further comment (2002: 319, fn. 19):

I am inclined to think that having a name is conceptualized as a property of an object—a descriptive feature—not unlike having a size or shape. And of course houses get their size and shape by virtue of some agentive act of building; we assume that a house has such an event in its history.

The latter sentence relates, of course, to Kripke’s (1981 [1972]) idea of the ‘causal’ source of name-referent associations in ‘baptisms’. Jackendoß ends the note by saying: ‘but perhaps I am being too flip’. I, for one, do not think so—but perhaps I am being too flip.

6.2 The categorization of names

Anderson (1997; 2003a; 2004c) hypothesizes that (despite e.g. Hacking 1968) all languages have names, and that in all languages names have a syntax
distinctive from other syntactic categories. They are an essential category. Reports of language communities that lack names have usually turned out to be purely mythological: consider, for example, Pulgram’s (1954: §1) description of the accounts of such language communities given by Herodotus and Pliny. Or, in such reports, the lack of a legal name is equated with lack of a name (Pulgram 1954: §1). Names are pervasive, though in some societies infants may remain ‘unbaptized’ for some years. In Greek they are identified as the youngest member of the immediate family, to moro ‘the baby’ (neuter).

6.2.1 Traditional criteria for names

As concerns the morphosyntax of names, the extent to which there are overt markers of namehood, and the nature of the markers, varies from language to language, so that simple formal definitions of names, as attempted in Algeo (1973), prove to be non-generalizable. Ones based on, for example, the resistance in English of many members of the class to pluralization or accompaniment by a determiner (despite, or because of, names apparently being ‘definite’ (cf. Bloomfield (1933: 205)), or the initial-capitalization given to names in writing, are obviously hopelessly parochial (cf. e.g. Gómez de Silva 1994: 205–6). As Mithun (1984: 40–1) observes, none of these criteria are applicable to a language like Mohawk, in which most nouns are not marked for plural and which lacks a category of articles. And she goes on to observe that in Mohawk there does exist a ‘particle’ that ‘can be interpreted as implying definiteness’, but it co-occurs with both personal names and common nouns.

It is clear that these crude criteria are not as such essential to the characterization of names as a general linguistic category. But they are often cited in accounts of individual languages, where names are not simply ‘presented’ as nouns. Thus, to cite a further example of the latter, Scheurweghs (1959: §157), in discussing the behaviour of (different classes of) names, simply introduces them as ‘nouns’. And Hockett (1958: §37.2), despite recognizing the variety of ways in which names may be differentiated, and the categorial diversity, where relevant, of their non-name bases, merely states baldly, as to their categoriality: ‘if the language has a noun-like part of speech, then names are almost invariably nouns’. More interestingly, however, Hockett discusses names in the chapter (Chapter 37) devoted to ‘types of idiom’, among which he also includes ‘anaphoric substitutes’. Each name-referent combination is an ‘idiom’ (§37.2).

Hockett also recognizes the importance of performative nomination: ‘in all human communities there are certain recurrent idiom-creating events called naming. People are named, places are named; sometimes certain individual animals, spirits, or vehicles are named’ (Hockett 1958: 311). The latter sentence implicitly acknowledges the (unsurprising) anthropocentricity of naming, and the relevance of some sort of hierarchy of human relevance.
Other discussions, particularly of a single language, often cite, as we have observed, one or other traditional criterion as signalling the subclass of noun called ‘proper noun’, or some subclass of that subclass: ‘Proper names like Sally and Ambrose—that is, personal names—are not usually modified by determiners of any kind’ (Roberts 1962: 21). Apart from anything else, this renders names in different languages incommensurate. And the usefulness of the ‘criteria’ even in relation to a single language is rather limited (particularly if not related to notions of prototypicality). Consider, for example, the vagaries in article usage with names catalogued by Poutsma (1914: Chapter 31, §§23–31).

However, invocation of these traditional criteria remains pervasive, as can readily be confirmed from the range of recent grammatical discussions that even mention names. Thus, to take one example from many, having offered a rather shaky preliminary characterization—‘proper nouns typically denote names of people . . . , places . . . , dates . . . or magazines . . . ’, and they ‘generally’ bear an initial capital—Radford (1997a: 60) proceeds to suggest that:

In terms of their syntactic properties, what differentiates proper nouns from common nouns is that common nouns can freely be modified by determiners like the, whereas proper nouns (perhaps because of their unique reference) generally cannot.

Notice the ‘generally’ hedge again—necessary because this characterization cannot be taken as criterial even for English. We can improve things by saying that absence of the article is criterial for prototypical names in English and many other languages. But here and elsewhere provision of simple ‘criteria’ for word classes (and other grammatical distinctions) remains problematical.

In Halliday (1994: §6.60) names are simply presented as one of the three subclasses of noun, which are: ‘common’, ‘proper’, and ‘pronoun’. However, the discussion preceding §6.60 in Halliday’s book perhaps throws, incidentally, some illumination on another of the reasons (apart from inertia) for the persistence of the classification of names with nouns. This discussion makes apparent the extent to which the undiscussed motivation for treatment of names as nouns may (in this and many other accounts) depend on viewing arguments as typically having a noun as their ‘head’. Among the words in the phrases in (5), only the noun hats is obligatory, and for Halliday it denotes the ‘set’ of which the others are ‘subsets’:

(5)  a. the two frightful battered hats
    b. battered hats
    c. frightful hats
    d. two hats
And Halliday (1994: §6.2.5) labels such a noun as ‘head’. As a ‘noun’, personal names (typically) would then simply be unaccompanied ‘heads’.

However, Halliday (1994: §6.2.6) recognizes that some non-nouns can be the ‘head’ of what he calls ‘nominal groups’: and he cites ‘numeratives’ (these two) and ‘deictics’ (these, which?), as well as predicative adjectives. He regards the final phrase in such as You’re very lucky as a ‘nominal group’, in a way reminiscent of Mill. These categories can all occur as ‘non-heads’, just as (common) nouns can appear as ‘non-heads’ (mahogany mantelpiece). But names are apparently always ‘heads’, as are pronouns. This again groups names and pronouns, against (common) nouns. One only has to recognize that the determiner, and not the noun, is the head of such sequences as (5a, e)—it is a complemented determinative, unlike the uncomplemented pronouns and names—and that the functional category of determiner/determinative need not be realized as a separate word, to arrive at the proposal of Anderson (1997). On such an account, Halliday’s ‘subsets’ govern the ‘set’, as formulated in §2.3.3.

Finally, it is important to note that, despite the problems with ‘criteria’, the prevalence of these traditionally invoked, but parochial, properties in such definitions as are typified by Radford is indicative of a contingent status for them in an account of names. They are not universal but we must provide some account of their prevalence. I shall look, in a preliminary way, in what follows in this chapter at Anderson’s (1997; 2003a; 2004c) attempts to show that it is plausible to suggest, moreover, that there is as a property of all languages a notionally coherent class of items with an associated basic syntax that corresponds to the least controversial traditional idea of what a name is, but which belongs to a different word class from nouns, and that this syntax underlies such non-universal properties and others. Firstly, however, let us consider the proposal that names are nouns.

6.2.2 Names as nouns

As we have seen (§1.2), the idea of the Stoics that names belong to a different word class from nouns and Anderson’s (1997) association of names with determinatives (pronouns and determiners) rather than nouns do not represent the majority view, by quite a margin. The distinction drawn by the Stoics was (re-)set within the word class noun from Dionysus Thrax onwards (on Thrax, see e.g. Robins (1966: 12)). The main disagreement encountered within this tradition has involved the question of how well defined the distinction is.
Some grammarians do acknowledge that ‘with proper names we have reached a stage part way between noun and pronoun’ (Strang 1962: 99). And, interestingly, Roberts, while suggesting that ‘personal and demonstrative pronouns pattern very much like proper nouns … except in one respect: the pronouns have antecedents’ (1962: 22), uses a footnote to exclude first and second person pronouns from the last clause, thereby apparently identifying them syntactically with names. Such an identification would agree with their shared notional function of providing primary identification, and we shall return to this in Chapter 7. Status for names as a subclass of nouns is maintained even by some grammarians (Aarts and Aarts 1982: 26–7) despite their having demonstrated that names do not show any of the positive syntactic criteria that they themselves employ to group and differentiate between count and mass nouns.

Sloat’s defence of something like the traditional position (akin to that of Gary-Prieur (1994), alluded to in §1.2), i.e. ‘names are nouns’, depends on the positing of ‘a zero allomorph of the definite article’ (1969: 28) and the citing of some strange examples (such as Smiths must breathe, which at best, in making of Smith a type, involves conversion to noun). As I have noted, Gary-Prieur (1994), in tacit general agreement with Sloat (1969), even maintains, even without recourse to ‘zero’ articles, that names show the distribution of (‘other’) nouns, despite such views having been already disposed of by Sweet (1891: §164); Schipsbye (1970); Seppänen (1974), and others. In the languages discussed by these scholars, names have the distribution of determiner phrases. Apparent exceptions involve name-based common words, and they do not reflect the prototypical distribution of prototypical names.

But what is perhaps most striking is that, despite the disparity in distribution of name and noun, in many works, as we have seen, the status of names as a subclass of noun is apparently unquestioned (see e.g., as a familiar instance in addition to the works cited in the previous subsection, Quirk and Greenbaum (1973: §4.2)). In sum, what emerges from the body of work briefly sampled here and in the preliminary brief survey in §1.2 is a consensus that names, or ‘proper names’, are at most a subclass with ‘common nouns’, of a class of ‘noun’, and that the boundary between the two subclasses, if such there be, is ‘hazy’. And I do not think that my sample of the literature is misleading in this respect.

Sørensen (1958) attempts to establish the place of names in English within the system of word classes, and particularly among nominals, on the basis of a battery of morphosyntactic tests (involving compatibility with modes of modification, number, determination, and perfect tense). And one conclusion he offers is that (1958: 159–60) ‘There are no appellatives [common
nouns—JMA] to which the personal pronouns are more closely related than to proper names, but, on the other hand, their relationship to the definite countables is as close as their relationship to proper names. This rightly points up the relationship between names and definites, particularly personal pronouns. On his account, also, names are closer to definite uncountables than to countables. Both of these observations will be taken up in Part III.

But in terms of other properties, some of them already discussed here, other relationships than those considered by Sørensen are also salient: among definites, deictics, including particularly deictic personal pronouns, rather than simply definites in general, or personal pronouns in general, share with names the capacity to permit what, following Anderson (2004c), I have called ‘primary identification’—i.e. identification of a referent that does not depend on variable phoricity (or co-reference) and/or a description. And this correlates with the fact that I and you are as resistant as names to ‘restrictive’ attributives. In this respect, Sørensen’s reference to a class of ‘personal pronoun’ is too coarse. And this is true of other aspects of Sørensen’s taxonomy. And, again, some of the tests are rather language-specific, as well as based on the presupposition that names are indeed a subclass of noun. Such ‘criteria’ are only ‘criteria’, and may or may not be relevant; they are not a theory of names—or of anything else (cf. e.g. once more Anderson (2006b: §5.4.1), on the use of ‘criteria’ in identifying semantic relations, or ‘theta-roles’).

The basic problem with the names-as-nouns view is that names basically have the distribution of traditional ‘noun phrases’—better, determinative phrases—rather than of nouns. Now, one can, of course, always resolve this syntactic dilemma by brute force. For instance, just as the absence of an overt determiner with plural and mass nouns can be provided for by their being ‘moved’ in the syntax into an ‘empty’ determiner position (recall §2.2.3), names can also be assigned to the basic category of noun but ‘moved’ or ‘re-attached’ to the determiner node (Longobardi 1994; 2001), thus accounting for their distribution. But this proposal is quite gratuitous (in relation both to names and plural and mass nouns). Longobardi (2001: 596) regards the fact that names do not denote classes but refer to individuals as ‘a consequence of deep principles and parameters of U[universal]G[rammar]’. But invocation of ‘universal grammar’ is superfluous. And the affinity of determiners and names can be simply accounted for as a lexical matter, as is also, in terms of the lexical apparatus of Chapter 2, the variation between English and languages like Greek, where the name functioning as an argument is regularly accompanied by an article. This is explored in some detail in Part III (and see already the subsections immediately below). Invocation of the
power of syntax is simply inappropriate here (for objections from another perspective see again Baker (2003: §3.3)).

6.2.3 Names as determinatives

In articulating a position opposed to the traditional view of §6.2.2, a brief introduction to the system of syntactic categories advocated in Anderson (1997), was given in §2.2 above. This system is summarized as (2.6), replicated below:

(2.6) *Notionally based classes*

a. *Functional categories:*
   
   Functor = \{ \}  
   
   Determinative = \{N\}  
   
   Operative = \{P\}

b. *Lexical categories:*

   Noun = \{N;P\}  
   
   Verb = \{P;N\} 
   
   Adjective = \{P:N\} = \{(P;N),(N;P)\}

Here, names are grouped, as determinatives, together with determiners and pronouns as members of a word class distinct from (common) nouns, a class represented as the category \{N\}, but a class which nevertheless shares with nouns the property of showing a preponderance of N, which characterizes nominals in general.

Names thus share in various languages morphological properties with nouns (and pronouns). But we cannot identify name (or pronoun) declension with noun declension—as is evident from, say, any traditional grammar of Modern German (e.g. Cochran (1934: §§98, 100, 101)), without going any further afield (but if the reader must, see Hamp (1956)). Declension may differentiate different kinds of nominal, as well as group them together as nominals. Moreover, though gender may be said to be inherent, lexically given, in nouns and intransitive determinatives (that is, in all uncomplemented nominals), declension for case and number, on the other hand, reflects what happens to elements, including nouns, within determinative phrases, if one leaves out of consideration here the predicative form, which is restricted to nouns and adjectives.

Anderson (1997; 2003a; 2004c) suggests that the determinative/noun distinction is semantically motivated, as invoking, respectively, instances of individuals vs. classes. And, as we have observed, the determinative grouping seems to be justified in many languages by the distribution: the core instances of names and pronouns pattern, as arguments, like determined phrases, phrases headed by determiners. Determinatives are the heads of arguments, and may be transitive or intransitive, determiner or pronoun/name. Again, the semantic basis for the dual role of determinatives is clear.
Thus, in one formulation, Bally (1944) distinguishes the name *Socrate* and the noun *homme* as ‘actuel’ vs. ‘virtuel’, and the role of determiners is as ‘actualisateurs’. As Anderson (2004c) insists, this is not, of course, to claim that syntactically pronouns are ‘derived from’ articles (Postal 1969), or that the definite article is syntactically ‘derived from’ a pronoun (Sommerstein 1972), or that names necessarily enter into any such relationships with determiners (or nouns, for that matter). As far as these observations suggest, they are all (but not nouns), simply, members of another class distinct from nouns, that of determinatives—but a class that, as nominals, shares preponderance of the primary categorial feature N with nouns.

Names as arguments, like personal pronouns, are specifically definite determinatives: shared identification (on the part of speaker and addressee) of arguments headed by such elements is normally assumed. Like deictics, name arguments are definites that do not depend on co-reference for identifying the referent; in the terms utilized in Anderson (2003a; 2004c), they allow ‘primary identification’ of a referent, where there need be no recourse to description or textual reference. This is provided either by deixis or inherent indexing. And various pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic phenomena follow from this, some of them already illustrated above. We pursue the character of these various types of determinative in Chapter 7.

As emphasized in Part I, in evaluating the import of distributional and morphological observations concerning proposed word classes, the term ‘prototypical’, or ‘core’, is crucial: both in relation to the membership of the class and to its syntactic behaviour, we need to pay attention to prototypicality. What is significant is the prototypical distribution of semantically prototypical members. Gross distributional behaviour of the items concerned is not a reliable guide to the identification of word classes. In pursuit of her assimilation of names to (common) nouns, Gary-Prieur affirms that ‘… un nom propre peut apparaître dans toutes les distributions caractéristiques du nom à l’intérieur du S[ystème]N[ominal]’ (1994: 243). But, as one might anticipate from the work disputing this view, cited above, the various constructions showing names used with articles, demonstratives etc. surveyed in Part II of her book (as in Sloat’s (1969) discussion) are non-prototypical; and they all most plausibly involve derived forms based on simple names, as discussed in Chapter 9 below. And Gary-Prieur’s descriptions of (the interpretations of) the name in (6a) as ‘métaphorique’ (1994: 131) and that in (6b) as ‘métonomique’ (1994: 173) are an unacknowledged admission of this:

(6)  a. C’est un véritable roi Lear
    it’s a veritable king Lear
These are name-to-noun eponymies (whatever else), not in any way (core or otherwise) uses of names. Their existence supports the distinction between name, \( \{N\} \), and noun, \( \{N;P\} \), the prototypical uses of which are distinct.

This distinction is based on the non-predicability of names, which follows from their representation as \( \{N\} \) only (they lack \( P \)); they cannot be predicates. As \( \{N\} \)s that are not also \( P \), they do not denote classes on the basis of Millian ‘attributes’, but refer to individuals.

As observed in §1.2, the name in (1.8a), and the blonde in (1.8b), are equative arguments, not predicates.

(1.8)  a. The blonde is Fay
       b. Fay is the blonde

Recall again that we saw in Seri, for example, that different copulas are used in equative and predicative constructions, and that names cannot occur in such formally distinguished equatives.

Anderson (1997: 18) contrasts the what- construction associated (among other things) with the questioning of predicates with the who(m) used with human arguments. Compare (7.i) and (7.ii):

(7)  i.  *predicate questions*  
     a. What happened (to Bill)? He died/Bert killed him  
     b. What did Bert do? He killed Bill/left/was a butcher  
     c. What is Bert like? He is charming  
     d. What is Bert (like)? He is a Tory  

   ii.  *argument questions*  
        a. Who(m) did he kill? He killed Bill/a plumber from Yorkshire  
        b. Who is he? He is Eustace/our teacher/a plumber from Yorkshire

A name cannot by itself supply an answer to the type of what-question of (7.i); it is not a predicate. If the initially-capitalized forms in (6) are unconverted names, then this property of names is apparently violated by them.³

³ It has been suggested to me that the post-copular phrase in (i) is an argument not a predicate (as argued in this book):

(i)  This person is a philosopher

Now, such an analysis may be appropriate in the case of one interpretation of (ii), which can be roughly paraphrased as (iii):

(ii) The guy she married is a plumber

(iii) It is a plumber she married
In terms of the framework of Anderson (1997; 2003a; 2004c), much of the perceived ‘haziness’ of the boundary between names and nouns derives from conversions from one to the other class, as well as from there being fewer prototypical subclasses of name (on these see further §6.3). The role of conversion in accounting for aspects of the alleged distribution of names is acknowledged in the sample of studies invoked in the preceding that are sceptical of the identification of names with nouns—by Sweet (1891: §164), Schipsbye (1970), and Seppänen (1974: Chapter 2).

But (i) is not paraphrasable thus, which is available only for arguments. On the other hand (iv) is possible, since, as we have seen, what can ‘stand for’ predicators in general, given an appropriate copula, be or do:

(iv) What this person is/does is a philosopher/rich/teach

A philosopher groups with the other predicators in (iv) in this respect. It has been suggested specifically that the nominals in (i) are ‘arguments of an asymmetric relation INSTANCE OF’ (an anonymous reviewer). This may be appropriate logically, in some cases at least, but this putative relation is given no independent linguistic expression. Rather, the inclusion relation follows from the classificatory character of nominal predicicators, which differ from names in this respect, names being neither predicicators nor classificatory. To predicate a noun of something is to classify it, to say it is an instance of some class. There is no grammatical motivation for such structural elements as an asymmetric relation INSTANCE OF. Further, a sentence like (v) introduces a (normally tautological) recursion of noun predicicators; both a philosopher and an instance of a philosopher are predicicators:

(v) This person is an instance of a philosopher
(vi) What/*Who this person is is (an instance of) a plumber
(vii) What/Who she married was a plumber
(viii) What/Who the guy she married was was a plumber
(ix) A theologian is a philosopher
(x) If there is someone who is a theologian he is a philosopher
(xi) If there is someone who is a philosopher a theologian is *he/*him/it
(xii) If there is someone who is a philosopher it’s a theologian

Thus both of (vi) are anomalous with initial Who, unlike (vii), which, as ambivalent between predicative and equative, permits both—though the Who-variant of (viii) is admittedly cumbersome. (ix) has a generic subject, which allows the conditional quantification in (x), unlike the predicicator (xi), unless the final pronoun is one that can ‘stand for’ predicicators, in which case it is not a simple paraphrase of (ix), but rather a more ‘emphatic’ version of (xii).

Moreover, there is ample evidence in languages for the predicational status of the equivalent of a philosopher in (i). Consider those languages, such as Guaraní (Tupi), where well-formed sentences can consist only of a predicative noun:

(xiii) né soldádo
2SG soldier

(‘You are a soldier’) (see Stassen (1997: Chapter 3), for further examples). Suggesting a predicational status for some occurrences of nouns seems to be linguistically ‘natural’. The presence of a copula, as with adjectives, is a distinct manifestation of finiteness, rather than finiteness being absorbed in the noun predicicator, as in (xiii). See further Chapter 8, note 3.
6.2.4 Problems with names as determinatives

In Anderson (1997) and its successors, names are thus treated as determinatives. Anderson (2003a; 2004c) nevertheless note various aspects of the behaviour of names that might lead one to question the status of names as simply determinatives.

In the first place, \{N\} and \{P\} are functional categories. And, as such, we expect them to be closed-class; lexical categories, on the contrary, are open-class. The set of names in a language like English is extensive and (though conservative) extensible. Anderson (2004c) observes, on the other hand, that this extension is not of the character of lexical classes, whose elaboration involves denotative (subcategorizational) differentiation. The categorial differentiation of names is not normally extended by increase in membership: a new name doesn’t introduce a new notional category, merely a new potential label for referents of an established (gender) category. For such reasons, as Vendler observes (1967: 39), ‘some linguists regard proper names as a single morpheme’. Further, if numerals are a type of quantifier, then the set of them too is indefinitely extensible.

Thus, extensibility of membership may not, after all, undermine the categorial assignment proposed for names, given the distinctive character of the ‘extensibility’ in the case of names. However, it suggests that this simple categorization is perhaps missing something; names are distinctive in some way, perhaps associated with their facilitation of non-deictic primary identification—as noted above, identification of a referent that does not depend on description, cross-reference, or deixis.

Also, functional categories are frequently expressed morphologically. This is not the case with names, no doubt for reasons to do with their extensibility and intransitivity. The extensible set of numerals (seemingly a type of quantifier, so also determinative) is also given word status. And, Anderson (2004c) observes that, at least in some languages other subcategories of determinative may be expressed only analytically not morphologically: English has no morphologically expressed articles, for instance. And pronouns are typically distinct words, unless incorporated as agreement. So perhaps this last observation is not a problem. But again the general (rather than incidental) absence of morphological expression of names suggests that something is lacking in our characterization, and not only recognition of the extensibility of the class.

Potentially perhaps more problematical is what is suggested by the fact that in languages like Greek, names used as arguments are expressed distinctly from definiteness. Consider (8a):
This distribution seems to be shared with nouns:

(9) a. Aftos ine o dimarhos
    this is the mayor

b. Ðen ida to dimarho
    not I.see the mayor

However, article+name still otherwise shows a distribution equivalent to a pronoun. Also, as one might expect on semantic grounds, the article doesn’t alternate in such positions with markers of indefiniteness. And (definite, ‘emphatic’) pronouns such as that in (9a) can also appear with a definite article, though less commonly, and only if used affectively (and thus ‘calling somebody names’).

Marlett (forthcoming) describes a similar situation to the Greek in Seri. Compare with Greek the name in the equative construction in (1.10), alongside the definite noun and (1.9b):

(1.10) Hipìix Juan quiq haa ha
    this.one Juan the EQT DEC (‘This is Juan’)

(1.9) b. Hipìix hiif quiq haa ha
    this.one my.nose the EQT DEC (‘This is my nose’)

(EQT = ‘equative (verb)’, DEC = ‘declarative (verb)’.)

What is more interesting still is that this separation of name and article in Greek and Seri coincides with other evidence that expression of definite determination and of name are separable. Anderson (2004c) suggests that it is not obvious that names as complements of naming verbs and as vocatives are definite. And this is reflected overtly in the syntax of Greek (10) and Seri (11):

(10) a. Onomazete Vasilis/ Ton lene Vasilis
    he.is.called Basil/ Him they.call Basil

b. Vasilis!

(11) a. «Pancho» mpah
    P. s/he/it.is.called
    (‘S/he/It is called Pancho’)

(8) a. Aftos ine o Vasilis
    this is the Basil

b. Ðen ida to Vasilis
    not I.saw the Basil
b. Pedro, ¿dónde estás intáho?
   Pedro, what did you see? her/him/them?
   (‘Pedro, what did you see?’)

(The examples in (11) are again from Marlett (forthcoming).) The form in (10b) is inflected for vocative.

Likewise, names in Hidatsa are typically accompanied by the s that otherwise is a realization of definite article/demonstrative (Matthews (1965: §5.1)—though he appears to regard this as coincidental: (174)). So too, for example, in Mezquital Otomi, personal names are accompanied either by the article ra (ra šúwa ‘the John’—cf. ra zí ngu ‘the little house’) or a title (nda pêdro ‘Mr. Peter’) or both (ra nda lípe ‘the Mr. Philip’)—examples adapted from Hess (1968: ch.3, §5). See too e.g. Krámsky’s (1972: 169) brief allusion to Albanian.

Some languages have a specialized article for names. Thus Krupa (1982: 112) observes: ‘A feature common to Polynesian languages is the presence of an article for proper names’ (cf. too Matthews (1926)). The name-dedicated article may not occur in all positions; typically it is restricted to names functioning as subjects and names governed by certain prepositions. Its occurrence is exemplified in (12a), from Maori (Biggs 1969: 30):

(12) a. Ka hariruu a Mere ki a Rongo
   ⟨asp⟩ shake-hands ⟨art⟩ Mary with ⟨art⟩ Rongo
   (‘Mary shakes hands with Rongo’)

b. To’oku injoa ko Vero
   My name ⟨focus⟩ Vero
   (‘My name is Vero’)

(⟨asp⟩ = ‘aspect’, ⟨art⟩ = ‘article’, ⟨focus⟩ = ‘focus’.) See too, more generally on ‘personal’ and ‘respectful’ articles, Krámsky (1972: 101–9). However, as in Greek and Seri, the Polynesian article is not used with a name which is part of an act of nomination, as illustrated by (12b), from Rapanui (du Feu (1996: 61); cf. Bauer (1993: 274), on Maori). Definiteness and the lack of it correlate with whether the name is an argument or not (if we group vocative and nominational uses together as not such). I return below, in Part III, to examine this correlation more explicitly and in more detail.

Anderson (2004c), as noted, suggests there are reasons for supposing that the English equivalents of (10) and (11) also lack definiteness, if we, as above, interpret the latter as involving something like the speaker’s assumption that the interlocutor can identify the reference of such an expression. (10a/11a/12b) report the results of a ‘baptism’ (Kripke 1981 [1972]: 96); it gives a ‘didactic nomination’ (Lyons 1977: 217–8). It fixes a referent for the name; it does not
assume that the interlocutor can already identify the referent. The vocatives of (10b/11b) identify the interlocutor: it is a vocative speech act, not simply a nominal expression; and the building-in of an assumption that the interlocutor can identify the referent is even more unnecessary than elsewhere—the person named as addressee is the referent.\footnote{John Davey (personal communication) reminds me that those names in English, such as river names, that normally have an article (thus the Thames) also lose it when used vocatively, as in Spenser’s Sweet Themmes, runne softly, till I end my Song (from ‘Prothalamion’ (1596)). The absence of a marker of (in)definiteness seems, indeed, to be a more general phenomenon, in that singular count nouns in English also lack an article when used vocatively, as in the (attempted) summons Waiter! This too must figure in our treatment of names and vocatives, which once more we are anticipating somewhat. The presence of a distinctive ‘article’ with names has sometimes served some goal quite unanticipated by the original language user. Thus, for instance, the decipherment of ancient scripts such as Hittite was enabled by recognition of the use of a special marker (‘determinative’) with names of (particularly) kings, cities, and countries, items which can be seen to recur in other, already deciphered languages (Ceram 1956: Chapter 6). And code-cracking in general makes use of the special status of names.}

I characterized the assumption of definiteness as being ‘even more unnecessary than elsewhere’ in the case of vocatives, because the identity of a name, even when it is an argument, is ensured by the (in principle) unique index borne by a name in context. This suggests that the main function of a name becoming a determinative is so that it can act as an argument; and it is as such of necessity definite.

This notional distinction, involving apparently definite vs. non-definite use of names, reflected in the morphosyntax of Greek and elsewhere, not only presents questions concerning the attribution of determinative status to names. It also calls into question many traditional views on names. We cannot, for instance, simply dismiss the variable usage of the article with Greek names after the fashion of the Port Royal Grammar (A General and Rational Grammar 1753: 52):

We see by this that the article ought not to be joined to proper names; because as these signify a single and determined thing, they have no occasion for the determination of the article.

And yet as custom and reason often differ, the article is sometimes used in Greek, even with the proper names of men, as ο Φίλειππος.

Further, such phenomena underline the non-generalizability (whatever its other virtues and vices) of attempted definitions like Vendler’s (1967: 42): ‘A proper noun . . . is a noun which has no specific co-occurrence restrictions and which precludes restrictive adjuncts and, consequently, articles of any kind in the same phrase’. Or attempted explanations such as Christophersen’s (1939: 65):
A common name is only an idea with potential realizations; the idea itself is abstract, the realizations are concrete. A proper name has no idea; it denotes only one definite individual and is therefore always concrete. Now, if we accept Guillaume’s theory of the article as the connecting link between idea and realization, between abstract and concrete, it is clear that proper names need no article.

In invoking above a ‘vocative speech act’, I have already gone beyond the discussion in Anderson (2004c), where vocatives are simply held to lack definiteness. But, however these phenomena are interpreted, we have found that in a language like English, a name seems to involve two different kinds of categorizations, one in which it is simply a definite determinative argument, the other in which it seems not to be in some way; Greek names, on the other hand, are apparently consistently categorized as lacking definiteness. Much of the grammatical tradition has ignored such languages (or merely cited them as curiosities), as well as failing to differentiate the distinctive role of names as vocatives and in nominations. In both vocatives and nominations names behave rather differently from in their use as (referential) arguments.

Moreover, as Anderson (2004c) acknowledges, the Greek and Seri phenomena raise the question of what presence or absence of definiteness involves? Are names a single category that may or may not bear a definiteness feature, whose lack in general in Greek and Seri is remedied where necessary by presence of a distinct article? Or are names in arguments in English etc. also categorically complex, as in Greek and Seri (rather than simply bearing a secondary feature of definiteness)?

As already anticipated, Chapter 7 pursues such observations made here concerning the semantics and syntax of different nominal categories and subcategories. It draws in more detail on Anderson (2004c), but also attempts to reflect the range of other observations we have surveyed in Part II, as well as suggesting a new approach to what is proposed in Anderson (2004c) to some of these categorizations—for instance, that of vocatives.

### 6.3 Classes of name and derivation

Many, particularly older, grammars devote some attention to the subcategories of name, along similar lines to what we find in the onomastic tradition. In doing so, they note the differing behaviour of these subcategories with respect to being accompanied by the article, pluralization, presence of a ‘classifier’ (classifying, descriptive noun), etc. These discussions confirm the anthropocentricity of naming, and the prototypical, or core, status of personal names. The brief survey of the results of some of the work on classes of English names that follows mainly reports the suggestions of Anderson (2003a), which, while
by no means comprehensive, draws on both the onomastic and the general linguistic traditions. This is followed by a preliminary look at the derivational ‘processes’ that names participate in. The ‘look’ is highly selective even compared with Bacchielli’s (2005) catalogue of name structures. This whole section is subsectionalized in a rather traditional way. We shall find in Chapter 9 that an attempt at explicit characterizations of these different kinds of names does not entirely support these divisions.

6.3.1 Subclasses of names

By extension we apply names in English to pet animals, some of the terms being specialized as such (Fido etc.), and we thus anthropomorphize the animals; we even give names to familiar inanimate objects (our private transport, for instance), which are likewise anthropomorphized to some extent. There are also less personal namings of inanimates, as with names of ships (and other vessels); but calling a ship Bismarck or Dreadnought is still an extension, a figurative act based on a non-ship name, or common word (or phrasal) elements normally applied to humans. Interestingly, too, such name extensions to the inanimate as the latter do not behave like core names in English, for instance, in being usually (in non-naval circles, and unlike small boats (Carroll 1985: 181), which are perhaps more personal) preceded by an article—in general, not just in a few instances, as with settlement names (The Hague etc.), continents (the Antarctic), mountains (the Eiger), and districts (the Weald): thus, The Bismarck has been sunk. This reflects the status of these ship names as not prototypical names. In accordance with a Van-Langen-donck-style hierarchy (1999), extensions of naming to the inanimate do not behave like prototypical names.

A consideration of English non-personal, and particularly place, names also thus demonstrates again that we cannot lay too much stress on the (traditionally invoked) ‘presence of article criterion’ for a specifically non-name status. Even apart from the parochiality of this criterion, we find that even in English some categories (in addition to ship names) of what are otherwise clearly names, particularly place names, consistently appear with the definite article (see e.g. Carroll (1985: 157)). This is true, among place names, of river names (the Trent, the Tay—unlike in Old English), names of channels (the Bosporus), and seas and oceans (the Baltic)—but not names of lakes (Windermere). So too with cinema and hotel names (the Odeon, the Ritz (Hotel)), and with some other names of buildings and monuments not based on place names (the Barbican, the Cenotaph, the Albert Hall—cf. (*the) Edinburgh Castle, (*the) Westminster Abbey; but we should note some place-name-based names with the pointed out by Graeme Trousdale
(reported in Anderson (2003a)), like *the Crieff Hydro, the London Eye* (the latter, at least, being figurative). See here too Zandvoort (1964: §335). And presence of the article is general with plural names, personal and place: *the Smiths, the Lothians, the Pyrenees, the Hebrides, the Balkans* (cf. e.g. Poutsma (1914: Chapter XXV, §19, i, Chapter XXXI, §26, a)), whether or not the plurality is in some sense contrastive (*Smith vs. Pyrenees*).

Along with various other types of *the*-free and *the*-containing labels for particular places, the forms mentioned are all names, non-deictic words (some of which require *the*) which provide primary identification of an argument. Whatever the apparent historical reason for the presence of the article in different cases (origin of the name as a common noun, or foreign influence, or ellipsis (Jespersen 1949: §16.13)), the *the* here, as with the article with Greek names, is not in contrast with other determiners or its/their absence, but, rather its presence is required by certain subcategories of names (or by some individual names). We must return, of course, to consider more formally the nature of this requirement, but we can at least say at this point that innovation of the *the*-construction in the history of river names in English (whatever, again, the motivations for this might have been—cf. Jespersen (1949: §16.14); Rissanen (1993: 44–5)) doesn’t seem to change the essential character of the items involved, as names.

Cross-linguistic comparisons in this case confirm the typically name-type-specific character of such articles as those we have been considering, and the linguistic variability in which name-types attract an article:

(13) a. France/French  
    b. i Gallia/(ta) Gallika  
    c. la France/(le) français

English lacks an article with country names (except plurals, of course), as in (13a), and with names of languages, while the equivalent country name of (13b), like other names in Greek, has one, as do language names, most of the time. Language names in Greek are also (neuter) plural. The use of the article in the French of (13c) is specific to this subcategory of name—and to a number of others—and does not reflect partitivity or genericness, as is associated elsewhere with the definite article in French (as discussed in Part III), while use of the article with language names is again context-dependent.

The reader will already have noted too that these notionally based subcategories are distinguished from each other not merely (in some cases) by the presence or absence of *the* but also, or instead, by other morphosyntactic characteristics, as exploited by Van Langendonck’s (1998) hierarchy (see again §4.3.1 above). Thus, lake and river names, though differing in respect
of co-occurrence with *the*, both take a ‘classifier’ to their left, as in (4.3a), while names of seas and oceans, and deserts, take it to the right, as with straits and bays, with many of which it is obligatory, and like some island names—though with these latter, unlike with sea and ocean names, *the* is lacking, as shown in (4.3b):

(4.3)  
  a. (Lake) Windermere, the (River) Thames  
  b. the Baltic (Sea), the Atlantic (Ocean), the Gobi (Desert), the Scilly Isles/the Scillies, Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, Lundy Island  
  c. the Straits of Magellan, the Bay of Biscay, the Isle of Sheppey, the Isles of Scilly, the Gulf of Bothnia

(4.3c) shows the other major ‘classificatory’ pattern with straits and some islands. With individual names either ‘classificatory’ pattern may be institutionalized; and the (4.3c) pattern is institutionalized for some minor seas (*the Sea of Azov*). This may be related to the fact that with gulfs also this represents the major pattern. Of course, plural island names, like other plural names, take *the* whatever, as illustrated by the Scilly examples in (4.3b–c). Many of the ‘classifier’ name forms incorporate a (usually personal) name. But note *the Channel*, converted from a noun, thus a name that is a bare ‘classifier’.

