

The Birth of Pan-Slavism

Pan-Slavism doğrusu Pan-Russizm ve Pan-Ortodoksizm dir, İstanbul ve Türk-Boğaz'ların rusların eli altına salmağı ve öylece Rusya'ni tüm ortodoks hıristıyanların başçisi etmek isteyür ... Anti-türkizm'de onun bir parçasıdır... Stalin'de bu düşünceni ileri apardı... Putin'de bu düşünceile savaşlara girdi..

Part One

08 August 2013

[Alexander Yanov](#)

The Institute of Modern Russia continues the series of stories about Russian nationalism written by the well-known scientist Alexander Yanov. This essay, which will be published in two parts, tells the story of the birth of Pan-Slavism in Russia's foreign policy and the dangers of its revival.



Tsar Nikolas I (left); Napoleon (right)

Mission Impossible

For three decades, from 1825 to 1855, Russia's foreign policy was dictated by, paradoxically, the Decembrist revolt. More precisely by the trauma which Nicholas I, the demiurge of this policy, suffered in the days of rebellion. And because he was completely convinced that "the madness of our liberals" stemmed from the West, he saw his mission as the eradication of the revolution in its very lair – in liberal Europe.

To the Tsar, it seemed most important because he was extremely vain. The glories of his elder brother Alexander I, victor over Napoleon, made him sleepless at night. He dreamed of brilliant victories, of getting the nickname *Agamemnon of Europe*, and of receiving the title *Blessed in Russia*. However, because in his time the disturber of the European peace was not the great Corsican but the revolution, a victory over this revolution under his leadership was the only way for him to catch up with the late brother. So it all came together: the injury on Senate Square, and the tsar's vanity.

Fyodor Tyutchev formulated this mission for Nicholas very precisely: "In Europe, there are only two real forces, only two major powers - Russia and Revolution. Now they come face to face and tomorrow they might fight. There can be no agreements or transactions between the one and the other. What is life for one - is death for another. For many centuries, the political and religious future of humanity depends on the outcome of this struggle."

Looking back from the XXI century, we see clearly that Nicholas' mission was impossible. Moreover, he had to admit his defeat during his lifetime. But this was not obvious in the 1830s. Ultimately, Russia was a European superpower after its victory over Napoleon. And it seemed that nothing was impossible for its sovereign.

Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin, the second prominent ideologue of the regime, wrote about this openly: "I ask, can anyone compete with us and we will not force him to obey? Is the destiny of the world not in our hands if we want to solve it? What is impossible for the Russian Tsar? Let them invent any sort of problem for the Russian Tsar, even similar to the problems offered in fairy tales. I think it is impossible to invent any that would be too difficult for him to resolve, if only he has his supreme will to do it."

The vanity of Napoleon's superpower triumphs taught his followers nothing: neither Nicholas I, nor Napoleon III, nor Wilhelm II, neither Hitler nor Stalin, nor even George Bush junior.

To an even greater extent than Tyutchev, Pogodin expressed the general opinion of that time, the spirit of the era, if you will. Few people would disagree with him in Europe at that time and even fewer in Russia. But even Pogodin could not keep up with Tyutchev's poetic imagination. Here is his picture of Russia's future: "Only two facts can be concluded for the Western revolutionary interregnum of the last three centuries. These two facts are: 1) the final formation of the great Orthodox empire, in short, Russia's future, carried out by the absorption of Austria and the return of Constantinople, and 2) the reunification of the two churches – the east church with the west church. These two facts, to tell the truth, are one: the Orthodox emperor is in Constantinople, he is the master of Italy and Rome, and the Orthodox Pope in Rome, who is a subject of the emperor."

You can argue about what exactly was this half-mad bragging evidence towards – Russia's glory or its illness. Vladimir Solovyov had doubts. "Russia is sick," he wrote, "and it is our moral malady." As a student of Solovyov, I not only share his opinion, but call this disease the *Napoleonic complex of Russia* (another addition to our terminology.)

Napoleonic Complex

Here, in fact, we talk not about some special Russian disease but a European one (this confirms that Catherine was right and Russia remains a European nation even in illness.) And anyway, I named Russia so only because France was the most striking example and victim.