One of the dimensions of systematic variation illustrated in (4.3) is discussed by Carroll (1985: Chapter 7) in terms of the availability or not with complex names of a ‘namehead’, where the ‘namehead’ may substitute for the name as a whole, as with names of beers (*Heineken (beer)*) or hotels (*the Ritz (hotel)*). These involve optionality of the ‘classifier’. Other classes of name are not so reducible: *the Security *(Council)*. This last, unlike *Heineken beer*, contains only non-name elements. I note finally on these forms that, given traditional notions of ‘headhood’ and phrasal structure, it is not clear that the ‘namehead’ is structurally a head, despite its being the only obligatory element. Chapter 9, however, shows that in terms of the present framework the term is also appropriate structurally.

There seem too to be further sub-regularities within all these semantic classes. For instance, Graeme Trousdale reminded me (again reported in Anderson (2003a)) that though *Everest* can also be *Mount Everest, the Eiger*, with exceptional inherent article, cannot be *Mount Eiger*, so too, of course, names with inherent synonyms of *mount*, thus (*Mount*) *Ben Lomond*.

In line with our notionalist assumptions, these various semantic categories, despite the existence of exceptional items, correlate systematically with particular kinds of morphosyntactic behaviour. This general picture is typical in language, as revealed by comparable surveys of such phenomena in other languages, such as Herrero Vecino (1997: Chapter IV) on Spanish. But the
morphosyntactic properties vary from language to language, and there is even variation in the correlation of recurrent properties (such as presence/absence of article) with different semantic subclasses. However, the classification is notional, with relative complexity of classes being dependent on their degree of individualization and, particularly, anthropocentricity.\(^5\)


(4.9) Van Langendonck’s formal classification and hierarchy

(i) zero-forms: London, Spain
(ii) suffixed forms: Germany, Bulgaria, Scotland
(iii) with article: the Thames, the Atlantic
(iv) with classifier: Lake Erie, the Atlantic Ocean

Another aspect of the hierarchy is that typically the less central a name is the less commonly does it tend to be ‘re-cycled’. In the application of many systems of personal names we are familiar with the referential plurality of names: John is referentially multivalent. This is still common with town and city names that are not descriptive (London, Perth). But with descriptive settlement names (Newtown, Greek Neohori, etc.), we have re-application of the description rather than ‘re-cycling’. The latter is less common still with country names; and the occurrence of New (rather than simple ‘re-cycling’)

\(^5\) An unnamed reviewer of Anderson (2004a) observed: ‘for a coherent classification of names . . . a clear, hierarchical catalogue of criteria . . . seems indispensable to me’. And s/he comments further that the paper ‘does mention several such criteria from morphology, syntax and semantics, but they are not set into a clear relation to each other’. This still seems to me to involve an unrealistic expectation, insofar as a hierarchization of morphosyntactic properties is anticipated. And this appears to be reflected in the reviewer’s further comment that ‘this semantic criterion [designation of “individual objects”] is more crucial to the definition of proper names than their morphological and syntactic peculiarities’. The only morphosyntactic hierarchization involved is the expectation that increasing divergence from the notional core is likely to be reflected in increasing morphosyntactic aberrance from the behaviour of members of the core.

The reviewer considers that a ‘catalogue of criteria’ should determine ‘degrees of propriality’. ‘Degrees of propriality’ involve, it seems to me, two kinds of distinction. On the one hand, we have degrees of centrality among the set of names, reflecting anthropocentricity, and it may be conjectured that extent of formal differentiation from that of the notionally prototypical will correlate with semantic distance from the prototype. On the other hand, there is variation in whether a name has/retains a transparent common-word base. Thus, Mount Everest contains an element that has a transparent common-word significance, but the whole remains a name. Accordingly, Mount Everest is not predicative: in a sentence like That is Mount Everest it is equative not predicative. In Grimsby, compared with Newbridge, the base of the second element is obscure, and this now serves merely as a signal of ‘town name’, a sense that is associated with some names, not with common words. Again, we may conjecture that obscuration involves less formal complexity.
seems to be even more common than with settlement names. We know that *France* refers to a particular country, but that *Frances* is a girl’s name.

Another kind of morphosyntactic reflexion of the place-name ‘hierarchy’ is illustrated by the use of the ‘terminal accusative’ in Latin. Thus, ‘the Names of Towns and small Islands, when used as limits of Motion Whither, are put in the Accusative’ (Gildersleeve and Lodge 1968: 213), while ‘Countries and large islands being looked upon as areas, and not points, require prepositions’ (214). This is illustrated in (14):

(14)  a. Missī lēgātī Athēnas sunt
       (‘Envoys were sent to Athens’)
    b. in Graeciam proficisci
       (‘to set out for Greece’)

*Athēnas* and *Graeciam* are both accusative, but in this (‘spatial goal’) sense the accusative must be preceded by a preposition (here *in*) in the latter instance but not the former.

The various place designations that we have considered here are all names, though they may (optionally or not) contain common-noun (thus descriptive) elements (*Lake Windermere*) or be derived from a common noun (*the Channel*) or involve a de-phrasal structure (*the Bay of Biscay*), or be plural (*the Scillies*), or simply retain a *the* (*the Baltic* (*Sea*)).

The ‘classifier’ forms are obviously non-prototypical to an extreme degree in having to conform in what they refer to to the denotation of the descriptive nouns on which they are based. As Carroll (1985: 167) argues, in the case of *the Willis Avenue Bridge* in normal circumstances the ‘referent must be a bridge’, even allowing for metaphorical interpretations. But this merely makes overt (extension of) a kind of subcategorization that may be covert with other names—though not typically with bridge names in English, or with other very specific kinds of place. Recall here the variation between overt and covert classification shown by some of the examples in (4.3a–b). And, as I have indicated, these covert subcategorizations already necessitate some weakening of the ‘reference-only’ position I have associated with Mill.

These place names are all non-deictic items which offer primary identification, and are not predicatable, and which show resistance to attributivization, except by directionals (*the northern Baltic* etc.), though the scope for attributivization is greater with plurals (*the larger Scillies*). Many plural names are also notionally deviant in not necessarily ensuring singular uniqueness of identification (as with *the Smiths*), though often the plurality is non-contrastive (e.g. in *the Hebrides*, which is a plural unit—*Hebride*). But there seems to be no reason to deny them, and the less central place names we have
considered, the status of names, given their role as unique identifiers of individuals, plus a residue of morphosyntax shared with more prototypical names.

So, these are all names, but not prototypical names, and they tend to be marked as such in some way. Likewise, Anderson (2003a) suggests that a generic name, such as those in (15) (cf. e.g. Sørensen (1958: §87)) is not prototypical notionally (on grounds of reduced individualization):

(15)   a. Man/Woman is a dangerous animal
       b. Modern Man/Woman is a dangerous animal
       c. The most dangerous animal is Man/Woman (cf. Man/Woman is the most dangerous animal)
       d. The most dangerous animal is a man/woman

And, unlike core personal names, generic names allow (limited) attributization, as shown in (15b); and they are to that extent peripheral, as expected, given their reference to a ‘generic individual’. It may be that we should associate the capacity for attributization to the derivation of these names from the corresponding nouns; the capacity is ‘carried over’ with the conversion.

Their (derived) name status seems, however, to be confirmed by their use as a definite equative, not a predicative, in sentences like (15c). Compare the generic nouns in (15d). Nevertheless, the reduced individualization associated with generic names pushes them to the edge of the category; the juxtaposition of name and generic comes close to contradiction.

6.3.2 Names based on names

Apparently at odds with Van Langendonck’s hierarchy is the observation that some ‘civic artefacts’ (so high in ‘human interaction’) less extensive than, say, London as a whole, such as street names and buildings, tend to be formally marked. One factor here is the proliferation of streets: the availability of ‘street’, ‘road’, ‘avenue’, etc. allows for the coining of a series of names based on the same personal or other name. This correlates with the fact that street names, as well as buildings, are usually name-based names. They are formed from a name of a different type and a ‘classifier’. It is this derivative status that is reflected in their formal complexity; and this is driven by the desire for structured differentiation.

As well as street names, institutional names are also often name-based, sometimes without ‘classifier’; and they are variously divergent from the core, with respect to individualization, as again is reflected morphosyntactically, but in a different way. For instance, apart from their all being conversions, at
least some of the following set, as far as I am concerned, show variation in verbal number concord, as in the context____has/have decided: Ford (converted from a personal name), America (converted from a place name), Government (converted from a common noun), NATO (converted via initialization and acronymy from a complex name derived from a phrase headed by a common noun), and IBM (converted via initialization from a complex name based on a phrase of non-names). And usage varies with different speakers. But again, though these are notionally non-core, and their deviant morphosyntax depends on this, their status as names, in the terms discussed here, seems not to be in doubt.

Huddleston (1984: 229–30) accepts as ‘proper nouns’ such items as the town names London and Hague, while regarding the latter as ‘less central’ as a member of that category because of the requirement that the precede it. But he rejects complexes such as the University of Queensland as a ‘proper noun’, though for him it does contain a ‘proper noun’, Queensland. The motivation for this is unclear; it seems to reflect an a priori rejection of ‘proper nouns’ that are any more complex than compounds like Queensland. Instead, Huddleston introduces a distinction between ‘proper noun’, such as London and Queensland, and ‘proper name’, which includes them and the University of Queensland. But, as with the similar differentiation made by Coates (2005), as discussed in §4.3.2 above, this distinction is necessary only if the latter cannot be analysed as a complex ‘proper noun’. The formulations by Huddleston and Pullum (2002), whereby ‘proper names’ are ‘expressions which have been conventionally adopted as the name of a particular entity’ (515) (note yet again the ‘convention’ topos), whereas ‘proper nouns’ are nouns ‘which are specialized to the function of heading proper names’ (516), do not clarify matters. It is obscure also in what sense of ‘head’ one can say that ‘proper nouns’ ‘head’ ‘a proper name’—as in the case of Queensland in the University of Queensland, which does not even qualify as a Carrollian ‘namehead’. Nor is it clear what, in these terms, ‘heads’ a ‘proper name’ such as Coates’ the Old Vicarage, which is composed entirely of non-name elements. That some names are based in part on other names does not motivate the banishing of the former from the same syntactic category as simplex names. Nor does the presence of common-noun elements in such complexes undermine their status as names (cf. again Queensland). Nor are names based entirely on non-names any less names.

As is emerging here, concerning the form of names there are a number of distinctions to be made. Even limiting ourselves to English, we need to distinguish, for instance, simple, synchronically opaque names (John); simple names that have a transparent etymology, or at least a resemblance to a
common word (Prudence, Providence, Butte), including nicknames (Slim); names based on other names (Lincoln); names overtly derived from other names (as in patronymics, fossilized as family names in English, as Johnson); names based on compounds, some of them containing a name (Queensland, Newtown), possibly obscured, but still serving a classificatory function (Wigton); names containing a definite article, plural or not (the Trent, the Scillies), as well as (as we look at in the following subsection) names based (figuratively or not) on a common word with a definite article (the Channel, la Manche); names based on longer phrases, ones including another name (the University of Queensland) or not (the Old Vicarage, Long Island, Hen and Chicken Island, New Zealand); and names based on sentences (if-Christ-had-not-died-for-you-you-had-been-damned-barebones). And even among names for people, we need to distinguish personal name, personal + family name, title + personal + family name, etc. Moreover, other languages show different bases, and a different internal structure for names, based on different systems of naming, as was exemplified for Old English and Seminole in §4.2.1. But the distinction between ‘proper name’ and ‘proper noun’, wherever you choose to draw it, throws no light on any of this, except perhaps to highlight the prototypicality of simple names as bearers of ‘properhood’. But simplicity of the prototypical is true (other things being equal) of any category that figures as a label for lexical entries (cf. e.g. Anderson (2006: Chapter 13)).

6.3.3 Names based on common words

Sørensen (1958: 168) is one of those who explicitly reject as names items which have a current common noun congener:

An entity like ‘the Channel’ is an appellative—not a proper name; for we can ask ‘what C(c)hannel’ and answer ‘the channel between England and France’. The fact that we use a capital letter when ‘the channel’ is short for ‘the channel between England and France’ does not affect the grammatical description of ‘the Channel’. The use of capital letter is a mere convention of speech economy. The convention may be formulated in this way: when we write ‘the Channel’, then ‘the channel’ is to be taken as short for ‘the channel between England and France’ and for no other entity.

The reader will already anticipate that this seems to me rather perverse—and not rendered more persuasive by the appeal to ‘a mere convention of speech economy’. We have here another rhetorical deployment of mere ‘conventionality’. The ‘convention’ formulated in the passage quoted (strangely described as one ‘of speech economy’, though it involves spelling) is effectively an admission that the Channel is used as a name; it is institutionalized as such.
If ‘John’ is mentioned, we can ask ‘which one’, if this is unclear in context; similarly, use of (the spoken form of) the Channel might be unclear in context. The main difference is that the alternatives to the intended referent of ‘John’ are all identified by the same name (unless we include the ‘toilet’ noun, though it will usually have an overt determiner), whereas the alternatives to ‘the Channel’ are entities to which there can also be applied the definitized common noun whose cognate can be applied to ‘the Channel’—and is homophonous with it, being the source of the noun-to-name conversion that underlies the Channel. But in common usage the Channel is used very generally, as a short form of the English Channel, in British English at least, as a primary identifier of the argument. And while use of a capital may not ‘affect the grammatical description of “the Channel”’, it does reflect it, I suggest, and specifically the status of the Channel as a name (one which has a common noun cognate); it enables us in writing to distinguish the name from this cognate. One wonders what Sørensen would have made of the Chunnel, a name based on blending rather than simple conversion from a common noun: one can scarcely ask Which Chunnel? (yet).

Consider too the Isthmus/isthmus. Is the Isthmus (the neck of land connecting the Peloponnesos to the rest of mainland Greece, based, metaphorically, in Greek, on a common word, ‘neck’) not a name (for those who know it)? Is isthmus (based on a name in English, overtly for some) not a noun (for them)? Conversion both ways is relatively common. Sørensen’s attitude reflects a failure to give recognition to antonomasia as a derivational process. Names may be derived from common words and phrases (along with their sense), and common words and phrases may be derived from names. Of course, in both cases the derivation may become opaque, for some speakers at least. Antonomasia is a variety of conversion. This and the subsequent subsection look at these, together with derivation by affixation.

Many place names in English are overtly based synchronically on common words, usually of (anthropocentric) affective or descriptive origin, as in Providence or Bath or a compound like Milltown. This latter is an instance of formations we have already encountered (recall e.g. Chapter 4, note 1); it is based on a compound noun. The name is derived from a common-word compound, unlike the onomastic ‘compounds’ of the Old English system described in §4.2. Obscurations affect place names, as with other names; but these are sometimes retarded non-locally by the established spelling, as with a village in East Lothian called Athelstaneford, whose various local pronunciations the reader can perhaps roughly reconstruct on the basis of well-known processes of attrition. And, as we have noted, even reduced second elements of compounds can figure residually as name-type markers (Grimsby etc.).
These derived names, when transparent, are thus associated with an inter-categorial redundancy of the character of those described in §2.2, specifically (2.17):

\[
\begin{align*}
(2.17) \quad \{N\} \\
\quad \{N;P\} & \iff \{N;P\}
\end{align*}
\]

Conversion to a name is another way for a noun to ‘become’ a determinative, and acquire referentiality and status as an argument.

Phrase-based names are again a stumbling-block for many scholars. *The United States* is also rejected as a name by Sørensen (1958: 168) on a similar basis to that appealed to with respect to *the Channel* (§6.3.2). But, once more, this is clearly institutionalized as a name (cf. Allerton (1987: §1)), and as such determines singular concord. The inter-categorial redundancy involved will be different from (2.17), since the base here is a determinative phrase, thus with internal syntactic structure. But the same principle is involved, as we shall explore in Chapter 9.

And, of course, there will be borderline cases, as with all questions of usage: at what point does one talk about institutionalization? What of the varyingly capitalized form in (16)?

\[
(16) \quad \text{The Government/government has decided}
\]

We might see in the variable (in my experience) capitalization in (16) the beginning of (recognition of) institutionalization of a name. In (17) the nominal item of (16) seems clearly to have been the basis for a derived name, a kind of institutional name with a noun base:

\[
(17) \quad \text{Government has decided}
\]

And this is reflected in its morphosyntax, in displaying the absence of an overt article (and not being mass, unlike the noun in *Government is difficult*). But it is already clear that occurrence with the definite article in English does not preclude name status, even if there exists a noun cognate. If we indulge in some grammatical anti-Arianism, *the Lord* and *the Saviour* belong to the same category as *God*.

Similarly, despite Sørensen (1958: 175), the titular forms in (18) are also names:

\[
(18) \quad \text{The President/King has left}
\]

They are another kind of conversion: a name based on a determinative phrase containing the noun for an office. An individual can be addressed as *Mr. President* as well as *Mr. Smith*, if this is appropriate. With royalty this form of
address is, of course, usually ruled out, given the meaning of the base noun. But Alan Bennett plays with this convention (along with the conversion of the royal title to an independently existing surname) when the eponymous hero of ‘The Madness of George III’ (*The Madness of King George*) and his consort refer affectionately to each other as *Mrs. King* and *Mr. King*.

We return in §9.1 to a more explicit formulation of such relationships, including in §9.1.6 those exhibited by the many place names based on phrases that are mentioned in §4.2.4. These introduce complexities such as we can associate with their decreasing notional prototypicality. Now let us turn to another aspect of name and common word relations that will also be dealt with more explicitly in Chapter 9, namely the source of some common words in names.

6.3.4 Common words based on names

As we have seen, personal names in English, prototypical names, reject the definite article unless in the particular context identification is not assured, as in (19a), or there is reference to (especially diachronic) instances or aspects of the entity whose name is being used, as in (19b):

(19) a. the Bill with red hair  
   b. the young Byron, the France I’m fond of

(cf. e.g. Chomsky (1965: 217); other more specialized usages involving *the* are noted by Jespersen ((1949: §16.38), for instance.) We shall have to investigate in what follows what grammatical mechanisms are involved here. Basically, I shall follow Allerton (1987: 66–7) in regarding such cases as involving conversion to a common noun. (Anderson (2003a) regards them as showing, rather, conversion to a non-prototypical name.)

The derivation thus involves (whatever else) the inter-categorial relation expressed in (20):

6 With respect to cases like (19a) Huddleston (1984: 130–1) again deploys his proposed distinction between ‘proper name’ and ‘proper noun’. He says with respect to the examples in (i) that ‘of the two NPs *Jones* and *the same Jones* only the first is a proper name, although both NPs have a proper noun as head’:

(i) a. Jones arrived  
   b. We weren’t talking about the same Jones

But again this terminological innovation is unnecessary—and problematical: what sort of category is ‘proper name’? It does not seem to be on a par with other categories or subcategories of words. As Huddleston points out, ‘any central proper noun behaves like *Jones*’ in occurring as in (ib); in the terms suggested here, any name can undergo this conversion. We have another common set of circumstances, apart from in nomination, where a name does not serve to uniquely identify an argument: identification in (19a) is associated with the whole phrase. But in this case this is the result of conversion.
In this particular instance the derived noun is a count noun (but see further §9.2.1).

However, the forms in (19) are nonce formations, and we must distinguish them, as such, from lexically established common words that derive from names. Despite (19a), there is no noun *bill* (or *Bill*) listed in the lexicon based on *Bill*, as there is with established (transparently) name-based words. Now, many of these latter, unlike typical word-formations that are based on common words, appeal to encyclopaedic knowledge associated with a particular referent of names rather than simply their sense: the name is used to invoke knowledge of the referent intended. They involve a kind of eponymy.

Some names are based on names (§6.3.2): we have already encountered group or institutional names based on personal names (*Ford* etc.): traditional (name-to-name) eponymy, a type of metonymy. And both institutional and basic names can form the base for diachronic conversions to common noun (which may remain transparent), that is, for eponymy in the extended sense (name-to-noun eponymy). And the latter involves appeal to encyclopaedic knowledge.

Two such diachronic developments are the familiar *Ford* (company) ⇒ *Ford* (vehicle); *(Earl of)* *Sandwich* ⇒ *sandwich*. Synchronically, the former derived noun retains a relation with the company name for most speakers: not all motor vehicles are Fords (yet). I am assuming that the noun is based on the corporate name: recall (5.8). In this respect it differs from, say, the count noun in *a sandwich* or *a Picasso*, or the mass noun in *He was reciting (some) Shakespeare*, which are based directly on the personal name itself.

The derivations of the last two of these are generally transparent. Indeed, they are a kind of nonce formation. But we cannot associate such transparency with *sandwich* (except in elementary courses on morphology). So the name component in the (synchronic) representation of the noun in (21), associated with the noun *Ford*, is presumably absent in its case:

(20) \{N;P\}
    | \{N\} ⇔ \{N\}

(21) \{N;P\{count\}\}
    | \{N\{inst\}\}
    : : : :
    \*Ford*
The conventional capitalization reflects the name status of the base rather than of the derived form itself; even this orthographic signal is absent with *sandwich*. The synchronic derivation of *sandwich* does not involve eponymy for many speakers. The synchronic status of the eponymously derived noun in *Bill needs a new hoover* is also perhaps in doubt for some speakers, or in some usages.

We see a like obscuration in the development of many such instances: for many users of English *mentor* is no longer name-based, whereas for many *a Solomon* remains transparently so—a common noun derived from a name on the basis of perceived resemblance in individual attributes between the referents. Greenough and Kittredge (1962: Chapter XXVI) and Vallins (1935: Chapter V), for instance, provide many such histories, histories often ending in obsolescence of the name-based noun. As Vallins (1935: 64) observes, ‘name-words perhaps even more than other words tend to grow old-fashioned’. Weakening in knowledge of the referent of the base name may result in either acceptance as a simple noun (*dunce*) or obscurity and loss of the item concerned (*bayard*). The status of such ‘established’ formations is taken up in §9.2.3.

Sometimes such name-noun conversions may be signalled overtly morphophonologically as well as distributionally. Consider, for instance, the examples in (22) discussed by Gary-Prieur (1994: 169):

\[(22) \quad \text{a. Il y a du Duras au programme} \]
\[\quad \text{‘There is some Duras on the programme’} \]
\[\text{b. Il y a du Andrè au programme} \]
\[\quad \text{‘There is some Andrè on the programme’} \]

Given that *Duras* in (22a) is the name of a female writer, one would expect a preceding definite article to be *la*, so that *du* rather than *de la* is apparently of wrong gender if reference is to the person bearing the name. The gender, as well as the use of the article, makes overt the conversion to a noun. Likewise, the partitivized nominal in (22b) would normally demand, since it begins with a vowel, the preceding formation *de l’* rather than *du*: so, *de l’André*. The presence of the composite article *du* rather than contraction of the article with the following item again reflects the conversion, another nonce formation. It is for such reasons that, as we have already observed, it is misleading of Gary-Prieur to state that, in this case and in others, ‘un nom propre peut apparaitre dans toutes les distributions du nom . . .’ (1994: 243). ‘Names’ can occur in many such positions only by virtue of undergoing conversion into common nouns. As already concluded in §6.2, Gary-Prieur’s observations do not threaten the word-class status of names adopted here.
The name-to-common relationship based on an act of eponymy is a very productive source of nouns, but also of verbs, though at least some of the latter are arguably derived on the intermediary of a noun. But consider the example from the New York Times magazine cited by Clark and Clark (1979: 768), and discussed in Colman and Anderson (2004: §1), which illustrates the productivity of such formations: ‘We all Wayned and Cagneyed’. Consider too the following passage from Meredith’s Lord Ormont and his Aminta (Chapter XV, p.189 in the Constable (1919) edn.), where a friend, alluding to an over-insistent suitor of Aminta, Lady Ormont, coins a verb based on his name: ‘I wonder men can see you while that silly lord of yours is absent, and not begin Mors Welden’. And the verb occurs again on the next page: ‘Have no fear. Mr. Secretary is not the man to be Morsfielding’.

As well as undergoing conversions, names also participate in affix-marked derivations, affix-marked eponymies (if we extend the traditional term even further), involving affixes generally shared with other nominals, as with Wagnerian. However, many of these are based on the sense (extended gender) and reference of the indexed name, rather than encyclopaedic knowledge. Thus, some country and regional names form the basis for (often formally irregular) adjectives in -ish, as (23a), a suffix which also attaches to common nouns (23b), and also ethnic (‘extended family’) names (23c):

(23) a. Spain ⇔ Spanish, France ⇔ French, Wales ⇔ Welsh
    b. fever ⇔ feverish, monk ⇔ monkish, slut ⇔ sluttish, baby ⇔ babyish
    c. Dane ⇔ Danish, Turk ⇔ Turkish

(Cf. e.g. Jespersen (1942: §19.62).) The derivatives in (23a) are basically compositional, composed of country name + a suffix meaning roughly little more than ‘associated with’, without invoking encyclopaedic knowledge concerning the particular country.

The examples in (23c) drag us into an instructive aside. I note firstly that where I have referred to ‘ethnic names’, I include both ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’, which in not always—or typically not—coinciding, introduce terminological (not to mention political) problems. This, however, is not the subject of the aside.

These ethnic names are generally most directly manifested as a plural name, as the Danes or the Kurds. This is to regard the Danes or the Kurds as equivalent to the Smiths, as an ‘extended family’ name, as I said above. Unlike family names, they are not incorporated into complex personal names: John Smith (though they can be the source of family names). Intermediate here are tribal (‘extended family’) names, which can be incorporated into a personal name. But clearly, as well as such as the Danes being ethnic names, there is also a
noun that is converted from such names, found in expressions such as the/a Dane and Danes—generic or partitive. On its own the form Danes is ambiguous between name and noun. Thus, the noun Danes, if generic, contains a non-overt definite determiner (as we expect with plural generics in English), whereas (non-partitive) the Danes contains an ethnic name, marked as such by the definite article (as we expect with plural names). Thus we have a reversal of what is often cited as the ‘criterial’ use of the article: available with nouns but not names. With plural names, however, the article is usually obligatory, whereas with plural generic nouns there cannot be an overt article. This illustrates the care with which ‘criteria’ must be deployed, even in relation to a single language.

We can thus correct our discussion of the set (2.28) in §2.2.3:

(2.28)  
  a. the Greeks  
  b. the Greek  
  c. Greeks

(2.28a) does not involve a generic noun, but an ethnic name. The generic plural noun occurs in (2.28c), where, as elsewhere in English, there is no overt determiner.

The processes underlying (23a/c) are scarcely productive, unlike other derivations involving -ish. But more generally available to country names is the corresponding process involving the suffix -((i)a)n, which attaches to city names as well, as shown by some of the examples in (24a), though it also shows some irregularities:

(24)  
  a. Italy ↔ Italian, Macedonia ↔ Macedonian, Morocco ↔ Moroccan, Chicago ↔ Chicagoan, Bristol ↔ Bristolian  
  b. Elizabeth ↔ Elizabethan, Petrarch ↔ Petrarchan, George ↔ Georgian  
  c. republic ↔ republican, suburb ↔ suburban, mollusc ↔ molluscan, mammal ↔ mammalian

(24b) illustrates the use of the suffix with what are ultimately personal names (and again partly encyclopaedic, as we’ll return to shortly); and (24c) exemplifies its widespread use with nouns (Jespersen 1942: §21.1.4–5).

An ethnic name can be formed by conversion from the results of (23a) (the Spanish, the French, the Welsh); and -man can be added to some of them (and to other nationality adjectives) to give a noun of national designation, as in (25a):

(25)  
  a. French ↔ Frenchman, Welsh ↔ Welshman, Scots ↔ Scotsman  
  b. China ↔ Chinaman  
  c. gentle ↔ gentleman, post ↔ postman
The affixation involved in (25a) contrasts with the derivation by conversion of *a/the Dane; a/the Scot vs. a/the Scotsman*, however, illustrates both noun derivations. The element is added more rarely to country names (25b), but it is again available to form nouns from adjectives, as well as from other nouns (25c). These and the preceding formations provide strong counter-evidence to the alleged grammatical ‘insulation’ of names (Gardiner 1954; Lass 1973).

With the (ultimately) name-based formations in (23a), (24a), and (25a–b), the names of countries or of cities contribute only their country-name or city-name content, together with the referential index, to the meaning of the derived form: the adjective *Moroccan* means ‘associated with Morocco’ and it is again the addition of the suffix which contributes the ‘associated with’ component. These are sense-based derivations, though the sense is minimal; and they also have a particular reference. The contribution of both sense and reference is perhaps clearer with name forms that can have more than one referent. I can illustrate this with my use above of the adjective *Carrollian*, which derives from a family name (sense) but the derivation is also based on a particular referent. These derivations are explored more explicitly in §9.2.2.

The contribution of the bases of such derived forms as are listed in (24b) is also limited, but these derivatives begin to build on enhanced sense or encyclopaedic knowledge: *Elizabethan/Georgian* is usually applied to something ‘associated with’ the period of Queen Elizabeth of England or with the period of the British Kings named George I–IV; mention of ‘Petrarchan’ typically summons up ‘sonnet’ and specifically its use to label the form of the sonnet ‘associated with’ the poet Petrarch. (See e.g. Chapman (1939); Beeching (1979); or Ehrlich (1999), for a range of examples.) As usually interpreted, these go beyond a simple, compositional combination of ‘associated with’ and the sense and reference of the name.

And the apparent contribution of the name to other derived forms can be even more detailed and individual, as also with conversions like *(a) Solomon* (for further examples of which see again Beeching (1979) or Ehrlich (1999)):

(26) Wagnerian, sadism, Byronic, Macadamize/Macadamization, Falstaffian, Stygian, Balkanization, sodomy

Such formations might be taken to indicate (in the spirit of e.g. Kuryłowicz (1966) or Linsky (1983)) that the ‘meaning’ of names is richer than envisaged by the modified Millian position adopted here: the position that names are limited in sense to a few basic higher-level semantic distinctions, the core of which are typically grammaticalized in a range of languages. But whether or not one wants to distinguish what is appealed to in such formations as
'encyclopedic knowledge', as I did above, the character of what is understood by the derived form is in each case in (26) idiosyncratic and ungeneralizable to an extent that makes them unlike regular morphological formations.

Of course, we must recognize that some derived forms based on common words also refer to encyclopaedic knowledge, but in this case of a class, not an individual. My attention has been drawn to such as *asine*, *sheepish*, and *lionize*. These are typically based on low-level hyponyms, terms for natural kinds, again associated with rich encyclopaedic associations, often rivalling those of the referents of names. Thus, interpretation of these common-word forms and the names in (26) goes beyond the simple sense of ‘associated with’ in ways that reflect knowledge of the world rather than the sense of a word.

The name-based examples are more striking, however, as well as being more pervasive. This is because, paradoxically perhaps, *Wagner* (etc.) doesn’t ‘mean’ anything except that it names a person (or place). The knowledge that we use in interpreting the forms in (26) is not part of this ‘meaning’, its sense, but, as with the name-to-noun eponymies (*sandwich* and the like) mentioned initially in this subsection, it involves a grammatically unsystematic selection of ‘attributes’ of the individual referred to. Compare (26) with most of the other formations discussed in this subsection, and with my rough description of the content of *Moroccan*. *Morocco* is the name of a country; this is what the name contributes to the meaning of *Moroccan*. *Wagner* is the name of a person (where we ignore all the other ‘Wagners’); that is what it contributes qua name to the meaning of *Wagnerian*. The rest is an idiosyncratic property of the derived form based on conventional knowledge of the most famous referent of the name. Likewise, as Fran Colman reminds me, *Morocco* is the base for a conversion to common noun, *morocco*, based on encyclopaedic knowledge (of Morocco as a source of goatskin leather). These two derivations based on *Morocco* encapsulate rather nicely the difference between sense-based and encyclopaedia-based formations.

Certainly, derived forms in general can develop idiosyncratically. Consider, for example, *gentleman* from among the items invoked in the preceding; the contribution of its base does not seem to correspond in a simple way to the sense of present-day *gentle*; and the sense of the derivative has incorporated worldly beliefs about the behaviour suitable to a ‘gentleman’. But the initial formation was sense-based. However, formations such as those in (26) do not just develop idiosyncratically but are so from the start. These formations involve grammaticalizations of (supposed) knowledge of individuals as the sense of the derivative. Again, these encyclopaedic derivations are formulated more explicitly in Chapter 9, in this case in §9.2.3.
It is already apparent, however, that the description of these morphological derivations conforms with the notional characterization of the name vs. common-word distinction we have been building up. Such a view is, for instance, in accord with Gary-Prieur’s account (1994: 244) of the differences in interpretation between nouns and names:

\[\ldots\text{alors que l’interprétation d’un nom commun ne met en jeu que la compétence lexicale, celle du nom propre requiert presque toujours une mise en relation avec le réfèrent initial, qui mobilise ce que j’ai appelé des connaissances discursives.}\]

Names are more prone to encyclopaedic derivations. But their limited sense does also support sense-based derivation, consonant with Carroll’s conclusion (1985: 180) that:

\[\ldots\text{proper names do abbreviate descriptions—but not in the logical sense that Mill correctly rejected and that Frege mistakenly espoused. Rather, proper names functionally abbreviate descriptions, suggesting rather than asserting or presupposing referent properties \ldots, structurally specifying category information (as the Willis Avenue Bridge purports by its very form to be the name of a bridge), or isolating intended referents by establishing joint attention.}\]

These quotations seem to recognize the relevance of both sense and encyclopaedic knowledge (‘referent properties’) to name-based formations. And, as I have noted, phrasal names, as in Carroll’s example, often make overt, in the form of ‘classifiers’, the categorizations associated with many other names, or refinements of them.

What is striking about the phenomena looked at in this section is the relevance of these semantic properties of names to their morphosyntax. And what emerges in particular from this subsection is the relevance of all of sense, reference, and worldly knowledge to the use of names as bases for words of other classes. All of this is as expected by the notionalist.

6.3.5 Pronouns as bases

However, such derivations as those in (26)—indeed the existence of derivations at all, particularly shared with nouns—might also be taken to call into question the grouping of names, as I have done, with (particularly personal and deictic) pronouns rather than with common nouns. Formations based on pronouns are notoriously scanty. And this demands that we confront the issue.

As a motivation for not conflating nouns and names as against pronouns on the basis of morphology, recall, on the one hand, that the inflectional and derivational morphology of names, no more than pronoun morphology, cannot be identified with noun morphology (e.g. Kuryłowicz (1966); Gómez
de Silva (1994: 208)), despite the shared formations we have encountered here, for instance. On the other hand, the paucity of pronoun-based derivational formations is scarcely surprising independently of their primary categorization (as determinatives, like names), given the limited numbers and restricted semantic and (particularly) encyclopaedic content of pronouns; the absence of encyclopaedic content and unique reference is associated with their status as ‘shifters’. Pronouns have no persistent referent; therefore, derivations such as (26) based on them are unlikely. Names are similarly, but less drastically, limited in the semantic distinctions we can associate with them, but they have persistent referents to which we attach encyclopaedic as well as lexical knowledge, and whose persistence enables and encourages derivations like those in (26).

It is notable that names and pronouns do show shared formations based on their few sense features, as illustrated by (27):

(27)  a. billy-goat, tomcat
      b. he-goat, she-wolf

Just as the name-based forms in (27a) (originally discussed in §4.3) exploit the gender differentiation of names, so the same differentiation in pronouns can be used in the same way (27b).

We even find a pronoun combined with one of the noun-forming elements discussed above—cf. (25)—in (28a):

(28)  a. he-man
      b. snowman, freeman

(28a) differs from the forms in (25) in showing an unreduced vowel in the second element, but this it shares with forms such as those in (28b). And it is certainly a derived form. Indeed, it even begins to approximate to the formations in (26) insofar as it is scarcely simply the gender category of some referent that is being conveyed (redundantly). This is perhaps even more obviously the case with the once current formation in (29), again involving one of the affixes discussed above—recall (23):

(29)  ittish

Jespersen (1942: 325) glosses this form as ‘sexually attractive’. This sense is no doubt inherited from the noun, converted from the pronoun illustrated by *She has ‘it’* (see Ayto (1999: 27)), that is the immediate source of (29), but it is not part of the sense of the pronoun.

The formation in (28) incorporates cultural assumptions about the referents of *he*, just as some names can, so that people may have ideas about what
are considered to be ‘manly’ names. Consider again Kitson’s attitude to the name Hengest (if based on the noun for ‘gelding’) cited in Chapter 4, note 2, or what is evidenced in the following passage (Kitson 2002: 91–2):

Two classes of personal name have become frequent [in England] since [the 1950s], one of which was rare then, the other almost non-existent: the former, names of film stars and other entertainers, Wayne, Tracy, and the like—my and John Insley’s least favourite, Darren, may be counted with these—, the latter, non-Christian immigrant names, of whom iconic recently was Omar Bakri Mohammed.

Often reactions to names reflect interpretation of the indexical information to do with class and other groupings.

In concluding a brief survey of de-pronominals, including allusion to the here-and-now, tutoyer, and others, Anderson (2003a: 393) presents, in a fit of meitas, the selection of morphophonologically regular Greek derivatives in (30b) which are based on the deictic pronoun in (a):

\[(30)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{ego ‘I’} \\
\end{align*}
\]

These de-pronominals all draw on attitudes to other people’s ‘I-ness’ rather than simply their deictic content.

We can add to these common-word derivatives a pronoun-based name, the eponymous protagonist of Stephen King’s novel ‘It’. The title is translated into Greek as to «Afto», ‘the “It” ’; with, as you’d expect of a name in Greek, a preceding article of the appropriate (neuter) gender. Consider too the character in a TV series by John Mortimer who is referred to by her husband (the eponymous Rumpole) as She who must be obeyed. This is based on an archaic phrase-type with a pronoun head (see §8.1.2); as part of the name, the pronoun is invariable (never Her . . .). Him upstairs, however, chooses as its invariable form the non-nominative.

The scope for derivatives based on the sense and deixis of pronouns, and affective extensions thereof, is limited; and there is naturally none in terms of their variable referentiality. But, given this and the small number of pronouns, they make quite a good showing compared to names.\footnote{Concern with the productivity of de-pronominal formations brings to mind, too, the old story of the church minister in the Scottish Highlands, who having remonstrated with his congregation concerning their sexual laxity, called on all of them to stand who had been guilty of the ‘he-ing and she-ing’. Reluctantly, large numbers of the congregation rose to their feet. Then he called on to do the}
6.3.6 Deictic names

Such phenomena as are illustrated by (19) have sometimes been grouped with that illustrated by (31) and (32), involving the subcategory of calendrical names (cf. e.g. Quirk and Greenbaum (1973: 76)):

(31) a. Easter is the most important festival here
    b. during the Easter of that year
    c. every Easter, last January, some Tuesday, that Passover

(32) a. I hate Monday
    b. She arrives on a Monday
    c. I hate Mondays (in term time)

(31a) and (32a) instantiate the names. But (31b–c) and (32b) illustrate that calendar terms can be much more easily and generally determined than (other) names, and (32c) shows pluralization unaccompanied by definiteness (cf. the Smiths etc.) as well as possible presence of an attributive without a preceding article. In these examples we apparently have count nouns. And they are based on a type of generic name, as illustrated in (31/32a). The two areas of usage are quite distinct in their properties, suggesting a derivational relationship.

Such calendar terms are not necessarily expected to identify a particular individual in the ‘real world’; and their sense and reference is given by their place in the calendar. Thus they also differ from prototypical names in that the items with which a term is in contrast belong to this fixed calendrical sequence of terms referring to individual members of the set associated with a particular interval of time, unlike the set of, say, female human personal names; position in the sequence contributes to the sense of the calendar terms. To this extent they are not prototypical.

These complexities underlie the variety of patterning we find in (31) and (32), which is quite common and unmarked with calendar terms—unlike, say, I’ve detested every Brian I’ve encountered. The temporal forms we have considered seem to be established derived nouns, where they are not names. What is perhaps more interesting is that the basic calendar terms are deictically specific when used as names for an individual, as what we might call ‘temporal place names’, rather than ‘generically’, as in (31/32a). As the name for a particular individual, the Friday in (33a) is interpreted as (b):

same those of the ‘he-ing and he-ing’ persuasion, again with the same reluctant but not negligible response. Then it was the turn of those who could be accused of ‘she–ing and she–ing’. This left seated, of the adult congregation, only one shy youth. The minister was about to commend him to the rest of the congregation, when the youth protested that the minister had not mentioned the ‘me–ing and me–ing’.
(33)  
   a. He arrives on Friday
   b. He arrives on the Friday that most immediately follows today

This suggests that in this use such terms are deictically restricted names.

_Yesterday, Tomorrow, and Today_—as already invoked in (33b)—are perhaps even more obviously an amalgam of name and deictic term, though, unlike _Friday_ etc., they lack a (non-figurative) common-noun use:

(34)  
   He arrives Tomorrow

We do have such figurative uses as _all our Yesterdays_. Allerton (1987: 79–80) shows that different calendrical names vary in their approximation to the prototypical name. The semantic non-prototypicality of such words is matched by their aberrant distribution (for names); they occur, for instance, as adjuncts without overt functor, as in (34). In Greek the non-prototypicality of such deictic names is reflected in the failure of the (rough) equivalents of _yesterday_ and _tomorrow_, unlike other names, to require an article when they are arguments. (I have described Greek _avrio_ as only a ‘rough’ equivalent of _tomorrow_, in that it covers a much less definite period than the latter; glossing it by the latter imparts to it an unwarranted sense of urgency.)

We also have deictically restricted (‘situationally defined’) place names in the form of the final word in _Have you been in town?_ and the like (Allerton 1987: 81). The amalgamative status of these (as deictic names), as well as their conversion from common nouns, is perhaps reflected in the general lack of capitalization. Capitalization of _Yesterday_ is also variable.

And we find a similar deictic content to that illustrated by (33) and (34) with those nouns of relationship and some professional terms (e.g. _nurse_) that can also be used as names, as the basis for primary identification, and with the syntactic restrictions associated with names, and usually with capitalization; that is, we have names derived from such common words. _Kinship_ names (_Mother_, _Mum_, _Mom_ etc.) are also typically deictic. Allerton characterizes them as ‘‘nonce” proper names’ (1987: 81), but their reference is persistent in particular recurring contexts.

A relationship between kinship terms (and some professional titles) and names is rather pervasive, and may even be reflected in the morphology. Thus, in Basque, for instance, nouns of superior-to-inferior family relationship (e.g. _aitaso_ ‘grandfather’, _ocho_ ‘uncle’) and the word for ‘(local) king’ decline in the same way as names. And Sloat (1969: 29) and others point to a restriction on ‘restrictive appositives’ that limits their ‘antecedents’ to names and possessed kinship terms: _John the barber, my son the barber, *the son the barber, *the foreigner the barber._
Numbers themselves are names (based on numerals). But the use of numbers for the hours of the day as names is also deictic—if, say, one omits the bracketed portion of (35a):

(35)  a. He arrives (every day) at 5
    b. *He arrives at every 5/next 5/some 5

Compare these with (31). Here we have another subcategory of deictic name, one of hour names based on numerals. But the structure of terms for the divisions of the hours, including their interaction with the hour names, is more complex.

My aim here is not a comprehensive (notional) classification of categories of name in English and their morphosyntactic properties. Indeed, some of the parameters of such a classification are still uncertain; so that well-known classifications of names such as that contained in Quirk et al. (1985) are, as Lipka (2000: 193), for example, indicates, incomplete, as is that offered by Allerton (1987), and as is even the rather extensive taxonomy of (specifically) place names developed by Baker and Carmony (1975). Carroll’s (1985) taxonomies are likewise open-ended. I offer at this point merely some evidence of the viability and interest of such a project.

But what we have looked at in this and preceding subsections does mean that we must return to a more explicit characterization of the category of name and an illustrative set of subcategories. Here I merely point to the phenomenon of deictic names as involving yet another type of name (different from person or simple place), and again illustrating the morphosyntactic relevance of a notional subcategorization of names.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter concludes Part II. It seems superfluous to repeat at this point the summaries provided in the conclusions to the chapters on names in onomastics and philosophy (§§4.4, 5.3). These traditions have principally given us an idea of the diversity of name forms, and the distinctive structures and systems that characterize them, and of the complexity of the questions involved in looking at the semantics, lexical status, and use of names. But these generalizations of mine do not acknowledge the many more detailed insights that have accrued in our survey. What we have looked at is apparently compatible, however, with the ‘modified Millian’ view that names have minimal sense but have referential status indicated in the lexicon, and with the provision for some names to be ‘derived’ from descriptive elements. It remains to be seen,
though, how the understanding we have gained can be explicitly represented in a grammar of names.

Little is added to that picture we had already gained by the studies of the semantics of names by linguists, though the elaboration of the different functions of names—‘referential, vocative, nominative’—by Lyons and others supplements and extends what we have derived from these other traditions in ways that will be crucial for what is to follow. And what mainly emerges from work on the morphosyntax of names is the diversity of formal markers of the category of name, as well as the lack of agreement on the categorial status of names. However, the work of linguists on the subcategorization of names provides a useful complement to the accounts offered by those dedicated to onomastics, which (as observed) introduced the idea of systems and structures of names, as well as subcategories thereof.

Let me note finally here, in relation to the subcategorization of names, that Anderson (2003a) suggests that the centrality of personal names in the class of names is parallel to the centrality of personal pronouns (and particularly those signalling speech act participants) in the system of deictics: I and you label the basic participants in the speech-act situation, which are anthropocentric; this and here and now and deictic that and there and then label entities located with respect to the primary participant (with or without an act of ostension), and in some language varieties there are such forms relating to the other basic participant. I and you are the ultimate in anthropocentric egocentricity, or nos-centricity; personal names are the ultimate anthropocentricity—and one’s own name is usually a very personal, egocentric thing.

And, finally on the categorization of names, I append the following, in an effort to articulate, in a relatively non-technical way, what divides the traditional interpretation of the categorization of names and what is suggested by Anderson (1997; 2003a; 2004c). In §6.2 I suggested, on the basis of an examination of Halliday’s proposals, which are traditional in seeing names as a type of noun, that one reason for the persistence of this view is the concept of ‘noun phrase’. Indeed, I have myself in what precedes agreed (for temporary, ‘exegetical’, reasons) with various scholars in the observation that names and pronouns have the distribution of ‘noun phrases’ (rather than nouns); as we have seen, this observation in itself is damaging to the view that names (and pronouns) are a type of noun (in so far as names don’t take part in any ‘intra-noun-phrase’ relations). But the observation, as such, is inaccurate. However, because of the maintenance of this inaccuracy, the appeal to ‘noun phrase’ in relation to names encourages the question: if they are not ‘ordinary’ nouns, but they have the distribution of a ‘noun phrase’, what else, despite the difficulties, can they be but some sort of extraordinary ‘noun’?
The implication behind the rhetorical question is no doubt supported by an intuition that both nouns and names (and pronouns) designate ‘entities’. But this too is inaccurate. And this inaccuracy correlates with the other inaccuracy involved in saying that names have the distribution of ‘noun phrases’. For nouns do not designate entities, they denote classes of entities. Their descriptive content helps in the identification of individual entities, but only when the noun is subordinate to a determinative, which introduces reference to a particular entity or entities. The semantic distinctions are summed up by Anderson’s (1997: 19) description of Latham’s views:

We might recall here that Latham describes the pronoun as ‘a variable name’ (1862: §646); whereas nouns (‘common names’) and (‘proper’) names are invariable but differ in whether they are applied to a whole class of objects or are appropriate to certain individual objects (1862: §633)—with pronouns sharing the latter property with (proper) names (1962: §636).

And names have the distribution of determinative phrases. They are thus not ‘noun phrases’ or part of ‘noun phrases’; they are parts of determinative phrases, indeed they are uncomplemented determinatives, differing from determiners in the lack of complementation.8

I have already given indications that this does not complete the grammatical story of names. Names are untypical of a functional category in various ways: their relative ‘open-endedness’ and the absence of manifestation as other than a separate word or words also doubtless encouraged the idea that they were nouns. And they show a distinctive syntax in nominations and vocatives, as we shall shortly explore further. Moreover, there are languages (such as Greek, Seri, and Fijian) where, as arguments at least, they are accompanied by a separate determinative of some kind. Notice too that though I denied that names can be said to denote, if we mean by ‘denote’ to designate a class with shared sense, pronouns might almost be said to denote, insofar as they designate members of a set of individuals distinguished in sense from other sets: she can be used of any member of the class of females, where Sheila cannot (except, to some extent, for Australians, by conversion).

8 This view goes back ultimately, in my own history, to the conviction arising from work of the early 70s, reported on in e.g. Anderson (1973; 1974), that the ‘common noun’ is not the head of quantified phrases, which was generalized to all noun phrases in Anderson (1976: Chapter IV, 1979). The evolution, in such a framework, of the categorial differentiation of names vs. nouns from the late 80s into the late 90s is charted in Anderson (1989; 1991; 1992; 1997). Re-assessment of the status of the determiner in the ‘noun phrase’, re-interpreted as the ‘determiner phrase’, has also been encouraged by the work of Abney (1987) and others (discussed in e.g. Hudson (1990: §11.2)). Recall too the continuing debate on the ‘type’ of names in the Montague-inspired work mentioned in §6.2.
However, pronouns too do not normally refer to a class as such, merely individuals sharing a property.

As far as their occurrence as ordinary arguments in predications in English and many other languages is concerned, names seem to be best characterized as determinatives. However, given their individual semantics (even in relation to other alleged determinatives) and other apparent quirks such as we have already observed (§6.2.4), and since names also occur as vocatives and in nominations, where, according to Anderson (2004c), they are not obviously definite determinatives (again §6.2.4), and in view of the linguistic variation in the expression of definiteness with names, the story must continue.
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Part III
Towards a Grammar of Names
Observations concerning names and related categories

As intimated in the conclusion to Chapter 1, this chapter can be seen as a kind of bridge from the reviews of proposals and debates which largely constitute Part II to the formulation, in the final two chapters of this final Part, of a grammar of names based on the concepts and notation introduced in Chapter 2, but enriched by the observations made in Part II. This chapter brings together in a relatively informal format a range of relevant comments on names and ‘adjacent’ (nominal) categories deriving from Part II, along with some fresh related observations and suggestions, particularly about the grammatical properties of names and their relatives. In organization, each section of this chapter will concern itself with a specific aspect of the categorial similarities and differences that seem to link and separate names and these other categories. The overall procedure will involve some repetition both between Parts II and III and among the chapters of Part III—and deliberately, since it is my hope that the explicit presentation of the grammar that emerges in the course of this Part will benefit from such iteration of the diverse and sometimes quite complex material involved.

I focus in this chapter, which draws heavily on Anderson (2004c), in particular, on the behaviour of the core members of the first category of what are traditionally called ‘names’ that is mentioned by the Port Royal Grammar, as cited at the beginning of Chapter 1 (A General and Rational Grammar 1753: 29):

There are two sorts of ideas, one which represents to us only one thing; as the idea, which each person has of his father and mother, of his friend, of his horse, his dog, of himself, &c.

The other which represents to us several similar things, to which this idea equally agrees, as the idea I have of a man in general, of a horse in general, &c.

Men have occasion for different names to express these two different sorts of ideas. They have given the appellation of proper names, to those, which agree to a single idea, as the name of Socrates, which agrees to a certain philosopher; the name of Paris, which agrees to a particular city.
They have called general or apppellative names, those, which signify common ideas; as the word man, which agrees to all men in general; and in like manner the words, lion, dog, horse, &c.

That is, among what are simply names in the present terminology, I shall concentrate on those items whose membership is least controversial and whose properties can be taken as typical, viz. personal names and, to a much lesser extent, place names (for reasons discussed in Part II).

Outside the core instances of names, especially personal names, there are undoubtedly name-like items which are nevertheless closer to nouns or to pronouns, semantically and syntactically. In this chapter, my focus, however, is on the semantic and syntactic character of core names in a selection of languages, in particular those applied to persons, though even there, in the course of an attempt to identify the properties of core names, the discussion will lead us to some more peripheral examples of the name category, and of name-like noun types. To all the different name-types can nevertheless be attributed the same primary role in identification of a referent, without recourse to variable phoricity or deixis. Names can thus be identified with respect to their referential role (onymic reference); and the latter transparently underlies the range of semantic, syntactic, and morphological properties that characterize names as arguments in different languages, but does not preclude their possession of sense, and it does not exhaust the roles that names play in predications. I shall set this in the context of other ‘entity-based’ categories.

The discussion in this chapter remains rather informal. Its role is to establish in a preliminary way properties that are investigated more explicitly in the chapter following. Crucial characterizing properties of names (positive and negative) in relation to other determinatives, such as definiteness, partitivity, specificness, and deixis, are discussed in §2. Similarities between names and generic (particularly abstract) uncountables are also noted, in §3, following some general discussion of generics. The section that immediately follows now is concerned with establishing a distinction between, on the one hand, the vocative and performative use of names, in which roles they are apparently not definite, and their use as (definite) arguments, on the other. This will involve the status and source of the crucial role of names in what I’ve called ‘primary identification’.1

1 I acknowledge too that in this chapter there is less full documentation of the ideas presented concerning categories other than names. This in part reflects the less central role of these categories in the discussion. Moreover, most of the phenomena and concepts I allude to are by now common knowledge. I shall indicate where I think I depart from such. And I content myself with a general acknowledgment of indebtedness to various traditions. These include the classical tradition
In this chapter, then, I shall be looking, in a preliminary way, at various semantic and morphosyntactic properties that both distinguish and relate the category of names from and to other closely related putative categories. I want now to look at the characteristics of the category in different languages and how closely it is related to (other) distinguishable categories of nominals of different kinds. As indicated in Part I, my starting point is the assumption underlying ‘notional grammar’ (particularly as embodied in Anderson (1997; 2005b; 2006a)) that basic syntactic distribution and morphological differentiation reflect the semantic character of the categories invoked by the syntax.

7.1 The roles of names: identification, nomination, address

The grammar of names is not uniform. Let us begin to focus on this by establishing two main linguistic functions fulfilled by names, a distinction anticipated in the first definition of ‘name’ from the COD also cited above at the beginning of Chapter 1:

1. Word by which individual person, animal, place, or thing, is spoken of or to . . .

Names are used as either arguments with a role as participant or circumstantial (complement or adjunct) in a predication, that is they are the means whereby an individual is ‘spoken of’, or they can be used as terms of address, vocatives, whereby an individual may be ‘spoken to’.

7.1.1 As arguments

When used syntactically as arguments, names otherwise constitute with deictics the primary means of establishing the identity of arguments in predications—of ensuring that both speaker and addressee know the identity of a particular argument:

(1) a. I don’t like Basil
    b. I don’t like that

The arguments I must and that can be interpreted deictically, as ‘linguistic elements whose interpretation in simple sentences makes essential reference

chronicled by Michael (1970) and Padley (1976; 1985; 1988) which culminates in the great descriptive grammars of the turn of the twentieth century and the tradition initiated by Guillaume’s ‘psychomécanisme’, particularly the work of Christophersen (1939), as well as the work in transformational grammar inspired particularly by Perlmutter (1970).
to properties of the extralinguistic context of the utterance in which they occur’ (Anderson and Keenan 1985: 259).

I adopt here, as background to the discussion, the more explicit characterization of deixis given by Lyons (1977: 637):

By deixis is meant the location and identification of persons, objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance and the participation in it, typically, of a single speaker and at least one addressee.

I and that in (1) are clearly deictic, in these terms; Basil is not deictic—unless this is signalled paralinguistically.

Together with the name Basil (unless the speaker has misjudged the shared knowledge of the speech-act participants), the deictics ensure that the likers and the likees in (1) are identified; they ensure primary identification. Deictics and names share this identificatory capacity as arguments; names and one deictic (you) also together constitute the core set of vocatives, as we shall see.

We shall find that the distinction between argument function and function as a vocative is an important one for our understanding of the character of names. In the case of the elements discussed in the previous paragraph, names and deictics, the similarities in their distribution—such as the resistance of both names and deictics to modification, their shared use as typical vocatives—is a consequence of the shared semantico-pragmatic property of uniquely identifying, without recourse to description, a particular argument in a predication or participant in a speech act. This is in accord with our notionalist assumptions.

As discussed above, particularly in Chapter 5, other successful identifications of arguments than by name or deixis depend ultimately on such elements, as in, say, (2):

(2)  a. You remember the girl who doesn’t like Basil? She just sat down over there

b. Don’t you like the statue? It is unusual, I agree

In the first sentence in (2a) a description is offered as identificatory, on the basis of shared knowledge including crucially the identity of Basil; and by using the definite (but not deictic) the, the speaker is signalling that, in this linguistic context, s/he intends and hopes that the identification will be successful. In the second sentence of (2a) use of the definite she depends on the immediately preceding linguistic context. In (2b), taken as sequel to (1b), the definites the and it rely on this linguistic context, including crucially the deictic that, to make identifications. We have in these instances derived identification.
Of course, these little examples greatly simplify the chain of connections whereby derived identifications may be established. But as arguments, deictics and names have ‘something extra’ that does not limit their identificatory capacity to such a dependence on (other) identifiers or the linguistic context: this ‘something extra’ enables them to achieve primary identification. Any account of the grammar of names must seek to provide a characterization of this or these ‘something extra’, as well as the identificatorily weaker property of definiteness which they share as arguments with, for instance, *the* and *she*, representatives (in the absence of ‘gestural deixis’) of the set of (non-deictic) definite determiners and personal pronouns. It seems to be already clear that the ability of names to make primary identification is associated with their capacity to make onymic reference. But we still have to make precise what enables the latter.

7.1.2 *In nomination*

Unlike deictics, names are not dependent on the immediate non-linguistic context. But, of course, again unlike deictics, the use of a name like *Basil* for identification presupposes that the speaker and addressee have participated, together or separately, in a naming to them, as *Basil*, of the same entity, and that, if separate namings are involved, they have ascertained that their namings correspond. As we have seen, Carroll (1985: Chapter 8, §3.1) and others, along the lines of Kripke (1981 [1972]), examine the character of nominations, or ‘baptisms’, and emphasize that such an act may depend on a ‘reference-fixing description’. But the ‘anchoring’ of the descriptions will again depend on names. Here I shall adopt the terminology of Lyons (1977).

An act of didactic nomination (Lyons 1977: 217–8), or at least an assurance of correspondence, may involve (more or less polite) ostension (deixis), or description, as in (3):

(3) a. Basil is *him*
    b. Basil is that guy over there
    c. Basil is the one who married Clotilde

In the absence of presence at the **performative nomination**, as exemplified by (6.4), we must substitute didactic nomination, which may be deictic or by description:

(6.4) I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth

The form of the name in (6.4) retains the determinative. Usage here, concerning the presence or absence of the article in performative nomination of ships varies in my experience. This perhaps reflects the ambivalence of *the*
with some names. Given its non-contrastive status, it is taken as an inherent part of the name, and so not dropped in (6.4) even when the expression of definiteness is inappropriate.

The importance of didactic nomination is highlighted by occasional literary flouting of (our expectations concerning) the rites of (didactic) nomination. This is illustrated by the treatment of a character in Aldous Huxley's *Point Counter Point.* ‘Norah’ is introduced in Chapter 4 in the following way:

‘Wasn’t the Old Man too marvellously funny?’ Polly Logan had found a friend.
‘And the little carrotty man with him.’
‘Like Mutt and Jeff.’
‘I thought I should die of laughing,’ said Norah.

The conversation continues, and attracts other characters, and Norah disappears from it, leaving the reader with only the knowledge that she is a friend of Polly Logan (who has been properly nominated). Norah reappears only twice in the book: later in the same chapter we learn, after a brief resumption of conversation between Polly and Norah, that ‘Norah was also under twenty’; and there is a brief allusion to her, towards the end of Chapter 11, in some quoted thoughts of Polly’s, viz. ‘“And then think of wasting attempted cleverness on Norah! Norah! Oh Lord, oh Lord.” ’ The reader has still not been ‘properly introduced’—and never is.

The sentences in (3) are equative, and in each case *Basil* is a definite argument, whether pre- or post-verbal. The complements of *is* here are not predicative, and thus if the discourse circumstances are appropriate they may be interchanged with their subjects, as one expects with equatives, for example, *That guy over there is Basil.* Thus, as noted above, *I am Basil* is a suitable answer to the question *Who are you?*, which asks for identification of an argument, but not to the question *What are you?*, which seeks for the specification of a predicator. As we have seen, in Greek, as elsewhere when names are arguments, the name in such sentences as are illustrated by (3) is normally accompanied by the definite article; in Seri it occurs in a specifically equative construction. In this respect they are not true acts of nomination, in that on the most salient interpretation the name in them is already familiar, hence definite; they merely fill out information about the name. They are not true acts of didactic nomination.

In acts of performative nomination (cf. again Lyons (1977: 217–8)), and in sentences containing verbs of nomination, or naming (which can be used performatively), definiteness of the name, identification, is not assumed; rather a name is assigned. In the English sentences in (4), whether performative or not, *Basil* is not definite:
(4)  a. I name this child Basil  
    b. That one/Their youngest child is called Basil

Unsurprisingly, and as we have seen, the name in the nominating Greek sentence in (6.10a) lacks the definite article:

(6.10)  a. Onomazete Vasilis/ Ton lene Vasili  
        he.is.called Basil/ Him they.call Basil

The names in performative nominations seem to be straightforwardly non-definite. The name in (4) does not even bear an appropriate fixed referential index, which would give it the power for onymic reference; it is assigned in the predication. And its subsequent definiteness depends on the presence of the fixed index.

But another distinction now arises. (5) is ambiguous:

(5)  This is Basil

It could be identifying a Basil known by description, substituting, like (3a–b), a ‘baptism by acquaintance’ for a mere ‘baptism by description’; or it could be performing the introduction of an unknown Basil, a true didactic nomination. Let us, however, focus for the moment on the overtly nominating structures in (4).

What is in question is the status of the name in the sentence as a whole. It seems to be obligatory, but it is unlike (other) complements in the specificity of what will fill the slot: it can only be a name. Contrast (6a):

(6)  a. I give this child (the) books  
    b. I find this child beautiful

Nor is it predicative, as in (6b); names as such are not predicators. The specificity of category is imposed by the particular verb used. And it recurs in another construction, where it is required by a noun:

(7)  I give this child the name Basil

Traditionally, Basil in (7) might be said to be in apposition to the name. Anderson (2004c) says that (7) gives a clue to the analysis of (4), particularly within the framework presented in Chapter 2. This too, of course, will require some more formal explication—and is another of the things which will occupy us in Chapter 8.

7.1.3 As vocatives

In the apparent absence of syntax, the primary function of names is vocative, attention seeking, as exemplified in (8):
(8) Basil!

(cf. e.g. Lyons (1977: 217)). And they can serve a vocative and/or phatic function as an ‘extra-sentential’ element in utterances such as that in (9):

(9) I read that, Basil

As we have seen (§6.2.4), the overt markers of definiteness that occur in some languages with names as arguments are absent in vocatives. Recall Greek (6.10b):

(6.10) b. Vasili!

Basil!

The lack of the definiteness marker is not exceptional, and is even testified in English with names that otherwise have an article (Chapter 6, note 3).

Apart from deictics (you), typical vocatives other than names are patently not expressed as definite in English, as with Look here, mate! or, even more obviously, Whoever said that, come out here (Quirk and Greenbaum 1973: §7.32). We do find overt definites if they are cataphoric (Halliday 1985: §9.2), i.e. are identified by referring forward in what follows in the construction for a description, as in (10a):

(10) a. Own up, the boy who wrote that  
    b. Own up, whichever boy wrote that  
    c. Own up, whichever of you boys wrote that  
    d. Help me, someone  

Compare (10b)—or (10c)—which makes it even clearer that any phoric definiteness here belongs, if anywhere, with the set of boys, not an individual. These are commands for an individual to identify himself as addressee, as is (10d).

Anderson (2004c) suggests that names conform to this pattern: as vocatives they are not definite, as suggested overtly in Greek and Seri. Default vocative names, such as Mac or Honey, are not usually available as arguments (Zwicky 1974: 789), suggesting some kind of categorial difference, for example lack of definiteness, between such names and the prototypical. And it is consistent with this for Anderson to also suggest that even vocative you, though deictic, is not definite: identification is not assumed but established deictically in such utterances as Come here, you. Vocative you confers addressee status on some entity; once this is done, of course, you is definite as an argument. On this view, vocatives reveal that naming and deixis are independent of definiteness, though in arguments in non-nominational predications they are combined with it.
However, one might well have some reservations concerning this denial of definiteness to vocative names. If a vocative is issued to attract attention, then it is doomed if the speaker is not able to assume that the intended addressee can identify himself; the assumption may be obvious, but is it therefore unnecessary, as implied by the treatment in Anderson (2004c) of vocatives as simply not definite?—see §6.2.4 above. If an identification of reference is being made in the use of a vocative, then these typically involve two terms in an equative construction, at least one of which is definite. Consider (11), for example:

(11) Her lover is the/a plumber from Liverpool

The first argument is definite; the second either definite or partitive, not predicative. If a vocative identifies some entity, say Basil, as the addressee, then we would expect the representation of the entity to be definite, as is the subject of (11). The use of the indefinites in (10) is a default act that is primarily an admission of failure to make identification. Something more complicated than simple presence or absence of definiteness seems to be involved here.

These considerations seem to suggest that the internal structure of the vocative is categorically complex, and that it is somehow the speech-act status of vocatives that is associated with the non-expression of definiteness, rather than simply the absence of the latter. This requires some attention to the structural expression of different kinds of speech act. Speech acts are represented by a predicator in Anderson (1997: §3.6.2), and often expressed as predicational ‘moods’: we pursue this in Chapter 8, where we must confront such reservations concerning the non-definiteness of vocatives as have just been outlined.

This emerging perspective on (the complexity of) vocatives is supported by some other vocative forms. Notice firstly that names also share a pervasive vocative, and apparently non-definite use with (some) nouns of family relationship (Mother, Dad) and social and professional status or function or sometimes title (Waiter, Chairman, Doctor, Madame). Now, as we have seen, nouns of relationship and some professional terms (e.g. Nurse) can indeed be used more generally as names, as the basis for primary identification and with the syntactic restrictions associated with names; that is, we have names derived from such common words. Kinship names are also typically deictic: they are the kind of amalgam of name and deictic term that is discussed in §6.3.6 in relation to calendrical terms like Tomorrow. As well as with names, a relationship between kinship terms and some ‘professional’ ones is rather pervasive, and may even be reflected in the morphology (as illustrated for
Basque in §6.3.6). However, there are also count nouns in English that resemble names in lacking an article of any sort only in vocative use; such is waiter. If we interpret these as noun-based names, they occur only as vocative names. They are converted to a vocative-name complex, not merely a name.

This supports the idea that vocatives are not simply names, but are also categorially complex in other ways that are not expressed overtly. Indeed, vocatives are not simply nominals of whatever kind; they must be represented as speech acts, and this is part of their lexically derived structure. The ‘apparent absence of syntax’ referred to initially in this subsection does not betoken the absence of a complex categorial structure—quite the reverse, it would seem. As indicated, how such a proposal is to be implemented and shown to be appropriate, say in the notation developed in Chapter 2, will occupy us in Chapter 8.

7.1.4 Conclusion

We have distinguished between the use of names as straightforward arguments and their use as vocatives and in performative nominations. The latter frustrate expectations based on the use of names as arguments, particularly by their failure to display marking as definites, either by absence of the article in Greek etc. and/or in not showing an obviously definite interpretation. The proposed bases for these frustrations, as I have signalled, we look at in Chapter 8. This will involve us in looking at the apparently shared function of names and you as core vocatives, which involves subtle questions of definiteness. It is more obvious that it is non-definite names that participate in nomination.

In that chapter too we shall need to make more explicit the representation of deixis, and the role of referential indices in the grammar of names. Let me say a little here, in conclusion to this section, to remind us of the story on indices emerging from Part II.

Rather obviously, and as we have observed, use of a name for identification presupposes prior nomination. It is obvious too that few names assigned by nomination are indeed unique, and they are generally drawn from a common stock; but in context a name can enable primary identification, identification not derivative of the linguistic context. As expressed by the Port Royal Grammar (1753: 30): ‘Not but that the proper name frequently agrees with many, as Peter, John, &c. But this is only by accident, by reason that several have taken the same name.’ Creative writers can of course play with this assumption of uniqueness: Thackeray, for instance, gives his hero in Penden-nis the same (personal and family) name as his (the hero’s) uncle, also
prominent in the novel; and differentiation depends on context and the judicious deployment of title and hypocorism.

A linguistic representation of names should reflect their identifiatory capacity, whatever its basis, whatever their wider-context-dependence, just as linguistic description should embody a recognition of deixis as something which can also establish primary identification in an immediate context. Used as arguments, the names and deictics of (1) and (2) share with the other definites in (2) the conveying of the speaker’s assumption that the addressee can also identify the particular entity or entities referred to by an argument. But, as I’ve been suggesting, they have additional components that enable primary identification. The crucial component in the case of names is the association of names with fixed referential indices, so that each name-index configuration is unique, enabling identification.

7.2 Names vs. determiners and pronouns

As has long been recognized, simple definites, including ‘third person’ pronouns, can function like the primary identifiers if the descriptions they are associated with (though minimal in the case of pronouns) uniquely identify some entity or entities in the relevant context, as in (12a) and (b):

(12) a. I prefer the pink ones (said by e.g. person choosing floor tiles)
    b. Will you feed the dog? (said by e.g. wife to husband, the joint owner of Bonzo)
    c. The government has decided

The use of the dog in (12b) (from Vendler 1967: §2.12) approximates indeed to the use of a name like Bonzo, in enabling identification of an individual with minimal description, merely, like the name, the sense of ‘canine’. This is even more apparent in an example like (12c). But, unlike a name, the dog and the government do not function prototypically as a primary identifier, and such a use has severe contextual limitations; it is ultimately deictic. Moreover, dog itself remains the label for a set, while Bonzo necessarily refers to an individual; it allows onymic reference, and only onymic reference.

With simple (non-deictic) definites, there is generally reliance on description. And identification may be ‘incomplete’—or, rather the description itself may be the only reference-fixing available; it is a primitive ‘baptism’. The identification provided by a definite description may not derive from an independent primary identification, as in (the most salient interpretations of) (4), but may remain purely descriptive, as with one interpretation of Donnellan’s (1966) example replicated in (13a), or as with (13b):
(13) a. Smith’s murderer is insane
   b. The author of this pamphlet is a liar

On these latter interpretations—Donnellan’s ‘attributive’ (vs. ‘referential’)—reference is to whatever otherwise-unidentified person respectively murdered Smith or wrote the pamphlet; and this can be spelled out as ... whoever s/he may be. Again, the definite is cataphoric; anaphora here is limited to reference to instances of the same description. I shall employ the (perhaps paradoxical) label non-specific identification for this use of deﬁnites. In the absence of deixis/naming or derived identiﬁcation, deﬁnites are only partially identiﬁcatory; and this use is much more general than is often acknowledged. With examples like (14), in particular, it may be that the only identiﬁcation of ‘the power’ is the new information provided within the second nominal phrase:

(14) Somebody else is the power behind the throne

Such phenomena qualify somewhat Christophersen’s (1939: 72) and Jespersen’s (1949: 417–8) association of the deﬁnite article with ‘familiarity’; ‘familiarity’ may be limited to familiarity with the description, with independently identiﬁed referent or not.

Names and overt deictics, on the other hand, if used successfully, are speciﬁc. Names depend for this on their ﬁxed index. As is embodied in their ‘name’, deictics are able to refer to individuals directly by ‘pointing to’ palpable elements of the immediate context. These are their ‘something extra’ that permits primary identiﬁcation. ‘Pointing’ should not be interpreted too literally: if there is only one potential addressee in the immediate context, then gesture, either by hand or look (or foot or whatever) may be unnecessary. And deictics may of course be used for ‘displaced reference’, as in narratives. And names (and deictics, such as the narrator’s I) may be also used for ﬁctional entities. But the identiﬁcation remains primary and speciﬁc.

The ability to provide primary and so speciﬁc identiﬁcation is a salient notional property of names among non-deictics.

Non-speciﬁc identiﬁcation of a deﬁnite expression is often the result of the entity concerned having been introduced as an ‘indefinite’, as in the ﬁrst sentence in (15a):

(15) a. A boy and a girl came to see Jill. The girl knows Jack
   b. There were a boy and a girl came to see Jill
   c. It was a boy and a girl came to see Jill

The speciﬁc identity of the girl is not established, but a boy and a girl nevertheless introduce speciﬁc though not speciﬁcally identiﬁed entities. We
have in the case of these indefinites what we might call ‘specific non-
identification’: the speaker may have a specific referent in mind, but does 
not, or cannot, identify it to the addressee. Existence (in some domain) is 
claimed for the referent of such indefinites, whereas it is assumed with 
definites that they make claims concerning identity. The existential status of a boy and a girl is made explicit in the periphrastic variant of the unmarked 
reading of the first sentence of (15a) which is given as (15b). (15c), on the other 
hand, unpacks a contrastive reading for that sentence where existence (but 
not identity) is assumed not asserted.

Consideration of (15) suggests that specificity is not a property of definites 
as such, but a reflection of whether or not the definite entity concerned has 
been given a primary identification. The difference between the definites in 
(15a) vs. (b) is simply whether the descriptive (‘non-specific’) identification is 
given by material following or preceding the definite; i.e. whether the definite 
is described cataphorically or anaphorically (Halliday 1985: §9.2). To pursue 
this terminology, we can say that names are ‘homophoric’, glossed as ‘self-
specifying’ by Halliday (1985: 314), and deictics are ‘exophoric’, extra-textually 
identified. Even items that are normally interpreted deictically can be made to 
carry what we might call ‘textual deixis’: consider I know a lawyer. This lawyer 
. . . , or that man we met yesterday. For various reasons I shall not adopt this 
terminology, except as concerns cataphora and anaphora. In particular, ‘homophoric’ and its gloss might encourage the interpretation that names 
identify themselves (which represents a famous dead end in understanding 
their semantics).

Indefinites too can be ‘non-specific’ in a sense (as has long been recog-
nized—see e.g. Kruisinga (1931: 315); Collinson (1937: 35)), insofar as they are 
used in expressions for particular entities whose existence is apparently 
neither asserted nor presupposed, as in the most salient interpretation of 
(16), with its (much-discussed) modal or ‘unreal’ context:

(16)  Bill longs for a yacht

There is for this no analogue to (15b)—though there is to (15c), but, it seems, 
without presupposition of existence.