It's amazing how Napoleon, a brilliant man in many ways, did not realize the futility of his bloody redrawing of Europe. Yes, he became the overlord of the continent, but it was obvious that all this gigantic building would collapse after his death like a house of cards. And then who needs his triumphs? After all, they had to pay for this a terrible price: a whole generation of French youth was killed on the European and Russian fields. But the vanity of Napoleon's superpower triumphs taught his followers nothing, who one after the other got into line for "the first place among the world's kingdoms:" neither Nicholas I, nor Napoleon III, nor Wilhelm II, neither Hitler nor Stalin, nor even George Bush junior.

What's worse, *the Napoleonic complex* has an insidious characteristic to recrudescence. An initial triumph inevitably followed by a second phase, perhaps even more brutal - national

poignant longing for the lost superpower. This longing led Napoleon III into the place of Napoleon I, Hitler into the place of Wilhelm II, and Stalin into the place of Nicholas I.

If the original *Napoleonic complex* rests on the right of the one with power, the keyword of the second phase is revenge. In other words, with the country, which had the historical misfortune to visit the superpower's Olympus (and inevitably after that was reduced to the ranks), in fact, happens the same as with the man who lost, for example, his hand in a war. There is no hand, but the pain remains. The man, of course, is aware that this is phantom pain but it is not getting any less painful. That's why I call this a secondary, revanchist phase of *the Napoleonic complex* the phantom (another term that we will need). For three Slavophile generations, desperately pining for the lost superpower after its collapse in the ill-fated Crimean war, revenge, in fact, became the Russian idea.

Slavic twist

These terms are important because Slavophilism finds its own foreign policy, which was before a domain of the regime's ideologues exclusively, at the intersection of the two *Napoleonic complex'* phases. In their understanding, the Russian idea was based on the chosenness of the Russian people according to the Third Rome philosophy, and not on tribal solidarity. As it was said in the circle of the Ministry of Education: "It [the foreign Slavdom] should not rouse our sympathy. It is on its own, and we are on our own. We arranged our state without it, and it had no time to create anything and now it completed its historical existence."



Fyodor Tyutchev (left); Mikhail Pogodin (right)

All this was logical from the principles of Nicholas' foreign policy. Ultimately, the foreign Slavs were legitimate sovereigns of other nations, and the Tsar stood firm in the defense of their legitimacy. In this arrangement, the Slavophiles were truly useless, or as Russians say, they were "the fifth spokes in a chariot wheel." Everything changed after 1848, when Europe coped with the revolution without the Tsar (he was invited to "clean up tails" in Hungary); and his dreams of catching up with his late brother went to pieces. Nicholas urgently needed to reorient his foreign policy. His concept of Europe should be reconsidered first.

In the Nicholas era, the view that Europe was "rotten" was generally accepted. Back in the early 1840s, Stepan Shevyrov's (Michael Pogodin's co-editor in *Moskvityanin*) article made a lot of noise. It clearly hinted that Europe was already rotten. In any case, Shevyrev rebuked St. Petersburg's audience that "it does not sniff the future corpse's odor, which already smells, in the communion with the West." The reproach was heard: "This produced such an effect in the highest circles, just a miracle," wrote Pogodin to his coeditor: "Your 'Europe' is driving me crazy."

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It is hard to imagine the degree of the public's frustration, when "rotted" Europe had beaten Russia in the Crimea some decade and a half later. "Not the force hits us," Khomyackov wrote then, "We have it. And it is not courage, we do not need to look for it; we were beaten and strongly beaten by thought and by spirit." And Pogodin exclaimed in horror: "There is not one force against us, but the spirit, the mind and the will, and what a spirit, what a mind, and what a will!"

It is fair to say that the process of revising the concept of Europe had already begun in the early 1850s. Then it was recognized that although Europe was rotting, it was still strong and Russia alone could not defeat it. Russia needed allies. That's when they remembered the foreign Slavs. And oddly enough, the first who thought of them was Pogodin. "Nations hate Russia," he wrote in his unheard bold letters to the Tsar, "They see it as a major impediment to their development and progress, and become angry for its interference in their affairs. The legion of the general opinion organized against Russia." And as if that was not enough, he adds in the following letter: "Here are the results of your policy! Governments betrayed us, nations hate us; we have no allies, and traitors are at all angles. So tell me why, if your policy is good?"