For some speakers of Macedonian, according to Berent (1977), only specific, 
but not non-specific, indefinite objects permit ‘doubling’ by a pronominal 
‘clitic’, as illustrated by (17a) vs. (b):

(17)  a. Sakam da go pluknam eden čovek koj beše včera kaj tebe 
I.want that him I.spit.on one man who was yesterday at you 
(‘I want to spit at a man who was at your place yesterday’)

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b. Sakam da (*go) pluknam eden čovek, no ne znam kogo
   I want that (*him) I spit.on one man, but not I know who
   (‘I want to spit at a man, but I don’t know who’)

(Cf. too Kazazis and Petheroudakis (1976), on Albanian and Greek.) Anderson (2004c) comments that we seem to have a parallel distinction of specificity applicable to both definites and indefinites: specific definites assume particular identification; specific indefinites assume particular existence.

I note also here that non-specific identification is, unsurprisingly, particularly associated with definite expressions involving entities introduced as non-specific indefinites (as well as specific, as in (15a)), as with the it in (18a):

(18)  a. Bill longs for a yacht, so that he can sail it to Cuba
      b. Bill has bought a yacht, so that he can sail it to Cuba

The identification associated with the first definite in the second clause in both (18a) and (b) is specific, though derivative of the primary identification of one entity as Bill; and the other definite in both cases is non-specific, in referring back to an indefinite, and in the case of (18a) to a non-specific indefinite; the indefinite in (18b) is again specific.

If indefinites, as opposed to specific indefinites, do not necessarily introduce or (like definites) assume existentiality, what is their function? Definites are associated with the speaker’s and addressee’s identification, specific or not, of an entity. Indefinites may also, apparently, be specific or not; but in their case the entities involved may or may not be claimed to exist as individuals. What are involved in both cases of indefinites are (specific or non-specific) members or subsets of the set of entities described by the associated noun phrase. As we have seen, this may be marked overtly, as with the use of quantifiers, and of the indefinite article with singular count nouns, as in (15), (16), or (18), or it may be covert, as with the subjects of the sentences in (19a) and (b), which are both specific indefinites, involving sub-sets/-parts, on the most salient interpretations:

(19)   a. Men came towards me
       b. Water fell on me
       c. I’ll hire painters
       d. I want wine

This is likewise the case with the objects in (19c) and (d), where the interpretations are most obviously non-specific, but again involve what I have called a partitive relation. This conjunction of partitivity and absence of definiteness illustrated in (19) is a defining characteristic of indefinites (except the generic indefinite article), and absent from other determinatives,
including prototypical names. These distinctions are incorporated in the framework outlined in Chapter 2, which we must develop further in the next chapter.

Both ‘definite’ and ‘indefinite’ involve the presence of some identifying substantive property (‘assumed identifiability’ vs. simply ‘partitivity’). And I am here using the term ‘non-definite’ to refer to nominals such as the names in performative nominations, where in the prototypical cases both of these are absent. It might be preferable at this point to substitute, for example, the term ‘partitive’ for ‘indefinite’, a term which has long been recognized as unfortunate (cf. e.g. Jespersen (1949: 420)). But I shall retain the latter as a familiar label in what follows, and as an abbreviation for ‘partitive but not definite’.

Definiteness and indefiniteness and their combination with specificity contribute to different ‘degrees of determination’ of nouns: cf. de la Grasserie (1895), who ranges proper names at one end of such a scale and the predicative use of nouns at the other (and who also allows for a ‘latent article’). His scale seems to be one of relative referential specificity which accords quite well with the representations being suggested in our discussion. I cannot attempt to substantiate the proposals concerning (in-/non-)definiteness made here; but it seems that they can be shown to be compatible with the range of phenomena surveyed in Lyons (1999: Chapter 2), for example. I have also not attempted to acknowledge the extensive literature on this topic discussed in Lyons (1999: Chapter 7). However, I elaborate such a scale somewhat in §7.3.2.

I am aware too, as the discussion in Chapter 5 should have already revealed, that ‘existence’ and ‘identification’ are tricky notions to be throwing around. My description of specificity in particular must be regarded as an approximation of uncertain degree. Indeed, whatever the status of de la Grasserie’s scale of degrees of determination, I do not think the parallelism between definites and indefinites implied by use of the specificness distinction with respect to both should necessarily be taken too seriously. It may be, for instance, that, despite critiques such as Lyons (1971: 171), a treatment of (16) in terms of scope of quantification might be appropriate, just as it illuminates the apparent non-individuality of the first indefinite in (20), which Anderson (2004c) refers to as also involving non-specificity:

(20) I eat an apple a day

A compatible account of quantification is outlined in Anderson (1997: §3.7.2); recall too the discussion in §5.2, which anticipates an analysis in terms of scope. The attribution of partitivity to indefinites as their basic property, with assertion of particular existence being limited to specific indefinites, does not in itself rule out the extension of an existential analysis as well as
partitivity to indefinites in ‘opaque’ or ‘modal’ contexts such as that in (16): see §8.1.2.

With definites, too, we have to acknowledge that, in the absence of deixis and prior reference-fixing of a name (by ‘acquaintance’ or description), all identification is incomplete, merely less or more so. Specificity as such seems to be epiphenomenal, but again it is a useful term to have available for our discussion, particularly as a ‘scalar’ term, involving degrees of specificity, or degrees of individualization.

However, even if, in terms of an analysis in terms of scope, we can associate all the indefinites with ‘asserting existence’, this does not diminish the significance of partitivity in the characterization of such structures, and their differentiation from names, which are not partitive. The question of existence also has some significance for generic nominals—which we now turn to. Thus far we can characterize names, if they are determinatives, as not partitive, as de
titive in presupposing that the addressee, as well as the speaker, can identify them, and as specifically non-deictic primary identifiers. Grammatically, they also do not assert existence, but merely presuppose that their referent can be located in some domain (not necessarily the ‘real world’).

7.3 Names vs. generics

‘Generic utterances’ are a special case of utterances with (among other things) arguments that are non-specific; these arguments are minimally described (and thus minimally circumscribed) non-specifics. We can perhaps recognize a cline of genericness for utterances ranging from the ‘habitual’ of (20), in which one of the arguments (I) is not merely specific but identified, to classic types from English such as those in (21):

(21)  a. A lion is a dangerous animal
     b. Lions are dangerous animals
     c. Sugar dissolves in water

In (21a) and (b) we have only a non-specific indefinite (subject) argument, singular and plural respectively, combined with a predicative expression whose tensing is non-specific; and in (21c) we have two mass non-specific indefinites and non-specific tensing.

Intermediate perhaps are such utterances as those in (22):

(22)  a. At one time there were dodos
     b. The author of this pamphlet writes well
     c. Persistent abstinence is dangerous
(22a) has a non-specific indefinite whose existence is tensed (involves deixis), and thus shows decreased genericness. With the utterances in (21), on the other hand, all potential reference, including tense, is non-specific. (22b) contains a non-specific definite with non-specific tensing, but the subject argument introduces partivity: the existence of a particular member of the set of authors is assumed; s/he need not normally be identified independently, but s/he is assumed to be identifiable. There is, or can be, a partitive relation between persistent and abstinence in (22c), but the whole phrase is not partitive, merely (covertly) definite, so generic, as is the tensing.

**Full genericness** demands pervasive non-specificity and non-partitivity. The suggested cline is, of course, a fuzzy one, and indeed at the moment a not well-understood one, particularly given the uncertainties in weighting the contributions of different varieties of specificity and instances of partivity to the reduction of genericness of an utterance. Here, however, I am concerned particularly with **generic arguments**.²

7.3.1 **Generics**

We can characterize the generic argument in (21b) as lacking partitivitity (in contrast with the similarly non-specific indefinite object of (20)), as well as, as a consequence, specificity. Such non-partitive non-specific indefinites nevertheless allow a **distributive**, or singulative, as well as a **collective** interpretation, as illustrated by sentence (23a) (vs. (b)):

(23)  a. Lions have four legs and a tail  
     b. Lions are extinct

In (23a) the possession of four legs and a tail is attributed to individual members of the set of lions, whereas in (23b) extinction is necessarily attributed to the set. The singular indefinite excludes, of course, the necessarily collective interpretation which would be associated with (24b):

(24)  a. A lion has four legs and a tail  
     b. * A lion is extinct

Our characterization of such arguments must reflect the association between distributiveness and singularity of number apparent from (23a): (24) shows that plural nouns may be either distributive or collective. This is simply done, apparently, by making the option contingent on plurality.

² This is not the place to pursue generics as such, and I admit to having neglected much that is apparent in this area from careful discussions such as Dahl (1975) and Carlsen (1977), as well as those in Galmiche and Kleiber (1985). My aim is simply to try to illuminate the relationship between generics and names.
Of these utterances, the collective (23b) obviously combines non-specificity and non-partitivity, which I have associated with full genericness of an argument. (23a) is also distributive, which, despite thus singling out one manifestation of lions, and however we characterize it, seems to be compatible with genericness. Thus the distributive generic character of (24a) is also unproblematic, presumably, in this respect. However, historically, the English indefinite article is descended from a numeral, thus a partitive.

In the case of English, Rissanen (1993: §2) produces evidence that the use of *a(n)* as a non-specific develops later than its specific use, and that generic use of (24a) begins later still, with the whole process of the extension of the form to its full range of modern uses taking centuries to complete. We have a process of semantic weakening, involving the progressive loss of the obligatoriness of specificity and of partitivity. Other languages are more resistant to ‘generic’ interpretation of the indefinite article. However, in terms of the framework introduced in Chapter 2, the indefinite article in English, at least, is not necessarily partitive-taking, but it may be simply a marker of singularity (recall §2.3.3); and, as such, it is compatible with a (singulative) generic interpretation. It is ambiguous in isolation.

The generic utterances in (21) and (23) all involve apparently indefinite non-specifics. But we also find in English, alongside (21a) and (23a), the utterance (25a), as well as, parallel to (21b), the collective in (25b):

(25)  
  a. The lion is a dangerous animal/ has four legs and a tail  
  b. The lion is extinct

We have a non-specific definite argument in this case, along with non-specific tensing; again, as with (21) and (23), the utterance is, on one interpretation, fully generic—non-partitive and non-specific. However, (25b) calls into question any generalization, based on such as (24b), concerning a necessary conjunction between singulars and the absence of a collective reading (cf. Lyons (1977: 196)). Definite singulars may be collective.

Notice too that unlike (26a), (25a) also has both a partitive and a generic interpretation:

(26)  
  a. The lions are dangerous animals  
  b. The sugar dissolves in the water

Overtly definite plurals in English are normally partitive. Although, as with indefinite singulars, the definite singular phrase is usually partitive (cf. Vendler 1967: §2.11), as in, for example, (15a), it can also be generic. And a singular argument marked with *the* (but not *a(n)*) can be accorded either a collective or a distributive interpretation if it is generic. (26a) and (b), the
first with a plural, the second with a mass noun, are insistently partitive, however.³

The expressions involving definite plural and mass nouns of (26) cannot be interpreted generically, unlike their analogues in French and Greek, for example, as we observed in §2.2.3. This is illustrated for French by the subject of (27a) and the objects of (a) and (b):

(27) a. Les exercices corporels entretiennent l’appétit
    (the) exertions bodily maintain the appetite
b. J’aime le poisson
    I like (the) fish

I suggested in §2.2.3 that plural generics in English are also definite, but the definiteness is expressed internally, by a definite determiner to which the noun is subjoined. This is a typological difference between these languages. The constant is the association of plural and mass generics with definiteness.

This is notionally unsurprising. Use of a definite means that the speaker expects the interlocutor to be able to identify the referent of the definite expression. This is ensured in the case of these plural generics by the coincidence of the referent with the denotata: the set of referents is identical to the set of denotata. This has important consequences for our understanding of the observed similarities between generics and names. Recall again, for example, (2.28):

(2.28) a. the Greeks
b. the Greek
c. Greeks

(2.28) contains an ethnic-group name (not a generic noun, as presented in (2.55)), with, as we expect of plural names in English, an overt definite; (2.28c) is a plural generic, with internal definite; (2.28b) can be interpreted as a singular generic. The similarity involves this: names have no denotation; generic nouns equate their reference with their denotation; they refer to the set of denotata.

³ From another aspect, in English the is mainly used with partitives, and the singular generic is exceptional. These phenomena to do with partitivity requirements are perhaps in part what leads Vendler, for example, to propose that ‘the in front of a noun not actually followed by a restrictive clause [from which he derives all restrictive modifiers—JMA] is the sign of a deleted clause to be formed from a previous sentence in the same discourse containing the same noun’ ((1967: 52); cf. too Serensen (1958: 127)). I interpret this in terms of the present discussion as a claim that the is usually associated with a definite partitive—i.e. it involves subsetting, often marked by the presence of attributives, but also in their absence. Even in the truth in sentences such as I want to know the truth ‘the truth’ is a particular one; and in such as the lexicon, the grammar, etc. they are seen as part of a whole.
We can also now revise our formulation of the distribution in determinative phrases of the distributive vs. collective distinction: collectives are limited to plural or definite-generic determinative phrases. This may be associated with the fact that the presence of definiteness emphasizes the identity of denotation and reference, as implied in the previous paragraph. And, in English, the definite article doesn’t itself signal singular vs. plural. A definite generic may be collective or distributive, whether the noun is marked for plural or not. However, it seems to me that there is a tendency for the distributive generic nouns to favour singular marking. The indefinite article, distinctively marked itself as singular, insists on distributive.

As we have seen, in French and Greek, plural and mass definites may or may not be partitive. Recall (2.29), where the object of the Greek sentence in (2.29) is ambiguous between a generic and a partitive reading, as is the subject of the French in (b):

(2.29) a. Fovate ta skila
   s/he.is.frightened.of the dogs

b. Les lions sont dangereux
   the lions are dangerous

This has been observed in relation to a number of languages (among earlier treatments cf. e.g. the comparison of Spanish and English offered by Klein (1976)).

Singular arguments in French and Greek, as in English, may or may not be generic. But we should note the preference by singular indefinite generics in French for ‘subjective’, discourse-based (deictic) contexts suggested by Herschensohn (1977). Herschensohn goes on (1977: 50) to associate ‘subjective generics’ with the providing of ‘an example to be generalized’, where ‘such an example exists as an instance related to one of the discourse participants’. (28a) involves an ‘objective generic’ and (b) a ‘subjective’:

(28) a. Le/*un brontosaure etait un animal enorme
   (‘The/*a brontosaurus was an enormous animal’)

b. Un brontosaure mangeait un arbre en dix minutes
   (‘A brontosaurus could eat a tree in ten minutes’)

c. Georges a achete *(des/les) timbres
   George (has) bought (some/the) stamps

d. Georges a achete *(du/le) sucre
   George (has) bought (some/the) sugar
Herschensohn’s (1977) observations thus seem to reflect residual partitivity in such indefinite ‘generic’ sentences as (28b). Also in French, unlike in English or Greek, a plural or mass argument noun must be accompanied by a determiner, even if indefinite, as illustrated by the ‘objects’ in (28c–d). And the indefinite plural is not generic, but necessarily partitive. Plural and mass indefinites in both French and Greek, unlike in English, are necessarily partitive, despite the differences in realization (on Greek cf. Holton, Mackridge, and Philippaki-Warburton (1977: §2.5.1)).

7.3.2 Generics and names

In the preceding subsection we observed the notional relationship between generics and names: they both, in different ways, eliminate the denotation vs. reference distinction. Names have no denotation, generics identity reference and denotation. In terms of the framework developed in Chapter 2, in English they are both characterized by absence, in prototypical cases, of an overt determinative and presence of a definite internal one. In Greek both generics and argumental names have an overt definite article. In French generics take an overt article, but personal names do not, though more subclasses of name take an article than in English. These observations instantiate the fact that while names cannot be identified with generics, their notional similarities tend to be reflected in their expression, in line with the notionalist assumption.

Thus, singular generic expressions (in particular), like that in (25a), approximate, semantically, and in some of their morphosyntactic restrictions, to names, in this latter instance, to names which appear in an utterance which is otherwise generic, as with (29):

(29) Derek is a dangerous animal

But the lion in (25a) differs in being non-specific. In this respect it is more like a generic name, rather than a prototypical name like Derek. Compare the generic names in (6.16a) (cf. e.g. Sørensen (1958: §87)):

(6.16) a. Man/Woman is a dangerous animal

On the development and detailed morphosyntax of the French partitive determiners, which lie outside our present concerns, see Posner (1996: §6.5(c), (i)), and references there. For a ‘minimalist’ account of the determiner system, see particularly Longobardi (1920). We return, however, to some further aspects in Chapter 8.
Recall too the similarity between plural generics and ethnic-group names, illustrated in (2.28), repeated above, where the difference between the two is signalled by the overtness or otherwise of the article.

Consider now the pattern that has emerged as represented in (30):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>singular</th>
<th>plural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
<td>the Greeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>generic noun</td>
<td>Greeks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a reversal in overtness of the definiteness marker between singular and plural. This is in accord with the hypothesis that plural is marked for names, so the article is present (here and generally with plurals); whereas in nouns singular is marked, vs. plural and mass. In English, too, the singular noun is necessarily accompanied by a determiner, the indefinite article if nothing else. Whereas the unmarked realization of the mass noun is uninflected, that of the plural noun is distinguished from the mass by its inflection.

Even more like names than generics in general, in being in a sense also uniquely identifying and in sharing certain syntactic restrictions, is the generic use of mass nouns. Indeed, in English generic mass nouns, like generic count nouns, share with names incompatibility, in unmarked circumstances, with an overt definite article, as shown in (31), as well as incompatibility with the indefinite article (unless converted to count):

(31) (*The/A) Love is a many-splendoured thing

Conversely, in Greek, for instance, as arguments, they take, like names, a definite article, as illustrated in (32):

(32) Γυναίκα to θησεν θανάτου s/he.is.frightened.of the death

In French, again, generic mass nouns do not pattern with names in this respect:

(33) L’art embellit la vie
    the art embellishes the life

As with most other occurrences of common nouns in French, a determiner is obligatory.

Anderson (2004) suggests that specifically simple abstract mass terms, such as truth, hope, and beauty are even closer to names. This is reflected in their capacity for personification, and thus address, thus deployment as names. Take, for instance (Yeats, An Acre of Grass):
Grant me an old man’s frenzy,
Myself I must remake
Till I am Timon or Lear
Or that William Blake
Who beat upon the wall
Till Truth obeyed his call.

And they are a common etymological source of names in various traditions (Patience, Faith, Hope, Charity etc.). Abstracts are also a fruitful source of titular terms of address, socially sensitive vocatives: (your) Excellency; (your) Majesty, your Honour. But in English names are not usually derived from abstract-based terms of address such as these, except in the short form of (his/her) Majesty etc. Note for example, (from Chapter VIII of Saki’s When William came) ‘...a ripple of whisper went through the vast audience from end to end. Majesty had arrived’—which also preserves some of the sense of the etymological source.

Underlying all this may be the observation that such terms seem to be more easily conceptualized, even non-figuratively, as count terms. Thus we have in English expressions such as those in (34):

(34) a. Those truths are self-evident
    b. She is our one hope
    c. You’re a beauty

Unlike concrete mass terms, abstracts are usually straightforwardly count when used (converted) as a concrete noun. This parallels the atypical, countable partitive use of name-based nonce nouns in those Johns or a Mr Smith. Contrast the use of concrete mass nouns illustrated by (35):

(35) a. Some butters are less harmful
    b. These muds are therapeutic

Conversion to count in their case introduces an extra component of meaning that we might paraphrase as ‘types of’.

Core names and core generic abstracts (in particular) thus seem to share a number of properties (cf. e.g. Zandvoort (1964: §334)). In a sense, too, generic mass nouns in general share unique identifiability with names. But, as with generic names, such as those in (6.16a), though for different reasons, what they identify is not discretely identifiable as an individual unit. Abstract mass nouns, however, perhaps by virtue of their very abstractness, are more easily conceived of as discrete, and so personifiable, and name-like.

It is as if, in moving away from the concrete individualization associated with prototypical names, we arrive, in the form of the abstract generic
A determinative phrase containing a mass noun, at an abstract individualization, as indicated schematically, and paradoxically perhaps, in (36):

(36) Cycle of individualization

Neither of the two endpoints is associated with a countability contrast: mass nouns lack it, and prototypical names are redundantly singular; both are invariable in number.

The basis for the metaphor embodied in (36) remains intuitive; but the intuition does seem to correlate with suggestions like Sloat’s (reported in §4.2.2) that at least some non-prototypical names are mass nouns. Recall too that abstracts like whiteness and ‘proper names’ constitute Mill’s class of ‘non-connotative names’, differing in that while ‘proper names’ can only be ‘subjects’, the abstracts can only be ‘attributives’—see (5.2). Certainly, generic names come close to crossing the boundary one way and colour terms the other (and are often described as ‘colour names’, as we have seen). And, as with de la Grasserie’s (1895) scale of degrees of determination (§7.2), which (36) can be regarded as an elaboration of, the individual steps around the cycle are individually motivated.

This again does not mean, of course, that we can identify names with (abstract) mass nouns. The latter remain nouns, and so may be predicative, unlike names. Mass noun phrases may be also be partitive, and quantified as not much hope, some butter, lots of blue. And even generic mass nouns denote classes, types not tokens—in their case classes of manifestations of ‘mud’ or ‘hope’ or ‘blue’, for example. They designate something like Millian ‘attributes’, not individuals. Moreover, though mass nouns, as uncountables, simply lack distinction in number, prototypical names, representing individuals, are redundantly both concrete and singular, not abstract or mass. And
the non-prototypical simple family or ethnic-group name is redundantly plural. Being prototypically singular concrete sentients, the referents of names lie outside the count/mass and concrete/abstract distinctions, which belong to nouns, and only peripherally to names. Nevertheless, names and abstract generic mass terms, in their different ways, can be said to identify a kind of individuality, but concrete singular vs. abstract mass individuality.

### 7.4 A brief overview

In the immediately preceding, I have tried to examine in an informal way the different functions of names, as arguments, in nominations, and as vocatives, as well as to confirm the status of names as non-deictic sources of primary identification, and to survey the various dimensions along which they share properties with other nominals. A name, whose sense is non-exhaustive in relation to its referent(s), is also, at least as used as an argument, redundantly definite and singular, properties shared with some other determinatives; it is not partitive or non-specific, nor deictic, properties shown by some determinatives. Non-partitivity it shares with generics, but not non-specificity.\(^5\)

We take up the status of names, and the role of these ‘key concepts’ therein, more explicitly in Chapter 8. In order to pursue this, we must embed the various categories and other concepts discussed in informal terms in this chapter in some explicit system of representation and ‘derivation’, such as was presented in Chapter 2. It is only within such an explicit system of categories that the preceding observations and further suggestions can be represented in a more precise and testable form.

One thing not so far commented on in this chapter is the restricted ‘immediate syntax’ of names compared with nouns. As is familiar, and as we have noted in earlier chapters, normally names are ‘equivalent to’ a ‘noun phrase’—better ‘determinative phrase’—rather than a noun: they lack accompanying attributives as well as (in English) determinatives. This follows from the restriction that names, as arguments, are redundantly definite but not partitive-taking, and so allow only non-restrictive modification. The formulation of this will also be among the things to occupy us in the next chapter.

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\(^5\) I have been at pains to try to clarify my usage concerning such key concepts as definiteness, deixis, partitivity, and specificity. This seemed essential in view of the latitude with which such terms have been understood. Compare with my usage in the preceding that of Givón (1978), for example. For Givón, ‘non-definite’, for instance, ‘may be viewed as a subcategory of referential-indefinite, in the sense that while the verbal expression indicates that the speaker is committed to the existence of some individual, the actual identity of that individual is left unspecified’ (1978: 296, fn. 11). This notion of ‘non-definite’ comes closer to my non-specific, while my non-definite is neither definite nor indefinite (partitive).
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The syntax of names

As far as their use as arguments in a predication is concerned, names clearly belong with determinatives in terms of both their semantic and their morphosyntactic properties. They have the distribution of determinatives as complements of functors; like prototypical pronouns, they are typically not restrictively modified (but see §8.1.2). They do not behave as nouns inside noun phrases. Semantically, they and other determinatives make reference; nouns do not, they denote classes. Names are like deictic determinatives in permitting primary identification; in particular, they are like the first-person pronoun in permitting primary identification even in the absence of pointing. But names are more powerful than even this last in not being dependent for identification on the immediate context, because they are not 'shifters'. Names are, in principle, highly specific determinative identifiers.

The prototypical name is personal, as well as individual, and concrete, and it does not participate in the count/mass or person and number distinctions. But absence of these last oppositions is not enough to explain the distinct syntax of names sampled in §6.2.4, namely their behaviour in nominations and as vocatives. These will be our concern in §§8.2 and 8.3 respectively. Firstly, however, I want to look in more detail, in §§8.1, at how, in the light of the observations made in Chapter 7, names fit into the grammatical system introduced in Chapter 2. What is their specific grammar, in comparison with that of (other) determinatives? Here, as throughout this chapter, I shall focus on prototypical names. The chapter that follows formulates the grammatical relationships and differences among the notional varieties of name, the scope of which was informally adumbrated in §6.3.

8.1 Names and determination

I have just recalled that, when functioning as an argument in a predication—participant or circumstantial—names share with deictic terms the capacity for primary identification; if successfully deployed, they are not dependent,
like other definite determinatives, on anaphora and descriptions. Names and deictics have ‘something extra’ that enables this capacity. This capacity of names depends on the sharing among speaker and interlocutor(s) of knowledge (direct or indirect) of prior nomination; this permits onymic, or direct reference. Deictics, on the other hand, identify with reference to the immediate context of speech. This seems obvious enough, but let us spell it out, as a prelude to greater explicitness: as a first approximation, I/me is identified with the source of speech; you is identified by use of a vocative (often a name), or by ‘pointing’ in some way (‘etymological deixis’), by finger or eye, or by simply directing one’s speech towards someone; and ‘pointing’ is what characterizes other deictic terms. Let us look at the representations we can associate with the syntactic manifestation of such deictic terms, as a contrast with how primary identification is achieved by names. We return to the latter in §8.1.3, after an attempt to arrive at a more explicit formulation of the grammar of deictics and other determinatives in the next two subsections.

8.1.1 Deictics

The ‘singular’ first- and second-person pronouns are uncomplemented determinatives, and they are definite: the speaker assumes that the hearer(s) can identify the referent. They are thus ‘{N{def}}’. But, as we have observed, identification does not depend on anaphora, it is primary not derived. These forms must therefore involve some further elements, which I shall label, for the moment, as ‘{ego}’ and ‘{tu}’: the content of these secondary features is defined by the structure of the speech situation, in which they are uniquely identifying; they tell us how to locate the referent in the situation. So ‘{N{def,ego}}’ and ‘{N{def,tu}}’ are identified by the act of speech. These are the speech-act participants.

These are often described as ‘singular’. But, left at this, the label can be rather misleading. It is a familiar observation that the corresponding ‘plurals’ are not or may not be homogeneous in the way that ordinary plurals are. Thus, ‘plural’ you may involve a set of addressees defined by the situation (so homogeneous) or an addressee + associated person(s) possibly not present. Only in the former (homogeneous) case of ‘plural’ you do we have a notionally ‘regular’ plural. And we is composed of {ego} + {tu} (the so-called ‘inclusive’), where {tu} may be singular or plural, or {ego} + some other or others for whom the speaker is being spokesperson (‘exclusive’), or a combination of these. Fijian distinguishes inclusive and exclusive first person plurals, as well as four numbers, as partly exemplified in (1) (Anderson and Keenan 1985: 263):
It is unsurprising that ‘singular’ vs. ‘plural’ in the case of the speech-act participants is often not signalled in the ‘usual’ way.

Jespersen, for instance, comments (1948: §4.54, p.85) on English: ‘The plural we is essentially vague and in no wise indicates what the speaker wants to include besides himself. Not even the distinction between one we meaning “I and my own people, but not you”, and another we meaning “I + you (sg or pl)” is made in our class of languages’. But he goes on: ‘But very often the resulting ambiguity is remedied by an appositive addition; the same speaker may according to circumstances say we brothers, we doctors, we Yorkshiremen, we Europeans, we gentlemen, etc.’ And he cites from George Eliot’s Mill on the Floss: ‘we people who have not been galloping’. These phrases, however, do not entirely resolve the ambiguity. Moreover, it is not clear that we should be talking of ‘appositive addition’ in relation to them.

This terminology would apparently amount, in present terms, to associating we farmers, you Frenchmen, etc. with a structure such as (2):

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\{N\} \\
| \\
\{N\{def,tu\}\} \{N;P\{count\}\{N\{sap\}\}\} \\
: \\
: \\
you \\
\quad Frenchmen
\end{array}
\]

(‘sap’ = speech-act participants). Recall the ‘non-restrictive’ (2.55), modified here to accommodate the interpretation (given in §6.3.4) of Greeks in the Greeks as a (non-typical) name, rather than a noun:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\{N\} \\
| \\
\{N\{def\}\} \{P;N\{N\{def\}\}\} \\
\quad : \\
\quad : \\
\quad : \\
\quad : \\
\quad : \\
\\quad : \\
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You Frenchmen is, rather, a complementation. Such complements are also not partitive and so are representable as in (3), as a simple \{N;P\} complement:

(3) \{N\{def,tu\}/[N;P]\}

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\vdots \\
\{P;N\{count\}\} \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
you
\end{array}
\]

\textbf{Frenchmen}

The definite article also takes such complements (as well as partitive structures). To this extent, these pronouns can be said to be ‘articles’ (Postal 1969). Unlike the definite article in English, however, the sap terms govern generic nouns in adjunction, not subjunction. Compare with (3) the definite generic in (2.30a):

(2.30) a. \{N\{def\}\}

\[
\begin{array}{c}
| \\
{N;P} \\
| \\
men
\end{array}
\]

In this respect, the sap ‘plurals’ resemble ethnic names. Recall again the discussion of (2.28a,c) in §6.3.4.

(2.28) a. the Greeks
b. Greeks

(a) is an ethnic name, and (c) is a generic noun; in (2.28c) but not (2.55) there is an absorbed definite determinative. An independent definite thus, unusually, governs generic names and the noun in (3) rather than a partitive.\(^1\)

Other (non-sap) deictic reference depends for identification on what we might call ‘etymological deixis’, the deixis which is the basis for one way of naming them, i.e. ‘deictics’ (cf. Jespersen’s (1933: §16.2) ‘pronouns of pointing’). The presence of some such deixis is signalled by the form, as in \textit{this}/\textit{that}, so that we expect a ‘pointing’ of some sort; other deixis is not formally signalled, so that (in the absence of ‘pointing’) \textit{the girl} is interpreted ‘deictically’ only if there is only one girl in the context. Traditionally, the overt deictics are called demonstratives. Their form also signals proximity to the speaker or addressee (and in some systems, to either the speaker or the

\(^1\) While Postal’s (1969) rejection of Jespersen’s (1954: 85, §4.54) ‘appositive’ analysis of such sequences as (2) seems appropriate, the evidence he adduces, as observed in §6.2.3, does not motivate adopting the transformational derivation of pronouns in general from ‘articles’, as he proposes.
addressee)—or some metaphorical extension thereof; to that extent, sap is also involved. They are thus clearly categorially complex.

We might suggest at least the components in the much simplified structure in (4) as the lexical categorization of this of this girl:

\[
(4) \quad \{N\{def\}/\} \\
\{\{loc\}\} \\
\{N\{sap\}\} \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
this
\]

The (usually partitive) referent is placed in the context of the speaker/addressee (or figurative extensions thereof). That involves an entity presented as distant, or more distant from sap. I do not elaborate on this representation here: it involves aspects of categorial structure not obviously relevant to our central concern, with names (see, however, on complex locationals, Anderson (2006b: Chapter 8)). I merely want to contrast the kind of ‘something extra’ that allows for primary identification here with that associated with names.

Demonstratives in English can, like the sap ‘plurals’, be either ‘pronominal’ or ‘article-like’: this (girl). (4) represents the ‘transitive’ demonstrative; the pronominal merely lacks the ‘/’. But in Greek, as in a number of other languages, instead of there being demonstrative determiners, parallel to that in (4), the definite article is optionally accompanied by deictic elements that are roughly notionally equivalent to the demonstrative pronouns, as illustrated by (5a):

\[
(5) \quad a. \ (aftos/ekinos) \ o \ astinomikos \\
\quad \text{(this/that) \ the \ policeman} \\
\quad b. \ Ti \ ine \ aefto/ekino; \\
\quad \text{what is this/that?}
\]

Thus, though these deictics can be used, as in (5b), ‘absolutely’, as with their equivalents in English,\(^2\) they cannot themselves be used transitively, unlike (apparently) this/that in English, for instance. The (proximal/distal) deictics in (5a) seem instead to be specifiers of the definite article.

---

\(^2\) The label ‘equivalent’ is very approximate here, given the role of the Greek ‘demonstratives’ in the system of ‘emphatic’ (vs. ‘weak’) pronouns (see e.g. Holton, MacKridge, and Philippaki-Warburton (1997: §2.8.1)). I cannot pursue here in any detail the consequences of this and other differences, and it must be conceded that the account given here ignores various complexities (see e.g. Panagiotidis (2002)). But some preliminary motivations for the suggestions made here follow.
Core specifiers are closed-class items whose syntax is not that of either a head or a complement; but they are specialized modifiers associated with some (other) category of which they constitute a characteristic modifying dependent (though in some instances that category may be very general—cf. e.g. Anderson (2003b) on only); and they lack a primary categorization of their own. The classic instance of such an element in English is very, which selects as a head for it to depend on a (gradable) adjective, as in very pretty, or a derivative of such, as in very prettily. We can thus characterize the structure of *She is very pretty* as in (6):

\[
(6) \quad \{P/N_{i}P\}
\]

\[
\{\{\text{abs}\}\} \quad \{N:P\}
\]

\[
\vdots \quad \vdots \quad \vdots
\]

\[
\{N:P/\{\text{abs}\}\}
\]

\[
\vdots \quad \vdots \quad \vdots
\]

\[
\{\{\text{abs}\}\} \quad \vdots \quad \vdots
\]

\[
\{N\} \quad \vdots \quad \vdots
\]

\[
\vdots \quad \vdots \quad \vdots
\]

\[
she \quad is \quad very \quad pretty
\]

As with other modifiers, the categorical representation of very results in the introduction of a governing (superjoined) node above the item being specified, here \{N:P\}, shown (as is usual with modification—recall §2.3.3) to the right of the backward slash in the representation for very. The introduced node is of the same category as the specified one. In this instance the valency of is (to the right of the slash) involves a noun or adjective (an item with N dominant over P—represented in bold to indicate that this includes adjectives and nouns, not just nouns); but this is not crucial to the present discussion. The ‘subject’ of the adjective shares its argument (via ‘raising’) with the free absolutive associated with the copula (§2.3.1).

Semantically and syntactically the Greek demonstratives in (5a), as in many other languages, are similar. The minimum categorization for the aftos and ekinos of (5a) is, accordingly, as in (7):

\[
(7) \quad \{N/\{\text{def}\}/\}
\]

And they themselves must be differentiated in terms of location with respect to sap, as in (8), for aftos:
In terms of (7/8), these items seek a definite transitive determinative to depend on, with a resulting structure as illustrated in (9):

\[
(9) \quad \begin{array}{c}
\{ N \} \\
\downarrow \\
\{ N[\text{def}/] \} \\
\downarrow \\
\{ \text{loc} \} \\
\downarrow \\
\{ N[\text{sap}] \} \\
\end{array}
\]

The interpretation of what constitutes ‘\{ \text{loc} \}–\{ \text{sap} \}’ ontologically, however, is rather different in English and Greek. Languages vary in the extent to which the members of such pairs insist on proximality/distality, so that, for instance, pronominal English this and Greek aftos are not strictly translationally equivalent. But I ignore these and other complications here (as acknowledged in note 2).

As we have seen, this proximal/distal pair of Greek deictics, as with English this and that, and, indeed, quite generally with such elements (whether there are two or more of them), can also occur independently as pronouns, as intransitive determinatives, as in (5b). In English, the demonstrative determiners will differ from the demonstrative pronouns in their categorization merely in being transitive: \{N[\text{def}]\}, instead of simply \{N[\text{def}]\}. In Greek definiteness is expressed separately, as we have seen, but the non-pronominal demonstratives that we analysed as specifiers in (8) are still associated as much as the pronominal with sap-proximity deixis. Given that the categorization in (4) is as appropriate to the Greek pronominal use as to the English, the Greek demonstratives overall can be represented as in (10):

\[
(10) \quad \langle \downarrow \rangle \{ N[\text{def}] \} \rangle
\]
The pair of ‘< >’ indicate coordinated optional elements: both bracketed sequences are jointly present or absent. This characterizes the Greek situation. In relation to (10), the pronominals in both Greek and English lack both bracketed sequences; the Greek specifier has both; the English ‘transitive’ demonstrative lacks the first bracketed sequence only, so there is no coordination between brackets, simply optionality of one sequence.

A similar pattern characterizes the analogous difference in behaviour between Greek and English sap plurals. The Greek equivalents to you Frenchmen, etc. again apparently involve a specifier, as shown in (11):

(11) emis i Elines
    we the Greeks

Description of (11) as involving ‘apposition’ (Holton, Mackridge, and Philippaki-Warburton 1997: 310) does not seem to be any more appropriate than in the case of English. But I shall not investigate this further here.

Whatever these cross-linguistic differences, it is appeal to speech-act context that enables the deictics to provide primary identification of arguments. This is the ‘something extra’ that distinguishes them from other, merely definite, determination. Names also have ‘something extra’ that secures primary identification; I have interpreted this as depending on the chain of name use that associates it with ‘baptisms’, a property we have labelled ‘fixed reference’. Having roughly identified the ‘something extra’ of deictics, the something in their representation that renders them more than merely definite, let us now try to arrive at a more explicit representation for the ‘something extra’ resulting from ‘baptism’ that is correspondingly distinctive about the representation of names; this too will involve us in looking at what this ‘something extra’ adds to the representation of definiteness. Firstly, we must look more carefully at the notion of referent, however.

8.1.2 Indefinites and definites

Determinatives are associated with a referent. With indefinites the speaker does not assume or imply that the interlocutor(s) can identify the referent, or even that the speaker can. An indefinite, as partitive-taking, merely indicates that the (singular or plural) referent is selected from a certain class, where the class is given by a noun or attributive(s) plus noun. The partitive {N} may be an independent item or absorbed, as in (2.27b) and (c), respectively:
Recall §2.2.3.

We have seen that there are contexts which favour the referent being or possibly being ‘non-specific’. Thus, in ‘opaque’ contexts, there is an interpretation on which the referent is located in an imaginary world:

(5.6) This girl wants to marry a British cabinet minister

Here the imaginary world is a wished for world governed by the want verb; it is within the scope of the latter. Likewise, one interpretation of (12) involves a ‘non-specific’ interpretation of an apple:

(12) He eats an apple every day

On this interpretation, the ‘apple’ falls within the scope of every day. Given the normal size and the normal longevity of the freshness of apples, the other possible interpretation, involving a ‘specific’ apple, is unlikely. This would mean that a ‘specificity’ contrast does not seem to be a property of the partitive determiner in either case, but a consequence of scope differences. If these interpretations in terms of scope are appropriate, we can characterize indefinites simply as partitive-taking determiners, as implied in §2.2.3 and discussed informally in §7.2; we need not invoke features such as ‘indefinite’ or ‘non-specific’—though I continue to use the terms informally.

What about indefinite pronouns such as those in (13), however?

(13) someone, something

These we can apparently represent simply as ‘{N}’, with individual members of the category differentiated by secondary features. But they too involve
some kind of notional partitivity; they refer to an unnamed individual person or thing, and they can therefore attract attributives, as in (14):

(14)  a. someone who should know better, something I said
     b. someone heavy, something blue

That is, they are complex, as hinted by their internal linear structure, perhaps after the fashion of (15):

(15) \{N/{\text{prt}}\}
   |   
   \{X{\text{human}}\}
   :   
   someone

This structure is given in the lexicon. I have divided the internally satisfied valency (/{\text{prt}}/) and the secondary feature ({\text{human}}) between the two categories. I have left the lower one unspecified for primary category (except for a ‘cover symbol’ ‘X’), for discussion in a wider context.

The second component of something, and in somebody, is clearly derived etymologically from a noun. So one might ask, ‘why not interpret “X” as “noun”?’. However, the item something itself doesn’t show the crucial noun property of count vs. non-count. Rather it is uncontrastive: something can refer to single entities undifferentiated as singular or mass or several such. The singular/plural features are referent-based, not noun-based, so associated with a determinative; and determinatives in general lack the count/non-count distinction. The latter contrast is a property of nouns, but is not associated with the lower category in (15). The lower category in (15) is inert, except, as interpreted there, for carrying secondary features of gender ({\text{human}}).

Moreover, the complex in (15) doesn’t behave otherwise like an absorption of the quantifier by a noun. It does not occupy a noun position in relation to attributives. While (14a) is indecisive in this regard, (b) shows the complex in determiner position. Also, there is no sign that a noun has been incorporated (synchronously) into a quantifier (rather than absorption being involved—on this distinction, recall §2.3.2). Compare the morphologically-marked incorporated functor phrase in the Greek verb of (16):

(16) elpiz-ume
     hope-we   (‘We hope’)

Of course, not all incorporations are signalled morphologically, but there is no morphosyntactic sign whatsoever of incorporation of a noun in the case of
the indefinite pronouns. And there is no indication that any nouns, other
than in the diachronic sense exhibited by the (in this respect) fossils *something*
and *somebody*, are incorporated in this way.

It may be that we can differentiate the non-definite *anything* from *some-
things* in terms of presence vs. absence of {prt}, as indicated in (15)’:

(15)’   \{N/<{prt}>\}
   |   
   \{X{human}\}
   :   :
   someone/anyone

That is, the representation remains complex, with the two components
dividing the referential vs. the classificatory properties. The ‘simple intransi-
tive’ analysis of indefinite and non-definite pronouns is replaced by one in
which a ‘transitive’ determinative is satisfied internally.

The referent introduced by any determinative, pronominal or determiner,
can be indicated by a variable index, indicated as in (17), the redundancy
which introduces a variable index with any determinative:

(17)   \{N\} ⇒ \{N_i\}

We can amplify the partitive-taking determiner in (2.27) and (15) as (18) and
(19), respectively:

(18)   \{N_i/{prt}\}   
   :   :
   some

(19)   \{N_i/{prt}\}
   |   
   \{X{human}\}
   :   :
   someone

The subscript is an invitation to attribute a referent in using the expression.
(17) applies also to definite determinatives. What they add is the speaker’s
assumption that the interlocutor(s) can identify the referent from a combination
of the dependent description (cataphora) and anaphora, or deixis, or because
the determinative is a name. Examples like Donnellan’s (1966) much-cited
phrase in (20a) show minimum anaphora and identification, on his
‘attributive’ vs. ‘referential’ interpretation, as does the example in (b):

(20)  a. Smith’s murder is insane
       b. the writer of this pamphlet
       c. the first book ever published
       d. the richest man in the world

In the case of (20b) the reference is partly dependent on a ‘deictic’. As we have
seen, ultimate, primary-based identification depends on use of deixis or a
name. Compare too the superlatives of (20c–d), where the identification
again is not complete. We can add to any of these ‘who/whatever s/he/it
may be’.

I have also characterized definite determiners as being complemented by
nouns (thus generic), as an alternative to subcategorization for a partitive
functor. These are collapsed in (21):

(21)  \[ N_i/\{<\{prt\}]/\{N;P}\} \]

The valency in (21), requiring a category \{N;P\} with an optionally intervening
partitive functor, may thus be satisfied by a noun or a partitive, as respectively
in (22) and (23):

(22)  \[ N_i/\{def,sg\}/\{N;P\}\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
the \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\{\{prt\}\} \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
{N;P} \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\{n;P\} \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
the \\
\end{array}
\]

(23)  \[ N_i/\{def\}/\{prt\}\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\{\{prt\}\} \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\{N;P\} \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
the \\
\end{array}
\]

These are based ultimately on (2.22) and part of (2.30b), but up-dated on the
basis of subsequent discussion. Only a partitive relation introduces a change
in designation, in differentiating between more and less inclusive sets. If the configuration (22) is non-singular, in English it is created in the lexicon by (2.32c), rather than in the syntax:

\[(2.32) \text{c.} \quad \{N\{\text{def}}\} \]
\[
\begin{array}{l}
| \\
\{N;P\} \iff \{N;P\} \\
\end{array}
\]

This and redundancy (17) result in (24):

\[(24) \quad \{N_i\{\text{def}}\} \]
\[
\begin{array}{l}
| \\
\{N;P\} \\
: \\
: \\
men
\end{array}
\]

(based on 2.30a). (22) and (24) are generic, non-partitive. The independent partitive definite article of (23) may be singular or not.

The indefinite article in English can also take either a noun or a partitive complement, as respectively in the non-definite generic in (25a), vs. the partitive in (b):

\[(25) \quad \text{a. A lion is a dangerous animal} \\
\text{b. A lion came towards me}
\]

These were differentiated in (2.31), up-dated here as (26):

\[(26) \quad \text{a. } \{N_i\{\text{sg}}/\{N;P\}\} \\
\begin{array}{l}
| \\
\{N;P\} \\
: \\
: \\
: \\
a \text{ lion } (\text{is a dangerous animal})
\end{array}
\]

\[(26) \quad \text{b. } \{N_i\{\text{sg}}/\{\text{prt}\}\} \\
\begin{array}{l}
| \\
\{\text{prt}\} \\
: \\
\{N;P\} \\
: \\
a \text{ lion } (\text{came towards me})
\end{array}
\]
We seem to have a contrast between (25a) and (27):

(27) The lion is a dangerous animal

(25a) and the like give us a way of distinguishing the singulative/distributive readings of (22) and (24). Compare the pairs in (28–30):

(28) a. The lion is a quadruped
   b. The lion is extinct

(29) a. Lions are quadrupeds
   b. Lions are extinct

(30) a. A lion is a quadruped
   b. *A lion is extinct

Definiteness with generics is interpreted in terms of identifying the referent with the denotative set associated with the noun. But this is perhaps most obviously to be interpreted collectively; and at best definite generics are ambivalent between singulative and collective. This means that, as anticipated, the singularity of the generic non-definite a is its salient characteristic in signalling singulative genericness. The English generic ‘indefinite article’ is an exceptional determiner, in being neither definite nor partitive. It marks singularity vs. mass, rather than partitivity. We might call it ‘non-definite singular’, since I have identified ‘indefinite’ with ‘partitive-taking’.  

3 It is perhaps significant that, as observed in §7.3.1, according to Rissanen (1993: §2) ‘generic’ use of the indefinite article is a late development. Observe at this point that equivalents of the generic use of the indefinite article do not seem to be characteristic of Greek. And, as mentioned in §7.3.1, Herschensohn (1977: 49) suggests that in French not only does the ‘generic’ indefinite article (which she associates with ‘subjective generics’) show ‘a more limited application than the definite article’ (which is to some extent true of English also), but also it ‘encourages the presence of discourse phenomena’.

Burton-Roberts (1976; 1977) argues that the English a-generics carry no ‘referential presupposition’. They are not merely non-specific, but they instantiate a ‘metapredicative structure’: A kangaroo is a marsupial = To be a kangaroo is to be a marsupial. If that is so, these differences between languages concerning what formally appear to be indefinite singular generics may be related to the necessity in English for a singular predicative noun to be accompanied by the ‘non-definite singular’ article.

In English, predicative as well as argument singular indefinites show an indefinite article, as in (ia):

(i) a. Peter is a doctor
   b. Pierre est médecin
   c. Ο Petros ine yatros

Compare the French and Greek equivalents in (b) and (c). English seems to have developed from such a language—cf. again Rissanen (1993: §2).

The situation in English may be associated with the non-partitivity of are; unlike quantifiers it does not require a dependent partitive. Indeed, as we have observed, unlike other determiners, it is neither definite nor partitive. Suppose, then, as an uncharacteristic determiner, it need not constitute the head of an argument, but its presence may be required merely to signal singularity rather than mass. So that though doctor in (ia) is a predicator, and so Peter is its subject as well as that of the copula, the determiner a intervenes between the copula and the lower predicator to mark singularity, as required
In §2.2.3 we noted that in some languages generic nominals in general usually have a definite article, and illustrated this from Greek and French in (2.29), which are ambiguous between a partitive and a generic (definite) reading:

(2.29) a. Fovate ta skila
s/he.is.frightened.of the dogs

b. Les lions sont dangereux
the lions are dangerous

In English, it is *dogs* and *lions* that are ambiguous, between partitive and (definite) generic, rather than the ambiguity involving definite partitive vs. (definite) generic.

French *du*, *des*, *de la* are ambiguous between partitive and definite partitive, as the short vs. the long form of (2.26), meaning either ‘some men’ or ‘of the men’:

(2.26) b. (un) des hommes
(one) of-the men

This ambiguity is local only, and disambiguated by the presence/absence of *un* in (2.26b). In both cases *des* apparently involves a partitive governing a partitive-taking definite. That is, *des* involves either the structure in (31a) or (b):

by concord. The presence of *a(n)* apparently ensures that concord requirements are met: for a count noun to be singular in English it must depend on a singular marker; otherwise, it emerges as expressing plurality. I assume that *a(n)* is transparent to the requirements of the copula, which requires to be satisfied here by a non-verbal predicator.

In Greek and French, a singular marker like that in (i) seems, rather, to be absorbed. Use of an indefinite article with predicative nouns in these other languages tends to emphasize a subpart relation, thus partitivity, and presumably involves a normal partitive indefinite article rather than a form like that in (i). Holton, MacKridge, and Philippaki-Warburton (1997) comment on Greek usage: ‘...the indefinite article may optionally accompany the predicate if the noun is made more specific in some way, e.g. by an adjective’ (1997: 283); and they offer the example in (ii):

(ii) Ine enas kalos kathiyitis
he.is a good professor

(iii) illustrates the same phenomenon in French:

(iii) a. Il est un artiste de mérite
(‘He is an artist of merit’)

b. La rose est une fleur
(‘The rose is a (kind of) flower’)

c. C’est une Flamande
(‘It is a Fleming (female)’)

This is as to be expected, given that an attributive involves partitivity: recall the representation of the attributive in (2.56). (ivb–c) likewise insist on the subpart relation, and partitivity. The post-copular nominals in (ii) and (iii) are equative, not predicative, on these grounds.
Compare the generic in (31c). Not just the generic but also the simple partitive in (31b) requires, apparently, an independent definite governor of the noun. The definite and partitive [N]s in (31b) are given independent expression in the mass expression de la bière.4

4 In negative contexts in French the definite [N] is absent:

(i) Il n'y a pas de bière
('There is no beer')

Given the distribution of [N]s, it seems that we can say, with some reservations (and with an acknowledgement of such lexicalized phrases as j'ai faim ‘I have hunger’, or je vous demande pardon ‘I you ask pardon’), there is a clear formal demarcation of argument and predicative lexical nominals in French: the former are preceded by an overt determinative (including partitives), the latter not (as in (ib) in note 3). Recall the argumental examples in (28) from §7.3.1:
However that may be, in both Greek and French there are fewer ambiguous covert noun-based determiners than in English. These latter arise from the lexical redundancies formulated schematically in (2.32):

\[(2.32)\]

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\{\text{prt}\} & \{\text{N/\{prt\}}\} & \{\text{N/\{def\}}\} \\
\end{array}
\]

\{N;P\} ⇔ \{N;P\}, ⇔ \{N;P\}, ⇔ \{N;P\}

(2.32a) underlies men in *some men*, (2.32b) underlies simple partitive men, and (2.32c) underlies plural generics. (2.32c) doesn’t apply in French and Greek. Definiteness, generic or not, is always spelled out with nouns in these languages. But definiteness with names is spelled out only in languages like Greek.

Consider, finally, (non-deictic) definite pronouns. Are they like indefinites (someone etc) in being complex? We would then represent she/her in a similar fashion, as in (32a):

\[(7.28)\]

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{a. Georges a \hat{a}chété *(des/les) timbres} \\
\text{George (has) bought (some/the) stamps} \\
\text{b. Georges a \hat{a}chété *(du/le) sucre} \\
\text{George (has) bought (some/the) sugar}
\end{array}
\]

Argumental nouns require an overt determiner.

Anderson (2004c: fn. 30) suggests that we might include among the predicatives those attributive nouns traditionally described as showing ‘référence virtuel’ (cf. e.g. Brulard (1996)—who also illustrates further some of the differences between French and English that I have been concerned with here). These are exemplified by the second noun in (ii):

\[(ii)\]

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{a. les poissons de rivière} \\
\text{the fishes of river (‘river fish’)} \\
\text{b. Il a été accusé de meurtre} \\
\text{‘He has been accused of murder’}
\end{array}
\]

Anderson acknowledges that instances of ‘référence virtuel’ like the noun in (iib) are less easily so interpreted, and concludes, rather weakly, that, perhaps after all, both types in (ii) should be regarded as involving an article, in the way that (i) arguably does—in its case, a negative partitive article. The preposition + noun in (iia) is simply attributivized, it’s been converted; and the noun in (iib), which is untypically event-based, seems nevertheless to be argumental. These then simply follow the regular pattern of non-predicatives.

But what is of more significance here is that, if predicative and argumental nominals are formally distinguished in French, this also means that presence vs. absence of a determiner also distinguishes between argumental nouns and argumental names. There is, on the one hand, no need to distinguish between argument and predicative names (since the latter are lacking); on the other hand, the absorption of definiteness by argumental names preserves a clear formal distinction between noun and (prototypical) name as arguments.
(32) a. \[ N_{\{\text{sg,def}\}} \]
   
   \[ X_{\{\text{fem}\}} \]
   
   ::
   
   she/her

b. \[ N_{i\{\text{sg,def}\}} \]
   
   ::
   
   :  
   
   she/her

Compare the indefinite in (19). Redundancy (17) will also apply here to give (32b) from (a):

(17) \[ \{N\} \Rightarrow \{N_i\} \]

The presence of ‘def’ tells us that the speaker expects the interlocutor to be able to give a value to the variable: again in these representations the more obviously referent-based secondary features are separated from the others. And again there are no motivations for assuming inclusion of noun in the structure of these forms.

There are, however, indications that such complexes can include a partitive element, and this gives some support for the complexity in (32). Attributives to pronouns are certainly severely limited in structure and interpretation. However, as we have seen, examples with third person pronouns like that in the second line of the following did not die out with Dryden (cited by Poutsma: (1916: 726)):

\[
\text{Errors, like straw, upon the surface flow,  
He that would search for pearls must dive below.}
\]

These utterances are gnomic statements in which the attributive behaves like a generic noun.

The pronoun-dominated sequence in sentences like that in the Dryden quotation seems thus to involve the structure in (33a), in which the attributive \( \{N/\{\text{prt}\}\} \) has been converted to a noun that satisfies the valency of the definite article:
The attributive itself is a converted finite predication, a ‘relative clause’. Here the valency of the attributive {N/{prt}}, which is indexed identically with the definite determiner, is satisfied by the partitive functor governing the {X} node of the pronoun. As elsewhere, the internal categorial structure of items is accessible to the syntax. For many users of this kind of phrase, the ‘{masc}’ would not have been relevant. He itself has the basic lexical structure in (33b), abbreviated as usual as in (33c). Exceptionally, in (33a) it has an externally satisfied valency in addition to that (the partitive) satisfied internally.

Compare (33a) with the gnomic structure in (34), with a simple definite article, where the partitivity of the attributive is satisfied by an independent {N;P}:
(33a) is in a sense a ‘reduced’ version of (34), as reflected in the complex valency of the \{N[def]\} in (33a): the \{X\} in (33a) satisfies the valency of the \{\{prt\}\} functor, as does the noun in (34). However, we cannot identify \{X\} with noun. Recall that the \{X\} in the indefinite (19) also satisfies a partitive; and in its case there are strong reasons for not interpreting \{X\} as a noun. And in (33a), too, \{X\} shows no distinctive noun properties. The semantic similarity between (33a) and (34) derives from the fact that the very general noun one is itself based on an \{X\} element (see §9.1.5), the one which also underlies the second morphological element in (19). The construction in (33a) seems to be recessive. Nevertheless the most usual use of the non-sap definite pronouns seems to be as partitive, even in the absence of an attributive, as represented in (33b/c).

This alleged complexity of the definite and indefinite pronouns would mean that, leaving names aside at this point, all determinatives are relational. This brings them into line with functional categories in general, and distinguishes them from prototypical nouns. But this too needs further discussion, particularly of the identity of ‘X’, seen in a wider context, and of the extent to which its presence can indeed be further motivated. Which takes us back to names.

8.1.3 Names as determinatives

We have seen that, when used as arguments at least, names show a distribution equivalent to that of determinative phrases, and thus analogous to that of pronouns. Whatever else is involved, in these circumstances names are of category \{N\}. They are definite, moreover: use of them is based on the speaker’s expectation that their referent(s) can be identified by the speaker. And, as \{N\}s, they will be expanded by redundancy (17). So the argumental
name is specified at least as ‘{N_{i}{sg,def}}’. But there is still more obvious evidence for their complexity than in the case of the definite pronouns.

It is not just that, as observed in §7.1.2, for instance, in nomination structures such as *I name this child William* there is no motivation for attributing definiteness on notional grounds to the name—which, rather, has availability for definite reference conferred on it by the performative (in this instance), as a result of the performance; but also that this property—or lack of a property—of names used in nominations seems to be reflected overtly in the behaviour of names in various languages.

Recall the nomination structures from Greek and Seri illustrated by (6.10a) and (6.11a):

(6.10) a. Onomazete Vasilis/ Ton lene Vasili
    he.is.called Basil/ Him they.call Basil

(6.11) a. «Pancho» mpah
    Pancho s/he/it.is.called (‘S/he/It is called Pancho’)

These lack the definite article normally found when names are arguments in these languages, as illustrated by the Greek of (6.8b):

(6.8) b. Ðen ida to Vasili
    Not I.saw (the) Basil

The ‘argument-name’ of (6.8b) is clearly bipartite. And the definite ‘compon-ent’ is what is separated from the rest, as in the structure for pronouns in (32)/ (33c), and just as the partitive component is detached in (19) and (33c).

Ignoring the case-marking in Greek, we can differentiate between the Greek and English structures for ‘referential’ names as in (35):

(35) a. {N_{i}{sg,def}}/{Y}
    :  {Y{masc}}
    :  :
    o  Vasilis

b. {N_{i}{sg,def}}
   | {Y{masc}}
   :  :
   William
I have assumed here, too, that the prototypical name argument is stipulated as singular as well as definite. ‘Y’ is another cover for a primary category, the basic category of ‘names’—if we assume, for the moment, that it is distinct from the ‘X’ of the pronouns of (32). The dependency in (35b) is assigned by a lexical redundancy in English; in Greek the dependency of (35a) is syntactic.

We can characterize the English redundancy as in (36), for masculine names:

\[
\begin{align*}
\{N\{sg,def}\} \\
\{Y\{masc\}\} & \Leftrightarrow \{Y\{masc\}\}
\end{align*}
\]

Of all the determinatives in Greek only the definite article is subcategorized for a name argument, as shown in (35a). In some languages, such as Maori, this is a specialized article, but in Greek the same article can take dependent partitives and nouns. In Greek, names have a special syntactic relationship with the definite article (which subcategorizes for them), in English names are converted lexically to a definite determinative.

Anderson (2003a; 2004c) identifies ‘Y’ with determinative, so that ‘N’ would be substituted for ‘Y’ in (35). But the evidence for such a status for names comes from their behaviour as arguments of predicators, not from their behaviour in nominations, where, as I shall argue in §8.2, they are not complements of functors dependent on a predicator. However, just as much as with the pronouns, there is, on the other hand, no evidence for basing names on nouns, i.e. interpreting ‘Y’ as ‘N;P’. This would be a kind of lexical equivalent of Longobardi’s (1994; 2001) abstract syntactic derivation. Of course, many names are based on nouns (or noun phrases), even synchronically, particularly in English in the case of place names, for instance. But, as well as there being non-noun sources of names, status as noun-based does not characterize them as ‘names’, as ‘Y’, as elements that are necessarily definite as arguments. And, as we have seen, names, as well as being notionally distinctive, and not just in being necessarily definite, also do not show any of the determinative-phrase-internal syntax of nouns (attribution etc.).

Nouns and other words and phrases may be converted into names. With such items there is a stage in the derivation before that represented in (35b), a stage at which the noun or other expression is converted into a ‘name’, a ‘Y’. So the representation for a converted name will be still more complex than in (35b), with (35b) governing a noun or whatever other base. This stage, and this complexity, is often lost; the name’s source is obscured. And this is not restricted to derived names, but is a general property of lexical items. That many names have been based on nouns is not surprising, given that they both
designate entities. But nouns, like other lexical categories, denote classes of 
entities, whereas names refer to individuals. Thus, even with nouns there 
must be a conversion to get from noun status to that of name.

In some languages (such as Mohawk), independent onomastic systems 
govern the meaning-based ways in the lexicon whereby names, even personal 
names, are based on other word classes, as well as on phrases of various types. 
Recall that in Mohawk the system allows names to be based on expressions 
describing something to do with the circumstances of birth (cf. again Mithun 
(1984: 46)). Many institutionalized onomastic systems, however, tend to 
obscure the creativity of assigning names, and the range of linguistic (and 
even non-linguistic) material that can serve as bases for names. This is where, 
even in such languages, nonce-naming is revealing.

Consider, for example, this anecdote of Muriel Spark’s (from Curriculum 

I remember a local furrier . . . had been altering a fur cape of my mother’s for a 
prequoted price that my parents took to be five pounds but which the furrier insisted 
was five guineas. Mrs Forrester sat in the bow window of our sitting-room, having 
delivered the restructured fur cape . . . repeating, ‘No, not five pounds, five guineas. 
I said five. We furriers always mean guineas. I said five . . . and always afterwards my 
parents referred to Mrs Forrester as ‘I said Five’. . . . ‘I said Five’ lived and worked 
opposite our house, so we saw her frequently from the window. ‘Good afternoon, Mrs 
Forrester,’ my mother would say, passing her in the street. But later she would tell my 
father, ‘I saw “I said Five”’. 

This makes it clear to me that use as a name distinguishes an expression 
categorically; it involves conversion to a category distinct from others.

It certainly has emerged from the preceding that names in English share 
with pronouns and nouns as inputs to a redundancy of the form of (37):

\[
(37) \quad \{N[\text{def}]\} \\
\quad \mid \{?\text{category}\} \leftrightarrow \{?\text{category}\}
\]

In terms of an analysis whereby names are either pronouns or nouns, \{N\} 
or \{N;P\}, then the base category in (37) would be ‘\{N>\}’, i.e. nominal, a 
category with a preponderance of N. What unites ‘X’, ‘Y’ and ‘N;P’, however? 
Whatever it may be, we cannot identify ‘Y’, i.e. base names, with nouns, since 
the redundancy applies to a name obligatorily in English if the name is to 
serve as an argument, whereas a noun may be made definite (generic) or 
partitive. Moreover, as we have seen, in some other languages, such as Greek, 
(37) does not apply either to names or to generic nouns; and in still others,
such as French, it applies to names but not to nouns. Let us try to begin to disentangle things.

### 8.2 The category of name

In the light of all this, I suggest that names and pronouns are of the same primary category—i.e. that ‘X’ = ‘Y’—and that that category is unspecified; it is the null combination of primary features. These items are all basically ‘names’, { }, empty of primary-categorial specification. Well, it might be said that there already is such a category, the functor. But there is a crucial difference between the basic category of name, as I shall refer to \{X\} = \{Y\} = {} from now on, and functors: functors take complements; names do not. Functors are the fundamental relational category, embodied in the presence of ‘/’; names are the fundamental entitative category, embodied in the absence of ‘/’. Verbals (categories containing P>) are relation-bearers enhanced with predicativity; nominals (containing N>) are entitatives enhanced with argumental referentiality. Verbs and nouns combine predicativity and referentiality. In possessing predicativity, nouns (unlike determinatives) are restricted to denoting classes of entities, rather than referring to individual entities; just as verbs, in possessing referentiality (unlike operatives), lack the capacity to head an independent predication.

\{P\} and \{N\}, which as functional categories are relational, enable dependent verbs and nouns to recover something of the basic capacities of predicativity and referentiality, insofar as finiteness pulls together the relational structure of the sentence, and determinatives enable descriptions to stand in for simple entitatives (names) where a simple entitative is not available or is insufficient. What characterizes the set of nouns, pronouns, and names, is thus not a categorial feature, but their joint status as entitatives, as inherently non-relational. This is the specification of the grouping in English that undergoes (37). ‘[?category]’ in (37) = ‘{ */}. Pronoun bases and names differ from nouns (and determinatives), however, in lacking a positive featural representation.

For names to serve as arguments in English they are converted to definite pronouns; they are **definite names**. As elements in nominations they are simply { }. However, these statements are notable for the absence of mention in them of any indication in the representation of definite names of the ‘something extra’ that enables them to serve as primary identifiers—as deixis does in the case of demonstratives, for instance. Of course there is equally no account of this given by deriving definite names from \{N\} rather than {} (or, for that matter from \{N;P\}), either. The missing property is fixed reference. How is this to be expressed in our representational system?
8.2.1 Active and inactive names

The conferring of fixed reference, and thus the capacity for primary identification, is the role of nomination. A nomination confers a fixed reference on a name. It differentiates it as an active name, a name with a referent listed in the mental lexicon; it converts an inactive name, one that merely has a potential for being active, referring. Institutionalized onomastic systems have a stock of inactive names, which can be used to refer only metalinguistically (Gwendolyn is a lovely name, Charity means love), that is, ‘homophonically’ in the strict sense.

I am now differentiating between two kinds of basic name (the ‘Y’ of (35/36)), the active and the inactive. Only the former belongs to the lexicon proper. Where conversion to an active name does not involve a sense-bearing item of the common vocabulary, the stock of inactive names constitutes what we might call dedicated names. These dedicated inactive names belong to an onomasticon, a dictionary of inactive names. Even nicknames can become onomastically institutionalized, as with the availability of Blue in some English-speaking communities as a potential active nickname for redheads. Nomination confers lexical, not merely onomastic, status on a name, and the fixed reference thereby introduced requires to be governed by a definite determinative in order to figure as an argument.

The active names of the lexicon trigger conversion to a definite pronoun in languages like English. These various kinds of structure involving names are related as in (38):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{inactive} & \quad \text{active} & \quad \text{definite} \\
\{\text{N}[\text{def}]\} & \quad | & \quad \{\text{fem}\} \\
\{\{\text{fem}\}\} & \iff \{\{\text{fem}\}\} & \iff \{\{\text{fem}\}\} \\
: & \quad : & \quad : \\
: & \quad R & \quad R \\
: & \quad : & \quad : \\
: & \quad : & \quad : \\
\text{Mary} & \quad \text{Mary} & \quad \text{Mary}
\end{align*}
\]

The inactive name bears only a secondary feature. In the active name there is added a fixed reference: ‘R’ is a variable over the set of fixed referents. I shall abbreviate the active name configuration as \{R\}, with the referential index again as a subscript. This ‘conversion’ from inactive to active name is performed by nomination.
In English the presence of ‘R’ entails the addition by lexical redundancy of the superjoined determinative: it introduces the capacity to be attributed definiteness lexically. That is, with names, we can fill out (37) as in (37)’:

\[(37)’ \quad \{N\{\text{def}\}\} \quad \{R\} \leftrightarrow \{R\}\]

In Greek, however, this last stage in (38) is in general absent from the lexicon; names are typically not inherently definite, as illustrated by (6.8b), repeated again for ease of reference:

\[(6.8) \quad \text{b. Den ida to Vasili} \quad \text{Not I saw (the) Basil}\]

Definiteness is provided in the syntax.

We can thus now substitute ‘R’ for ‘Y’ in the representations of Greek and English definite name structures in (35), giving (35)’:

\[(35)’ \quad \text{a. } \{N_i\{\text{sg,def}\}/\{Y\}\} \quad \text{b. } \{N_i\{\text{sg,def}\}\} \quad \text{William}\]

The subscripted ‘R’ ensures that the expectation of \{def\}, that the associated ‘i’ can be identified, is indeed satisfied internally to these configurations, without recourse to anaphora, description, or deixis.

Not all inactive names are dedicated in quite the way outlined above, however. It is not just that the stock of names may correspond (entirely or largely) to a subset of common words, as in Germanic or Seminole. In such languages, they still constitute a dedicated stock of inactive names, however, even though they have related common words. They are not synchronically related, except by word play, to these corresponding common elements. But,
as we have seen, in other systems (such as Mohawk) names may be converted from descriptive words or phrases which are held to be appropriate at the time of nomination. There is hardly a dedicated stock in this case: the onomasticon is potential, delimited by regularities governing the selection of descriptions.

8.2.2 Indexation, names, and pronouns

We need to differentiate the lexical status of the fixed indices assigned to active names in the lexicon in (37), on the one hand, and the variable indices associated with \{N\}s in the provisional representation in (5.13b) and in (8.35a)’, on the other. In the representations that were given in (5.13) these are not yet properly differentiated:

(5.13) a. \{P/{abs}{abs}\}

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\{{\text{abs}}\} & \Rightarrow \{{\text{abs}}\} \\
\{N\} & \Rightarrow \{N\} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{n} = \text{m} \\
\text{Hesperus is Phosphorus}
\end{array}
\]

b. \{P/{abs}{abs}\}

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\{{\text{abs}}\} & \Rightarrow \{{\text{abs}}\} \\
\{N/{N/{prt}}\} & \Rightarrow \{N/{N/{prt}}\} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{n} = \text{m} \\
\text{the guy... is the man...}
\end{array}
\]

The indices in (5.13b) and (35)’ are not assigned in the lexicon. And insofar as pronouns have a name representation subjoined, as in (33c), it remains a semi-inactive name:
It cannot ensure primary identification; only ‘n’ and ‘m’ in (5.13a) are instances of ‘R’. Pronouns are names that fail to acquire ‘R’. It is the upper (determiner) component in their representation that involves reference, and the index they are assigned is discourse-based, not lexical. Their definiteness is satisfied by the discourse, not in the lexicon. In a sense, then, such pronouns are lexically ‘defective’ names. And this is compensated for by the superjunction of a determiner, as in (33c), which as well as allowing them argument status, makes reference available to entitatives that are not names or deictic.

What of indefinite pronouns? They too originate as inactive names, and a variable index is assigned to the complex in (19)’:

\[
(19)’ \quad \{N_i/\{prt\}\}
\]

\[
\cdot \quad \{\{human\}\}
\]

\[
\quad \cdot \quad \text{someone}
\]

Lacking definiteness, however, the speaker is not assuming that the referent of a specific indefinite can be identified by the interlocutor. They are nevertheless assumed to have a referent, even if it is in an imaginary or temporally limited world, as in (5.6) and (12):

(5.6) This girl wants to marry a British cabinet minister

(12) He eats an apple every day

As we have seen, the obvious reading for (12) involves a referent that is different within every member of the set of ‘every day’; it is within the scope of the universal.

8.2.3 The ontology of names

Names are at one pole of the basic distinction underlying grammatical categories. It is this basic distinction, between entity and relation, upon which are built category-types of increasing structural complexity. We can
indicate the role of this distinction as in (39), as well as showing there something of the ontological relations among the categories of the lexicon that are implied by the proposed analysis of names and related categories:

Underlying the rest of the relationships in (39) is the distinction between entity and relation, introduced in the top row, which combine in different ways to give us, first of all, the basic categorial distinction between entitativity and relationality. The basic entitative has a fixed reference, a relation to an extra-linguistic concept; the basic relational category involves the intra-linguistic relation of valency.

What emerges from the child’s babbling phase as baba or mama or dada is a pre-syntactic manifestation of entity and relation: it comes to be perceived as having the structure of a vocative name (relation + entity). The name is more basic than the noun, just as the performative relation, the relation given by performance, by a pre-speech-act (in both senses), is more basic than the verb. Likewise, other categorial distinctions presuppose the syntactic implementation of these relations as the basic categories entitative vs. relational. This is crudely represented by the arrows in (39). Each arrow introduces at its point a distinction enabled by the property at the tail of the arrow.

The contentives N and P introduce classification combined with variable (rather than fixed) reference, and predication. The lexical categories, involving non-null combinations of both N and P, both classify and predicate; they lack simple
reference, and are limited to co-reference. In a system containing such combinations, all categories involving dependency-free combinations are specialized as relational. Crucially this relationality serves the syntax of the lexical categories: thus, determinatives allow argument status and operatives allow sentencehood. We return in chapter 9 to the role of secondary categories in this schema.

At this point, what arises most immediately, given the dependence of what precedes on the function of nomination, is the question of the structure of nominations, in which names are not definite, either as part of their lexical structure (as in English) or by virtue of complementing an independent definite article (as in Greek). If we associate capacity to be an argument with \{N\}, then we seem to be saying that in nominations names are not arguments, in lacking a governing \{N\}. Let us now consider this.

### 8.3 Names and nomination

In §7.1.2 I cited some examples of names in nominations. These included performative nominations such as (7.4a) and didactic nominations such as (b):

\[(7.4) \quad \text{a. I name this child Basil} \]
\[
\quad \text{b. That one/Their youngest child is called Basil} \]

(7.4a) and (b) also involve another difference, independent of the performative/didactic distinction. While name comes close to being a pure **verb of nomination**, of giving a name, call is much more general in terms of what is given, and is better thought of as a **verb of designation**, where what may be given includes names and class (lexical) words—and, as we all know, \(mi\) is ‘a name I call myself’.

I shall concentrate here on strict naming verbs like name, rather than ‘loose namers’ like call. The latter can be accompanied by default vocative names such as Mac and Honey, mentioned in §7.1.3. This means that They called me Honey is ambiguous in a way that They named me Honey is not: Honey is interpreted in the former case either as a true name or a default (see further on the role of these in vocatives in §8.4.1). Naming structures themselves can be more or less overtly dedicated to this function; as well as the use of verbs like call, which do not necessarily involve names, there are also indirect naming structures such as that in (7.5) (Lyons 1977: §7.1.2):

---

5 Given the vagaries of usage associated with name as a noun, it is unsurprising that the verb is also not always reserved for nomination, but may also be a general designator. Thus, in Chapter 38 of Gaskell’s Mary Barton, Mary and her fiancé delay to reveal their plan to leave for North America to his mother, from whom they anticipated opposition, and ‘to whom the plan had never yet been named’.  

---
This is Basil

On one (introduction-making) interpretation, it can be a nomination.