No one talked to the intimidating Emperor in his timid country like this, where, in the words of Alexander Nikitenko, "People began to fear for their living day, thinking that it might be the last one with their friends and family members." And yet, as Pogodin wrote later, "The emperor was pleased to hear (my letters) not only with good will, but also with gratitude." Does this seem to be true? Paradoxically, it seems. Nicholas desperately needed a new foreign policy strategy. And Pogodin was the only person in his entourage (Slavophiles did not count for the Tsar despised them), who proposed it.

Another triad

The new strategy required a decisive rejection of the old counter-revolutionary approach. Forget about the revolution, said Pogodin, "It frightened us groundlessly." Forget about Uvarov's triad and its nebulous "national spirit." The new triad should sound clearly: Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Slavdom! Because our allies - and the only reliable and powerful ones - are Slavs. There are 10 million Slavs in Turkey and 20 million Slavs in Austria. Subtract this amount from all over Europe and you will add to our 60 million. How much will they have and how much will we have? The thought stops; it is breathtaking.

The new strategy required giving up the sacred principle of legitimacy. The shift towards the Slavs meant the dismemberment of Turkey and "absorption" of Austria, countries that had quite legitimate monarchies. But what was offered in return for all these sacrifices turned Tsar's head. It sounded really enticing. Listen to this: "Russia has to become the head of the Slavic Union. According to the philology laws, the Russian language will become the standard language for all Slavic tribes. In general affairs, Greece, Hungary, Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania should stick to this Union by their geographic position, considering the Russian emperor as the Head of the World, i.e. the Father of the Slavic tribe.... And let's see whether we then fear the Old West with its logic, diplomacy and treachery."

Of course, Pogodin's plan of a "great Orthodox empire" appears to our contemporary viewpoint as utopian as Lenin's project of the world revolution. Especially as the first step towards its implementation - a clumsy attempt to dismember Turkey - led to the European war, the collapse of Nicholas' regime and, worst of all, the expulsion of Russia from the superpowers' Olympus. But then, the first failure of Lenin's project - a campaign against Poland - did not force Bolsheviks to abandon the utopia. And even a quarter of a century after Pogodin, Slavophile Nikolai Danilevsky considered the Panslavist project realistic, giving his utopia a science-like appearance.

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The problem was that the initial phase of Russia's *Napoleonic complex* had gone into oblivion along with Nicholas, and Slavophiles were left with revenge. They stayed in these circumstances until 1917. But was it only up to 1917?

In July 2003 I was looking through responses on the article by Vladimir Bondarenko about "Russian revenge" on the site of the *Tomorrow* newspaper and I stumbled upon this gem: "The energy flows at once from one phrase RUSSIAN REVENGE [capital letters preserved, as in the original. - AY]. It's not a dream. It is in the air ... Accidentally I met an intelligent Bulgarian at the airport who lives in Germany 12 years. Just during our ten minutes of conversation the Bulgarian said with a restrained force: "Yes, we are poor and lowly, some people make fun of our inclination toward Christian truth, but I am convinced that the West is a dead society. There will be our Slavic feast of OUR ORTHODOX REVENGE. Everything is ahead of us! Everything is behind them.""

The only difference between modern cultural Bulgarian and the old man Shevyrev was in that: the last one wrote when illusions were still fresh and not checked by the reality, and the first one, wrote when the phase of the phantom came long time ago. That's where the cry for the revenge came from. The rest, a complete coincidence. And this is after so many cruel dispelled illusions...

To be continued in part two.

The Birth of Pan-Slavism

Part Two

19 August 2013

[Alexander Yanov](#)

The Institute of Modern Russian continues the series of articles by the well-know historian Alexander Yanov. [The first part of the essay on Pan-Slavism](#) told the story of the birth of this movement. The second installment is dedicated to the standoff between radical “nomenklatura” and radical youth, and explains how Russia lost its chance for the timely adoption of the first constitution.



Nomenklatura's Revanche

Liberals didn't react well to Nicholas I after his death. Ivan Sergeyevich Turgenev, for example, called his reign "a kind of plague." It was contempt, hatred even. But all that was nothing compared to the ruthless campaign of debunking that the conservative political class of Russia, the *nomenklatura*, if you will, unleashed against the memory of the late monarch. Even moderate conservative A.V. Nikitenko was among them. "The main disadvantage of this reign," he wrote, "was that it all was a mistake." Details of the anti-Nicholas campaign were recorded in the diary of Anna Fedorovna Tyutchev, who was an influential maid of honor of the new empress.