(7.4) are dedicated nomination constructions, with a characteristic head. But, as just observed, sentences such as (7.5) could either be identifying a Basil known by description, so in a sense completing his ‘baptism’, or introducing, and thus truly ‘baptizing’, an unknown Basil. In both instances, the ‘baptism’ is gestural, deictic. And be itself can be said to serve as a verb of name-designation when it equates a name with a definite description involving deixis. However, it is only on the latter, initial-introduction-making, interpretation of (7.5) that we have a true nomination (pace Lyons (1977: 217–8), who doesn’t distinguish the former sense). Only if the name is being assigned to a referent for the first time, as in its case, is the name not definite, in common with (7.4); and it is, of course, a didactic nomination. But, as indicated, I focus here on the structure of dedicated performative nominations and structurally related didactic ones such as are represented by (7.4a) and (7.4b) respectively.

8.3.1 Nomination and inactive names

We have observed that the name in (7.4) (repeated above) is not definite. The speaker does not assume (at least as part of the ‘performance’ of a ‘baptism’, in the case of performatives) that the interlocutor(s) can identify the referent of the name before the nomination; the nomination identifies the referent for the interlocutor(s). We confirmed that the name in the nominating Greek sentence in (6.10b) lacks the definite article:

(6.10) a. Onomazete Vasillis/ Ton lene Vasili
    he.is.called Basil/ Him they.call Basil

Recall too (6.11a) from Seri:

(6.11) a. «Pancho» mpah
    Pancho s/he/it.is.called
    (‘S/he/It is called Pancho’)

This does not represent an idiosyncrasy of Greek.

A nomination, or ‘baptism’, transforms an inactive name into an active name, one which has fixed reference, and it is this which enables it to be definite. What we are concerned with in this section is the structure of nominations and how this relates to the mechanism associated with this transformation. Sentences like (7.4) seem to show a set of arguments not unlike causative verbs like that in (40):
(40)  a. They made me angry  
     b. They made me a laughing stock

These are causative formations based on predicative adjectives and nouns, such as (41):

(41)  a. I am angry  
     b. I am a laughing stock

But a naming structure such as (42a) cannot be interpreted as based on such as (b):

(42)  a. They named him Darren  
     b. He is Darren

*Darren* in (42b) is not a predicator; the sentence is equative, not predicative. And while the name in (42a) is not definite, that in (b) is definite (unless we try to give it too a nominational interpretation). Observe too that there are very specific semantic relations among named, him, and Darren, such that, for instance, named totally determines the category of Darren, so that it requires to be satisfied by a name, specifically an inactive name. These relations are not adequately represented by the kind of configuration we might associate with (40). *Darren* in (42a) is not predicative. But, on the other hand, Darren would also make a strange argument of the verb. What relation would it bear to the verb? (42a) is not the simple causative equivalent of an equative, such as we find in (43a):

(43)  a. They made me the victim of their racism  
     b. I am the victim of their racism

The activity denoted by (42a) doesn’t merely cause an equation, it confers a name. Interpretation of (42a) as the causative of a predicative or equative structure does not capture the role of such a sentence in the conferring of reference.

What is going on here is clarified somewhat if we look at the alternative naming structure in (44):

(44)  They gave him the name (of) Darren

(44) is a lexical causative in which *they* is { {erg}}, *him* is a ‘receiver’ or ‘recipient’;⁶ and the name (of) Darren an { {abs}}. It is a causative based on a subjoined directional ‘exchange’ predicator (Anderson 2005a; 2006b:

⁶ In terms of the system of secondary functor features alluded to at this point, this ‘recipient’ would be another instance of (directional) | | {erg,loc}|. However, the identity of this functor is not relevant to our present concerns.
§§9.3.3, 12.1.3, 12.2.3, 13.2.3): the action causes the name ‘Darren’ to be assigned to the referent of *him*. The name in (44) in terms of some traditions would be regarded as being ‘in apposition to’ the element the name. Let us focus now on this aspect of the structure of (44).

8.3.2 Inactive names and apposition

I have already alluded to ‘apposition’ in §2.3.2, in relation to the *by*-phrase modifier of passive verbs, as in (2.46b), and I shall come back to that variety of ‘apposition’. Firstly, however, let us look at the kind of ‘apposition’ I am attributing to (44). It seems to fall within Huddleston and Pullum’s (2002: 447) class of ‘integrated’ appositions. Specifically, in present terms, it involves two entitatives, such that a name is in apposition to an instance of a subclass of noun to which it is co-referential. Moreover, a complement relation holds between the apposed element and what it is apposed to; specifically the name is an attributive which is complemented by the element it is apposed to.7

We can thus represent the relevant substructure as in (45a), with an absolutive phrase converted into an attributive {N/{prt}}, and realized as *of*, which also marks absolutes in nominalizations (recall (1.1a, 7.4a)—and for further illustration Anderson (2006: chapter 7)):

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7 The syntax and semantics of apposition is not well understood (cf. e.g. the survey of views in Nosek (1986)), and there exists a variety of classifications. The proposals made here remain tentative, and informal. 'Apposition' has been used to cover a range of possibilities, not necessarily syntactically homogeneous. But I suggest that an appositional account of nomination structures does not violate a basic understanding of what is involved in ‘apposition’, as involving juxtaposition of co-referentials, integrated here by a complement relation. Moreover, such an analysis does at least give some motivation for the presence of a definite article which, in the absence of the name, has to be taken anaphorically: in the apposition it is the appositive name that supplies the identification. This defines what we might call hypotactic apposition (i.e. ‘restrictive’ in the Quirkian tradition). More generally recognized is ‘paratactic’ apposition.

Thus, (ia) also contains an appositive, but in its case the apposed-to element provides more specific identification and the appositive is more obviously omissible:

(i) a. We then met the butcher, Mary’s uncle
   b. He came to the city *(of) Birmingham
   c. The idea *(of) leaving early appalled her
   d. The idea that Celia loved Damien came as a surprise

In its case we have two sources of identification, and we have paratactic syntax. The appositive in the other examples in (i), on the other hand, is, as in (44), non-paratactic, ‘close’; and (ib), for instance, is, if anything, even more closely integrated than in (44) with the apposed-to element. Notice the non-omissibility of the overt functor here and in (ic). In (ib–d) and in (44) the appositive conveys the identity of the referent; the phrase otherwise does not ensure definiteness/identification.
(45) a. \{N_i\text{\{def\}/\{abs\}}\}

b. \{N_i\}

\begin{align*}
\{ & \} \Leftrightarrow \{ & \}
\end{align*}

c. \{P\}

\begin{align*}
\{ & \text{abs} \} \{ & P;N/\{\text{erg} \} \} \\
\{ & \text{erg} \} \{ & P;N/\{\text{abs}\};\{\text{rec}\};\{\text{src}\} \} \{ & \text{abs} \} \\
\{ & \text{src} \} \{ & \text{rec} \} \{ & \text{abs} \} \\
\{ & N_k \} : \{ & N_j \} \{ & N_i;P \} \{ & \text{def}/\{\text{abs}\} \}
\end{align*}

they gave him the name Darren
(45a) thus shows an absolutive functor phrase that has been converted to a partitive {N} that satisfies the valency of the definite article. It differs from normal attributives in that it does not involve a partitive {N} dependent on the article, but an absolutive; moreover the article is co-referential with the attributive {N}. These properties mark an appositive; the whole phrase is cataphoric. The identity assumed by the definite is fully satisfied internally, and does not presuppose some previously mentioned subset of names. Hence the definite article is not partitive.

The name in (45a), which is an inactive name, having no fixed reference, is nevertheless susceptible to (45b), which allows inactive names to absorb a determinative that is neither definite not partitive.Inactive names are not available to be converted to definite or partitive determinatives, whereas, as we have seen, active names may be converted to definite determinatives, by (37)′:

\[
(37)′ \quad \{N\{def}\} \\
\{R\} \iff \{R\}
\]

The ‘bare’ determinative of (45b) is a marker of metalinguistic status for the item that depends on it; this is the only (derived) syntactic status for inactive nouns; subjoined to ‘bare’ \{N_i\} they have no referent external to the linguistic (including here onomastic) system, and therefore have a limited syntax.⁸

The determinative to which the inactive name is subjoined is co-referential with the definite article and the attributive {N}. The ‘bare’ determinative is dependent, in adjunction (in this case), on the absolutive; the latter, in being

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⁸ Of course, like other words, i.e. anything in the combined onomasticon and lexicon, inactive names, as I have observed, can also be used metalinguistically in other ways, as in *Millicent is a name I like*. Here the \{N_i\} governing the inactive name is co-referential with the governing determinative in the other nominal. Compare here *Linguistician is such an ugly noun*, where the noun *linguistician* has also been absorbed into a \{N_i\).

And there may be allusion to the limited sense of the name, as in *Darren is such a manly name*. But there is certainly not the range of metalinguistic reference or play upon the sense of common words. For the latter, consider the following passage from Dickens’ *Tale of Two Cities* (Bk.II, Chapter II), which describes an indictment of someone accused at the Old Bailey of spying on behalf of ‘Lewis, the French King’, to the detriment of ‘our serene, illustrious, excellent, and so forth, prince, our Lord the King’:

… by coming and going, between the dominion of our said serene, illustrious, excellent, and so forth, and those of the said French Lewis, and wickedly, falsely, traitorously, and otherwise evil-adverbiously, revealing to the said French Lewis what forces our said serene, illustrious, excellent, and so forth, had in preparation to send to Canada and North America.
subjoined to the partitive noun, has been converted to an attributive. We thus have an attributive structure where co-reference holds between the two \{N\}s in the phrase in (45a). And definiteness is satisfied ‘internally’ to this structure; as observed, it relies purely on cataphora rather than anaphora as well. This configuration in (45a) involves the only kind of determinative that can have an inactive name dependent on it: as we have seen, names otherwise need to be active and immediately dependent on a definite \{N\} in order to be participants.

(45c) represents (44): it involves the embedding of (45a) in a predicational structure, where in this instance (to illustrate the other possibility shown in (44)), the name is subjoined to the appositive complex. The representation in (45c) remains, however, considerably simplified, in some ways that have already been signalled in relation to the limitations of the apparatus used here (see particularly Anderson (2006b: §13.2), for some of what’s missing).

I have, however, indicated that in relation to the causative complex, they in (45c) is both ergative in the action and source in the ‘exchange’ subjoined to agentive predicator, and that the recipient is ‘raised’ to be associated with the free absolutive of the agentive component predicator in the complex. The didactic nomination in (45c) is a representation of a performance whereby the inactive name Darren was in one instance made active, so that the ‘i’ of co-reference is ‘upgraded’ to the ‘R’ of fixed reference, as shown bottom-right in (45c), where is interpreted the result of the causation. This is how witnesses interpret the performance; to give a name is to fix its reference and so to place an entry in the witnesses’ lexicon. (45c) locates the name Darren with respect to whatever entity him refers to; ‘\{ {rec} \}’ is a kind of (locative) goal. Henceforth, the referent of \{N\} in (45c) is identified by the name Darren, which is a new \{ {R} \}, a new instance of an active name with its own place in the lexicon.

Performative nomination is of course the enactment of the performance itself. To sum up: some such (description of a) performance serves to sanction entry of a name-referent combination into the lexicon proper. As an item in the onomasticon, a name can figure in language use only in such nominations and (other) metalinguistic discussions of ‘names’. On acquisition of fixed reference, it undergoes the various redundancies that characterize active names, and confer on them, if prototypical, determinative status, definiteness, singularity, and so on. Acquisition of fixed reference depends crucially on the transfer of the reference in the appositional structure in such as (45c) to a ‘recipient’ thenceforth associated with the fixed referent.
We come back in Chapter 9 to other ‘integrated’ appositional structures involving names. Let us return now, however, to (42a) and the like, where there is apparently no nominal structure for the inactive name to appose to; the noun ‘name’ has been converted into a verb. But this conversion relation now gives us a vital clue to the structure of such sentences. We can see them as an instance of the pattern that is also illustrated by (46a) compared with (b):

(46)  a. We thanked Fred
     b. We gave Fred (our) thanks

In (46a) we have a derived verb that has had subjoined to it, by lexical conversion, the equivalent of the \{abs\} argument that is expressed overtly in (b), and the derived verb reflects in its expression the shape of the argument that has absorbed it. In some languages the ‘recipient’ argument in simple ‘transitive’ structures such as (46a) may retain the morphological marking it would have in the non-incorporated ditransitive in (46b). Old English (47a) illustrates this when compared with (47b):

(47)  a. He God-e Þancode
       he God-dat thanked
     b. He God-e Pancas dyde
       he God-dat thanks made

Compare the morphosyntax of (47a) with that associated with the verb without incorporation of (b), along with the evidence for conversion in the retention of the base ‘shape’ (for discussion see again Anderson (2006b: §13.2)).

I suggest that we have a similar pair in the name-giving predications of (42a) and (44). (42a) involves a verb converted from a noun-based argument. But in this case there is apparently a ‘residue’ of the full structure of the base argument, in the shape of Darren. And this is the element in such a sentence whose characterization we found so problematical in §8.2.1: it does not seem to be either a straightforward complement or a predicator. This too is where we might usefully revert to the brief discussion of the passive by-phrase in §2.3.2, for I am going to propose that (42a) involves a similar kind of apposition to that, different from what we have been looking at so far here.

Recall the structure of the passive sentence in (6.26):
(6.26)

Bill was expected to-like music

Here we have incorporation of an argument (reflected in the morphology). However, if a by-phrase is present, it has the status of a verbal modifier, an adjunct, but one that seeks to modify a verb of a very specific character, namely a verb incorporating just the configuration in (6.26), but also involving co-reference. The argument in the adjunct is required to be co-referential with the lexically incorporated argument.

Let us expand (6.26), to show this, i.e. to represent one of the fuller forms of (6.24b), though still simplified to exclude the not strictly relevant (see again Anderson (2006b: §13.2)):
Here the *by*-phrase, analysed as a (abstract) ‘path’, inserts the topmost \{P;N\} above the \{P;N\} that it seeks to modify (‘\’), namely the \{P;N\} that has subjoined to it the experiencer argument. The configuration of this latter \{P;N\} is replicated within the path element, and the two subjunction paths are marked as co-referential, as is the \{N\} dependent to the right on the path, i.e. *some: some* is required to be co-referential with the incorporated argument.

Here the apposed element is not itself in a complement relation to the element to which it is apposed; the only complement relation is between the \{P;N\} and the subjoined argument that the apposed element is co-referential with. Thus, without the apposed element, the passive is interpreted as having unidentified agency. In these respects this apposition differs from that involving *name* the noun. The details of this, however, are not important in the present context (but see, for instance, Anderson (2006b: §12.2.2)). What I want to illustrate is primarily that the lexical mechanisms that I shall now invoke in relation to (42a) and the like are manifested elsewhere.

Thus, I am associating with (42a) a structure such as is shown in (48):

\[
(48) \quad \text{\{P\}} \quad \mid \quad \text{\{abs\}} \quad \text{\{P;N/\{erg\}\}}
\]

Again we have a causative verb composed of an action predicator with a subjoined directional (cf. again e.g. Anderson (2005a)). But subjoined to the latter is an absolutive argument based on the noun ‘name’. The inactive name *Darren* is subjoined to an \{N\} that modifies the ‘exchange’ sub-predicator in the causative complex; the \{N\} associated with the name has been converted to an adjunct. The adjoined element, like the passive *by*, imposes some
detailed requirements on the content of that verb—specifically that the verb have subjoined to it an absolutive argument that is co-referential with the inactive name. These requirements are given in the path of dependencies to the right of the ‘\’. Again the didactic nomination is interpreted by the interlocutors as converting an inactive name into an active one. As with the passive, the interpretation of the subjoined argument of the verb in such a sentence, in the absence of an apposed element, as in They have named him, is simply not specified.

This is the only circumstantial configuration in which inactive names appear, as that in (45c) is the only ‘attributive’. And the categorial representation of the circumstantial is reduced to simply the representation of what is modified, just as the {N} to which Darren in (45c) is subjoined is neither definite nor partitive. The syntactic participation of inactive names is minimal, and notionally impoverished.9

In many languages the non-participant, or adjunct status of the name in (42a/48) is reflected in the corresponding questions, as, for example, in Greek (49a) and (b):

(49) a. Pos onomazete? (‘What is s/he/it called?’)
   how s/he/it.is.called?

b. Pos ton lene? (‘What do they call him?’)
   how him they.call?

c. Ti θa kani tora o oδiγος? (‘What will the driver do now?’)
   what FUT does now the driver?

d. Ti ton kanane? (question: Ton kanane γramatea.) (‘What did they make him? (They made him secretary.))
   what him they.made? (question: him they.made secretary.)

Compare the questioning of a participant and a predicator in (49c) and (d) respectively. English is more ambivalent, in that what is used as the question word in the glosses throughout (49). How did they name their child? is formal and archaic.

Nominations are also associated in some languages with (what is in traditional terms) an ‘awkward’ case (like the vocative—see e.g. Anderson (2006b:

9 We might characterize the content of the onomasticon as items that occur in such constructions as that in (45a/c) and (48), were it not again for the vagaries of usage concerning name, both noun and verb. Recall, for example, our initial look at the history of name studies at the beginning of Chapter 1—or the quotation from Elizabeth Gaskell given in §8.1.3.
Chapter 2)). In Hungarian, as we have seen (in §3.1), the name in such structures is marked by a special affix, as in (3.1a):

(3.1) a. Én Ferinek fogom hívni
     I Frank I shall call (him)
     (‘I shall call him Frank’)  
b. Ezt szépnek mondják
     this beautiful they call
     (‘They call this beautiful’)

However, (3.1b) recalls to us that the affix is also associated with acts of ‘calling’ that are not necessarily acts of ‘naming’ in the strict sense, i.e. are merely designations rather than nominations.

Unsurprisingly, in Greek, names which are apposed to a nominal, as in (50), as well as those apposed to the verb (6.10a), lack the definite article associated with argument use of a name:

(50) Kliste mas ena diklino sto onoma Tomaras
     (‘Reserve us a twin-bedded room in the name (of) Tomaras’)

Notice too that the name in (50) appears in the nominative (citation) case, rather than in the accusative in agreement with the noun it is apposed to, onoma—though in the morphology of the (neuter) noun or its article, as opposed to the name, the distinction is not made overt.

Thus, such a characterization as is envisaged here for nominations such as (42a) is rather different from what seems to be appropriate to sentences with ‘standard object-predicatives’ such as They made him a/the scapegoat, with which nominations have sometimes been grouped by grammarians (see e.g. Jespersen (1948: §1.2)). Names are involved in standard nomination structures as appositives of different kinds, either (in English) to name the noun or name the verb, and their status as names is converted by the nomination from inactive to active. The nominal apposition structure involves a co-referential relation to a member of the set of names; and the verb-headed apposition shows co-reference between the name and an argument realized as name that has absorbed a verb.

8.4 Names and vocatives

In languages such as Greek or Seri, in which the definiteness of normal argument use of names is expressed analytically, names used as vocatives, as well as names in nominations, lack the definiteness marker. Recall here the Greek (6.10b) and Seri (6.11b) vocatives from §6.2.4:
As recounted in that section, Anderson (2004c) suggested that this was because, in such a circumstance also, names are not definite in general, including in English. However, this lack of definiteness is perhaps not at all as obvious as in the case of names in nominations.

8.4.1 Definiteness and the speech act status of vocatives

What vocatives identify is the interlocutor, the individual who counts as ‘second person’. And if the vocative is a name, then the name must be active, and moreover, apparently definite, if a successful identification is to be made. Identifying the interlocutor by the name presumably must mean that the speaker assumes that the intended interlocutor knows the referent of the name, i.e. that the name refers to her/himself. The fulfilment of the assumption is relatively trivial, but seems to be necessary. However, it seems that it is not simply a matter of presence vs. absence of definiteness.

Compare the use of you in English, usually assumed to be uniformly definite, as a vocative. In order for identification to be successful it must be accompanied by some overt deictic support; it involves the identification of the addressee, not simply reference to the addressee. Both vocative names and vocative you are used on the assumption that they can be given primary identification, which usually coincides with definiteness. But is the definiteness we associate with referential acts relevant to the act identifying the addressee? I’m again suggesting by my question that the absence of a marker of definiteness in Greek and Seri vocatives cannot be attributed simply to lack of definiteness of these elements; something else is involved.

As anticipated, I think this question has to do with the speech-act status of vocatives. Moreover, I think this status motivates our not attributing definiteness, after all, to either names or you in vocatives. For vocatives are not referential acts as far as the addressee is concerned; the addressee is not referred to but identified as the addressee. This identification depends on the capacity to make primary identification, via either deixis or a fixed name-referent relationship. Definiteness is simply irrelevant in a vocative rather than a declarative act (or its predicational equivalent).

It is this observation that undermines the argument in favour of the definiteness of names in vocatives offered in §7.1.3, based on ‘equation of identity’. There it was argued that ‘if an identification of reference is being
made in the use of a vocative, then these typically involve two terms in an
equative construction, at least one of which is definite’. But we cannot conflate
statements of identity with acts of identification. The properties of the former
do not necessarily carry over to the latter.

Definiteness of a name or sap (speech-act participant) in particular is relevant
to its role as an ordinary argument, not to its role as vocative. In vocatives, it is
unnecessary for the speaker to have to assume (perhaps wrongly) that the
interlocutor can identify the referent; the speaker knows. The speaker may
address someone by the wrong name or fail to make clear who is you: these
are not mistaken assumptions about the interlocutor’s capacity to find a referent
but a failure of deixis or of lexical storage on the part of the speaker, or a failure of
the addressee to accept the (say, abusive) name or description by which s/he is
addressed. The contrast between definite and not definite is simply not pertinent
in the description of vocatives; it doesn’t arise. It arises with arguments.

Thus, the sap pronoun and the name are subjoined to a definite determiner
when used as argument, as is the non-sap pronoun in (33c) (now with absence
of specification substituted for ‘X’):

\[(33) \quad \text{c. } \{N_1\{sg,def\}/\{prt\}\}
\]
\[
\quad \{\{\text{masc}\}\}
\]
\[
\quad :\]
\[
\quad :\]
\[
\quad he
\]

So we have (51) for sap pronouns, alongside (35)’ b. for names in English:

\[(51) \quad \{N_1\{sg,def\}\}
\]
\[
\quad |\]
\[
\quad \{\{\text{sap}\}\}
\]
\[
\quad :\]
\[
\quad :\]
\[
\quad I/you
\]

\[(35)’ \quad \text{b. } \{N_1\{sg,def\}\}
\]
\[
\quad |\]
\[
\quad \{R\{\text{masc}\}\}
\]
\[
\quad :\]
\[
\quad :\]
\[
\quad William
\]

But what is relevant in vocatives is simply the subjoined components in (51)
and (35b)’, which provide the capacity for primary identification. The avail-
ability or not of this capacity is what characterizes the range of vocatives.
The capacity is provided prototypically by established names and deictics. In certain circumstances—if, say, the name is unknown and ‘pointing’ is thought inappropriate, or use of the name is thought inappropriate (on grounds of politeness, respect, etc.)—in such circumstances nonce names based on the role of the individual addressed may be employed, such as Nurse, Mother, Waitress, Friend, Mate, and so on. In Mazatec (Kirk 1966) and Chontal (Waterhouse and Merrifield 1968) there is a range of kinship-based vocatives that may be extended to non-kin.

These shade off into dedicated nonce names, what I called ‘default names’ (beginning of §8.3)—largely variable by region, and in formality—such as Honey, Dear, Mac, Hen (Scots), Idiot, and so on. When identification is impossible, one may use the (desperate) addressee form betokening this failure, someone, as in Help me, please, someone! Compare here again Whoever said that, come out here (Quirk and Greenbaum 1973: §7.32). We also find ‘non-specific’ definites, as in Own up, the boy who wrote that. What distinguishes these from vocatives with successful primary identification is simply the absence of deixis or fixed reference. Both indefinites and other definites are lacking in this respect. So too is obviously the even more desperate, Hey! To the elucidation of none of this is the definiteness opposition appropriately applied.

8.4.2 Vocatives as predicators

Let us now look a little further, in the light (or obscurity) of these suggestions, and following on from the brief discussion in §6.1, at the character of vocatives in general. The syntax of vocatives suggests that they fulfil a function distinct from ordinary functor phrases. Thus, as Jespersen observes, ‘the vocative . . . may be said to indicate that a noun is used as a second person and placed outside a sentence, or as a sentence in itself’ (1924: 184). And Davies (1986: §5.3), for example, illustrates in some detail the distinctive distributional properties of vocatives in English, particularly as compared to imperative subjects, with which they have sometimes been confused (cf. Downing (1969)).

In (52a) the vocative is the sole element in the utterance, and even in an example like (52b), where the vocative is, in Jespersen’s terms, placed ‘outside the sentence’, we do not seem to have use of the name as a participant in the predication, nor even as an adjunct (circumstantial) to the basic predications:

(52) a. Basil!
    b. I read that, Basil

This distinctive function is signalled in some languages not merely by position and morphologically, but also phonologically. Thus, vocatives in Vedic Sanskrit are generally, like finite verbs and unlike other case-marked nouns,
unaccented except when initial in some domain. Moreover, in common with other performative elements, vocatives do not occur in embedded clauses (Banfield 1973; Zwicky 1974: §4.1), except as quotations.

(52a) illustrates that vocatives can occur as complete utterances. And they need not be interpreted as truncated predications: they constitute a complete predication. Compare, along with Jespersen (cited above), Sweet: ‘the vocative...is a noun used as a sentence-word; we might therefore call it the “sentence-case”’ (1891: 50). If we interpret ‘vocativeness’ as a ‘mood’ feature of a finite predicator, then a vocative name in isolation has at least the structure in (53a), created by a lexical redundancy (53b) converting an active name to a subclass of finite predicator:

\[\begin{align*}
(53) & \quad a. \{P\{\text{voc}\}\} \\
& \quad \mid \{R\} \\
& \quad b. \{P\{\text{voc}\}\} \\
& \quad \mid \{R\} \leftrightarrow \{R\}
\end{align*}\]

This redundancy gives a signal that a named individual is being addressed.

A similar redundancy (54a) can apply in the case of vocative you, but crucially different in that it is some ‘pointed-to’ individual (where ‘deixis’ is indicated by the subscript ‘D’), not named, who is assigned addressee status, an individual who in any consequent discourse is what I referred to earlier as ‘{tu}’ (one member of the category ‘sap’), now represented as subscript ‘V’, the vocative:

\[\begin{align*}
(54) & \quad a. \{P/\{\text{voc}\}\} \\
& \quad \mid \{D\} \leftrightarrow \{D\} \Rightarrow \{V\} \\
& \quad b. \{N/\{\text{def}\}\} \\
& \quad \mid \{V\} \leftrightarrow \{V\}
\end{align*}\]

(54a) makes overt ‘baptism’ of a ‘pointed-to’ individual as addressee, where the individual retains for the time the subscript ‘V’, as designated addressee. And it is the resulting specification as \{V\} that undergoes (54b) in order to appear as an argument, realized as you (cf. Thorne (1966)). Neither (54a) nor (53b) or the resultant structure captures all that is involved in vocative predications; they merely include the presently relevant components.
‘Baptism’ as addressee may be tacit, as when there is only one candidate present. And, in general, the status of an individual as speaker is usually given ‘silent baptism’; this status is representable in the present notation as ‘\{ _S_ \}’ (the other member of the category sap), by that individual’s simply speaking, though the status may be overtly claimed in various ways. \{ _S_ \} is also susceptible to the equivalent of (54b). But we must return to names.

(53b) would constitute for active names an alternative conversion to that given in (37)’:

\[(37)' \quad \{ \text{N[def]} \}
\quad \{ \text{R} \} \Leftrightarrow \{ \text{R} \}\]

Only by (37)’ does a name acquire definiteness. This definiteness is obligatory if the name is to function as a participant in a predication, but not otherwise. This accords with the absence of definiteness marking in Greek and Seri vocatives.

(54b) thus serves to create what one might call a ‘sentential particle’, whose realization is exemplified by (52b). On similar representations for other such ‘sentential particles’, such as \textit{yes} and \textit{no}, see Anderson (2001 §2). These are all performative elements. As compared with canonical manifestations of other predications, they seem incomplete, as do imperatives; elements necessary to interpretation are supplied pragmatically. This is not something to pursue here, but it is perhaps worth observing that their shared notional character may be reflected in analogous developments. Thus, as de Groot (1957: 156) observes, ‘the disappearance of attitudinal inflections is a . . . feature of linguistic change in Indo-European languages’; and he cites ‘the vocative of the noun’ and ‘the imperative of the verb’ (together with ‘the finite verb’—though to me this last seems to involve a distinct kind of development, and is scarcely ‘attitudinal’ in the same sense as is appropriate to the others).

(52b) contains such a predicator-name complex in a ‘very loose’ relation to another predication. Unfortunately, the vocative among semantic functions has suffered something of the same neglect as names among word classes; but some of their syntax is clear (from studies such as Davies (1986: §5.3)). And Jespersen’s term ‘outside the sentence’, for instance, involves a range of linear positions such as are characteristic of, or at least overlap with those of, ‘sentence modifiers’, including such as \textit{Basil, I read that}, or \textit{I too, Basil, read that}.

What kind of modifiers are ‘sentence modifiers’, such as that in \textit{I dislike that, frankly}? They are most obviously to be distinguished as modifiers of \{P\}. Many \{P\}-modifiers, such as \textit{frankly}, also modify \{P;N\}. The distinction between \{P\}- and \{P;N\}-modification is reflected, as well as notionally, in
the different word-order possibilities (cf. e.g. Anderson (1997: §2.8)). However, as a specifically performative sentence modifier, the vocative modifies only unsubordinated {P}s, (cf. again Banfield 1973; Zwicky 1974: §4.1), except as quotations. Other ‘sentence modifiers’ may occur in subordinated reports, and are placed in the appropriate positions in the reported sentence (as e.g. in *He said that frankly he was appalled*).

Basically, however, like other ‘sentence modifiers’, the vocative seeks a finiteness element as a head, as shown in (55a), associated with a syntactic structure such as (b):

(55)  a. \{P\{voc\}\{P\}\}

\[\begin{array}{c}
\text{b.} \\
\text{I read that Basil}
\end{array}\]

(55c) gives the modifier-creating redundancy for the element \{P\{voc\}\} which underlies the representation in (55a).\(^{10}\)

Notice finally in this section that (adjoined) vocatives, like ‘sentence adverbials’, as modifiers of a type of verbal, introduce a {P} that does not require

\(^{10}\) Anderson (2004c) provisionally interpreted such vocatives as a distinct kind of functor phrase rather than a predicator, with ‘voc(ative)’ as a distinct kind of semantic relation (from absolutive, ergative, locative, etc). Interpretation of ‘vocative’ as a functor subcategory is, of course, consistent with the signalling of ‘vocative’ in various inflectional languages by members of a declensional paradigm which are in commutation with ‘cases’ expressing such distinctions as {abs} vs. {erg} vs.
an unsubcategorized-for \{ \{ \text{abs} \} \}, as shown in (55b). But what is the reason for the apparent failure with the vocative \{ \text{P} \} in (53a) of the requirement that a predicator must be accompanied by an \{ \{ \text{abs} \} \} even if not subcategorized for one? Other \{ \text{P} \} \text{s require at least an absolutive argument (a free absolutive, if necessary), unless they are inserted by a modifier, as in (55b). The vocative \{ \text{P} \} is not inserted by a modifier. Why is the vocative \{ \text{P} \} exceptional? I suggest this may be accounted for if the \{ \text{P} \{ \text{voc} \} \} incorporates an \{ \{ \text{erg,abs} \} \} (intransitive agent) argument that is specified for first person. This is consistent with the \{ \text{P} \} being a covert performatative.

However, this begins to complicate further, though perhaps necessarily, the analysis of vocatives in ways that would correspondingly elaborate further the relation of the addressee to the vocative \{ \text{P} \}, but such elaborations do not contribute directly to our understanding of the grammar of names as such.

\{ \text{loc} \}, etc., or neutralizations of these (nominative, accusative etc.). The Greek vocative is paradigmatically related to the nominative and accusative forms of the name in (6.10a):

\begin{align*}
(6.10) \quad & \text{a. Onomazete Vasilis/ Ton lene Vasili} \\
& \text{he.is.called Basel/ Him they.call Basil}
\end{align*}

In this paradigm the vocative syncretizes with the accusative; but compare (for instance) filos/filo/filu/file ‘friend’, nominative/accusative/genitive/vocative—i.e. with distinctive vocative.

There are problems with the acceptance of such a semantic relation as \{ \text{voc} \}, however, and not just to do with its semantic exceptionality, its essentially different, performative character compared with the other semantic relations. But this in itself is suspicious. Roger Böhm has reminded me that, in particular, the reluctance, especially among localists, to include vocative with other manifestations of ‘case’ follows from the conclusion that ‘il semble en effet impossible de trouver une parenté de signification entre le vocatif et les cas, en grec aussi bien que qu’en toute autre langue’ given by Hjelmslev in discussing the case theory of Dionysius Thrax, to which he traces the ‘innovation choquante qui consiste à enrichir l’effectif casuel par le vocatif’ (1935: 4). The vocative is notionally incompatible with the spatial/directional elements that the localists attribute to the members of the category of case.

Reluctance by some grammarians (such as Isačenko (1962: 83)) to recognize the vocative as a ‘case’ like the others is not surprising, even laying aside these localist motivations. Unlike the (other) ‘cases’ it is not subcategorized-for: it would be either a modifier of \{ \text{P} \} (55b) or it is part of a derived predicator, a ‘sentence-word’ (54a). As Hjelmslev (1935: 22) comments on the case theory of the Roman grammarians, ‘le vocatif figure toujours comme le casus quintus, et c’est lui seul qui peut être défini par le caractère d’indépendance: quintus non regitur’. Here I have interpreted the vocative as uniformly a ‘sentence-word’; the vocative inflection is simply the marker of an entitative that has been converted into a vocative predication.

Anderson (2004c: §3.2) suggests that, despite such objections, it is nevertheless interpretable as a functor, relating a \{ \text{N} \} to a \{ \text{P} \}. The other functors are basically spatial (‘localist’); the vocative is unspecified for the localist distinctions, and is interpreted with respect to the speech act, as the addressee, rather than in terms of bearing a (spatial) relation to a subcategorizing predicator. This suggests that vocative differs from the (other) uses of functors in indeed lacking the secondary categories which enter into subcategorization. Anderson suggests that it is tempting to see the truncational expression of vocative in some languages (Floricic 2002) as an iconic manifestation of the lack of a secondary category, though clearly affective factors are (also) involved.

Vocative is, in these terms, a functor lacking a secondary category, then. It can be defined as an unspecified (for secondary category) functor that requires a finiteness category to modify, either as overt modifier or in subjunction. Anderson suggests that this enables us to retain expression of its relational character (it is a functor) but avoids serious dilution of our notion (and particularly the localist notion) of the content of functors. Its distinctiveness consists in being an unspecified functor that is attached to \{ \text{P} \}. The present suggestion is more conservative concerning the traditional scope of what counts as a ‘case’.

Towards a Grammar of Names

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8.5 Conclusion: what is a name?

The first Part of this book posed a question, ‘Why names?’ There I outlined what I saw as the interest of names for grammatical theory, and, conversely, what attention to the rather neglected grammar of names might contribute to our understanding of names, in other aspects besides the grammatical. I suggested, in particular, that a notional approach to grammar was offered a challenge by the recognized behaviour of names, given the traditional perception of names as being very distinctive in relation to semantics, so that for many they lack ‘meaning’, but, on the other hand, being merely a subclass of noun, one of several proposed by Mill (1919 [1843]), for instance. Much of the rest of the book has been concerned to demonstrate the interest of the grammar of names, and of a notionalist approach to it.

On the basis of notional and morphosyntactic evidence from several languages, I have argued that names should be assigned in a notionally based universal system of syntactic categories to a unique category, whose closest relative is the sap pronouns. Derivatively active names belong to the category vocative-\{P\}, as in (53a) above, or the category definite determinative as in (35b)’:

\[(35a)’\]
\[
\begin{array}{c}
{P}\{\text{voc}\}\\
{R}
\end{array}
\]

\[(35b)’\]
\[
\begin{array}{c}
{N_i}\{\text{sg,def}\}/\{Y\}\\
{R}\{\text{masc}\}\\
{R}\{\text{masc}\}\\
o \text{ Vasilis}
\end{array}
\]

\[(35a)’\] reminds us of the absence of this subjunction in Greek.

Pronouns and determiners are also determinatives, in the system proposed in Anderson (1977; 2003a; 2004c). Determinatives are characterized notionally as maximally referential and thus non-predicable. Names differ in having fixed reference. The members of the category of determinative function as prototypical arguments in predicational structure, either on their own (names and pronouns) or complemented by a noun (determiners); determiners, which as members of a transitive (complement-taking) functional category, may be signalled by a separate word or be absorbed in the noun complement, accord argument status to the noun, which otherwise cannot serve as an argument.
Names are inherently neither definite nor indefinite (partitive-taking) nor non-specific; and, indeed, as argued here, they are derived (definite) determinatives only. This absence of the definiteness contrast is manifest in vocative use and in naming predications. In order to complement functors, and thus constitute arguments in a predication, names must acquire definiteness. The expression of definiteness with names may be covert (lexical), acquired by virtue of (37)’, as in English, or overt, acquired ‘analytically’, as in Greek, as shown in (35)’:

\[(37)’ \quad \{N\{\text{def}\}\} \quad \{ R\} \leftrightarrow \{ R\} \]

In this chapter I have attempted to spell out the characterization of names rather more explicitly in terms of the notation adopted in this book, and its elaboration, to accommodate more precisely the behaviour of names.