Of course, Anna Fedorovna was an exalted girl, but she really knew the situation from inside, from her place at the imperial court and in the community. No, the *nomenklatura* critics were not concerned that Nicholas hadn't bothered to liberate the peasants or to repeal the eleven censorships he introduced to them—they were blaming him instead purely for his personal policy, which, in order to satisfy his own vanity and for the sake of European glory, betrayed our brothers, the Orthodox Slavs, and turned our , who had to revive the East and the Church, into Europe's police chief.

The essence of their accusations, if you clean from them the husk of rhetoric, was simple: Nicholas, in his efforts to isolate Russia from Europe *morally*, hesitated too long to isolate it *politically*. It's as if Putin, after his death, could be accused of cutting Russia off morally from the civilized world and dipping it into the font of Orthodox fundamentalism, and then continuing to play G8 games instead of creating with the Izborsky Club his own Eurasian Group of Eight, in which Russia would dominate as the Soviet Union once did. A. G. Dugin has warned Putin that "Russia within the Russian Federation is not only an insufficient geopolitical entity, but essentially the false solution to the issue." And that its correct decision should come "from a purely imperial understanding of the historical mission of Russia, which must either be an independent, self-sufficient continent, or else deviate from its historical mission."

What other consensus could the *nomenklatura* come to in this phantom phase of its Napoleon complex? According to this consensus, Russia now had to seek restoration of the superpower status that the "loser" Czar had so foolishly squandered.

One and a half centuries ago, Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin knew nothing of such abstruse words as “self-sufficient,” but he taught Nicholas, as we remember, about “Russia’s historical destiny”—not a Eurasian destiny, but a Slavic one. Does it change the very core of it? We are talking in both cases about the same thing: the restoration of a superpower. Regardless, anyone who read the first part of this article knows which voices the *nomenklatura* listened to after Nicholas’s death. Here’s how Tyutchev summed up its ideas:

Nicholas felt that he was destined to suppress the revolution. But he was mistaken as to what resources to use for this. He tried to galvanize a body that was at a stage of decomposition—the heretical West—instead of giving freedom to a chained, but living, slave—the Slavic and Orthodox East—who kept faithfully to traditions and social system, and who was destined to bring the living a redemptive start to the world.


As a result, it was concluded that “Russia had lost its way.” And only a *revanche* could correct this fatal mistake. But what other consensus could the *nomenklatura* come to in this phantom phase of its Napoleon complex? According to this consensus, Russia now had to seek restoration of the superpower status that the “loser” Czar had so foolishly squandered.

On the Constitution

So the *nomenklatura* was distressed because of Russia’s expulsion from its superpower’s Olympus. The problem was that most of Russia’s educated society, especially young students, paid little attention to its heart-rending suffering and grandiose plans. They had their own worries. It is true that, at first, hatred of Czar Nicholas’s ancient regime rallied the country for a short historical moment. And—it’s hard to resist the comparison—it was very much like the raging anti-communism wave that rallied Russia for a moment 130 years later, in the late 1980s. A hero of that old Russia, its own Boris Yeltsin if you will, became the young, not yet the liberator, but one who rejected, along with his people, the old regime. Here, however, the comparison ends.

Then the *nomenklatura* didn’t dream of private property, but of a superpower status, and society expected not European standards of living from its hero, but a constitution. Society’s position seemed logical. Was it actually appropriate for the new Russia to remain the only autocratic monster in constitutional Europe, where dictators like Napoleon III and Bismarck opted for universal suffrage, knowing that, as Count Hayden said in his maxim:

“the only way to keep the monarchy is to limit it”? Moreover, everything that the Decembrists were whispering in secret societies thirty years prior was now being discussed by their successors in public. According to Konstantin D. Kavelin, who knew a lot about these matters, “the constitution—that is now the subject of dreams and fervent hopes. It is now the most favorite and widespread thought of society.”



Vera Figner (left); Fyodor Dostoyevsky.