Anderson (2003a; 2004c) regarded names as the simplest forms of \{N\}, ‘bare \{N\}’. Here I have suggested that names are basically the empty non-relational category, represented as \{ \}, as far as primary categorization is concerned. They are the barest category of all; and this reflects their basicness in language structure, as crudely represented in (39) (as repeated here), where they are in contrast as the basic category with the basic relation:

\[(39) \quad \{ \} \quad \text{entity vs. relation} \]

\{ R\} \quad \text{entitatives vs. relationals}

\{ N\} \quad \text{classification vs. predication}

\{ N;P\} \quad \text{nouns vs. verbs}

\{ N;P,P;N/\} \quad \text{adjectives}

In their primitive state, names constitute a stock of inactive names without fixed referent residing in the onomasticon.

Nomination confers on names, via co-reference with an individual (designated by deixis or description), a fixed reference, a name-referent association.
In order to co-refer, inactive names undergo (45b), which allows them to appear in (45a) and other metalinguistic structures:

\[(45)\] a. \[\{N_i[\text{def}]/[\text{abs}]\}\]

```
: : \{\text{abs}\} :
: \{N_i/[\text{prt}]\} :
: \{\text{prt}\} \{\text{abs}\} :
: \{N;P\} \{N_i\} :
: : : \{\}\ :
: : : : :
```

\textit{the name of Darren}

b. \[\{N_i\}\]

```
\{\}\ \Leftrightarrow \{\}\ :
```

c. \[\{\text{P}\}\]

```
\{\text{abs}\} \{P;N/[\text{erg}]\} :
\{\text{erg}\} \{P;N/[\text{abs}]\{\text{rec}\}\{\text{src}\}\} \{\text{abs}\} :
\{\text{src}\} \{\text{rec}\} \{\text{abs}\} :
\{N_k\} \{N_j\} \{N_i[\text{def}]/[\text{abs}]\} :
\{\text{abs}\} :
\{N_i/[\text{prt}]\} :
\{\text{prt}\} \{\text{abs}\} :
\{N;P\} \{N_i\} :
\{\}\ \Rightarrow \{\text{R}\} :
\{\} = \{N_j\} :
```

\textit{they gave him the name Darren}
As a result of nomination predications such as (45c), names become active, indicated by \{ R \}, fixed reference. This fixed association is the ‘something extra’ that enables names to be agents of primary identification, in the appropriate context (i.e. where the same inactive name cannot equally well be interpreted as two or more active ones). In such circumstances they are referentially specifically identifying.

Active names that have not undergone absorption by a determinative (by (37)') are not themselves determinatives. Their non-complement-taking status is incompatible with being a functional category, as is their not being manifested inflectionally. Unlike standard functional categories, too, membership of the class is open-ended. This non-determinative interpretation of active names thus avoids the anomalies mentioned in §6.2.4 as associated with an analysis of names as determinatives.

By virtue of their fixed reference, names allow primary identification, for which function other elements of primary identification depend on deixis. Basic among these are the sap elements, \( I \) and \( \text{you} \) in English, which are represented as \{ s \} and \{ v \}, respectively; ‘sap’ is a variable over these latter, representing the category to which these features belong. Their lexical specification adds minimally to that for inactive names, and their complexity is of the order of a simple active name. Other pronouns are also categorically complex, and definite or partitive. And the definite ones may also be deictic; the deixis may be simple, as in use of \( \text{he} \) accompanied by a gesture, or accompanied by location relative to the speaker (or addressee), \textit{this} vs. \textit{that} in English. Recall the representations in (19)', (32b)' and (4), from §8.1.3:

(19)’ \{Ni/{prt}\}
|   
| \{ {human}\}
| :
| :
\textit{someone}

(32)’ b. \{Ni{sg,def}/{prt}\}
|   
| \{ {fem}\}
| :
| :
\textit{she/her}
The representation for the deictic in (4) points up some of the distance between Russell’s ‘logically proper names’ *this* and *that* (see §5.2) and the conception of name being suggested here, which is based on a range of linguistic evidence.

The complexity of pronouns means that they (as well as names) do not violate the ‘transitivity’ otherwise associated with functional categories. Pronouns, as well as definite names, are also derived determinatives; and they differ from (active) names primarily in lacking fixed reference. In this respect, as observed in §8.1.3, they are ‘defective names’, denied fixed reference. They thus cannot appear in the configuration (45a).\textsuperscript{11}

The status of names (and pronouns) as derived determinative, however, accounts for their lack of attributives and other co-constituents as part of an argument—in short, their apparent equivalence to a phrase rather than a word-level category like noun. Names can be specified syntactically only by global specifiers like *only*, which typically specify phrases. Definite names are non-partitive, indeed intransitive. And they do not act as a complement to anything but a functor.

Finally here, we can now offer a more complete account of different aspects of the notation, whose different features are not arbitrarily distributed. We can decompose the representations we have been operating with into various elements. On the one hand, there are components to do with the dependency relation, specifically the arcs in the tree structures that characterize the lexicon and the syntax, but also the ‘preponderance’ relation in simple categorial representations, indicated by the semi-colon. Distinct from these are the

\textsuperscript{11} As language users, we can of course play with giving them, even the indefinites, a fixed referent, on the nonce, as in the following passage from Dickens’ *A Tale of Two Cities* (Bk.II, Chapter XVIII):

\ldots Now, I hear Somebody’s step coming to the door. Let me kiss my dear girl with an old-fashioned bachelor blessing, before Somebody comes to claim his own.

These words are spoken by an old friend of the ‘dear girl’, Lucie Manette, who is about to be married to ‘Somebody’.
substantive, ontologically based elements whose more complex combinations are articulated by the dependency relation; these include the primary features P and N and various secondary features typically associated with one or the other; these are elements of sense. Category status is indicated by the braces {}. As we have seen, some categories are lexical, in the sense that they divide the contents of the lexicon. Apart from all of these there are those elements that indicate the different kinds of referential links associated with linguistic categories; these include the subscripted elements, ‘D’, or deictic, ‘V’, or vocative, ‘S’, or speaker, ‘i’, or variable reference, and ‘R’, or fixed reference; the capitalized ones allow primary identification. These categories and relations are all independent of linearity, which is a derived property as far as morphosyntax is concerned.
Names and the lexicon

Chapter 8 was concerned with only part—though syntactically a crucial part—of the lexical regularities that names enter into. In considering only the redundancies directing the different syntactic functions, argumental, nominational, and vocative, of the most prototypical of names, the personal name, that discussion neglected two interrelated areas of lexical behaviour. In the first place, almost no account was taken of less prototypical classes of names; not only left out of account were the lexical regularities that regulate the syntactic differences shown by many of these subclasses, but also the very (notionally based) lexical categorizations that differentiate them from the prototypical. Some of these subclasses of name were illustrated in §6.3.1. Secondly, in filling out our understanding of the grammar of names, we need to pay some attention to what was illustrated in the remainder of §6.3, the kinds of inter-categorial derivational relationships that names enter into in the lexicon. This involves some attempt at characterizing name-based derivations and the (synchronic) sources of derived names. The latter take us back to non-personal names, many of which are more transparently derived forms than, say, simple personal names in English.

I had originally thought of this chapter as being able to follow the pattern of §6.3, i.e.:

6.3.1 Subclasses of name
6.3.2 Names based on names
6.3.3 Names based on common words
6.3.4 Common words based on names
6.3.5 Pronouns as bases
6.3.6 Deictic names

However, things do not turn out to be quite so clear-cut, particularly in relation to the relationship between §6.3.2 and §6.3.3. And, more importantly, observance of this division obscures the interaction in the formation of names between these two varieties of derivation, as well as rendering more diffuse than necessary any discussion of the relationships among classes of name,
including relative prototypicality and markedness, and the (extent of) presence in a name of non-name elements.

The circle of interests formed in the preceding paragraph raises, then, the question of where to begin, where to break into the circle. I shall start with a look at the internal system of subclasses of names, and allow the derivational status (simplex, name-based, common-word-based) of the subclasses to arise from the classification. Within each subclass of name, we can distinguish a system and possibly an internal structure. I am talking here of onomastic systems and structures, not the structure of non-common-word bases for names. Thus, the system of names of a particular class, say personal names, may consist of an inventory, what I have called (in Chapter 8) an onomasticon, which may consist simply of dedicated inactive names; but also in many such name systems, names are formed by combining identifiable linearly manifested components, as in the traditional Germanic system described in §4.2. Some of these latter systems involve (combinations of) dedicated inactive names; but, as indicated, others are mostly (synchronously) common-word/phrase-based, and thus descriptively transparent, though perhaps limited in choice of common-word base. This will lead us on to formulations of some of these derivations for names in terms of the apparatus provided by Chapter 2 in particular.

§9.1 will thus be concerned with the subclassification of names and how this relates to the internal complexity, and relative prototypicality, of subclasses; complexity relates in part to the derivational status of particular subclasses. And in §9.2 we shall consider the formulation of some of the major regularities governing the derivation of common words from names. I reiterate that my use of the traditional terminology of ‘derivation’ etc. in relation to lexical regularities does not presuppose synchronic directionality in the relationship between base and derived form. And the base may indeed be missing from any particular mental lexicon.

Basic to the task of formulating the lexical regularities that names enter into will be the deployment of the apparatus of lexical redundancies introduced in §2.2, particularly the inter-categorial redundancies of a type illustrated by those which absorb, and so convert, nouns, formulated in (2.32):

(2.32) a. b. c.

\[
\{\{\text{prt}\}\} \quad \{\text{N/\{prt\}}\} \quad \{\text{N\{def\}}\}
\]

\[
\{\text{N};\text{P}\} \iff \{\text{N};\text{P}\}, \iff \{\text{N};\text{P}\}, \iff \{\text{N};\text{P}\}
\]

\text{example:} \quad (36c) \quad (36b) \quad (39c)
The double-headed arrow (recall) indicates these non-directional relationships. We shall be looking firstly at redundancies of the basic form (1a), involving names based on names, where \{ R \} are active names with fixed reference; subsequently we look at forms involving (1b), names derived from common words, where \{ .... \} is any category involving a non-null combination of N and P; and lastly (1c), deriving common words from names:

(1) a. \{ R \} \rightarrow \{ R \}

b. \{ R \} \rightarrow \{ .... \}

c. \{ .... \} \rightarrow \{ R \}

These and their elaborations will occupy us in §§9.1–2, respectively. I shall not, however, formulate every redundancy relevant to the discussion, particularly if the form it should take is obvious in that particular case, or involves too many factors that are not germane.

9.1 Classes of names and their complexity

I adopt here from Allerton (1987: 67–9) the term pure names for names that are not derived from non-names: I intend the term to include both simplex names and names based (via (1a)) on other names, where the latter may involve ‘compounding’ of names. Even in relation to pure names, the morphological complexity of name-based names, compared with simplex names, is one factor that relates to the prototypicality of a name. In general we expect representational complication of some sort to accompany increasing distance from prototypicality, and we shall find that this expectation does not seem to be unfounded. But any strict correlation is obscured by the presence of factors other than prototypicality. On the one hand, not merely prototypicality but also frequency of use (itself not unrelated to prototypicality) favours ‘brevity’ of all sorts in expression. On the other hand, names, perhaps especially personal names, can have a range of other functions that compromise their fulfilment of the identificatory role of the ‘ideal name’ of Nübling (2000), just as different aspects of the identificatorily ‘ideal’ may interact to create complexity; recall §4.2.3, and see again Duke (2005) and Nübling (2005). As I have
observed (see too Anderson (2006b: §5.4.1)), this is the typical kind of situation which renders impractical any attempts at establishing linguistic categories on the basis simply of ‘criteria’. This must be borne in mind as we look at different classes of name diverging in various ways from the prototypical.

We shall thus, as indicated, be broadening out our concerns again to include non-personal names. However, as a prelude to what follows in this section, I want to look a little more carefully at the structure and system of personal names. The possible elaborateness of onomastic systems based on personal names is characteristic of them, and not of names in general. This will provide us with a jumping-off point for a consideration of the properties of other subclasses of name, whose onomastic systems are usually much simpler, and where complexity is commonly introduced by the importation of common words and phrases.

9.1.1 Systems and structures of personal names

The major system of Anglo-Saxon personal names described in §4.2.1 appears to show an onomasticon of inactive names. Given the limitations of our knowledge, the extent of the membership of the onomasticon must be uncertain; but, as we have seen, it comprises a set of often recurrent forms with etymological bases in the common vocabulary but not employed in name formation in ways that respect the etymologies. Various scholars have attempted to show, however, that their etyma belong to certain semantic and/or stylistic categories. But by the historical period it is not clear that such sense-based selection of inactive name forms is commonly operative.

These forms are drawn upon by two subsystems which respectively convert single or double inactive names into an active name: the active names are either monothematic or dithematic. And we can represent them as in (2a–b):

(2) a. \{R\}
   \[
   \begin{array}{c}
   \vdots \\
   hild \\
   \end{array}
   \]

b. \[
   \begin{array}{c}
   \{R\} \\
   \{\} \quad \{\{masc\}\} \\
   \vdots \quad \vdots \\
   god \quad wine \\
   \end{array}
   \]

c. \[
   \begin{array}{c}
   \{<\} \quad \{>\} \Leftrightarrow \{<\} \quad \{>\} \\
   \end{array}
   \]
For the sake of illustration I am assuming that while *wine* is a masculine inactive name, *hild* and *god* are not necessarily of that gender. Of particular significance here is representation (2b), which has an active-name head which is realized only via its dependents: the construction can be said to be *improperly headed*. Such a representation approximates to a simple claim of constituency; the two elements are simply combined by (the fuller expansion of) (2c) to make a dithematic name. It may be that this kind of ‘compounding’ characterizes names; normal lexical compounding is properly headed. The order of the two inactive names in (2c) is arbitrary. The extent to which there are inactive names dedicated to first or second position or to monothematic use is uncertain; and I have left this out of account here. The minimal expansion of (2c) derives (2a).

According to Lévy-Strauss (1962 [1966: 182–3]), the Seminole system of name formation (§4.2.1) makes specific reference to the common-word system, in that names are based on three-member combinations of inactive names based on words belonging to three different specific lexical fields (unlike in the Anglo-Saxon system), but these combinations are not deployed descriptively, as indicated schematically in (3):

![Diagram](image)

These selections do not involve compositional derivational relations between noun and name. I have tried to indicate this by the use between name and noun of association lines rather than dependency arcs in (3); the common words are not used descriptively. (3) is in part a specification of the contents of the Seminole onomasticon, which is parasitic upon certain sections of the general lexicon.

A separate system of name formation in Old English involves descriptive bases, nicknames in terms of Colman’s terminology adopted in §4.2.2, though, as we saw, given the historical source of traditional inactive names in common vocabulary, it is often difficult to decide in particular instances. Among nicknames, bynames may supplement a standard name or replace it, as perhaps respectively in *Leofwine Horn* and *Horn* (from (4.1)). These include patronymsics, which are name-based descriptive elements, such as *Wulfstan Deoring* and *Deoring* (cf. name *Deor*). We take up such formations in the
following section, devoted to descriptively based names. I also neglect here other, related aspects of the Anglo-Saxon system. Recall, for instance, that family relationship was sometimes indicated by choice of alliterating inactive forms. This begins to draw on encyclopaedic knowledge.

However, as in any (sub)system of name formation, nicknames may lose their descriptive base, and be interpreted as purely onomastic, particularly as family names. And, as observed in §4.2.2, these may, as such, become part of personal names or alternative personal names. As a result of this, and as we have seen, in English and many other languages, the personal name attached to a particular referent may or may not be internally complex on different occasions, and the complexity may be more or less extensive.

On different occasions I have myself been referred to as in (4b) (as well as initialized versions of these), as alternatives to the simple form in (a) (to use only English versions):

(4) a. John
   b. Anderson, John Anderson, John Mathieson Anderson

And each of (4b) has on some occasions been preceded by Master, Mr., Dr., or Professor (and no doubt other titles I may prefer not to know about). These various alternatives are thought to be more appropriate in varying circumstances, involving formality, familiarity, and other dimensions, but they can all be used to refer to an individual, in one instance me. The personal names in (4b) are not simple names, however, even the first one.

Anderson is, in my case at least, not a simple name, unlike John. It is based on a family name. Family names are non-prototypical: they are lexically specified as plural, whereas personal names are redundantly singular. And as a plural name, it does not undergo the redundancy (8.37)’ creating definite names:

(8.37)’ \{N\{def\}\}
      \{ R\} ⇔ \{ R\}

Thus, as we have seen, the plural name requires a definite article if it is to be used as an argument: so, the Andersons. That is, the lexical configuration for plural names given in (5a) blocks (8.37)’:

We can associate the structure in (5b), derived via (c), with the derived personal name. Here subscript ‘R’ corresponds to two different indices, differentiated as ‘Ri’ vs. ‘Rj’; and in this case the referent of the first is included in the (plural) referent of the second. A family name does not normally involve ‘baptisms’, but is inherited from a parent, usually the father. Such names thus provide distinctive encyclopaedic information about the person so named, information which will vary in its specificity and may indeed be lacking with some referents. In some circumstances, a language user may not know (of) other members of the family that an individual belongs to. S/he may, indeed, know nobody else with such a family name. In that case the family name as such is inactive; there is nothing corresponding to ‘Rj’ in (5) that is distinct from ‘Ri’.

The other names in (4b) are overtly complex. And they again involve improperly-headed constructions, such as in (6a):

(6) a. \{R_i\} \\
    \{\{masc\}\} \{R_j\{pl\}\} \\
    :: :: \\
    John Anderson

b. \{R_i\} \\
    \{\{masc\}\} \{R_j\{pl\}\} \Leftrightarrow \{\{masc\}\} \{R_j\{pl\}\}

(6b) forms an active name from an inactive and an active; it joins, in an improperly-headed construction, an element from the onomasticon with a lexical family name to form an active (‘compound’) personal name. Anglo-Saxon dithematic personal names unite two inactive names: cf. (2b). Of
course, (6a) implies that in some circumstances ‘Rî’ may be associated with John (or indeed Anderson) alone.

I have already suggested that the relative structural, as well as conceptual, simplicity of ‘compound names’ may constitute another characteristic of names: ‘compound names’, unlike (most) common-word compounds, are apparently headless; the two (or more) elements appear to simply juxtapose (or appear alone, depending on various extralinguistic factors). I associated this with what I have called the sequences being ‘improperly headed’. Even though John Anderson consists of a prototypical personal name and a non-prototypical (and less simple) family name, neither element is a head. Rather, assignment of ‘headhood’ to the whole sequence seems to be appropriate; it is a gestalt. And both elements can in principle appear alone as the ‘personal’ name, referring to the same individual.

Even a ‘middle’ name such as Mathieson in the sequence John Mathieson Anderson differs from the other elements only in its own optionality combined with its inability to appear alone as an active name. And there are particular exceptions to this, where an individual may be known (to some, at least) by the ‘middle’ name. More generally, in some three-element systems where the ‘middle’ name is an overt patronymic it may be used as a personal name.

In discussing John Smith, however, Vachek (1986: 694) attributes the following development to such ‘compounds’:

The originally determining item was to turn into an element functioning as determined, and vice versa. More concretely, the qualification Smith no longer identified the named person among all the Johns, but the element John was to identify him among all Smiths.

But the ‘informational’ relationship between John and Smith surely varies in response to social and discourse-based functions (including those determining ‘functional sentence perspective’), according to the context, and does not involve syntactic ‘determination’. It may in different circumstances be appropriate to identify someone as John or Smith or John Smith; this does not seem to involve ‘determination’.

Insofar as the various titles mentioned immediately after (3) depend, to varying degrees, on encyclopaedic knowledge concerning the referent, not merely gender, their use depends on the active-name status of the following item. They are apparently specifiers of personal names, though not usually in English of simple names such as (4a). A structure like that in (7) is perhaps appropriate, however the individual titles are differentiated:
Dr. Anderson illustrates another way in which name structure may be amplified, in this case by a non-name. Dr. is still synchronically related to doctor, and so is based on a common word (though this is not indicated in (7)); Mr. now seems to be a dedicated derived-name specifier—though it has a parasitic function for many speakers as a default vocative.¹

Anderson is in origin a patronymic. In onomastic (sub)systems, like the Icelandic or Russian, which involve active patronymics, we have again an element that departs from prototypicality (a patronymic refers less specifically), and that is more complex than simple personal names. A patronymic again expresses a family relationship, and, like a family name, it too can form part of a ‘compound’ name, as in María Björnsdóttir (or Pál Jóhnsson, invoked in §4.2.3). But we cannot characterize it, like a family name, as a plural personal name; it is more complex, in invoking the paternal name, Björns-dóttir, ‘Björn’s daughter’. Such a ‘compound’ name can be represented as in (6a), except that the second element would have to be shown as in (8), rather than in the redundancy given as (6b):

(8) 

¹ A similar analysis seems to be appropriate for a range of such ‘status’ forms, including honorifics used with names. Certain honorific forms are associated with the presence of particular referring entitative items, though the realization of the honorific forms may be associated with various categories in the sentence, including verbs as in Nahuatl—see Pittman (1948). These forms are what Harada (1976; §1) calls
The first element is the simple personal name, the second the patronymic; together they form the ‘compound’. The \{N;P\} is a relational (kinship) noun, daughter or son, which takes the name of the paternal parent as a locative argument (cf. Anderson (2006b: §10.3.3)). The user of the patronymic may not know the referent of the father’s name; this has accordingly been left inactive in (8). But in other circumstances it will involve a distinct ‘R’. These various elements of the patronymic are spelled out morphologically.

As we have seen, a patronymic may in some systems be combined with a family name to extend the ‘compound’ structure further into three elements. Other systems of additional names are less systematic. ‘Middle’ names in English have a variety of sources. My ‘middle’ is my mother’s unmarried family name, but obviously this is not a requirement on ‘middle’ names in English. Other systems still involve patronymics not overtly marked as such, as in the ‘bureaucratic’ Greek system mentioned in §6.2.3, or in the Arabic practice described by Knifflka (1999: 15). There a ‘full’ name consists of personal name + father’s name + family/tribal name. The latter two may be preceded by the definite article, as in Abdullah Al Ali Al Ghamdi. The third may be dropped, as in Saddam Hussein.

As we have also seen, other systems of personal names, such as many African ones, are even more description-based, rather than relying on listing in an onomasticon, an inventory of dedicated inactive names. But in them too there are limitations on the kinds of description deployed in naming. There is thus a residual, or less distinctively and fully institutionalized, onomastic system, in the sense of the set of regularities prescribing the kind of description that is acceptable as a name. And, as we also have seen, other systems still are ‘mixed’ in the kind of system they show. Indeed, there is a tendency for languages to tolerate co-existence of different subsystems, as one manifestation of the process of ongoing change that characterizes language as much as does the presence of systematic areas of equilibrium.

9.1.2 Personal vs. place names

I want here to begin to have a look at the overall shape and characterization of name classification, once more without any intention of trying to be in any way exhaustive. The classification of names is hierarchical; and the hierarchy is based on markedness, where the latter is interpreted in terms of relative ‘propositional’ honorifics, vs. ‘performative’, where the former are associated with the presence of elements in the predication that refer to persons who are ‘socially superior to the speaker’, whereas the latter, as Harada puts it, ‘do not require the presence of an S\(<\text{socially}>S\(<\text{superior to the}>S\(<\text{speaker}> in the propositional content of the sentence,’ and are associated with predicators. There are problems with this formulation of Harada’s, but pursuit of it would take us away from our main theme.
simplicity and its association with notional prototypicality. I have taken at least marked the prototypical, underived, names for individual persons that we have mainly been discussing so far in this Part of the book. It is only (with one notable exception that we shall return to) with these prototypical names that we find the kind of elaborate onomastic systems sketched out in the preceding subsection.

This prototypicality is based principally on an animacy hierarchy, and it is reflected in the typical relative simplicity of the lexical entries for such names. An inactive name that is used for persons need not be so marked in the lexicon or onomasticon: its humanity is redundant. At most, it need be attributed the sense of feminine vs. masculine; and some names in many languages are hermaphroditic. We have a situation of contrast and possible neutralization, as, for example, in (9a):

\[(9) \text{ a. } \{$fem\}$ vs. $\{$masc\}$ vs. $\{\}$\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{Millicent} \quad \text{Darren} \quad \text{Hilary}
\end{align*}
\]

b. $\{R\{\text{loc}\{\text{country}\}\}\}\}$

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Germany}
\end{align*}
\]

All place names are marked in the lexicon as a place, however, by the feature $\{\text{loc}\}$, and by features for subclasses of $\{\text{loc}\}$, which further differentiates them as types of place name, as in (9b), or by being based on a description, a common word or phrase.

I have added a subscript ‘R’ to the representation for Perth, indicating an active name. This is because place names have at best only a marginal onomasticon, in the sense used here. Perth, or Cambridge, is applied to a new referent because of the existence of a prior Perth and Cambridge. The ‘onomasticon’ of town names comprises names for which we know of an already existing referent, along with descriptions (Newport), or a combination of these (New York). Of course, awareness of the ‘parent’ referent may disappear, just as can the meaning of descriptions. Certain of the latter, too, become so pervasive (Newtown) as to be institutionalized as properly members of an onomasticon, or even as a noun in the lexicon.

In some languages, the $\{\text{loc(ative)}\}$ feature is itself spelled out. Thus, in Zoque, place names divide structurally into two large classes, with one or two items that can belong to either: the first class is marked as a place name by the
presence of one of a set of suffixes, the other lacks these, with presence being optional with a few names. All but one of these suffixes are overtly based on functor suffixes with different local-relational meanings. The functors are illustrated in (10) (from Wonderly 1946):

(10) nas- kelas, nas-kosma, tokh-anqa
    ground-above, ground-below, house-at
    (‘above the ground, below the ground, at the house’)

However, Wonderly comments (1946: 218):

When used in place-names, the relational meanings are less pronounced; the meanings of the suffixes as expressed in translation then depend on the context in which the name is used rather than on the choice of suffix. For example, in names uttered in isolation the suffix acts merely as a place-name indicator: pokyosma Copinalá, homenahsohmo Pichucalco, sakasm Sacalapa, kehisa Cascajo. These same suffixes are translated by at or in when the name occurs with a verb like ?ihtu he is, he lives: pokyosma ?ihtu he lives in Copinalá, homenahsohmo ?ihtu he lives in Pichucalco, etc.

The rest of each name is descriptive. It looks as if the suffixes have specialized as place-name markers, expressions of {loc}.

Notice too, for further illustration, that place names in the New Guinea language Telefol, while sharing various restrictions with personal names, are also compatible, along with ‘geographical nouns’, with the ‘locational indicator’ kal ‘at’ (Healey 1965: §§1.1, 3.22). And in Basque personal names do not inflect for the locative cases found with nouns and place names. The use of a locative case is illustrated in (11a) and (b), which contain the (directive) allative suffix -rat, attached respectively to a common noun and a place name (Lafitte 1962: Chapter 7):

(11) a. gainetarat ‘to(wards) the summit’
    b. Pariserat ‘to(wards) Paris’
    c. Martinen ganat ‘to(wards) Martin’
    d. San Martinerat ‘to(wards) St. Martin (town)’

In order to construct an ‘allative’ for the name in (c), the allative of a postposition is deployed (ganat), and the name is in the (possessive) genitive; the direct suffixing of the allative in (d) tells us that this is the name of a locality not a person. This is but one indication that personal names are more central to the class than even settlement names—unsurprisingly, given the anthropocentricity of language. But these examples from various languages also further demonstrate the relevance of name categoriality to the morphology; categories of name belong to the language system.
Many place names are transparently based on common words. And, even with names based on a name element, further subcategorization among place names is often marked overtly by the incorporation of a common noun, a ‘classifier’. Recall familiar forms such as those repeated from (4.3):

(4.3)  

   a. (Lake) Windermere, the (River) Thames  
   b. the Baltic (Sea), the Atlantic (Ocean), the Gobi (Desert), the Scilly Isles/the Scillies, Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, Lundy Island  
   c. the Straits of Magellan, the Bay of Biscay, the Isle of Sheppey, the Isles of Scilly, the Gulf of Bothnia

Despite such formations as -burg(h) and -town, this is perhaps least common with settlement names, though they are often based on personal and on (other kinds of) place names and on common (possibly compound) nouns to do with place (Adelaide, Aberdeen, Hillhead, etc.). This relative independence of description possibly reflects the centrality of settlements among place names.

And this seems to be associated with Van Langendock’s (1999) hierarchies, whereby decreasing prototypicality, in the form of distancing from intimacy of human involvement, correlates with structural complication (recall §4.3.1):

(4.9)  Van Langendonck’s formal classification and hierarchy

   (i) zero-forms: London, Spain  
   (ii) suffixed forms: Germany, Bulgaria, Scotland  
   (iii) with article: the Thames, the Atlantic  
   (iv) with classifier: Lake Erie, the Atlantic Ocean

Allerton likewise recognizes four morphological types among names (1987: 67–9): ‘pure proper names’ (which we have already encountered), with or without article (Aristotle, the Hague), which may be compound, and may be accompanied by a title ((Mrs) (Margaret()Thatcher)); ‘mixed’, as in (4.3); ‘common-based’ (the White House, Park Lane); ‘coded’ (initializations and acronyms). These names outside the ‘pure’ likewise tend to show a correlation between decreased notional prototypicality and increased involvement of common-word elements. Thus, even with the last category, the use of initials to refer to persons is formalizing, de-humanizing (though of course it may be played upon, and become familiar).

I have observed that place names also differ from established personal names in not warranting an onomasticon, of the kind I have envisaged here, i.e. a repository for inactive names. Place names are ‘baptized’ with the
(active) names of other places, plus or minus a ‘new’ (Perth, Australia; New York), and possibly ‘translated’, or they are based on descriptions. Compare with place names the names of pet animals, whose referents are high in animacy and human involvement. Languages may develop for pets a specialized sub-onomasticon (*Fido, Rover*), as well as expropriating names of persons, though there may also be (sometimes institutionalized) nicknames for animals (*Fluffy, Spot*). But they are close to personal names in the simplicity of their structure, so that an inactive pet name might consist of simply \{\{canine\}\}. Place names start off from this point in decreased prototypicality and thus potential for complexity of structure. I take up the derivation of non-name-based place names, particularly phrasal, in §9.1.6.

### 9.1.3 Family and ethnic names

Family names depart from prototypicality along another dimension, in their plurality; individualization is also an important property of names. Similar are the looser ‘family’ names usually labelled ‘ethnic names’. Some of these seem to be basic, though as plural names they require the definite article. So: *the Scots, the Lapps, the Finns*. Contrast again the (plural definite) generic (as well as partitive) nouns *Scots, Lapps, Finns*. These *ethnic* names differ from the family name in having a specified ‘extended family’ sense; they are more complex. I take family names to be the semantically unmarked plural name, as represented in (5a); but a representation such as (12) is appropriate for such determinative phrases containing ethnic names:

\[
(12) \quad \{N[\text{def}] / \{R\} \\
\quad \quad \quad : \quad \{R[\text{pl, ethnic}]\} \\
\quad \quad \quad : \quad : \\
\quad \quad \quad \text{the} \quad \text{Scots}
\]

Other ethnic names appear to be derived, however, rather than merely distinguished by a feature.

Consider *the English, the Italians*, for example. These bear a suffix which signals, among other things, a derived adjective. And the forms *English* and *Italian* can indeed be used as adjectives, as in *the English patient* and *the Italian job*. One interpretation of this is that the ethnic name is in these cases based on the adjective, which in turn is based on a form which does not appear as an independent lexical item but only as a base, as shown in (13a):
That *Engl-* is an ethnic form that can surface only as part of a more inclusive lexical item is indicated by the single-headed (but double-shafted) arrow in (13b); independent bases involve a double-headed arrow. The form to the left in (13b) thus undergoes neither baptism nor (8,37), and it does not bear in the lexicon the upper node associated with *Scots* in (12). The notation in (13), following Anderson (2003a), extends what a modifier can demand, lexically; there is no evidence I am aware of that would require us to apply this to the building of syntax. Lexically, however, a modifier can not only specify the category it modifies but also convert that category into a different one: this is the role of the ‘double backslash’, with the derived category specified to its right. So, I am assuming that ‘category-change’ is not a syntactic possibility, but limited to the lexicon—which is a rather traditional view (cf. e.g. Wasow (1977)).

Such a derivation for an ethnic name like *English* would involve a common-word base, the adjective derived by (13b), though the common word itself is based on an ethnic name component. Consider also, however, *the Greeks*, where there is no signalling of derivation, but *Greek* can be used as an adjective, as in *my big fat Greek wedding*. Does it involve conversion? Are indeed *the English* and *the Italians* based synchronically on the adjective? Are indeed our mental lexicons consistent in this respect? *Language* names perhaps present a similar problem, but they certainly offer, overtly, different derivational relationships. Terms for languages are names, though they can be converted (*How much Albanian does she speak?*). And again the language *Scots* is apparently simple, but *English* (and *Albanian*) is morphologically complex.
Greek usage, for instance, again presents a different pattern from what happens in English. The ethnic adjective seems to be based on the ethnic name, though the distinction ethnic name vs. generic definite plural is not drawn: *I elines* ‘(the) Greeks’ could be translated either way. The adjective is *eliniko* (in its neuter citation form), with a derivational affix *-ik*. However, the language name appears to be based on the adjective: the language is referred to as *ta elinika* (with, as with names in general, a definite article); this form corresponds to the neuter plural of the adjective. This is, however, compatible with name status: many names of settlements are also neuter plural (including ones based on the adjective from family names—as in *ta Kotsireika*, the name for the hamlet associated with the *Kotsiris* family). We are thus involved in a different pattern of derivations in such a system. We find a further diversity in the onomastic systems of different languages.

The Greek system is roughly indicated as in (14), where (14a) gives the adjective derived from an ethnic base (ignoring the possibility of an ethnic name):

\[
(14) \quad \text{a.} \quad \{P:N\} \\Rightarrow \{R\{\text{ethnic}\}\} \Rightarrow \{\{P:N\}\} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \text{:::} \quad \text{:::} \quad \text{:::} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \text{elin-} \quad \text{ik-} \\
\]

b. \[
(14) \quad \text{b.} \quad \{P:N\{pl\}\} \\
\quad \{R\{\text{ethnic}\}\} \Rightarrow \{\{P:N\}\{pl\}\} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \text{:::} \quad \text{:::} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \text{elin-} \quad \text{ik-} \quad \text{-a} \\
\]

c. \[
(14) \quad \text{c.} \quad \{R\{\text{lang}\}\} \\
\quad \{P:N\{pl\}\} \Rightarrow \{\{P:N\{pl\}\{N:pl\}\}\{P:lang\}\} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \text{:::} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \{R\{\text{ethnic}\}\} \Rightarrow \} \{\{P:N\}\{pl\}\{N:pl\}\{P:lang\}\} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \text{:::} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \text{elin-} \quad \text{ik-} \quad \text{-a} \\
\]
(14b–c) give ‘subsequent’ stages. (14b) is inflectional; it is the unmarked (non-dative/genitive) plural form of the adjective. This plural form of the adjective is taken as a base for the language name in (14c).\(^2\)

9.1.4 Corporate and generic names

Institutional names based on personal names (§6.3.2) involve loss of individualization, referring to an organization that comprises individual humans and the relationships among them. They are derived corporate names, reflected in concord, for instance, as in *Ford has/have decided . . . :*

\[
(15) \quad \{ R_i \{ \text{corp} \} \}
\]

\[
\{ R_j \}
\]

\[
: \\
Ford
\]

Other such corporate names are based on common words and phrases and abbreviations and blends, such as *Meridian, Safeway, the European Central Bank, IBM, Intourist,* etc.

Generic names represent a further departure from the prototypical along the individualization parameter, and this is reflected in an increased capacity for attributivization, as noted in §6.3.1. *Man/Woman,* as in (6.16), however, again remains human:

\[
(6.16) \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. Man/Woman is a dangerous animal} \\
\text{b. Modern Man/Woman is a dangerous animal} \\
\text{c. The most dangerous animal is Man/Woman} \\
\text{ \quad (also Man/Woman is the most dangerous animal)} \\
\text{d. The most dangerous animal is a man/woman}
\end{align*}
\]

Genericness is apparently at odds with the individualization associated with names. Their co-presence in (6.16) is associated with the complexity of generic names, which I suggest are based on nouns (6.16d). It is the presence of a noun component in the internal structure of generic names that allows for the attributivization in (b). This is shown in the representation in (16), which also shows the application of \((8.37)^{'}\) to the derived name:

\(^2\) *Elin-* also appears as an ethnic name *Elines* (‘the Greeks’)—if this doesn’t represent an ethnic noun converted from the base *Elin-*. Recall that, given that an overt article in Greek accompanies both plural names and plural generics, the distinction between *the Greeks* (name) and *Greeks* (generic noun) cannot be drawn in this way in Greek.
The default for \{R\} is \{sg\}. But \{N;P\{fem\}\}, of course, represents a class, which may be subclassified by an attributive.