This was reflected in what Interior Minister Sergei Lanskoj reported to the Czar about his conversation with one of the most influential members of the nobility: “He spoke positively of the constitution, saying that this idea is spreading in the minds of the nobility everywhere, and that if the government does not heed such a common request, it should expect very unfortunate consequences.” Any sensible person could understand the nature of the “consequences” the deputy spoke of, and the Czar certainly knew this after Dmitry

Karakozov's shot in the spring of 1866: it was the danger of the young people's radicalization.

But the 's *nomenklatura* stood against the constitution. The main spokesman of its ideas, the wimp-heir and future Alexander III, carelessly said: "The Constitution? They want the Emperor of Russia to swear to some cattle?" Yes, he thought very well of his people. (Please, I need to be excused by the reader for my irreverent review of the monarch, whom Orthodox monarchists do not tire of praising to this day. But even his closest associates did not speak much better of him. Sergey Yulievich Witte wrote about him: "below average intelligence and below average ability and lower than average secondary education.")

Meanwhile, if there was ever a time for the revival of the country, it was then, in the 1850s, when the very air in Russia was filled with expectations of a miracle.

Alexander Herzen felt it, even in London, when he wrote to the Czar that "the current government could do wonders." So, would it not have looked miraculous if the young emperor had invited for advice and consent, "public persons," as they said in the old days, and signed at the beginning of his reign what he signed at the end of it, on that fatal morning of 1881? I'm speaking of the project of the Legislative Commission, about which Alexander II said to his sons, according to ceremony witness Dmitry Milutin: "I agreed to this idea, although I cannot hide from us that we are on the path to the constitution."

If the Czar had signed this act [on adoption of constitution] a quarter-century earlier—in an atmosphere of euphoria, rather than one of fear and panic—the country could have saved the monarchy and avoided street terror and regicide. And bolshevism, too. And Stalin.

Few people recognized then that Russia had been offered a unique opportunity: If the Czar had signed this act a quarter-century earlier, in the 1850s—in an atmosphere of euphoria, rather than one of fear and panic—the country could have saved the monarchy and avoided street terror and regicide. And bolshevism, too. And Stalin. Needless to say, it is difficult to imagine now. And even more difficult to prove it in a short essay (although I worked through it pretty thoroughly in my trilogy.) I can say that the fears of minister Lansky's unnamed interlocutor were more than justified: the youth did indeed radicalize. And the more the *nomenklatura* (and the Czar who, for a long time, didn't have the guts to contradict it) clung to the right to treat its own people like cattle, the faster the youth radicalized.

Only their radicalism was not Leninist, but Decembrist. The young people did not try turning Russia around in the name of world revolution, but merely to get rid of the autocratic power. They sought not socialism, but safeguards against arbitrariness. This explains not only the sympathy of liberal society (revolutionary Vera Figner attested, “The majority of society surrounded us with sympathy”), but also the desperate lurches of the most desperate “demons” accuser: Fyodor Dostoevsky. No wonder his Peter Verkhovensky was “a con artist, not a socialist.” No wonder Dostoevsky applauded the verdict of “not guilty” in Vera Zasulich’s trial. No wonder he said before he died, “Wait for a continuation of *The Brothers Karamazov* ... My pure Alyesha will kill the Czar.”

Dostoevsky knew that these pure boys and girls started not by shooting; they began with “going to the people,” to teach and to heal. And they were appalled by what the autocracy did with people. I risk quoting here an excerpt from the memoirs of the same Vera Figner—a future member of Narodnaya Volya. The quote is long, but without it, we would have difficulty understanding Dostoevsky’s logic. Figner graduated from medical school in Switzerland and worked as a nurse in the countryside. This is what she saw:

“30-40 patients instantly filled the room. Dirty, exhausted. All have chronic illness; in adults, in every step there is rheumatism, catarrh of the stomach, chest wheezing, audible from a lot of steps, syphilis, sores, ulcers, endless—and all this is with such incredible mud houses and clothes, with food so unhealthy and lean that it stops me in stupefaction over the question: is this an animal or a human life? Often, my tears stream down in a hail of medicine and drops.”

And how did the autocracy thank that noble, self-sacrificing, educated youth? With mass prison terms. It was dull and relentless—both to the suffering of its people, and to the attempts of young people to alleviate that suffering.