Such human generic names thus have a common-word base. There are, however, some generic names that, synchronically at least, are not based on common words. These include some product names (Omo), game names (skat, tennis), and, to some extent in English, names of learned disciplines. Despite involving human involvement, all of these are hierarchically lower than personal names, both in their low animacy, and, of course, in their genericness. The same forms are converted (usually mass) nouns when they refer to individual instances: Let’s play (some) skat/tennis. Names like physics can be decomposed, and no doubt are by some speakers, into parts, say phys- and -ics, that are sense-bearing, but they do not appear as independent common words: we have a dedicated base and an affix. In that limited sense, the subject names are pure names, along with the other generics considered in this paragraph.

9.1.5 Numeral-based names

Let us look now at another, rather neglected, class of names that is not based on lexical words, but is nevertheless not basic. I have in mind the subclass of number names, in English. These in themselves are ‘abstract’, low in animacy; and it is only when the same forms are used to govern a concrete human noun, i.e. as numerals, a type of quantifier, that they can involve reference to an entity high on the animacy hierarchy; and here the animacy is associated with the accompanying noun. As names the numbers are not prototypical. I associate this with their being based on numerical quantifiers. The numerals are the concretely anchored basis for figurative extension into the abstract domain of number. Also from the numerals are derived ordinal numbers, which are attributives: the third man. Number names, just as ordinal adjectives, are derived from a class of determinative, then, not from a lexical word.

In numeral use, we have a determinative, as represented in (17a):
Numerals quantify the members of some class of entities. Our concept of number seems to be based on recognition of the recurrence of concrete entities that share some property; it is thus linked with subclassification. What we can count are the members of subclasses. Thus, the number name in (17b) is derived from the numeral, ‘abstracted’ away from it; and it is used in predications about numbers like *Three is her favourite number* or *Two and one make three*.

In the particular case in (17) we can instantiate ‘num’ as ‘3’, the particular member of the category of numeral, as in (17c). This label, moreover, specifies the locus of the numeral in the sequence of numerals. The fixed referent of the derived number name *three* is simply this locus in the abstract sequence.

Thus, on the one hand, numbers are not prototypical in various ways, and this is reflected in the complexity of their internal structure. But, on the other, they might be said to share with personal names organization into a complex ‘onomastic system’. This ‘onomastic system’, the organization of the numbers, however, is constituted by the regularities governing not just the sequence of numerals but also the formation of the ‘complex’ numerals; and these regularities are associated with the {N} in (17). Here I’m of course not thinking of
the conceptual system we formalize as arithmetic, but of the very varied
systems of numerals involved in the representation of ‘complex’ numbers in
different languages (see e.g. Hurford (1975; 1987)), which of course are never-
theless not unrelated to arithmetical considerations. The latter considerations
focus on the ultimately numeral-based system as a property of the (subclasses
of) names ‘abstracted’ from the numerals. Indeed, the system of numbers/
umerals is most fully exploited in metalinguistic discourses containing
number names. This surrogate ‘onomastic system’ is the foundation of the
study of arithmetic.

Names of numbers are almost as remote as possible, it might seem, from
the concrete individualizing of personal names. But numbers have very
specific abstract referents. It is as if, once more, personal names are at one
end of a cycle, in this case of classes of name, with at the other end the
ultimate abstract generic name. Recall for comparison the cycle of entitatives
given as (7.36) in §7.3.2:

(7.36)  Cycle of individualization

```
names                   abstract generic mass phrases
                       /              \
definite pronouns      generic mass phrases
                        |                 |
          indefinite pronouns      generic phrases
                        |                 |
definite partitive phrases   indefinite partitive phrases
```

Personal names and numbers likewise embody different interpretations of
individualization.

I have attempted in (18), the cycle of individualization for names, to
separate the two dimensions of de-particularization and de-humanization
involved, and this gives us a slightly different picture:
(18) **Cycle of individualization for names**

```
                     de-particularization              de-humanization
                                 |                               |
                   personal                         |
                                 |
                                          |
                   family                           animal
                                 |
                                          |
                   generic                         place
                                 |
                                          |
                   number                         |
```

The first dimension, represented by the progression down the lefthand side of (18), culminates in the least particular, general names, names based on numeral quantification that apply to no particulars; the second dimension, down the righthand side, ends up with those names furthest removed from the human. Personal and number names oppose concrete human to abstract fictional individuality. It is the gap marked by the plain straight line in (18) that is leapt by Gaskell’s ‘Tell him of the hard and thorny path which was trodden once by the bleeding feet of One’ (*Ruth*, Chapter 27). Descending both the dimensions increases dependence of the names involved on non-name sources; numbers are totally derivative of numerical quantifiers.

Part of the organization of the ‘onomastic system’ of numbers is the imposing of a sequence (to put it no more technically): in English, *one* < *two* < *three* etc. And combinations are deployed as the system extends: *sixty-one* < *sixty-two* < *sixty-three* etc. Some combinations involve common vocabulary to articulate the combinations: *one hundred and sixty-three*. But the overall system regularities are particular to number names.

In many languages this system allows for an indefinitely large set. So, it looks as if we’re back with one of the anomalies that attached to names as a functional category, i.e. if they were interpreted as determinatives: names are not a closed class, unlike other functional categories. In terms of the proposal made here, names do not belong to a functional category, so the extensibility
of the set is not anomalous in their case. I am regarding number names, however, as derived from numerical quantifiers, which as determinatives do belong to a functional category. So numerals seem to show the anomaly that we formerly associated with names. However, extension of the system of numerals depends on compositionality: numeral systems construct derived forms and compounds that may be elaborated to an indefinitely large extent on the basis of a small set of components.

What is perhaps more linguistically interesting about the number system is that various other classes of name are parasitic upon it, such as the calendar terms discussed in §6.3.6. The temporal dimension is structured in various ways by number-based systems. Units of time, perceptually salient (in terms of recurrence of natural phenomena) or not, are paired, sometimes overtly, with the sequence of numbers or corresponding ordinal attributives: fourteen fifty-three, May first. But sometimes the pairing is covert, as in the modern European system of months, and with many systems of days of the week: Tuesday. But compare with this the four Greek day names like I Tītī ‘Tuesday’, which is related to the adjective for ‘third’, tritos. Some of the calendar sequences are indefinitely long (years, centuries); others form short recurrent cycles (months, weeks, days of the month or of the week). Some short cycles may or may not appeal to sequencing, so that Dawn or Dusk can be located simply with respect to a natural phenomenon, regardless of its position in the diurnal cycle. And, as we saw in §6.3.4, some of these otherwise generic names can be used deictically, with their reference being identified with respect to the act of speech. Recall here (6.33a):

(6.33)   a. He arrives on Friday

And we could substitute for on Friday any of on the ninth, at dusk, at five, in May, without recourse to an overt deictic (cf. this month). Some temporal names, like today, are dedicated deictics. All of these temporal names, then, are internally complex in some way, as befits such non-prototypicals.

Like other names, such temporal terms can be converted to nouns, as in They’ll come (in) (the) April of next year, and as already illustrated by (b) and (c) in (6.31–6.32):

(6.31)   a. Easter is the most important festival here
   b. during the Easter of that year
   c. every Easter, last January, some Tuesday, that Passover

(6.32)   a. I hate Monday
   b. She arrives on a Monday
   c. I hate Mondays (in term time)
But this takes us on into §9.2, concerned with the characterization of common words based on names. Finally in this section, however, we need to confront some of the issues raised by phrasal names.

9.1.6 Names based on phrases

We have already encountered in this section different kinds of name based on common words, particularly lexical words. We can add to these the type of *the King* and *the Sun*, mentioned in previous chapters. Synchronically for many people these will be derived from the corresponding common nouns. But even if not, they are still non-prototypical in the extent of their lexical specification; they have a detailed sense. Moreover, in itself this sense identifies them uniquely, in contrast to the sense of prototypical names such as *John*.

As well as being based on common words (compound as well as simplex), names, particularly place names (in English, at least), as we have seen, can be based on phrases. In this they are like other ‘idioms’, as indeed Hockett refers to them (1958: §37.2), not inappropriately, insofar as they constitute phrasal lexical items. Phrasal names do not introduce anything new in this respect into the lexicon. Phrasal names, indeed, though they can vary in internal structure (*Glasgow University/the University of Glasgow* etc.), are less accessible to the syntax than some phrasal items, such as that in (19):

(19)  a. Mary took advantage of John
     b. John was taken advantage of
     c. Advantage was taken of John

Phrasal names are not disruptible in this way. This distinctiveness is associated with their status as names. However that may be, recognition of phrasal names does not require an exceptional lexical or syntactic apparatus. Where they differ from other ‘idioms’ is in introducing not a figurative sense but a fixed reference.

As we have seen, a name may incorporate a descriptive, ‘classifier’ noun; in this case, subcategorization is overt, and systematic (cf. again Carroll (1985) on ‘rule-scheme strategies for name generation’ (1985: 144)). Indeed, this is typically the case with many types of place name (cf. e.g. Gómez de Silva (1994: 209)), formed from a name and a descriptive noun indicating its category. In other instances, the article constitutes one of two elements in a name, as in *The Hague*.

We have noted the need, however, to distinguish between those ‘phrasal names’ that are phrasal because of the requirements of the name system and those that are phrasal because they include phrases that can be formed in the
syntax. Recall how we have had to distinguish between onomastic and lexical ‘compounds’. We might thus similarly want to talk of something like The Hague (or, for those people who persist in the usage, The Peræus) as a (syntactic) phrase that is onomastically motivated, insofar as the article is introduced in response to the idiosyncratic failure of Hague to undergo (8.37)′:

\[
\begin{align*}
(8.37)' & \quad \{N\{def\}\} \\
& \quad | \\
& \quad \{R\} \iff \{R\}
\end{align*}
\]

(as is general with names in Greek). Whereas Glasgow University can be regarded as a syntactically generable phrase converted as a whole into a name. Only the latter shall I refer to as a phrasal name.

But what then of the The in The University of Glasgow? In titles of works of art, an initial definite article seems to be part of the name: compare The Golden Bowl with A Tale of Two Cities, where the articles could be interchanged without affecting title status (if perhaps not accuracy of the title). However, in the present place-name instance, where such interchange is not feasible, let us consider first the representation for Glasgow University, for which I offer (20), with application of (8.37)′:

\[
\begin{align*}
(20) & \quad \{N_i\{def\}\} \\
& \quad | \\
& \quad \{R_i\{loc\}\} \\
& \quad | \\
& \quad \{N\{prt\}\} \\
& \quad | \\
& \quad \{\{loc\}\} \quad \{\{prt\}\} \\
& \quad | \\
& \quad \{N_j\{def\}\} \quad \{N;P\} \\
& \quad | \\
& \quad \{R_j\{loc\}\} : \\
& \quad : \\
& \quad : \\
Glasgow & University
\end{align*}
\]

That is, Glasgow is essentially a locative attributive; it is ultimately a name-based (Rj) locative which is subjoined to an attributive partitive-taking determinative; this in turn has been converted into a phrasal name (Ri) along with its partitive noun dependent; the converted name is susceptible to (8.37)′, as is assumed to have taken place in (20).
Such a derivation gives structural recognition of Carroll’s (1985) notion of ‘namehead’, where the ‘namehead’ may substitute for the name as a whole: recall names of beers (Heineken (beer)) and hotels (the Ritz (hotel)) cited in §6.3.3. In these latter cases the second element is dependent and optional. The included name in Glasgow University is the head of the phrasal name; and it too counts as a ‘namehead’: cf. I studied at Glasgow (University), as opposed to I studied in Glasgow, where the name refers to the town. Where the first element is not a name an overt article is generally necessary, and the second element is not optional: the Security *(Council). Such a derivation also goes some way towards accommodating Huddleston’s idea of ‘proper nouns’ as the heads of ‘proper names’.

If The University of Glasgow involves the same locative-partitive configuration, except that the locative-partitive combination is overt, and so the attributive is post-nominal, then we would have (21):

\[
\begin{array}{llll}
\{N_i\{\text{def}}/\{R\}\} & \vdash & \{R_j\{\text{loc}}\} \\
& \vdash & \{N_i\{\text{prt}}\} \\
& \vdash & \{\{\text{prt}}\} & \{\{\text{loc}}\} \\
& \vdash & \{N_i\{\text{def}}\} \\
& \vdash & \{R_j\{\text{loc}}\} \\
& \vdash & & \\
\end{array}
\]

The University of Glasgow

I assume that (8.37)' is blocked here by non-coincidence (in the same subjunction-chain) of \{R_i\} and \{R_j\}; the included name is not the ‘namehead’. And a definite determiner must be supplied, as with the Hague, at the lexicon-syntax interface, in order for the phrasal name to function as an argument.3

---

3 In some such complex names in English with pre-nominal attributive, an article is optional, as in:

(i) (The) Ohio State University

When (i) is itself attributivized, the article is construed with the whole phrase:

(ii) a. the/an/that Ohio State University student
    b. the/those Ohio State University students
However, with some classes of name, even the coincidence in placement of the two \( R \)s that we find in (20) does not ensure application of (8.37)', as in the examples in (4.3b), except where the ‘classifier’ cannot be dropped:

\[(4.3) \quad \text{a. (Lake) Windermere, the (River) Thames} \]
\[\text{b. the Baltic (Sea), the Atlantic (Ocean), the Gobi (Desert), the Scilly Isles/the Scillies, Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, Lundy Island} \]
\[\text{c. the Straits of Magellan, the Bay of Biscay, the Isle of Sheppey, the Isles of Scilly, the Gulf of Bothnia} \]

The names in (4.3b) are all ‘close apposition’ structures in which the two ‘R’s coincide in linear placement. So we get respectively with optionally absent and necessarily present ‘classifier’: the Gobi (Desert) but Baffin Bay. But even here there are exceptions like The Tasman Sea, with both article and ‘classifier’ obligatory. Some of the variation here may have to do with degree of familiarity of the name. The examples in (4.3c), with postposed attributive have, as expected, an overt article. All the plurals in (4.3b–c), as usual, require a the. But in forms with optional preceding ‘classifier’, as in (4.3a), there is variation. Here the ‘classifier’ seems to function as a specifier, a title: recall the structure for personal titles in (7).

Names based on phrases not containing a name vary according to subclass of name in terms of whether an article is found with them:

\[(4.4) \quad \text{a. the Black Hills, the Dead Sea} \]
\[\text{b. Long Island, Thunder Bay, Newtown} \]

We can generalize, however, that compounds like the last item in (4.4b), as with totally simplex names, lack the overt article.

The examples in (4.3) involve names as attributive in the presence of a ‘classifier’, as in (20) or (21), but, unlike with the latter, the fixed reference of the two name components in the subjunctive path that is adjoined to the

Or the article is omitted (the phrase is indefinite):

\[(iii) \quad \text{Ohio State University students} \]

Unlike this last example, the Ohio State University students cannot be construed as ‘students from the Ohio State University’, but only as ‘the students from (the) Ohio State University’. The presence of the article in all of these is not a part of the phrasal name, but is introduced in the syntax. Such examples were brought to my attention by Brian Newton (personal communication).

As we have seen, use of an article in English with names depends on both subclass (river names once didn’t but now do take an article) and exceptionality (the Hague), and may be variable (as with (the/ The) Ohio State University, where variable capitalization perhaps suggests some uncertainty as to the full status as names of such complexes). See further e.g. Jespersen (1933:§16.5); Anderson (2003).
article is identical. We can associate this with the optionality of the ‘classifier’, in the specified circumstances. (Cf. too the game of skat.) The appropriate structures are shown in (22), where the optionality is illustrated by the first two:

(22)

(a) \{N_i\{def\}/\{R\}\} \\
    : \\
    : \{R\{loc\}\} \\
    The Baltic

(b) \{N_i\{def\}/\{R\}\} \\
    : \\
    : \{R\{loc\}\} \\
    \{N_i\{prt\}\} \\
    The Baltic Sea

(c) \{N_i\{def\}\} \\
    \{R\{loc\}\} \\
    \{N\{prt\}\} \\
    \{abs\} \\
    Baffin Bay

(d) \{N_k\{def\}/\{R\}\} \\
    : \\
    : \{R\{loc\}\} \\
    \{N\{prt\}\} \\
    \{prt\} \\
    \{abs\} \\
    The Isle of Sheppey

(22c) gives the representation for where there is a non-optional ‘classifier’. Non-optionality seems to be particularly associated with phrases based on names, like Davis in Davis Bay, that are not unambiguously a place name. A very distinctive island name like Tasmania lacks both article and ‘classifier’; it is a simple place name, though morphologically complex, in origin at least. However, in (22c) itself the component name is not active for me; only the whole phrase is an active name.

The post-nominal attributives in (4.3c) include both some examples where the attributive is recognizable to many speakers as a distinct name in its own right (the Straits of Magellan) and some where this is not so. The former will have a structure like that in (21) in terms of non-identity of the name components; and we can characterize the latter as in (22d). Here, as in (22c), only the whole phrase (in my usage, at least) is an active place name; there is not a component active name (identical to the whole or not).
The representations in (22), which of course omit much detail, characterize phrases with ‘classifiers’ of names that are not specifiers (as in (4.3a)), but take the name as attributives. In (4.4), based totally on descriptive phrases, the attributive to the ‘classifier’ is not a name. This invites the representation in (23):

\[
(23) \quad \{N_i[\text{def}]\} \\
| \{R[\text{loc}]\} \\
| \{N_i[\text{prt}]\} \\
| \{P:N\} \{[\text{prt}]\} \\
| \{N_i:P\} \\
| \{N;P\} \\
Long Island
\]

For some of these, as in (4.4a), (8.37)' fails. The (English) Channel is an interesting case, in that the ‘classifier’ has established itself as a place name in its own right.

It is useful to contrast the attributives of (4.3c) with those found in nomination. Some differences are immediately apparent. As indicated in (22), the preposition in this case is not optional. Recall (8.44) and (8.45a) for comparison:

\[
(8.44) \quad \text{They gave him the name (of) Darren} \\
(8.45) \quad \text{a. } \{N_i[\text{def}]/[\text{abs}]\} \\
| \{[\text{abs}]\} \\
| \{N_i[\text{prt}]\} \\
| \{[\text{prt}]\} \{[\text{abs}]\} \\
| \{N_i:P\} \{N_i\} \\
| \{\} \\
| \{\} \\
the name of Darren
\]
Only the attributive is a name here, and it is inactive.

I have described the name in (8.45a) as being in a particular variety of ‘close apposition’ associated with nomination, and indicated by the absolutive complement the definite article, and the agreement in index between the two {N}s in the appositional substructure. These seem to be distinctive of nomination; but in general a relation with ‘close apposition’ has been claimed by various scholars to be associated in general with names, not just with nomination structures.

In Seri, the construction equivalent to those in (4.3c) or (24) contains a ‘nominalized’ form of the ‘name’ verb (Marlett (forthcoming): §6):

(24) The City of Birmingham
(25) hezitim caacoj [Londres hapáh] quij
city London called the
(‘the city called London’)

Here, in present terms, what is apposed is an attributivized nominating verb. Notice that the article belongs with ‘city’ not with ‘London’. Unsurprisingly, given the above representations, names in Seri, which require an article when they are predicational arguments, lack them here.

Other classes of names in English also occur in prepositionless ‘close appositions’ such as Jones the Baker, alongside Baker Jones. Concerning all of these appositional structures, Van Langendonck ((2005: §3)—see too (1997)) indeed cites occurrence in ‘close appositional structures’ such as those in (26) as ‘the most important syntactic criterion to define proper names’:

(26) a. the poet Burns, Fido the dog, the country of Sweden, the river Thames, the word ‘bank’
    b. Lawyer Wright, Hurricane Edna
    c. Robert Frost

(26c) consists entirely of names, and belongs to a different pattern; and we have looked at these in §9.1.3. The others fit the patterns we have been looking at. And the association of such ‘close appositions’ with names, and the kind of structure I have been suggesting here, is certainly recurrent.

Thus, Marlett (forthcoming: §6) contrasts two ‘appositive’ constructions in Seri. In the first of these, illustrated in (27a), names are ‘used in a D[eterminer]P[hrase]’ as ‘integrated appositives’, wherein ‘the name is intonationally not separate from the common noun’:
In the construction in (27b), ‘the name comes first and is followed by an appositional noun phrase set off with a slight intonational break’; it is followed by an article when it is an argument, as is general with argumental names in Seri. However, once again, there is no article with the name in (27a); it’s an active not a definite name. Compare the equative-argument name in (1.10):

(1.10) Hipíix Juan quih haa ha
      this.one Juan the EQT DEC
      (‘This is Juan’)

In accordance with the structures proposed in the preceding, what is involved here is apposition by attributivization of an active but not a definite name; it is again the construction as a whole that is definite, not the component name.

There is much variation, particularly cross-linguistically, in the syntactically generable structures that can figure as names, as there is with (other) idioms. Here I have merely illustrated the kind of conversion, or ‘idiomatization’ if you prefer, that appears to be involved in the formation of phrasal names. Much remains to be investigated here (as far as I am aware). But one thing that emerges very clearly is the mixture of name-specific and general grammatical regularities that phrase-based names are involved in. This again emphasizes the integration of names into the grammar as well as their partial grammatical distinctiveness. On both counts, names cannot be reduced to a ‘mode of reference’ or a ‘social convention’. Categoriality is basic, even for phrasal names.

Notice finally, in relation to the integration of names into the grammar, that, as Marlett (forthcoming) reminds us, in a footnote, Greenberg (1963: 71) expresses the establishment of a correlation between the position in nominal structure of apposed names and that of genitives:

Universal 23. If in apposition the proper noun usually precedes the common noun, then the language is one in which the governing noun precedes its dependent genitive. With much greater than chance frequency, if the common noun precedes the proper noun, the dependent genitive precedes its governing noun.

Both genitive and appositive name precede in Seri. Again, the correlation is unsurprising, in view of the status, in terms of what is suggested here, of both
apposed name and adnominal genitive as attributives (see Anderson 2006b: §10.3, on the latter).

9.2 Names as bases

I have divided name-based derivations into three main types, each of which will be the concern of one of the following three short subsections. The derived forms in these successive subsections are increasingly individual, idiosyncratic. Firstly, I deal with those nonce formations, conversions to noun, whereby any name can be nominalized, for various different reasons: such nonce formation is very productive. In the second place, there are lexicalized derived forms based on particular (notionally defined) subclasses of name which are associated with affixation or conversion to a common word; instances of this we have already encountered in the preceding section—such as we find in the expressions in (6.31–6.32) recalled at the end of §9.1.5. An example is (6.32b):

(6.32) b. She arrives on a Monday

Finally, there are those common words based on encyclopaedic knowledge of a particular referent, such as Wagnerian or morocco (mentioned in §6.3.4).

The processes of word formation deployed in these derivations, of variable idiosyncrasy, are in all cases, however, mundane; the processes of affixation as well as of conversion are largely shared with common words. There are of course in many languages dedicated morphological markers of proper-name status, or status as a subclass of proper name. Szczepaniak (2005) and Nübling (2005), for instance, discuss Polish surnames like Kowalska/Kowalski (fem/masc), which a suffix distinguishes from the noun kowal ‘smith’. But subclasses of other classes of words can also display such ‘markers’. Thus this shared morphological apparatus is hard to reconcile with suggestions that names somehow do not belong to language. And syntactically even inactive names may be deployed in metalinguistic constructions (like other words, such as bank in (26a)). Names are intimately integrated with the morphosyntactic and lexical system of the rest of a linguistic system. This is also difficult to reconcile with designating ‘proper names’ as simply a ‘mode of

---

4 English presents a purely ‘morphological’ preposed genitive, as in John’s book, and a prepositional postposed construction, as in a book of John’s. Some phrasal names show a similar variation, as we have seen: Glasgow University vs. the University of Glasgow.
reference'; they enable a particular ‘mode of reference’, and primary identifica-
tion, but there is more to them than that.

Names are nevertheless different, in that the derivations are based on forms
with individual reference. And they are also different, as one might expect
from this, in the richness of notionally idiosyncratic (encyclopaedia-based)
derivations based on them, though they are not unique in displaying such.
Non-compositionality is the result of similar developments in other, common
words. But firstly let us look at those name-based derivations that are both
non-idiosyncratic and nonce.

9.2.1 **Nonce formations**

Examples like those in (6.19) are often employed in arguments purporting to
show the similarity of the syntax of names and nouns.

(6.19)  a. the Bill with red hair
        b. the young Byron, the France I’m fond of

Here we apparently have personal names preceded by a definite article in
English, and with attributives of various sorts—just like (‘other’) nouns. But these ‘criteria’ are stigmata of a conversion; these are derived forms,
nouns based on names. Such a lexical analysis is also preferable to the over-
powerful transformational analysis suggested by Vendler (1967: §2.1.4) and
others.

And they are nonce forms: there is no separate lexical entry for these forms
as nouns (on the basis of such behaviour). They are created when necessary
(though the constructions associated with such formations may of course
become clichés). They are created particularly when, in context, there would
be an ambivalence in identification in use of the simple name (6.19a), a need
to recognize that there are different referents for Bill, or when the speaker
wants to discuss a unique referent non-uniquely, particularly as temporally or
otherwise disjoint (6.19b), and use of the simple name is again identificatorily
insufficient.

Both types in (6.19) involve conversion to count nouns, hence the
distributions in (28), for example:

(28)  a. all the Bills with red hair, a Bill with red hair
        b. the Frances each of us knows, a France I do not recognize.

And the outline of a representation in (29) is appropriate for (6.19a), for
instance:
The speaker knows the identity of the Bill referred to, but, for the identification to be successful, the description subordinate to the lower \{Ni\} must correspond to the addressee’s encyclopaedic information associated with the referent of Bill that is intended (‘Ri’). The name is redundantly human, and normally masculine. In (6.19b), on the other hand, the index of ‘R’ in the corresponding representation to (29) would differ from that associated with the partitive \{N\}; rather, the referent of the name includes the referent of the phrase.

The conversion to count noun in the preceding examples is motivated by recognition of multiplicity of some kind. The examples in (6.22), on the other hand, show conversion of names to a mass noun:

(6.22) a. Il y a du Duras au programme
    (‘There is some Duras on the programme’)

     b. Il y a du André au programme
    (‘There is some André on the programme’)

And here there should no identification problem, if the speaker has correctly judged the participants’ shared knowledge of referents. The mass noun is not composed of referents of the name, as in (29), but of the work of a particular referent; the derived form is more complex in these latter cases. So that something like (30) is perhaps appropriate (recall here the analysis of French partitive articles given in §8.1.2, as represented in (8.31b)): 
The structure of the noun given in (30) assumes that it is derived from a verb (which I haven’t specified otherwise here) that has in turn incorporated an agentive (ergative) argument, *Duras*. The name is again redundantly human. The motivation for conversion here seems largely to be brevity. There are also of course such formations that involve conversion to count noun, as in *a Picasso*, used to refer to a painting. But these do not introduce relevant complications.

We also find nonce formations involving affixation. I used one here myself in talking in §6.3.2 about the ‘Carrollian “namehead” ’ notion. This involves an adjective formation that is generally available to family names, and associates an adjective with a particular referent. There is already an appeal to sense, however, to family name. This particular form is a new formation as far as I was concerned, for me unlexicalized; indeed, in writing the present section I had trouble remembering the example and its location in this
book. And this is true of many such potential adjectives. But many such formations become ‘established’ lexical items. And some of these exhibit exceptional behaviour, in appealing to extra lexical or even encyclopaedic information. This begins to move us on to the following subsections, however—to which I now turn.

9.2.2 Sense-based lexicalized formations

We encountered some relevant examples in §6.3.4, including the -(i)an forms in (6.24):

(6.24) a. Italy ⇔ Italian, Macedonia ⇔ Macedonian, Morocco ⇔ Moroccan, Chicago ⇔ Chicagoan, Bristol ⇔ Bristolian

b. Elizabeth ⇔ Elizabethan, Petrarch ⇔ Petrarchan, George ⇔ Georgian

c. republic ⇔ republican, suburb ⇔ suburban, mollusc ⇔ molluscan, mammal ⇔ mammalian

(6.24a) illustrates adjectives/nouns regularly based on country and city names. Similarly, the adjectives in (b) are person-name based. As already noted, some of these, at least, also illustrate the intrusion of name-derived encyclopaedic knowledge in the interpretation of the corresponding adjective. Georgian is also different from the others in involving several Georges. There are also of course morphologically exceptional adjectives, apart from the -ian/-an alternation, where the -i- is not always motivated by the base. More extreme are Liverpudlian or Mancunian (cf. Liverpool, Manchester). And there is ‘blocking’: there is no Londonian (though there is Dundonian—cf. Dundee); we already have Londoner for the derived noun. These are all features of formations involving word classes other than names. And (6.24c) illustrates the application of this particular formation to common-word bases. Names are not isolated by eligibility for this formation.

The general adjective-deriving relationship for certain classes of noun can be formulated as in (31):

\[
\begin{align*}
\{P;N\} & \mid \{N;P\} \iff \{N;P\} \not\leftrightarrow \{P;N\} \not\leftrightarrow \{N;P\} \\
\{P;N\} & \not\leftrightarrow \{N;P\} \not\leftrightarrow \{N;P\} \\
\end{align*}
\]

An \{N;P\} is thereby related to an adjective meaning little more than ‘associated with’, and the relationship and composite meaning are signalled
by the presence of the affix: the affix is specified as seeking to modify a noun, shown (as usual) by ‘\{N;P\}’, which is converted to an adjective, as shown by ‘\{P:N\}’. This is a lexical regularity involving a modifying element that, contrary to syntactic modifiers, is associated with change of category: category changes are lexical, not syntactic.

(31) has been extended to form the adjectives based on country and town names in (6.24a), and they can be converted into nouns for inhabitants of these places. The -(i)an formation can be applied to names, nouns, and adjectives (disciplinarian, valetudinarian), to give adjectives, and nouns. It thus takes as a base any form belonging to a category that is not inherently relational.

However, in order to undergo (31), some other names are converted into nouns, as shown in the representation for Elizabethan:

(32) \[\begin{array}{ll}
{P:N} \\
\{N;P\{\text{temp}\}\} & \{N;P\}\{P:N\}
\end{array}\]

The variety of -(i)an-adjectives based directly on names is limited by their impoverished variation in sense. The name in (32) has gained more sense than it possesses, by conversion to a noun: here one with a temp(oral) component to do with the period of the reign of the Elizabeth referred to.

9.2.3 Encyclopaedia-based formations

In other cases the derived common word, affixed or converted, is based historically on encyclopaedic information associated with the name, as in (6.26) and (33) respectively:

(6.26) Wagnerian, sadism, Byronic, Macadamize/Macadamization, Falstaffian, Stygian, Balkanization, sodomy

(33) a sandwich, a virgil, a solomon

As discussed in §6.3.4, these all draw on encyclopaedic information concerning a particular person or place. They share with the other name-derived formations in this section the basis in a particular active name, which distinguishes them from all formations based on common words. But whereas
my *Carrollian* involves nothing more than this particular reference, as far as the base is concerned, and the base of *Elizabethan* is extended in sense, like the names of other rulers, by absorption in a noun to do with the period of their reign, these last formations in (6.26) and (33) depend on the base contributing some idiosyncratic encyclopaedic information in determining the sense of the derived form: how is the individual ‘associated with’ the meaning of the derivate? They thus potentially intrude into the sense of the derivative information derived from outside the linguistic system proper, from the encyclopaedic attachments of individual active names.

We can represent what is going on in their case, very crudely, as in (34a), for the -(i)an-formation, where ‘E’ stands for a piece of encyclopaedic information associated with the referent of the name:

\[
(34) \quad \text{a. } \{ \text{P:N} \} \quad \text{b. } \{ \text{P:N}'\{E'\} \}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\{ R \} & \Leftrightarrow & \{ R \} & \{\{ R\}\{\text{P:N}\}\} \\
: & : & : & : \\
E & E & -(i)an
\end{array}
\]

Given the lack of transparency of the derivation, often the connection expressed in (34a) is lost, and part of the ‘E’ element is incorporated into the sense of the originally derived form, as indicated, again very crudely, in (34b). The base of the morphologically complex form is opaque. Both these representations drastically simplify the relationships between the component parts, including the interaction between encyclopaedia and sense.

Such encyclopaedia-based formations are not limited to name bases, of course. As observed in §6.3.4, there are common-word-based formations such as *asinine, sheepish,* and *lionize,* which also seem to invoke encyclopaedic information, but in this case associated with a class not an individual. Again, this shows that names are not isolated from the rest of the linguistic system. It is just that their paucity of sense, and so limited capacity for being the base for sense-based derivation, highlights the variety of name-based forms that incorporate the encyclopaedic.
9.3 Conclusion: what are names?

The conclusion to the preceding, and penultimate, chapter summarized what I think the investigations surveyed in this book have shown us about the grammatical status of names. That chapter was concerned with prototypical names and their grammar. Such names are singular (without being count, a property of nouns); their referents are human, and some names may typically be used of a particular gender; they refer to concrete individuals. In this chapter, we have looked at the systems that such personal names belong to, both those names involving a distinct onomasticon of dedicated inactive names and those based on common words used descriptively, as well as ‘compromise’ systems where the common-word bases are not used descriptively in name formation. This was the concern of §9.1.1, which also looked at onomastic structures involving properly personal names combined with names derived from family names, and extended by titles of various sorts. These provide alternative personal names, appropriate to different settings.

As far as understanding the use of names is concerned, this brief account of systems and structures would have to be massively supplemented, to take just one instance, by description of the processes whereby the application of names, particularly when addressing the person named, is negotiated among the participants in the interchange. This can be delicate, and problems can arise, for (from Alexander McCall Smith’s *The Sunday Philosophy Club*, Chapter 22):

... our names are important to us, they express our essence. We are protective of our names and resent their mishandling: Charles may not *like* being called Chuck, and Margaret may not approve of Maggie. To Chuck or Maggie a Charles or a Margaret in the face of their discomfort is to wrong them in a particularly personal way; it is to effect a unilateral change in what they really are.

(This passage also illustrates conversion of inactive names into verbs, in ‘To Chuck or Maggie’). And consider too the use of names to subvert identification in some way, the pseudonym, the alias, the cryptonym. These areas touch on a vast territory, involving the social, personal, and magical functions of names, that is largely unexplored in these chapters. But our understanding of it cannot but benefit from insight into the grammar of names.

We must also acknowledge that the use of names is not limited to identification and other functions in relation just to persons. The grammar of names must allow for the non-prototypical, the plural name, the place name, the collective or generic name, the abstract name. The rest of §9.1 reviews something of the range of classes of names beyond personal names, and the
derivational relationships they enter into, both name-to-name and noun-to-name. It also looks at the correlations between relative prototypicality and expression.

§9.2 looks at name-based derivations. It distinguishes common-word formations, particularly conversions, utilized to distinguish on a particular occasion among alternative referents for a name or alternative manifestations of a referent, nonce formations, from words based on the sense or encyclopaedic associations of active names. These formation types are all shared with common word bases: names are integrated, despite their exotic semantic character, into the lexical relationships shown by words in general.

There are various other respects in which the study of the derivational relationships that names enter into, as bases or derivates, throws further light on the grammatical character of names and other categories, including their ontological status. The subclass of number names discussed in §9.1.5, for instance, involves derivation from a category that depends on the recognition of counting, and that depends on recognition of recurrent properties. Number names such as one, two, three, etc. are based on numerical quantifiers, a type of partitive. The establishment of the category of quantifier depends on recognition of the recurrence of properties in different entities, that is, on the presence of subclasses. In the light of this we can extend our ontological network (8.39) to include a place for subclassification and counting, as in (8.39)′:

(8.39) \{ \} / entity vs. relation

\{R\}  \{/\} entitatives vs. relationals

\{N_i\}  \{P/\} classification vs. predication

\{N;P\}  \{P;N/\} nouns vs. verbs

\{N;P,P;N/\} adjectives
Towards a Grammar of Names

(8.39)', like (8.39), is an attempt to represent, admittedly in a crude way, the ontological dependencies among the various facets of the grammatical notation. The lower properties again presuppose the higher they are linked to by an arrow. The addition to (8.39), the irregular boxed area in (8.39)', is the subclassification zone, where secondary categories such as \{N\{fem\}\} and \{P\{loc\}\} appear. The subclasses are embodied in valency as well as subclassification, as in \{P\{loc\}\}; they involve relation as well as entity. The reciprocal relation between counting and the subclassification zone is represented by the two-way arrow. The presence of partitives in the lower left area of the box depends on the recognition of subclasses. And the arrows leading to nouns, verbs, and adjectives have to pass through the subclassification zone; the primary categories are superclasses based on cross-classification.

However that may be, I suggest that the centrality of names to the linguistic system is evidenced by the range of relationships, derivational and ontological, that they bear to other categories. Names are the basic entity-category, minimally subclassified and endowed with the capacity for primary identification via onymic reference; and they are the basis for the structure and development of other categories—including, most directly, of pronouns and nouns. But their centrality is also attested to by their essential presence in the implementation of grammar in the form of referential utterances that do not
have to depend on indefinitely recursive descriptions (as emerged in our
discussion of ‘descriptivism’). Names are obviously not sufficient to make a
linguistic system, but they are necessary: name-free full linguistic communi-
cation is not an option. And, as the range of concerns we have surveyed
testifies to, having a name remains perhaps the most mysteriously and
fascinatingly human manifestation of language.
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