And how did the autocracy thank that noble, self-sacrificing, educated youth? With mass prison terms (recall “the Trial of the 50” and “the Trial of the 193”). It was dull and relentless—both to the suffering of its people, and to the attempts of young people to alleviate that suffering. God forbid, I do not condone the acts of terror performed by this youth; I’m just trying to explain the situation that would drive “pure Alyesha” to “kill the Czar.” There is no doubt that Dostoevsky would have explained it incomparably better. But he ran out of time. I think it came to his mind, though for some reason it didn’t come to ours, that terror is, of course, terrible, but that it was also in the power of the emperor to put an end to it with just the stroke of a pen. In fact, there was not only the constitutional project of Loris-Melikov in 1881, but a similar Valuev project, commissioned by the

Emperor in 1862! This means the -Liberator understood that an end to terror depended on him. He understood, but he did not dare go against the *nomenklatura*; he dared only when he found himself at odds with it because of his love affairs.

Ideological Revolution

The *nomenklatura* was strongly dissatisfied with the rotten public mood. On the other hand, they also disliked the 's unreliability. The Revenge demanded a "strong," autocratic Russia, not a European, constitutional mush-head. Political imagination never was the *nomenklatura*'s strength. Opposing youth idealism with state idealism was the only idea it had in 1870 for reversing the liberal mood in society. It was an idea of tribal and religious unity among Slavs, an idea that demanded Russia's absolute selflessness, her willingness to make any sacrifice for the liberation of her Orthodox brethren. In other words, they replaced the Decembrist revolution, in the name of which the youth had sacrificed their lives, with an ideological revolution.



Ilya Repin. Arrest of the Propagandist (1880–89).

At the time, however, it worked. There is a remarkable document: a letter to Dostoevsky from Alexandra Korba (another future member of Narodnaya Volya), written during the patriotic hysteria of the mid-1870s. She writes: “And the discord between the Czar and the intelligentsia has ended finally. A bright celebration of reconciliation took place among the preparations for a war for the liberation of fellow Slavs.” They wanted to believe in goodness so badly. The reconciliation was temporary, though. Korba would still take part in the regicide.

The Slavophiles had no competition for the leadership role in the ideological revolution. In contrast to the *nomenklatura*, their reputation was impeccable; they were in opposition to the old regime, and they had always been whole-heartedly committed to autocracy. Moreover, this role seemed to them a way out of their own crisis. In the situation of a miniature civil war between the radical *nomenklatura* and the radical youth, the Slavophiles could not continue to sit on the fence (as they had under the old regime) and at the same time advocate for freedom and autocracy. In the words of the leader of their second generation, Ivan Aksakov, “there is no middle in the present situation—you are with the nihilists, or with the Liberals, or with the Conservatives. We have to go with the latter, no matter how sad it is.” In practice, this meant they had to lead the Pan-Slavic ideological revolution. Ivan Aksakov’s marriage to Anna Tiutcheva became a kind of symbol of the new political union.

Getting Absorbed in the Game

The general scheme of the Revenge strategy has been clear since the time of Pogodin: after a big European war, a victorious Russia would proceed to re-division Europe. And, as a head of the “Slavic union, with Russian grand dukes on the thrones of Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Dalmatia, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Moldavia, Walachia—and St. Petersburg in Constantinople,” would once again become a superpower. Nikolai Danilevsky, very detailed and accurate in his accounting, calculated how many square meters of land and how many millions of “fresh people” each of these countries added to Russia. It turned out to be very, very many. And here you have an example of Russia’s “selflessness” in the Pan-Slavic revolution. Honest Pogodin called it “the fair game.”

Political imagination never was the *nomenklatura*'s strength. Opposing youth idealism with state idealism was the only idea it had in 1870 for reversing the liberal mood in society.

But the most interesting thing is that this (or something close to it) happened again decades later. But the designers of the *revanche* did not take into account that a very different revolution would be needed the second time around, a revolution that was not the one the Petersburg boys sought. It would be a terrible, bloody revolution that would leave behind no stone of the royal *nomenklatura*, nor of the old Russia, nor, alas, of its truly great culture.

The designers of the *revanche* took too crazy and suicidal a risk, getting absorbed in their games, forgetting that behind them had been waiting for centuries another, "peasant Russia." Yes, they could suppress the revolt of the neo-Decembrists youth. But in the process of suppressing it, they would bring the country to Lenin.